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FYI			
<p>1. Forwarded herewith for your information and retention are copies of the English translation of the BFV annual report entitled <u>Results of Counterespionage in 1963</u>. 2P</p> <p>2. We defer to Headquarters for the indexing of names found in the report.</p>			
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<p>INDEX</p> <p>Attachment (h/w): as noted</p> <p>Distribution: 2 - C/EE w/att (5 cys) 2 - Bonn Element Frankfurt w/att (1 cy) 2 - C/BOB w/att (1 cy) 2 - C/MOB w/att (1 cy) 1 - COS/G/B w/o att 1 - COS/G/P w/o att</p>		<p>SOURCE SYMBOL FILE</p> <p>RECORD COPY</p> <p>CS COPY</p> <p>SOURCE SYMBOL FILE</p>	
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ATT. CONTAINED IN EGNA-28479

- 1) ATT. 1 to EGNA-28479 - ENGLISH
TRANSLATION OF BFV ANNUAL REPORT
ENTITLED - RESULTS OF COUNTERESPIONAGE
1963.
- 2) ATT. 2 to EGNA-28479 - PERSONNEL
DATA
- 3) ATT. 3 to EGNA-28479 - PICTURES

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FEDERAL AGENCY FOR THE PROTECTION
OF THE CONSTITUTION
NY A 1-104-A-20004/64 YE-20004

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RESULTS OF COUNTERESPIONAGE IN 1963

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3 DEC. 1964

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A. The Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services' Activity against the Federal Republic of Germany in 1963

General Situation

In 1963, the Federal Republic also was one of the main targets of Soviet Bloc intelligence services. According to the Soviet Bloc intelligence terminology, the Federal Republic, as well as the United States, Great Britain, France and Japan, is a "main enemy".

Consequently, the activity of Soviet Bloc intelligence services did not slacken. Espionage activities were again directed against almost all fields of public life. No essential changes were noticed with regard to targets. All services' interest continued to be specifically concentrated on the procurement of military and political information.

As previously, the hostile services paid greatest attention to the careful selection and training of their agents and equipped them with highly qualified technical aids for maintaining the connection and for communication.

The decrease of recognized recruitment cases which was noticed after the erection of the Berlin Wall, did not continue further. The figures remained the same as last year.

I. Extent of Activity

A total of 1,432 agent recruitments or recruitment attempts made by Soviet Bloc intelligence services, were discovered in 1963 in the Federal Republic (1962: 1,430). These again included quite a number of cases in which training, infiltration and equipment with intelligence aids already permitted the conclusion as to the agent's or resident agent's value and qualification. Agent couples appeared rather frequently.

Of the 1,432 recognized cases 1,214 persons, that is 84%, were approached by the Soviet Zone intelligence services. This number again emphasized the danger which the Soviet Zone intelligence services constitute for the Federal Republic.

The other cases can be broken down as follows:

Soviet intelligence services	84
Polish intelligence services	59
Czech intelligence services	35
Yugoslav intelligence services	15
Hungarian intelligence services	10
Rumanian intelligence services	4
Bulgarian intelligence services	2
unidentified hostile intelligence services	9

The Soviet Zone of Germany continued to remain an important operational base for these intelligence services' activities against the Federal Republic. As in previous years, cooperation between the Soviet Zone and the Soviet Union services was the closest. Again a few cases became known where agent

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handling was transferred from the Soviet Zone to the Soviet service, or vice versa.

Furthermore, the Soviet Bloc States missions in the Federal Republic continued to be used as bases of hostile activity which enabled the individual intelligence services to carry out espionage under the guise of diplomatic or commercial relations.

A comparison^{of} the activity of the individual services with the above mentioned starting points, does not give a uniform picture. The gravity center of the Soviet Zone intelligence services is naturally with the handling agencies in East Berlin. The Soviet intelligence services carry out their activities against the Federal Republic mostly through their operational offices in the Soviet Zone. Besides, the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Trade Mission developed intelligence activities to quite a considerable extent. The Yugoslavs appear to primarily use their missions for intelligence activities against the Federal Republic.

