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XX9667

DOUGH 631

X-251837

2 November 1945

TO: SAINT, Washington
 FROM: SAINT, London *pd*
 SUBJECT: Interrogation Report on SCHELLENBERG,
27 June - 12 July 1945

Excerpts from:

1. Herewith one copy of this report, the subject of your 2693 and our 1253. A check of the registry files shows that XX-8333 went to Berne, Stockholm, Madrid and Lisbon.

2. It is impossible now to determine the reason for this and other failures to forward reports (such as the KRAEMER one) last summer. We can only apologize, and ask you to inform us of such cases as quickly as possible, since the whole problem of receiving and disseminating interrogation reports is growing more difficult with the reduction in War Room activities.

Attchmt: 1 cpy subj. rpt.
 no ccs

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED OR CHANGED TO

Secret

by AUTO. INT. OF TSCO-1 WFI

3 JUN 1952

EGGEN
201-

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file #:
 WASH - Reg - INT-174
 Doc. #: XX-9667
 Box: 96

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3828
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2001 2008

46. KOJIMA, so SCHELLENBERG says, recognised very clearly these mistakes in German policy. In the course of many conversations he had with SCHELLENBERG on this subject he declared: The German military authorities regard everything only through their narrow military spectacles. For instance Admiral MEISEL sees only his U-boats and has no other problems. KOJIMA knew very well all the deficiencies of the German leadership. He had no use whatsoever for RIBBENTROP. One day in January or February 1945, KOJIMA, confiding himself to SCHELLENBERG, said: The whole German state machinery, also the military leadership of the Reich, are over-organized; in separate sections everything works very well and in an exemplary way. What is lacking, however, is the right combination of the whole. Hitler has concentrated everything on himself. This will not do. He needs a Reich General Staff and a Reich Cabinet. Co-operation with Japan has not been realised either in the political, the military or even the economic field in the manner in which a war like this makes it imperative. RIBBENTROP, KOJIMA said, confuses foreign policy with propaganda. His (KOJIMA's) main object after his return to Germany had been to bring about a compromised peace between Germany and Russia. Behind him had stood the opinion of the Japanese navy which regarded a block, Germany-Russia-Japan, as a desirable goal.

47. Japan had even been prepared to give up parts of Manchukuo and other territories and to bring about a complete change in the policy vis a vis China. KOJIMA said it had taken a long time before he had convinced OSHIMA of the necessity for such lines of thought, as OSHIMA had been a devoted follower of Hitler's ideas. RIBBENTROP and Hitler had shown completely wrong reactions and had transferred the centre of gravity of entirely superficial soundings to Tokio and Ambassador STAEMER who as a result of the questions which he was asked to put officially to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, had given a wrong direction to the whole course of events. KOJIMA said now everything was too late and he regretted sincerely that he had to wait to February 1945 to speak with SCHELLENBERG in this way. He thought that if he had found the line to SCHELLENBERG in 1944 things would have gone better. The same applied also to the intelligence connection between SAKAI and EGGEN.

Psychic

48. According to SCHELLENBERG, SAKAI was an obviously specially picked intelligence officer working with KOJIMA. He was in contact with EGGEN. The latter worked with SAKAI on an economic basis. As far as SCHELLENBERG remembers he founded a firm for which the Japanese had to find the money. Apart from the tendency to put thereby his financial position in order (EGGEN had, it seems lost a great deal of money in Hungary and France), he achieved good relations based on confidence with SAKAI. This man must have had contacts with the Russians or must have known ways to approach them. It was planned that EGGEN should together with SAKAI, meet a Russian spokesman in Bern at OKAMOTO's house. This meeting did not, however, take place as OKAMOTO fell gravely ill (it was alleged that he had a heart attack). SCHELLENBERG remembers EGGEN telling him that the Russian in question was a professor at one of the Swiss Universities (Zurich?). His name was something like ORLOWSKI(?). EGGEN always pretended that the Japanese, therefore mainly SAKAI and KOJIMA, wanted to win over SCHELLENBERG for co-operation with the Russians. KOJIMA referred to disagreements between the Army and Navy in Japan. The Navy wanted a quick termination of the war in China and a moderate, peaceful and purely Asiatic co-operation with China as well as a close alliance with Russia, which in KOJIMA's view was quite natural because Russia needed in the Pacific a naval power tuned in with Russian policy. KOJIMA firmly believed in his thesis. He was therefore also of the opinion that it was essential that a more intelligent and more flexible Japanese Ambassador should be dispatched to Moscow. He maintained that MATSUOKO was too old for his job. He also said that the Japanese army always wanted to show off and for this reason prolonged the war in China.

