



The President's Daily Brief

June 10, 1975

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

June 10, 1975

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Annex: We review the problems accompanying Angola's move toward independence.

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KOREA


The South Koreans have moved a portion of their west coast fishing control line northward

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The line has been kept well south of the disputed islands for over a year, although in previous years it has been moved north in May and June to allow the South Koreans to fish spawning grounds in the area. The western portion of the line now extends west from the tip of Paengnyong-do Island and is the northernmost extension thus far.

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The South Korean government probably will increase naval patrols in the area--a step that could lead to incidents between North and South.



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Yesterday morning at least two MIG-21s, both reconnaissance versions, overflew Paengnyong-do. The North Koreans rarely overfly any of the UN-controlled islands in the Yellow Sea.

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LAOS

The Pathet Lao are continuing to neutralize the non-communist Royal Lao Army as an effective fighting force.

Having already succeeded in driving most of the army's competent commanders into exile, the communists are now busy conducting "thought reform" seminars for non-communist officers who have not yet been purged. The tone of the presentations is strongly anti-US and strongly pro-North Vietnamese.

The communists also are planning to reorganize and streamline the Royal Lao Army. "Acting" Defense Minister Khamouane Boupha will be in overall charge of the army, and Pathet Lao officers will share authority throughout the chain of command. In addition, [redacted] the army will be reduced from its present strength of approximately 46,000 to form an integrated army with the Pathet Lao of some 30,000 men. This reduction will be accomplished by demobilizing entire non-communist units--including all former irregular forces. [redacted] the new integrated army will total 28,000 men, including 12,000 troops from the Royal Lao Army, 10,000 Pathet Lao, 4,000 pro-communist neutralists, and 2,000 non-communist neutralists.

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[redacted]


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[redacted] the Royal Lao Army has been effectively destroyed by the Pathet Lao with the willing acquiescence of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.

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[redacted] effective control of the army is now in communist hands and [redacted] "all is now lost." [redacted]

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


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NOTES

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Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide Egypt with a \$600-million emergency loan to help meet Cairo's immediate cash needs.

The Saudi loan, along with other available foreign exchange, will permit Egypt to meet an estimated \$1.7-billion current account deficit this year. President Sadat, gambling that Arab sources would make cash available to him, had avoided cutbacks in imports this year that would have increased public restiveness. The new Saudi commitment brings emergency aid pledged to Egypt by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Abu Dhabi, and Iran so far this year to about \$1 billion--one fourth of OPEC members' total aid to developing countries in 1975. Fulfillment of these commitments, combined with those made at the Rabat Arab Summit last October, will bring OPEC disbursements to Egypt in 1975 to more than \$1.5 billion.

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Socialist Party leaders have announced their intention to remain in Portugal's coalition government.

The Socialist truce with the Revolutionary Council may last no longer than the end of the week when the Socialist newspaper Republica is expected to resume publication. The Socialists reportedly have begun court action against the pro-communist workers responsible for the attempted take-over of the paper in the hope of forcing them to resign and find other jobs. The military government, however, has ruled that the workers can be transferred to other papers only if they request the change themselves.

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Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans' decision to buy the F-16 fighter has been rejected by one of the components of his three-party coalition government.

The Walloon Rally Party, a backer of the Mirage aircraft, has 13 members in parliament and the loss of their support would deprive the government of a majority. Tindemans will be in trouble if today's scheduled debate on the F-16 is followed by a no-confidence motion. Even if the government squeaks by with the aid of some opposition support, the Walloon Rally Party's withdrawal from the coalition would force the Prime Minister either to continue with a minority government or resign. Tindemans has succeeded in keeping his government together through adroit manipulation and compromise, but his talent may be sorely tested this time.

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
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Fighting in Luanda, primarily between Angola's two main nationalist groups, subsided yesterday. The Portuguese army, which had intervened somewhat more aggressively in the latest round of fighting, early today raided the armories of the two main protagonists.