As regards intelligence activities, the other services probably equally operate from their intelligence bases in East Berlin and their handling agencies in their own countries, while the missions of these countries in the Federal Republic appear to be primarily concerned with tasks of a preparatory and supporting nature.

II. Targets of Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services

In 1963 a total of 4,025 espionage cases were recorded. As compared with the number of the previous year (4,645), this means a decrease of 13.7%. In view of the same number of recruitments, this fact is of no decisive importance, neither with regard to the hostile services' activity nor to the counterintelligence results. During the period under review, the most important espionage targets hardly changed. The following survey makes this evident (in parenthesis the percentage of the 1962 results):

Assignments of a preparatory and supporting nature	1,704 - 42.5% (40.8%)
Political Espionage	636 - 16.0% (16.8%)
Economic Espionage	216 - 5.4% (8.6%)
Military Espionage	1,311 - 32.2% (30.9%)
Counterespionage	153 - 3.8% (2.2%)
Acts of Violence	5 - 0.1% (0.7%)

Of the total of 4,025 recognized assignments, 1,992 were completed (= 49%), namely:

885 assignments	= preparatory and supporting assignments
320 "	= political espionage
66 "	= economic espionage
637 "	= military espionage
84 "	= counterespionage
- "	= acts of violence.

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Also last year the greatest numerical share of recorded espionage assignments was directed against military targets in the Federal Republic. Besides the FRG Armed Forces and all their installations, the allied forces stationed in Germany, were again the subject of espionage activities.

The targets of the Soviet Bloc services' political espionage primarily were the spheres of foreign and domestic politics. About 10% of all political assignments were directed against the democratic parties.

Almost all fields of economic life in the Federal Republic were covered by hostile economic espionage. The Soviet Bloc intelligence services' special interest was German industry. The greatest number of assignments were recorded in the field of electrical industry, followed by the chemical and armament industries and other branches of industry having almost an equal share. Assignments against institutes of scientific research were also continuously issued. The agents of eastern intelligence services in 1963 also received assignments to furnish public opinion reports and the views expressed by West German residents with regard to certain political events or current political questions. Through this type of espionage, the Soviet Bloc continued to pursue the aim of procuring in an intelligence manner, documents and material for infiltration, subversion, as well as for agitation and propaganda against the Federal Republic.

During the year under review, one case was recorded in which an agent group was engaged in sabotage preparations upon instructions of a Soviet Bloc intelligence service. The agents as a rule had the assignment to select concealment possibilities for weapons, explosives and food, and to detect sensitive points for destruction in important plants, whereby the entire manufacture could be paralyzed. The sabotage measures concerned were only to be realized on X-Day, in part by members of the agent net, in part by infiltrated saboteurs. The agents believed that X-Day was the day of the outbreak of a war, or the day which appeared suitable for a violent overthrow of the democratic order in the Federal Republic.

III. Recruitment Methods

The Soviet Bloc intelligence services' methods to recruit agents also did not change in 1963.

a. Recruitment Occasions

The Soviet Bloc intelligence services continued in their previously recognized practice to recruit Federal Republic citizens while visiting in their sphere of power. The same applies to resettlers from these States and immigrants from the West. The situation for an approach in their own sphere of power is so favorable for these services, that they can accept a recruitment failure or a possible disclosure after return to the Federal Republic. They obviously are of the opinion that of the great number of recruited persons, at least some will become active as agents.

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Although the majority of recruitments is effected in the hostile intelligence services' own sphere of power, they do not hesitate to effect recruitment attempts also in the Federal Republic territory. These approaches usually are only made after the recruit has been thoroughly vetted in all detail and compromising information on him is available, which means a certain prospect of success and a safety guaranty for the recruiter.

b. Recruitment Aids

In making their recruitment attempts, in 1965 the Soviet Bloc intelligence services again used all the previously known aids:

financial promises or other advantages,
compromise and threat,
use of constrained position (former activity as a spy etc.),
use of character weaknesses,
ideological ties.