49. This difference of views was also perceptible between KOMATSU and KOJIMA. They kept from each other their visits to SCHELLENBERG.

life was dropped. By this he saved Stevens and Best from the "Volksgorichtshof" and execution. SCHELLENBERG thinks that neither of these men are aware of this as Stevens' and especially Best's later attitude towards him proved.

182. SCHELLENBERG, though not providing concrete proofs, connects KALTENBRUNNER with the shooting of British officers at Hallo.

183. Ludwig NEUBERG, chief of the Spanish desk of Amt VI is described by SCHELLENBERG as "an unimportant man".

184. Lieut. Colonel FREUND. This officer of Amt VI Z (counter espionage) worked under ROHLEDER and dealt with questions affecting the Balkans. In this subject he was at home and knew all the lines there. SCHELLENBERG says that he chose him for counter-espionage work because he was less obstinate and disputatious than ROHLEDER. He collaborated closely with Dr. SCHMITZ of the Secretariat because SCHMITZ also made use of FREUND for counter-espionage at home. FREUND was a valuable colleague vis a vis Amt IV that is, "against MUELLER". From MUELLER nursed the plan to take over the whole of counter-espionage as a domain for the Staatspolizei. Abroad he wanted to hand over the desk to the Police Attaches. In Section VI Z FREUND was still a new-comer. His special successes in former times must have been in the Balkans. SCHELLENBERG did not know much about them. He thinks that FREUND must always have been very efficient because he was recommended by everybody. Other special territories of FREUND were Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. In Switzerland, the solution of the "Agent 509" case was his particular hobby. In Portugal FREUND maintained close contact with Fritz CRAMER and in Spain with ROHRSCHIEDT. FREUND must know many names in Spain, Portugal and Switzerland. In Spain FREUND worked against JOHN and LEDEBUR, in Switzerland against AUERSPERG, GISSEVIUS and WESTJEN. FREUND also had an interesting case in Turkey. A very good agent worked there whom the British Intelligence Service called "PROFESSOR". LEVERKUEHN reported this case. In Istanbul FREUND dealt with another big case. It concerned the Austrian Freedom Movement and had ramifications in Vienna and to the former Semperit works there.

185. Sturmabfuhrer EGGEN was not a serious intelligence officer, but exploited the Geheime Meldienst for his own amusement and profit. He regarded his privileged position in the SS as a means of further enriching himself; SCHELLENBERG took pleasure in protecting him against investigations. He had his own contacts and sources in Switzerland, the most important of which was the Japanese OKAMOTO; but he did not produce reports of any value.

186. Dr. SCHINDOWSKI originally came from Tilsit. In 1943-4 he was in Amt VI C. He was then posted to Amt VI Kult as special assistant to SANDBERGER. One of his functions was to receive and entertain visitors. He was presentable and sufficiently intelligent.

187. Standartenfuhrer TSCHILERSKY. TSCHILERSKY was removed by SCHELLENBERG from Amt VI C because he was too stupid. He joined PRUETZMANN's staff and was always in PRUETZMANN's special train. He must know everything which can be known about the Werewolves and their training.

188. Standartenfuhrer RAPP. RAPP was put in command by SCHELLENBERG of the remnants of Amt VI in North Germany when the offices of the RSHA were divided into Northern and Southern sections. He was SCHELLENBERG's specialist on Polish questions.

189. Obersturmbannfuhrer PAEFFGEN. PAEFFGEN was an efficient intelligence officer, but without initiative or independent political judgement. He always required to be given instructions. SCHELLENBERG had confidence in him.

190. Obersturmbannfuhrer BERNHARD. BERNHARD was an altogether negligible figure.

191. Oberstleutnant FOCKE. SCHELLENBERG has no respect for FOCKE, whom he describes as hard working and active but stupid and politically uneducated.

192. Major LOOS of Mil Amt D was given to SKORZENY as NAUMANN's successor by KALTENBRUNNER. LOOS, like KALTENBRUNNER, was native of Linz, and this constituted a bond between them.