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Sunrise to offset Schuster's publication. This particularly necessary for historical developments in German armistice.

(5) Colonel George Smith, G-2, informed verbally our action with details as to Vatican/SIM implications. However his presence in case purely tacit though on his departure gave details to Hartman.

(6) Recently, before local administrative elections returned to office learning Italian police arrested D (Dollmann referred to hereafter as D.) D issued phoney document by US under Italian name corresponding to name identity card issued him by SIM. Our document signed with false name of Major O'Brien. Office had already attempted to retrieve him from low police echelon but made unfortunate mistake of sending Italian driver to do so. Faced with possibility that whole Vatican/SIM scandal would break, buffing up Communist attack on church and center during elections, immediately saw Chief of Police, Ferrari. During interview stressed false identity card issued by Italian authority, that both Ferrari's political party and Vatican would severely suffer if Communists managed to break him, that he could keep body since our action purely passive. As result Ferrari produced body.

(7) Flaw in arrangements caused by new Rome questor Polito who had ignored allied document and had previously informed press. Polito deliberately lied before Ferrari stating that press had not been informed and that body was only Cassani. Therefore choice of regaining body immediately taken since in escaped PW cases Italians have no jurisdiction. At no time did D confess his true identity but stuck to name given by SIM.

(8) Local press, with emphasis from Left, began to attack. Colonel Hartman, informed of case from Colonel George Smith, arrived for consultation. In agreement Rome G-2, was generally decided to stand pat that Cassani was I.S. suspect following juridical practice any enemy agent is within allied jurisdiction. This followed by transmittal to Hartman of memo on case for General Lee.

(9) In middle of this, Polito, who denied Cassani was D on own initiative (in statement which I refused to sign) informed press of true identity adding that Allies had taken body. In view impending Fosse Ardantina trial which was vital issue in case, telephoned Hartman that original request to Lee that we ship D out of country be predicated on result trial which should (and so far has) establish his innocence. Hartman replied Lee approved our memo (which justified action on basis that D and Wenner were Operation Sunrise obligations which must be liquidated while we still maintained the power to do so) and that we were to stand pat.

(10) Case went to British General Airey who stated he personally participated in surrender negotiations and that D had nothing to do with negotiations. Result of British attitude was that AFHQ made press release that D was in Allied hands and that he had nothing to do with Sunrise. This was made without information to us.

(11) Have passed to Ambrignani for General Lee complete D story together with the British CSBIC interrogation of D which clearly indicates whether

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authorized or not D was made promises by both Hussmann and Parilli and that he clearly participated in the secret I.S. phase of negotiations. The latter part of this Airey convinced Lee was false. It was made precisely because of these promises made by Parilli and Hussmann during the negotiations that both contacted D and W during their incarceration by STM in Milan.

(12) On orders from Hartman, D now lodged in an WP jail. In today's papers there is an account of the first day of the Fosse Ardentina cave trial in which D's mortal enemy, Kappler, answered direct question on D's participation stating directly D had nothing to do with the Fosse Ardentina.

(13) Colonel Hartman from the first day of our regaining body from police stated he would take case in hand and cover for us at Caserta. This was unfortunate but logical step. However, case once in his hands served as estoppel whereby I was not only stopped fighting own battle but did not learn of events until late last night.

(14) Since Hartman unwittingly victim of his own gold intentions on our behalf, and because future disposition D and W now under discussion, urgently request your examination of British CSDIC interrogation of D as well as other aspects of Operation Sunrise during preliminary negotiations, to see whether our omission is correct.

(15) Have been informed privately by Abrignani and Hartman that if War Department would send urgently cable to General Lee stating in effect that D and W participated in negotiations during their I.S. phase and were made promises of rehabilitation by American O.S.S. agents Hussman and Parilli, he will consider whole matter most favorable. This act would reestablish our position and resolve present conflict. Feel strongly that no other interpretation can be placed on the D interrogation which was scientifically conducted by British and which refutes the primary issue made by Airey when he convinced Lee D had nothing to do with the negotiations. Such statements confirmed by Parilli. WD cable would not embarrass Airey or Lee if it merely spelled out that secret side of American negotiations conducted did involve D, W participation.

(16) Regret to cable this so late, but movement of events prevented presentation of any issued until last night.

(17) For benefit Abrignani and Hartman may I have indicative reaction soonest.

