

OK, 11/21/54
DOSTI

22 November 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT: Recent Developments Concerning Hasan DOSTI Contacts
with an Alleged Yugoslav Official

PARTICIPANTS: [] [] [] and [] [] of SE and [] [] []
of Staff C

1. On 20 November a meeting of one hour's duration was held in the office of the Chief, SE, with the above mentioned persons participating. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss recent developments involving Hasan DOSTI and the information obtained by him through contacts with an alleged Yugoslav official (the subject of another memorandum by [] [] and to obtain Staff C advice in the matter of evolving a course of action directed toward bringing the information acquired from DOSTI to the attention of the FBI. It will be recalled that CIA initially informed the FBI of DOSTI's contact with an alleged Yugoslav official in New York City and that the FBI assumed responsibility for monitoring the operation. The recent developments, however, mentioned above were brought to the attention of [] [] by DOSTI, but not to the FBI.

2. [] [] opened the meeting and covered the following: a) briefly reviewed the DOSTI-Yugoslav contact to date, b) stated that SE discharged its duty by informing the FBI, through Staff C and Security, of the initial DOSTI-Yugoslav official contact and passed information learned from DOSTI of subsequent meetings, c) pointed out that CIA is in the dark re the DOSTI-Yugoslav official meetings being monitored by the FBI since the FBI has not informed CIA of the identity of the Yugoslav official in question. Commented that it could even be an Italian provocation as far as

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CIA is concerned, d) reviewed the unique position of CIA at this moment, i.e., being in possession of hot information obtained from DOSTI while the FBI remained uninformed, e) commented that since the information was developed in an FBI operation, the third agency rule applied and CIA should not disseminate the information, f) in view of the delicate situation, CIA should staff out the problem before acting, and g) agreed that the information should be passed as soon as practicable to the FBI. [] requested [] views.

3. [] said that he thought about this matter the night before inasmuch as [] had already briefed him on the situation. (NOTE: DOSTI reported to [] on the afternoon of 19 November, and [] discussed the DOSTI problem with [] at about 1700 hours on the same day. [] felt that the information item should be FD'd to the FBI. C/SE and SE/CPI, however, were not satisfied and believed the matter should be carefully staffed out before acting. It was the general consensus that hasty action might result in a flap.) [] said that he has several questions and raised the following:

a. What is DOSTI's relationship to CIA? [] said that DOSTI, as President of the NCPA, is a cleared CIA contact who transacts business between the Executive Committee of the NCPA and the American sponsor of the Committee, i.e., CIA. Presently, [] is in contact with DOSTI.

b. Does DOSTI know that he is in contact with CIA? [] answered that DOSTI knows he is in contact with U. S. intelligence and it is presumed that he knows this means CIA. Russell mentioned that if DOSTI read the recent Saturday Evening Post article, he would receive some confirmation.

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c. To what degree is it necessary to protect DOSTI in this matter?

Is the Department of State aware of DOSTI's contact with CIA? [] answered that the Department of State is aware of DOSTI's collaboration with CIA on NCPA matters. Nonetheless, it is absolutely imperative that DOSTI be protected, since his role as President of NCPA and his future usefulness to CIA would be in jeopardy if a leak would occur that DOSTI is in contact with a Yugoslav official.

d. Why didn't DOSTI pass the information recently obtained from his alleged Yugoslav contact to the FBI? [] said that DOSTI personally feels that the FBI is not competent to deal in political matters. [] observed that DOSTI must feel that such political matters are of interest to the NCPA American sponsor. Since rapport has been established with the latter, DOSTI probably feels freer to work with the representative of the American sponsor of NCPA.

e. Is IO involved in this operation? [] answered that IO is involved only indirectly. At the moment, SE is awaiting a policy decision from the Department of State relative to the return of NCPA to NCFE. If this should occur, IO would be involved with the NCPA.

4. After a brief exchange of views between those present concerning the courses of action which might be considered, [] recommended that SE/1 present the case to the FBI in the form of a CSDB, via staff C. When reminded that Security handled contacts with the FBI in the past concerning DOSTI, [] asked to be briefed on how SE/1 actually handled the case. [] answered that SE/1 prepared memorandums for Security, with an information copy going to Staff C. However, the memoranda were routed to

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Security via Staff C. [] stated Staff C recommended initially that the case be handled in this matter. [] remarked that SE/1 does not know precisely how Security passed the information to the FBI. Since the DOSTI case now transcends the pure security problem which initially was the case [] remarked that Staff C now will handle the case. [] recommended, however, that if SE/1 initiates any memorandums relative to this case, Security should receive information copies.

5. [] said that the CSDB should be carefully worked-out because of the delicateness of the problem vis-a-vis the FBI. Further, in order to insure that CIA interests are protected, [] advises that the CIA position be carefully spelled out. He recommends that the following be treated in the memorandum:

a. DOSTI relationship with CIA, i.e., that he is a cleared contact with CIA for NCPA and Albanian matters. This must be included in order to convey to the FBI our continued interest in being kept abreast of developments.

b. The degree necessary to protect DOSTI, particularly with regard to dissections that the FBI might initiate. It must be pointed out that a leak concerning DOSTI's contact with a Yugoslav official would have serious consequences for the CIA sponsored NCPA project.

c. It should be stated that CIA and State, in particular, as customers in the intelligence community, are vitally interested in intelligence on Albania and Yugoslav intentions toward that country. At this particular moment, this information is of vital importance. It should be noted that CIA would like to receive such information developed in the operation on a priority basis.

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4. CIA, honoring the third agency rule, has not disseminated or made use of the recently acquired DOSTI information. CIA shall await receipt of a dissemination of the information from the FBI before acting on the information.

5. In view of DOSTI's relationship with CIA, it is necessary that CIA be informed by the FBI of the identities of alleged Yugoslav officials in contact with DOSTI, primarily for defensive CE purposes. This information too is needed to evaluate the alleged Yugoslav approach to DOSTI; it is implicit that DOSTI was approached only because he is President of the NCYA and known to have contacts with American officials.

6. [] raised the question of FDing the information today, but observed that the FBI has only a watch officer on duty. [] suggested that the CSDB would present a more complete picture. [] remarked that THE CSDB should be prepared for transmittal first thing Monday morning by SE/1. [] suggested that a draft CSDB be prepared and cleared with C/SE and SE/DFI. [] said that he would alert [] of Staff C regarding this CSDB and that [] could alert PAFICH, FBI liaison with Staff C early Monday in order to expedite handling. Further, Staff C would orally explain to PAFICH of the urgency and delicateness of the problem.

7. [] raised the question of possibly bringing this entire matter to the attention of Mr. Helms in view of the many implications of the DOSTI case, i.e., information-wise, NCYA project etc. [] stated that Helms is not in his office today, but that he had no objections. [] suggested that it is best to handle the case as discussed. Further, if [] wishes, he can brief Mr. Helms accordingly.

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8. [] asked [] where DOSTI meets his Yugoslav contact.
[] answered that meetings are held in DOSTI's New York office.
[] speculated whether or not the FBI had thought of bugging the office.
9. [] remarked that he would be alerted with a representative of General Clark's group Monday morning, but that he would like to see the COMB in any case when presented to Staff C by SE/1

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