



The President's Daily Brief

September 3, 1976

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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USSR: The appointment of Nikolay Tikhonov as first deputy premier is an initial step to deal organizationally with what has been confirmed to be the serious illness of Premier Kosygin. The Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia told Ambassador Byrne on Wednesday that Kosygin, 72, had suffered a heart attack.

If Kosygin's "heart attack" was a true myocardial infarction, he has survived the most life-threatening phase of his illness. Kosygin has not been well for some time, however, and his prospects for regaining sufficient strength to resume a vigorous schedule are not good. His convalescence from a heart attack would in any event probably extend into at least another month.

Tikhonov becomes the second "first" deputy premier, along with Kirill Mazurov, who has held the post since 1965. Tikhonov, 71, is General Secretary Brezhnev's protege and is one of many officials with career ties to Brezhnev's region in the Ukraine. He made his early career in metallurgy and continued to be responsible for that field and the coal industry as deputy premier.

The leadership may have promoted Tikhonov to help take on the workload that Kosygin, at least temporarily, must be spared. Brezhnev undoubtedly welcomed the opportunity to place an ally that high in the government as a counterweight to the more independent Mazurov. Tikhonov could also be elected to the Politburo, since Mazurov is a member, as was former first deputy premier Polyansky.

The leadership has behaved routinely in recent weeks and has given no sign that Kosygin's illness, which probably struck in early August, raised the question of replacing him.

If Kosygin should retire or die, his succession appears to be an open question. Mazurov has the clearest claim to the job. Brezhnev may have wanted to ensure that his man, Tikhonov served as first deputy in such an eventuality.

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
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Mazurov, 62, is in indifferent health, however, and was absent from public view all summer. His promotion would break the hold on the top leadership posts of the still older generation of Soviet leaders.

Tikhonov could conceivably replace Kosygin, but probably only after serving a period on the Politburo, and his close association with Brezhnev would probably offend Kosygin and other members of the collective. With his age making him a member of the elder generation, he could not be expected to be a long-term premier.

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

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
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
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


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
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
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LEBANON: The apparent refusal of Lebanese president-elect Sarkis and President Asad to comment on the results of their private meeting Tuesday has prompted speculation in Beirut that the two leaders had major disagreements. Palestinian sources are saying that Sarkis failed to reach an understanding with Asad on the issue of Syrian troops in Lebanon.



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


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The Palestinians' failure to undertake any new negotiating initiatives with the Syrians probably has also been a major factor in Asad's thinking. 50X1



The military situation remains relatively calm.

Lebanese leftist sources charged yesterday that Israeli troops and armored units had crossed the border in large numbers. We have no information of this, and the Israelis so far probably have provided Christian troops in the south only limited support.

Israeli units have for some time conducted patrols along well-known Palestinian access routes on both sides of the border. The Israelis also have occupied observation posts during daylight hours in southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist intimidation of Lebanese villagers in the area and renewed cross-border terrorist raids. This patrolling probably has been stepped up in recent days. Earlier this week, Israeli artillery units also are said to have shelled suspected Palestinian positions located near the border.

Israeli Foreign Minister Allon reiterated on Tuesday that his government would not tolerate a resumption of Palestinian terrorist attacks against northern Israel from bases in southern Lebanon. Allon's statement comes on the heels of clashes between Christian

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
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and Palestinian forces in the southern Lebanese village of Ayn Ibil where residents evidently have requested Israeli military protection.

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EGYPT-ISRAEL: *Israeli Defense Minister Peres told press sources Wednesday that the Egyptians have withdrawn three battalions of troops from the east bank of the Suez Canal over the past several days. Peres went on to say that Egypt now has eight battalions remaining in the limited armaments zone, the maximum number allowed under the terms of the Sinai II agreement.*




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If the units have in fact withdrawn, this would be the first appreciable change in the strength of Egyptian infantry in the limited armaments zone since May 31.