(18) Acting in good faith but somewhat inexperiencedly, Hartman showed British top secret control document written by me for Hartman to be shown Gen. Lee. Now appears British know we have Werner as well as D. Hartman's handling of case most unfortunate but desire no further action be taken on his handling since primary mistake was to follow his instructions that we drop out of the picture and that he be given whole case since had been

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priorly briefed by Colonel George Smith, and that he could reveal it without British knowing our participation. Last night whole case thrown back on me following long delay.

(19) Publicity has revealed nothing on this unit or members to Italian. British, however, now knows now hold Wenner.

(20) Following Abrignani's talk with Lee, have just learned he will back us if official statement forthcoming, particularly so because he is taking over from Morgan who is supposed to have left Italy.

2. The following background is pertinent to this cable and to the present status of D and W:

(a) PARRILLI - Parrilli is Baron Luigi Parrilli, an important Italian industrialist with former Fascist connections, who initiated the surrender negotiations with OSS representatives in Switzerland. He was the prominent figure throughout the negotiations in establishing and maintaining contact between General Wolff and OSS.

(b) DOLLMANN - Dollmann is Eugenio Dollmann, formerly a SS Standartenfuhrer and former aide of General Wolff. He, according to a CISEVIC interrogation report dated 20 August 1946, after conversations with General Pohl and General Wolff, opened negotiations for an armistice in December 1944 when he started conversations with Baron Parrilli, above referred to. Dollmann first discussed negotiations with General Pohl in July 1944 and agreed with General Pohl that he would discuss the matter with General Wolff, which discussion took place in December 1944.

The above is from Dollmann's own statement in his interrogation. The report of Mr. Dulles, who handled the negotiations with General Wolff and his aides, indicates that after the initial contact by Baron Parrilli, Dollmann appeared, representing General Wolff, to initiate surrender talks. At that time he was given the names of two prominent prisoners whom the Germans were holding and whom we desired to be released as evidence of good faith. This was done. Dollmann also went to Switzerland with Wolff on more than one occasion in connection with the surrender talks. Wolff, in his statement of the surrender negotiations which appears in Mr. Dulles' report, states how Dollmann carried out on 23 April 1945 a mission from Wolff to Kesselring to explain the broad outlines of the surrender negotiations. Dollmann was sent due to the fact that "I had sent his and my old confidants SS Standartenfuhrer Dollmann and Staff Doctor Nieson...". It thus appears that Dollmann did actively participate in the surrender negotiations at no small risk to himself.

(c) WENNER - Wenner is Eugene Wenner, formerly a SS Sturmbannfuhrer. He, too, according to Mr. Dulles' report, was an aide of General Wolff and accompanied Wolff on some of his trips to Switzerland in connection with the surrender negotiations. Wenner was the German officer authorized by General Wolff to represent him in the final surrender negotiations which started at Caserta on 28 April 1945 and ended with the signing of the surrender on 29 April 1945,

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Wenner signing for Wolff. It thus appears that Wenner did participate in the surrender negotiations at no small risk to himself.

(d) We have no information that Mr. Dulles made any promises or commitments to Dollmann or Wenner, nor do we have any information as to whether Hussmann and Parilli made any such commitments. Hussmann was connected with Mr. Dulles in some of the connections in Switzerland. Parilli, of course, would have no authority to have made any commitments binding upon the Allies. Whether or not binding commitments were made to Dollmann and Wenner, it seems that we owe some consideration to these men.

3. Actually, Mr. Dulles made no commitments to Dollmann or Wenner, nor did he authorize any other person to make such commitments. The position of CIG with reference to Dollmann and Wenner is as follows: While these men received no commitments as to their future treatment, their services in connection with the Sunrise Operation cannot be overlooked. For the future of American intelligence it is essential that these men be given some consideration at least to the extent of keeping them from mistreatment at the hands of others. The failure to take some action regarding these men would be a difficult blow for American intelligence to overcome if we ever were in a position of wanting to pull a similar operation in the future. With this as a premise negotiations were carried on in Washington and the field with The State and War Departments involving cables from the Director to General Lee personally, finally resulting in their transfer to Germany.
4. It is believed that the above will give you sufficient background of this case for handling [] 373. We are particularly anxious that they be advised that American intelligence was solely responsible for getting them out of the situation they were in in Italy. By inference they should be made to understand that, while no commitments were ever made by us to them, we do maintain a continuing interest in them as evidenced by our action when they were involved in the difficulties in Italy.

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