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MUNICH/LIAISON BASE CONTACT REPORT

12 April 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2001 2005

[] - BERNHARDT
12 April 1961 - 1400 to 1510 Hours
[] Home

TOPICS DISCUSSED AND COMMENTS

1. FRIESEN: [] gave BERNHARDT some information from KUBARK files including the following points:

a. [] indicated that on the basis of various comments made by FRIESEN, we were relatively sure he had relatives in the DOR. [] mentioned that in February 1957, FRIESEN had mentioned to [] that FRIESEN and his wife were expecting to entertain a woman from Dresden who was an old friend. [] suggested it might be a good idea to put mail and telephone coverage on FRIESEN's "Erbonkel" in West Berlin and BERNHARDT agreed.

b. [] filled in BERNHARDT on the background of FRIESEN's strong interest in the polygraph, the fact that he had borrowed various books from us on this subject, and the fact that he claimed in 1956 or early 1957 that he had permission from UTILITY to look into the whole question of the polygraph.

c. [] gave BERNHARDT the background of the episode involving FRIESEN and [] at the time of FRIESEN's visit to Berlin. [] noted the number of hours FRIESEN had been unaccounted for and the fact that he apparently had tried to cover up by producing two movie tickets, only one of which had been used. BERNHARDT appeared particularly interested in this incident. [] said that at best FRIESEN's behaviour on this occasion had been strange.

d. [] told BERNHARDT that [] had had a meeting with FRIESEN on 11 April after FRIESEN's return from vacation. [] told BERNHARDT that [] who knew nothing whatsoever about the case, had commented after the meeting that FRIESEN had been unusually nervous and tense, appeared to be quite tired, and simply did not seem to be himself - all of which seemed strange on the heels of vacation.

2. Christian HOFFMANN: [] passed BERNHARDT sterilized copies of information from our files in the form of a personal history questionnaire and other biographic information. BERNHARDT said he still had not had a chance to get at UPHILL's file which still is in the possession of FRIESEN.

3. GREGOR: The following points came up:

a. BERNHARDT said that the earlier intercept on GREGOR we had passed indicating a connection between the GREGORS and the FRIESENS was in error and that it appeared that CALLIKAK had put the GREGOR heading on a FRIESEN intercept. BERNHARDT said a careful check of the transcript indicated that the conversation definitely had originated in the FRIESEN household.

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b. BERNHARDT said further analysis indicated that we did not have a tap on GREGOR at all. BERNHARDT said after going over the transcripts he suspected this and had checked with the telephone company. He learned that the number listed in the current telephone book for GREGOR is not actually his number. GREGOR's number apparently had been changed shortly before the book came out. BERNHARDT said GREGOR's telephone number really is 36-36-30, instead of 36-36-04.

[] said we would switch to the proper number soonest.

4. (Orsula BERNHARDT/Pension Dresden): BERNHARDT said he thought it also would be a good idea to put mail and telephone coverage on the Pension Dresden just to see what turned up.

5. (GRUFF): BERNHARDT said he again had reviewed GRUFF's file and could find no cause for concern. BERNHARDT said the weakest thing in GRUFF's file was the fact that he had polished off his earlier relationship with CIC in one casual sentence and had tried to give the impression that he never really had been employed by CIC.

[] said this obviously was not the case and noted that GRUFF actually had been employed for a number of years. BERNHARDT also said there is no indication whatsoever in UPHILL's files that GRUFF ever had been in contact with SKORZENY. BERNHARDT said it seemed certain that if GRUFF ever had been in contact with SKORZENY, it had not been under UPHILL's auspices. With reference to GRUFF's earlier remark to a KUBARKER that he was in contact with SKORZENY in December 1954, BERNHARDT said it was possible GRUFF knew SKORZENY from the war and was also possible he merely claimed such a contact in order to make himself seem important. [] also threw out the name of ROGAL, saying that [] thought ROGAL might be the name of the KGB agent he had in mind who was in contact with SKORZENY. BERNHARDT said the name ROGAL rang a bell with him but he couldn't place it. [] said the only ROGAL we had been able to come up with was a former employee of MIG who, among other things, had had as TROUVILLE as his mistress for a time. BERNHARDT said he would check UPHILL's files on ROGAL.

6. (KROG, (V-3154 - Wilhelm KRICHEBAUM). The following points emerged:

a. BERNHARDT said that he was looking carefully into the background of KROG, since, contrary to what BERNHARDT had mentioned at the previous meeting, it had been KROG who had brought both FRIESEN and Hans JENSEN into UPHILL.

b. BERNHARDT said in the process of his research on the [] case, he had re-read [] "Tandem Theory" several times and had come upon the startling fact that Kurt POWNER under Soviet instructions had contacted various members of UPHILL, including GRUFF. BERNHARDT said the fact that POWNER had met KROG and several other UPHILLERS under Soviet instructions had been mentioned rather in passing in [] paper on the "Tandem Theory" and BERNHARDT said he now would be interested in obtaining all available details. [] asked if the POWNER angle had been discussed at all at the time and BERNHARDT said to the best of his recollection only superficially.

c. [] said he recalled the POWNER-VEREER case from Austria but swore that there had been an UPHILL angle, and very much doubted that our local files had sufficient information to be helpful. [] added that he would alert Headquarters to search our files for all leads.