A total of 207 of the recognised recruitments concerned women (15%).

IV. Handling of Agents - Communications

The methods of the hostile intelligence services actually remained the same.

The most important means of handling continued to be the meeting between agent and handling person. Most of the meetings were held in the eastern sphere of power, but also in western countries, however, preferably in East Berlin if circumstances permitted. Quite a number of piloting methods were developed for crossing the sectorial border, which excluded the agent's identification by the People's Police.

Further, for the maintenance of intelligence connections, as well as for the completion of limited vetting assignments, the Soviet Zone and also the other Satellite services employed courier and instructor agents. Beyond this, the connection with the agents was maintained via cover-addresses, secret writing and radio traffic. That the hostile services always use all technical possibilities and innovations for this purpose, is shown by a case in which radiotelephone connections were established and used by means of infrared rays.

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B. Soviet Zone Intelligence Services

I. Recruitment Methods

1. Share of Soviet Zone Intelligence Services

In spite of a decrease of recognized recruitments since 13 Aug 1961, the Soviet Zone services' share of almost 85% in the total number of recruitments equalled last year's.

While in 1960 still 2,543 cases,
and in 1961 2,149 cases

could be recognized and evaluated, in 1963 a total of 1,432 cases was recorded which is almost the same number as in 1962 (1,430).

In the 2nd year the total number of recruitments already shows a decrease by at least one third. In spite of this decrease in the total number, since 1960 the Soviet Zone services held a constant share of 84-87% in the recruitments.

2. Recruited Persons' Place of Residence

In 1963, twenty-three percent of the total of 1,432 recognized agents at the time of their recruitment had their residence outside the Federal Republic. In 16% of the cases, the residence at the time of the recruitment was in the Soviet Zone. The share of persons who at the time of recruitment lived outside the Federal Republic (excepting the Soviet Zone) consequently was 5% in 1963.

While this share (residence of recruited persons in the Soviet Bloc outside the Soviet Zone) has almost remained the same since 1960, the portion of persons who at the time of recruitment lived in the Soviet Zone, has steadily decreased.

In 1960 this still was over	46%
in 1961	- 40%
in 1962	- 23%
in 1963	- 16%

This may permit the conclusion that the events around 13 August 1961 forced the Soviet Zone services to reduce the recruitment and subsequent infiltration of persons living in their sphere of power, into the Federal Republic (often disguised as refugees).

It is noteworthy to what extent this development is reflected by the figures of the preliminary examination groups and by cases investigated at the emergency admission camps.

In 1960, the Berlin preliminary examination group alone established 411 cases of recruitment by a Soviet Bloc intelligence service, for intelligence activities against the Federal Republic. Besides, there were

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74 cases recorded in Uelsen,
60 cases recorded in Giessen, and
28 cases recorded in Friedland,

total: 575 persons.

In 1961 this total figure was 486.

In 1962 it decreased to 107 cases.

Last year in Berlin only 27 cases,
in Giessen 29 cases, and
in Uelsen 4 cases

were recorded, a total of 60 cases.

Of all the cases recognized in 1963, at the time of
recruitment by the Soviet Zone intelligence services,
952 persons lived in the Federal Republic.

3. Recruitment Occasions

a. In the case of persons, who at the time of recruitment
lived in the Federal Republic, the recruitment occasions
are manifold. The most important groups established are
the following:

- o emigrants to the Soviet Zone 246
- o private travel to the Soviet
Zone (visiting relatives etc.) 202
- o official stay in the Soviet
Zone 18
- o visit to Paris 28
- o stay in the Soviet Zone for
political reasons 18
- o controls in East Berlin 85
- o use of traffic roads between
Berlin and the Federal Republic 46.

b. The recruitment occasions in case of persons who at the
time of recruitment lived in the Soviet Zone, are not
quite so varied.