Casualties in the Luanda fighting number in the hundreds, according to press reports. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, a third group which has tried to stay neutral, was for the first time caught up in the fighting between its much bigger rivals and clashed briefly with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Nevertheless, Union President Jonas Savimbi is not ready to align himself with the National Front for the Liberation of Angola against the Popular Movement. He has, instead, been instrumental in arranging a meeting next Sunday in Kenya, where he hopes to get all three groups to try to stem the continuing drift toward full-scale civil war. Meanwhile, in Cabinda, representatives of the three groups are said to have signed a formal truce.



ANGOLAN NATIONALIST GROUPS

Group	Leader	Military Strength	Major Backers	Comment
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)	Agostinho Neto	8-10,000 in Angola proper; 2-3,000 in Cabinda	USSR, Congo	Strong Marxist orientation; Neto well-known throughout third world.
National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA)	Holden Roberto	8-10,000 in Angola proper; approximately same number in training in Zaire; 2-300 in Cabinda	Zaire, China	Pro-Western; poorly defined political philosophy.
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Jonas Savimbi	3,000 in Angola proper; 3-4,000 undergoing training; 200 in Cabinda	No major backers; seeking support	Pro-Western; moderate, largely inactive and little known outside Angola during the anti-Portuguese insurgency.

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ANGOLA

Angola is likely to lurch toward independence next November plagued by intermittent clashes among contending liberation groups. If one of the two principal groups perceives that it has gained a clear military advantage, it may initiate all-out war against the other before independence is achieved.

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola are on a collision course. The two groups have repeatedly clashed during the past two months in the northern part of the country as well as in Luanda and the oil-producing exclave of Cabinda. The Popular Movement appears determined to establish military superiority over its long-time rival. Neither the Popular Movement nor the National Front has the supplies or mobility to wage a sustained military campaign throughout the country, but both appear to be preparing for that eventuality.

Last week, the Popular Movement also began attacks in Luanda on units of the smaller National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which then retaliated. Until this episode the National Union had maintained a neutral stance vis-a-vis the other groups.

The rivalry between the Popular Movement and the National Front dates back to the late 1950s. Throughout the insurgency against Portugal, which began in 1961, the two groups fought each other almost as much as they engaged Portuguese troops.

The rival groups competed for scarce financial and military support available from individual countries or through the Organization of African Unity. In the early years of the insurgency, the National Front was the dominant movement and was favored by the OAU. By the late 1960s, however, the Popular Movement was able to swing the OAU behind its cause and also was receiving steady supplies of military assistance from the Soviet Union.

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At the time of the coup in Lisbon, both groups were showing the strain of more than a decade of fighting. In addition, the Popular Movement was afflicted by bitter internal factionalism that has yet to be resolved.

Transitional Government Fosters Split

The transitional government that was installed in Luanda last January has probably done more to encourage competition than cooperation. It has a complex system of checks and balances in which members of one liberation group find themselves working, as government officials, with subordinates from the other groups. Portuguese officials are often ineffective because they are caught in the middle.

The integrated political, military, and police organizations have failed to maintain order because the individual interests of the three participating liberation groups are often in conflict.

Military Build-up

The independence agreement with Portugal allows the liberation groups to maintain individual armies. Although they are also required to contribute to an integrated national army, each group has shirked this commitment and instead has steadily built up its own military force, particularly in the northern half of the territory and in and around Luanda. The countryside is dotted with garrisons of the three groups living in uneasy coexistence.

Both the National Front and the Popular Movement draw the bulk of their tribal support from northern Angola and maintain their heaviest concentrations of troops there. Portugal still has about 24,000 troops in the territory, but the bulk of these are stationed in and around Luanda. The Portuguese forces are anxious to go home and probably would be unwilling to intervene in prolonged fighting between the two groups.

The National Front and the Popular Movement have established important bases in northern Angola that dominate major supply routes to Luanda. The National Front also has gained control of the port of Ambrizete, in northwestern Angola, partially relieving it of its dependence on Zaire as a transshipment point.

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The fighting that broke out in northern Angola on May 28 was initiated by the Popular Movement in a coordinated offensive to drive the National Front out of areas where the Movement's ethnic support predominates and to disrupt the Front's supply routes to Luanda. The offensive apparently was timed to pre-empt a suspected similar operation planned by the National Front.