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the POWERS case affecting UPHILL interests, especially POWERS's contacts with [redacted] and GROSCHKE.)

d. In connection with this discussion, BERNHARDT commented that [redacted] Pandea Theory certainly made more interesting reading now than it did in 1957. BERNHARDT said that he earlier had found [redacted] theory interesting and stimulating, but that now, in light of [redacted] information, it was a very impressive piece of work indeed.

e. Hans CLEMENS: BERNHARDT repeated that he was quite uncertain of CLEMENS. He said he was gradually pulling together all available information and had learned that CLEMENS actually lived with PRIESEN for a short while in 1949 after CLEMENS had been released as an American POW in Italy. BERNHARDT also said that although he had not gotten to the bottom of the story, CLEMENS at one point claimed that he had received an offer to work for the KIS but had turned down the approach. BERNHARDT also said that CLEMENS was known to have close family members, including his separated wife, in Dresden - although CLEMENS had claimed that his relatives, including his separated wife, did not know his actual location; mail correspondence was carried on through outposts in West Germany. BERNHARDT commented that if CLEMENS's claims were true, he would eat his file without any sauce.

f. RISCHE: BERNHARDT said he had been racking his brain attempting to figure out who, in addition to PRIESEN, was the leading suspect as the second KIS agent on the 1956 UDRACO trip. BERNHARDT said he had again reviewed the files on all of the persons on this trip and now was of the opinion that the leading candidate was RISCHE. BERNHARDT talked at some length about RISCHE's background and said that he thought there was nothing definite he could put his finger on, RISCHE's background was such that he seemed a more likely candidate than any of the others. BERNHARDT mentioned that RISCHE had aged considerably in recent years, now was becoming extremely set in his ways and opinionated, and noted that he was working in an area that presumably would be of considerable interest to the East. BERNHARDT also mentioned that RISCHE had gone down hill considerably since the point some years ago when he had divorced his wife and married a much younger UPHILL secretary. BERNHARDT concluded by saying again that although it was hard to put one's finger on anything specific, there was no doubt that RISCHE was a funny sort of guy. [redacted] mentioned that [redacted] always had felt that RISCHE's background was such that he had to be considered a leading candidate and suggested that BERNHARDT no doubt would hear more on this score when he got to Washington.

g. HACKE: BERNHARDT made the following points:

a. BERNHARDT and Fr. KUNZE still are going through massive amounts of paper and files pulling together material that ties in with HACKE. BERNHARDT said he still was optimistic that he would have pulled together most of the material before it was time to leave for Washington.

b. BERNHARDT said that in pulling together this material, and reviewing the background of PRIESEN, CLEMENS and various others - it had become clear that there was a very definite clique in UPHILL consisting of former SS officials.

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who were very close and who took great pains to cover up for one another. BERNHARDT said he still was assembling information on this and felt that the final picture might be quite interesting.

c. BERNHARDT asked if we had had any luck getting a line on the "veteran Abwehr and Gestapo Officer KASZUBOWSKI CLARSEN", who was repatriated to Germany under KUB auspices in 1956 or 1957. [] said we had not been able to locate KASZUBOWSKI. BERNHARDT said he also had had no luck on this score and was very puzzled since he did not see how KASZUBOWSKI could disappear into thin air. BERNHARDT said he still was doing a considerable amount of research on this point and was in the process of checking all of the West German refugee camps to see if they possibly had any record of KASZUBOWSKI.

10. BULLA Case/OSINGER/Ignaz ZILINSKI: BERNHARDT said he had done a considerable amount of checking in the hopes of identifying an OSINGER who had been used by the KUB in 1960 to check on the status of the principles in the BULLA Case. BERNHARDT said he had come across a repatriate debriefing report of 29 September 1958 in which the repatriate claimed that one ZILINSKI, OSINGER, was a member of the UB in Lindenburg from 1951 to 1954. The repatriate also claimed that ZILINSKI, OSINGER, had earlier used the name SINGER and had a brother who resided in Munich. BERNHARDT said he was reasonably sure of this identification since he recalled that in the information UPHILL had received from the French on the KROZ case, there also had been mention of a UB agent by the name of ZILINSKI who used the alias SINGER. []

11. BERNHARDT said that, since he did not expect to be able to pull together all the material he wanted to take to Washington until very shortly before his departure, he would carry all of the necessary information with him. BERNHARDT also said that he was in the process of getting a "Dienstpass" in order to make the job a little simpler. BERNHARDT also mentioned that during his absence, [] should give any [] material, including intercepts, to OPLEMING who would be responsible for the case until BERNHARDT returned. []

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