- o personal or official West
contacts 89
- o returnees 12
- o Official trips to the Federal
Republic 6.

4. Recruitment Aids

As compared with last year, no noteworthy changes could be
established with regard to the recruitment aids. Extortion
and threat frequently connected with all kinds of promises,
continued to be the most frequently used recruitment aid.

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The Soviet Zone intelligence services continued to make reckless use of the fear of considerable personal or financial disadvantages. Frequently, criminal offenses were used as a pressure aid. Federal Republic citizens were then assured that the offenses they had committed, would not be reported to the West German authorities.

This is an example:

On 22 Jan 1963, auxiliary waiter Dieter G. of West Berlin committed burglary in Berlin-Hermsdorf. On this occasion among other things, he took a camera, jewelry and cigarettes. On his way home he was controlled and searched by the People's Police at the Friedrichstrasse RR Station and arrested after they had discovered the stolen items. Soon a MfS member interfered with the interrogation. He placed G. before the alternative of either working "for the East" or being handed over to the West Berlin Criminal Police. Under these circumstances G. signed a pledge. After the receipt of various intelligence assignments, he was permitted to return to West Berlin. He could keep the stolen items.

Other occasions for an intelligence approach are minor violations of Soviet Zone export regulations, which Federal Republic citizens usually commit in ignorance of the pertinent directives. Such violations are liable to severe punishment.

Those cases are noteworthy in which Federal Republic government service members were confronted with this recruitment practice of the Soviet Zone intelligence services.

- o On the occasion of a baggage control at the Soviet Sector of Berlin Verwaltungsoberinspektor (administrative official) N. of Hannover came in contact with the MfS when on his return from a visit to relatives in Spremberg the end of September 1963 he had to change trains in Berlin.

In his wife's suitcase, the controllers found two sets of new bed-linen, a present they had received from the mother in Spremberg. The couple was interrogated separately; at first both by Border Troop officers, N. also by a MfS member. With reference to the violation of Soviet Zone export regulations, N. was requested to carry out intelligence activities. For fear of being detained, N. pretended to accept the offer.

- o From the end of July until mid-August 1963, Zollinspektor z.A. (customs official) Claus-Peter SCH. and his wife Helga (also Zollinspektor z.A.) stayed in Leipzig to visit their grandparents. On the return trip, at the customs control in Wartha, objections were raised that they had with them table linen and some records, which were wedding gifts from their relatives and friends. As a result, SCH. was handed over to a MfS member who questioned him as to his agency and his activity and finally requested him to currently furnish him information from his office. SCH. allegedly refused to render information. After he had promised to keep the interrogation secret before third parties, he and his wife were permitted to continue on their trip.

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He had to send the presents which had caused the trouble, back to Leipzig.

Recruitments of Federal Republic citizens on the basis of merely ideological arguments were effected only in exceptional cases. They can basically only be applied if the vetting of the person revealed indication that the recruitment candidate sympathetically views communist ideas, or at least does not agree with the political and economic conditions in the West.

In the last six months of 1963, within a rather short period, several cases became known in which Federal Republic citizens received replies from the Soviet Sector of Berlin to work wanted ads in West German newspapers which in style and contents clearly revealed the intelligence background.

The great number of these cases, during the above mentioned period, permits the conclusion that the Soviet Zone intelligence services (at least during this period) made increasing use of the want ads in West German newspapers, for their approach attempts.

The following examples characterize this working method:

- o In reply to a position wanted ad in an engineers' technical magazine, an engineer of Mannheim received the following letter from a certain F., Berlin-Mahlsdorf/Waldesruh, Kleiststrasse 30:

G. Franke
Berlin-Mahlsdorf/Waldesruh
Kleiststrasse 30

1 Aug 1963

Dear Sir:

With reference to your ad of 22 May 1963 under No. 103326, we wish to make you an offer. We offer you a position of trust and the possibility of making a good salary. In our opinion, it would be advisable if you came to Berlin for a personal interview.

