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117 CBGFG

16 March 1951

SUBJECT: DTLINEN

TO : Chief, PBMIGHT

1. Submitted herewith as an enclosure is a translation of a report prepared by a member of DTLINEN staff and submitted to Newham. As you know, [ ] has been attempting to indicate to DTLINEN that they should begin to think in terms of more active type opposition, or at least plan to be in a position to shift over to more active type opposition in the near future.

2. This report is submitted not because it represents any particular action on the part of DTRULER, but rather as an indication of the type of thinking that is going on inside DTLINEN. We have no recommendations and are not making any suggestions as to action to be taken on the basis of this report.



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

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*Relay to [ ]*  
*Yes*

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14 March 1951

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SUBJECT: DTLINEN

TO : Chief, PBMIGHT

1. Report summarized below, stems from the pen of a DTLINEN staff member submitted to Newham as the basis for formulation of DTLINEN policy and planning in the more active resistance field. In the author's opinion, a war between East and West will see Germany as the battle-field, at first in any case.

"The Russians as well as the Western Allies have to reckon with underground warfare; in West Germany because of the absence of any effective counter measures, in East Germany due to the opposition on the part of the majority of the local population. During the last war, as is well realized, underground activity and guerilla warfare played a major role.

"One only has to picture the results of highly organized sabotage activities directed against extremely sensitive centers of operations, as i.e. radio towers, telephone exchanges, electric power stations, certain industrial plants, gasoline and munitions dumps, etc. In addition, other important installations like bridges, railroad traffic centers, flood gates, canal locks, etc. can be put out of commission; the most diverse methods of sabotage have been thoroughly tested and tried out during long years of experience. The success of these operations which should occur simultaneously can be assured if tight control is exercised and independent radio communication between the various sections available.

"The do-nothing attitude of the West German government in this respect is inexcusable, especially if the above-described plans are taken under serious consideration; however, looking at it from the other side, namely that of building up such an apparatus in the East Zone, the military and economic success of such an operation is assured. Even though the objects in question are not as freely accessible as in the West, the will to resist on the part of the local population is strong enough to overcome practically all obstacles. Any resistance activity against a politically well-developed and autocratic regime is usually carried on by an active minority.

"I.

First goal of this minority should be the psychological preparation of the rest of the population, with special attention being paid to those groups which are naturally inclined or have the will to go into active opposition. Once this stage has been reached whereby broad sections of the population have been convinced of the necessity of eliminating this regime, then

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serious thoughts can be given to an expansion of certain operations. In connection with this program of political orientation and psychological preparation, an active effort will have to be made to attract new members from various groups who should by then be ready to participate. Extreme caution and care however must be exercised, especially in the selection of these new members; only by this method can there be any assurance that the security and striking power of the organization will not be impaired in any way. An intense feeling of comradeship and trust in each other and toward the head of the team or organization — blind obedience to the leader is necessary until or unless that person's integrity is questioned; or his incompetence established; this will insure his absolute authority and guarantee survival of the individual team member.

"II.

Individual teams with a maximum strength of five men which have been formed by then, are charged with starting the next phase of operations, namely the planning and coordinating of S-actions as outlined by the executive committee of the organization which also selects individual and special targets. Preparation for any sort of action necessarily falls into three states:

- "1. Reconnaissance and gathering of information about the selected target.
2. Detailed plans for the execution of the mission.
3. Procurement of the necessary supplies.

"These three phases are closely tied together and will be considered only after prior consultation with the headquarters staff; this is absolutely necessary, (a) for security reasons and (b) in order to conserve manpower and eliminate any waste of materials. If these preliminary problems are solved then steps 1 and 2 can be executed assuming that they are in accord with the plans of the staff; provided the three types of actions closely connected with S-activities are taken into account, namely safeguarding, crippling or destruction of suitable targets:

- "1. Safeguarding, by preventing acts of destruction by the opposition.
2. Crippling, by partial or complete paralysis.
3. Self-initiated acts of destruction.

"Before these individual teams are briefed and prepared for any action, it is mandatory that the team leader at least, have thorough schooling or experience in connection with all phases of this operation; the success of any such operation depends on the human qualities and technical know-how of the team leader.

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"III.

The third phase, the actual implementation of S-actions, the matter of timing and coordinating them with military operations can only be decided after a thorough discussion with the staff leaders; they are the only ones who can and should authorize any operative action due to their knowledge and appraisal of the political situation which is all-important and can mean the difference between success and failure of any S-action.

"It won't always be possible to keep the different phases of the operation strictly apart; it might so happen that one phase has to be started before the other one has been completed.

"The efficient and smooth-running tactical use of S-troops will not only save human life and material but will, through safeguarding and crippling efforts, protect valuable properties belonging to the state, which otherwise might have to be eliminated by acts of destruction. Independent and overt activities by W or S groups are in direct contrast to their function and endanger their existence.

"Conclusions:

I. Workplan for DFLINEM

- a) Intensification of the psychological preparation of the population through the medium of propaganda and by acts of a seditious nature using new and proven tactics.
- b) Speeding-up the process of selecting S-troops.
- c) Reorganization and setting up of new functions with special attention given to the streamlining of S-leadership and the welfare of the individual teams.
- d) Preparation for schooling with special emphasis on radio instruction, exploratory discussions with Western allied officials, followed up later with more detailed talks.

II. The position in Western Germany.

- a) It is a fact and also a matter of record that our opponents, at this date -- after working for three years undisturbed -- control a large well-organized and efficient S-net in Western Germany (one only has to refer to FDJ reports, SSD circulars and remember the well-known facts about the operation of sabotage schools).
- b) Our opponents will not hesitate for one minute on X-day to make wide use of the above-mentioned operations, because
- c) no effective counter measures have been developed within Western Germany.

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- d) Through organization of S-groups in the Soviet Zone, not only a counter-balance can be maintained but by clever propaganda methods, the existence of such groups can be exploited to such an extent so as to delay or even prevent the opposition from carrying out their S-program.
- e) A danger not to be underestimated which can seriously affect our plans, is the developing split occurring in the West German police force and government offices, at the same time also disrupting the West German economy.

"The present situation brought about through the "cold war", and due to conditions existing in the eastern parts of Germany, not only demands a continuation and intensification of psychological warfare -- especially on the fruitful ground of the Soviet Zone -- but makes mandatory the exploitation of all three factors with the goal firmly in mind of establishing an extensive, well-organized and technically-efficient S-net."

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