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**Special Analysis**

**INTERNATIONAL: Non-Proliferation Treaty Conference**

*The monthlong Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference opening Tuesday in Geneva will be a major indicator of world sentiment toward, and confidence in, the nonproliferation system. The conference will significantly affect not only the administration of the treaty but also perceptions of its long-term usefulness. Debate on some issues is likely to be contentious.*

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Arms control issues in particular will be sharply debated. Many nations believe more strongly than ever that the superpowers are failing to live up to their obligation under the treaty to work toward arms reductions. This has been especially apparent in the UN Committee on Disarmament, where many countries—including NPT members Sweden, Mexico, and Australia—have repeatedly called for a comprehensive test ban. Such a ban almost certainly will be discussed at the review conference.

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The US probably will be strongly criticized on arms control issues at the conference. At the Conference on Disarmament, for example, Washington was accused of failing to live up both to its NPT obligations to reduce weapons stockpiles and to its commitment under the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty to seek to end weapons testing. Moreover, the conference committee responsible for substantive debate will be chaired by a representative from a neutral or nonaligned nation. This will further diminish the chances for balanced debate on arms control at the review conference.

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**Security Issues and Israel**

Israel's attack in 1981 on a safeguarded Iraqi reactor may cause major controversy. At issue is whether the application of IAEA safeguards can or should be taken as ironclad assurance that a facility is strictly nonmilitary. Egypt, seconded by Australia, has proposed formal steps leading to a blanket prohibition on attacks against safeguarded facilities. Passage of this proposal would be a major political victory for Iraq and other countries that apply safeguards but may still aspire to develop weapons.

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Israel, a non-NPT party which attended the conference as an observer in 1980, may seek to do so again this year. Such a bid probably would provoke a major outcry from Arab and other Third World nations and impede the proceedings.

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Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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CIA/CPAS --- NID-R5-197IX ---



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CPAS NID R5-197 IX

23 August 1985

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**Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

In the debate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and transfer of technology from the nuclear "haves" to the "have nots," the neutral and nonaligned states are likely to criticize the West. Third World discontent with the extent and level of technology sharing by the advanced nations emerged repeatedly in previous review conferences and at preparatory meetings for next week's conference. [Redacted]

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Debate on technology transfer issues will also focus on relations among Western suppliers as well as supplier-recipient concerns. Fundamentally, US interest in controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear know-how often conflicts with the desire of numerous Western nations to sell technology. [Redacted]

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**The Soviets**

The Soviets probably want the review conference to succeed but also intend to use it to move against the US on arms control. Their unilateral moratorium on weapons testing is an attempt to take the "moral high ground" on arms control, to turn neutral and nonaligned criticism toward Washington, and to put the US delegation on the defensive on the issue of a comprehensive test ban. Indeed, the moratorium announcement increases prospects for Third World criticism of the US. [Redacted]

**Prospects**

Chances are good that the conferees will in the end reaffirm the importance of the NPT. Worldwide sentiment for nonproliferation appears to be growing, and 18 additional nations have adhered to the NPT in recent years, adding weight to the arguments of nations urging nuclear restraint. [Redacted]

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An unambiguous reaffirmation would encourage more countries to join, which is a major US objective. It would also demonstrate that world sentiment against proliferation continues to grow and with it the political drawbacks of defying that sentiment. [Redacted]

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An equivocal outcome would do less for US objectives but would keep NPT credibility intact and would not send a message to potential nuclear weapons states that antiproliferation sentiment had weakened. Far less likely is a clearly negative outcome in which conferees attacked the treaty or even threatened to withdraw. [Redacted]

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