All expenses incurred by you on the trip and your stay in Berlin, will be reimbursed by us. Please inform us immediately what you think of this offer. Further details will be discussed during the personal interview.

Very truly yours,

By Order: G. Franke
signature

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o In July of this year, a student placed a want ad in the "Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger". He requested employment during the semester vacation; if possible in a hotel. In reply hereto, among others a certain Heins R., Berlin C 2, Am Koellnischen Park 4 a, wrote to him:

..... Reits Berlin, 1 August 1963
Berlin C 2
Am Koellnischen Park 4 a

To Pressehaus Koeln
K o e l n
Breite Strasse 70

Dear Sir:

Subject: Ad in Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger of 20/21 Jul 1963

With reference to your ad in the Koelner Stadt-Anzeiger, I can offer you such limited employment (but not in a hotel).

This is in regard to cooperation at an extensive cultural-political history on Northrhine-Westphalia.

Payment will naturally be made in your currency. Should you be interested in such cooperation, please so inform me by telegram not later than 8 Aug 1963.

I will be prepared to receive you for a personal interview in Berlin at a time convenient to you which, however, must be between 8 and 10 Aug 1963. On the day you suggest, I will await you at the Press Café at the Friedrichstrasse RR Station between 10 and 1200 hours (please ask at the checkroom for me). You will certainly know that you can enter the democratic Berlin via the Friedrichstrasse RR Station without encountering difficulties.

Travel and other expenses will fully be reimbursed.

Very truly yours,

sgd. Reits
(REITZ)

II. Handling of Soviet Zone Agents

In 1963, MFS handling agencies East Berlin, Magdeburg, Leipzig, Erfurt and Rostock played a particularly important role. The majority of all intelligence operations against the Federal Republic, was started from East Berlin.

As previously, the personal contact between agent and handling office was mainly the Soviet Zone intelligence services' handling method. This contact primarily was maintained by meetings in East Berlin and in neutral foreign countries, as well as by sending couriers and instructors who after previous conspiratorial agreement, called on the agent in the Federal Republic.

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The evaluation of these cases brought about conclusive knowledge as to the conspiratorial courier services prior to and after the Soviet Zone blockade measures of August 1961.

Prior to 13 August 1961, the MfS frequently employed Soviet Zone relatives or friends of the agent (whom it pledged for secret cooperation for this purpose) as couriers. The Soviet Zone citizens usually entered the Federal Republic under their true names. They were in possession of a travel certificate FM 12a and to disguise their intelligence assignment, stated that they wished to pay a visit in the Federal Republic.

After the Soviet Zone blockade measures, the MfS developed new methods for the conspiratorial courier service. The use of falsified West Berlin personal papers or Federal personal identity cards which previously had only been used in exceptional cases, now became the rule. All courier agents from the Soviet Zone, whom the BFV recorded after 13 August 1961, were provided with falsified personal identity cards in the name of persons living in the Federal Republic or West Berlin. No falsifications of the new Federal identification in book-form were discovered to date. The MfS devoted particular attention to the falsification of a Federal personal identity card for courier agent BOEHME. His assigners wished that he travel with a Federal identity card in the name of his friend Herbert K. of Hagen/Westphalia. BOEHME had to call on K. in Hagen in August 1956 for this purpose and under some pretext made him show his personal identity card, on which occasion he was to note the number of the form. Besides, he had passport photographs made of himself in Hagen and brought them along. He made this trip with a travel certificate in his true name. In the Fall of 1960, K. moved from Hagen to a nearby village. Thereupon B. had to call again on him, make him again show his personal identity card and note whether the entry in the identity card had been filled out by hand or by typewriter. In accordance herewith, the MfS later on provided the falsified identity card with a remark of the move and the pertinent stamp of the Ennepe-Ruhr-Kreis.