Reliable estimates of the troop strengths of the respective groups are difficult to obtain. The liberation groups inflate or deflate their own reports according to political necessity.

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It would appear that at present each of the two major groups has about 8-10,000 troops in Angola, the bulk of which are in northern areas. In addition, the Popular Movement apparently has several thousand troops in Cabinda, where it has long been active. The other two groups have much smaller forces there. The Movement has demonstrated in the recent fighting that it can quickly mobilize large groups of well-armed irregulars in Luanda that give it a distinct advantage there.

In recent months, the Popular Movement has been receiving increased supplies of arms and other material from the Soviet Union. The Soviet supplies are offloaded in Congo--long an important exile base for the Popular Movement--and forwarded to Angola

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In addition to its troops in Angola, the National Front may have another 10,000 troops in Zaire being trained by [Redacted] Zairian military instructors. It is also recruiting former Portuguese army officers

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The National Front's support from Zaire, on the other hand, has fallen off because of President Mobutu's financial difficulties. Support from China and to a lesser extent Romania has not made up the

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
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difference and appears insufficient to enable Front president Holden Roberto to achieve his goal of having 10,000 trained men ready to enter Angola in the next month or so.



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The leaders of neighboring states have a major interest in seeing that civil war is avoided in Angola, but their ability to influence events there is limited. Both Zaire and Zambia rely heavily on rail and port facilities in Angola to ship their copper. Zambian President Kaunda is convinced that large-scale fighting and turmoil in Angola will hamper his efforts to promote a settlement in Rhodesia. He has been unable, however, to convince fellow African leaders to support an embargo on arms shipments to the liberation groups.

Zairian President Mobutu, whose own country suffered years of civil war, military revolts, and secessionist rebellions upon independence, is particularly sensitive to the prospect of similar turmoil in Angola. Mobutu remains adamantly opposed to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement gaining control of the government of Angola, but he can no longer provide the Front with the support it needs to attain military superiority.

The Cabinda Problem

The three liberation groups and the Portuguese regard the exclave of Cabinda, long administered as a district of Angola as an integral part of the territory despite its geographic separation. The Organization of African Unity supports this position.

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Mobutu, however, would like to see Cabinda detached from Angola and is pushing the view that the Cabindans should be allowed to decide for themselves the district's future political status. He has allowed a small Cabindan separatist group to establish a headquarters in Kinshasa and has given it modest financial and technical support.

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A rival faction of the separatist group is also based in Brazzaville. Both factions have representatives in Cabinda, where they enjoy some public support. At present, however, they do not have the strength to challenge the liberation groups for control of the exclave.

Political Problems

None of the three Angolan liberation groups has enough popular support to win a majority in the elections to a constituent assembly that are supposed to be held before the end of October. The assembly is to select a head of government to assume office upon independence.

The National Front suffers an additional political disadvantage because of Roberto's refusal to appear in Angola. Roberto fears assassination and realizes that he probably cannot attract crowds of the size that Agostinho Neto of the Popular Movement and Jonas Savimbi of the National Union have.

Roberto is finding it increasingly difficult to coordinate his group's political and military operations from Zaire and will probably have to move into Angola in the near future. He apparently intends to use the Front's military stronghold in northern Angola as his headquarters.

The liberation groups could agree to postpone national elections, which would eliminate some of the immediacy of the competition between the Movement and the Front. Only the Popular Movement, however, seems to favor such a move at the present time.

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All three liberation groups as well as the Portuguese are standing firm on the date for independence. Unless a compromise head of government is agreed upon, Angola will become independent without a strong central leader. Even with a compromise candidate, it is unlikely that the governmental structure can be refashioned in a way to make it responsive to the demands of independence.

According to a Kenyan announcement late last night, the leaders of the three liberation groups have agreed to meet in Kenya, beginning next Sunday, to discuss these issues. Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, the smallest of the three liberation groups, who has remained apart from most of the fighting, could emerge as a compromise head of state. Unless Holden Roberto and Agostinho Neto are willing to subordinate their rivalry for the sake of Angolan unity, however, any compromise arranged at such a summit is likely only to postpone the final conflict between the two principal antagonists.

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