

IR

2469  
RGLA-~~333~~

„SECRET CONTROL“  
US OFFICIALS ONLY

AUGSBURG

20 February 1953

Chief, DE

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/ZIPPER [CART]

[JURGLERY] # 350

Ref: [RGLA-2272], 2348

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2000 2008

1. Enclosed is ZIPPER memo 4885 giving the latest developments in subject case. [SCHWARZ] has now been able to get a job which requires less traveling in the LAGO Vehicle Factory located in Bochum-Essen. This will facilitate his being carefully run by ZIPPER. On the other hand [SCHWARZ] has temporarily lost contact with [SCHROEDER]. [V-2907] attributes this to [SCHWARZ]'s moving. He feels that as soon as the FIS establishes some new surveillants in Bochum that "SCHWARZ" will once more be contacted.

2. It is interesting to note that [V-2907] reiterates his conviction that [SCHWARZ] is being surveilled by the FIS, but that he feels there is no particular danger as long as [SCHWARZ] is not seen with people who are known as Western DE operatives. [V-2907] can hardly avoid considering himself in this category. Apparently [V-2907]'s research project for the RSEA was quite well known to the Poles as he was frequently contacted by Polish officers in the latter part of 1945 (see MSSA-4499). [V-2907]'s general meeting techniques as outlined in second ref., don't seem to lessen the security problems in this case. However, [V-2907] seems to be fully aware of the problem and may be undertaking the more detailed security measures necessary to counteract the security difficulties evolving from such meetings. Perhaps the past difficulty of meeting [SCHWARZ] necessitated a lengthy meeting in [ ] local in Oberalchingen, and a more detailed study of the counter-surveillance techniques employed in connection with this one meeting would illustrate that [V-2907] is doing all possible within the realm of practicality to avoid his being seen in public with [SCHWARZ]. We are not going to press ZIPPER for more operational details in connection with this meeting or others, unless a blatant lack of security arises. We feel that it would only aggravate them and lessen other operational reporting in the future. We will use our information on above meeting only as a possible starting point for digging into a flap.

Dist:

5 - EE w l cy att 1  
3 - COM " " " "

„SECRET CONTROL“  
US OFFICIALS ONLY

COPY

revised  
EE [CE]  
EE [Poland]  
FI [STC/SIA]  
Z

„SECRET CONTROL“  
US OFFICIALS ONLY

9. You may wonder why a person who stands a good chance of being known to the PIS was assigned this case in the first place. [Y-2937] seems to be a "shining star" of EV I and has often before been transferred to a number of important cases. As this is the sole Polish BA case, the EV I probably felt it was important enough to overlook the weak security aspects of using [Y-2937] in favor of putting one of their best men on the case.

[ ]

Approved by

[ ]