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TANZANIA: *President Nyerere is fearful that the factionalism among Rhodesian black nationalists may preclude bringing them to the bargaining table.*



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
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
GUINEA: Guinean officials recently confirmed to Ambassador Harrop their government's decision to halt Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance deployments from Guinea beginning this month.

Two spokesmen for President Toure, in separate meetings with the ambassador, also noted Guinea's earlier request for a "US security guarantee" to help protect the regime against the alleged threat posed by Guinean exiles. They implied that the continuation of the ban on Soviet reconnaissance deployments may well depend on a favorable US response to this request.

According to one of the spokesmen, Soviet representatives in Conakry have been told that no flights would be authorized after Wednesday because they were being used for surveillance in the Atlantic rather than along Guinea's coastline as was originally agreed to protect against the threat of invasion by exiles.

The spokesman asserted that Guinea had granted Soviet requests for reconnaissance deployments on a month-to-month basis. He implied that the Soviets might propose a deployment for October.

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The last TU-95 deployment to Guinea--the 16th since the operations began in mid-1973--ended on July 22, when the two aircraft involved returned to the USSR.

We have no evidence that another flight to Guinea is planned in the near future, but this is not unusual. Following the deployment of TU-95s in July last year, the Soviets waited until October 10 before they sent another flight.

The loss of air facilities at Conakry would make it very difficult for the Soviets to conduct open-ocean reconnaissance in the Atlantic south of the equator.

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CUBA-ANGOLA: We present here the key points of an Inter-agency Intelligence Memorandum, "Angola: Cuban Intentions and Changes in Cuban Personnel Strength."

Cuba almost certainly will keep a large number of military and civilian personnel--probably on the order of 10,000--in the Angolan area for at least the next several years. For both military and economic reasons, Angola will need foreign personnel on this scale, and Havana has clearly indicated that it will do all it can to meet this need.

Although our information is incomplete and imprecise, we estimate the number of Cuban personnel presently in the Angolan area (including neighboring Congo) to be over 10,000 and it may be as high as 14,500. The net reduction since March 15, 1976 of Cubans in the Angolan area has probably been on the order of 2,500 to 5,000.

Some 1,000 to 2,000 of the Cubans who had been in Angola earlier this year have apparently moved to Congo in recent months. Since one of their tasks is to help assure Angolan control over Cabinda, they should be considered part of the Cuban force in the Angolan area.

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In addition to regarding their interests in Angola as long range, the Cubans appear to see Angola as a base from which to increase their influence elsewhere in southern Africa. Castro would probably respond favorably to a request for additional assistance to Mozambique should the latter's position in the conflict with Rhodesia deteriorate further.

Cuba will of necessity be constrained by its own relative lack of resources beyond those which it must expend in Angola to preserve its investment there. Its actions will also be heavily influenced by the willingness--or lack of willingness--of the Soviet Union to support Havana.

Finally, Cuba's policies will be affected in varying degrees by such factors as the sentiment of black African leaders, concern over its relations with Western Europe, Japan and Latin American states, and internal developments in Cuba.

Nevertheless, given Fidel Castro's urge to play a major role on the world stage, he will not easily be dissuaded from further involvement in Africa.

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NOTES

North Korea has responded with unusual swiftness and moderation to inquiries from the South regarding the fate of the South Korean fishing boat that strayed into Northern waters earlier this week.

North Korea's statement on the boat incident indicated that it is prepared to cooperate in arranging an early release provided South Korea confirms the identity of the boat and crew. This suggests North Korea wishes to avoid any steps that might complicate the negotiations on its proposal for new security arrangements in the Panmunjom Joint Security Area.

Since the Panmunjom incident on August 18, North Korea has attempted to portray itself as the responsible party advancing constructive proposals for easing tensions provoked by the US and South Korea.

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UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim will accept another five-year term if there is support for his re-election when his current term expires at the end of this year.

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The Mexicans apparently are still pushing President Echeverria's candidacy for the UN job.

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Mexican strategy for securing Echeverria's election seems to be based in part on a claim that China would veto Waldheim. China, however, has not made its position known;

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Open support for Echeverria from the third world states has been noticeably lacking.

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