In addition to the falsified personal papers, the equipment for courier trips to the Federal Republic regularly included western clothing and items for use on the trip. As a rule, the agents were permitted to purchase these items at the MfS' cost, when they were on trial assignments in West Berlin or in the Federal Republic. After the completion of every assignment they had to be returned. Often the first trips to the West (which were to enable the future couriers to get acquainted with the conditions in the Federal Republic) were connected with the assignment to collect confidential information on the true holder of the identity card. In case of possible controls they had to be in a position to answer pertinent questions accordingly.

It was the couriers' primary task to hand over money and receive treasonous material. Beyond this, they were to supply their meeting partners with new instructions of the handling agency, to encourage them to better cooperation and possibly influence them politically, as well as to give them advice for a useful completion of their assignments. In this respect, they frequently took on the tasks of instructors.

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In selecting couriers, the MFS applied rigid standards to the political attitude of the recruitment candidate, because of the danger of "breaking away". Almost all courier agents recognized during the past years, were SED members.

III. Qualified Individual Agents

Also during 1963 the Federal Republic security organs succeeded in neutralizing a number of specifically qualified agents who had carried out intelligence activities in the Federal Republic for several years. Their assignment to the Federal Republic principally was preceded by thorough intelligence training, primarily on the following subjects:

- a. deciphering of radio messages;
- b. preparation of latent writing by way of contact paper; and
- c. use of chemical inks.

The use of infrared rays for the transmission of information was recognized for the first time. In case of one agent a portable radiotelephone was secured which was destined for the receipt of intelligence assignments. The assignments of these agents concerned the following:

- a. military and economic targets in the Federal Republic;
- b. western security organs.

The below examples of these agents' intelligence activities are specifically noteworthy:

1. As a result of investigative intelligence work accomplished by the Protection of the Constitution, on 17 Mar 1963 the couple Gerhard and Elisabeth B. could be arrested.

[Handwritten: B. SUMMARY OF CASE]
B. had lived in West Berlin since war's end. His mother brought him up in the communist ideology. As a pupil, he was a FDJ member; in 1956 he joined the SED. In 1957 he married his wife who came from the Soviet Zone. The couple was unable to gain a financial footing in West Berlin; therefore in the Summer of 1959 they decided to move to the wife's parents in the Soviet Zone. However, in spite of numerous visits to the returnee agency and the SED Central Committee in East Berlin, they did not receive the residence permit for the Soviet Zone "since a SED comrade must stick to his post".

On the occasion of a visit to the returnee agency in the Soviet Sector, B. was introduced to a MFS member who stated his name was "Waldemar". "Waldemar" promised B., to give him financial support should he regularly furnish him political public opinion reports from West Berlin. B. did not hesitate to accept this offer. Every three to six weeks, he met "Waldemar" in taverns in the Soviet Sector, and on these occasions handed him the desired public opinion reports, for which each time he received amounts between DM-West 50 and 150.

In the Summer of 1959, Elisabeth B. had received employment with the railroad repairshop (EAW) in Treptow (Soviet Sector)

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with the help of SED offices. The end of 1960 she was contacted there by two MFS members and requested to secretly cooperate. At a meeting at a conspiratorial apartment in the Soviet Sector in January 1961, which was attended by the couple, detailed agreements were made. Gerhard and Elisabeth BUTH were to make full-time "observations" for the MFS and in return draw a firm salary. After a trial period of approximately three months, during which they had been briefed as to their future tasks at numerous meetings, they were pledged in writing by the MFS. At the same time B.'s reporting activities for "Waldemar" were discontinued.

On 2 May 1961, the B. couple entered 'service' with the MFS. As permanent quarters the MFS placed an office in Prenslauer Berg District, Knaackstrasse 8 (Soviet Sector) at their disposal which was disguised as "Surveying Office of Waldemar SCHULZ". To give the cover-story a solid basis, B. had to subscribe to the Soviet Zone magazine "Die Vermessungstechnik". Possible customers were to be given new appointments with the excuse the chief was not present at the moment. Anything further, was to be personally settled by MFS handling officer "Horst".

Since the couple was to be full-time at the MFS' disposal, the MFS saw that they received fictitious employment contracts. They were to tell relatives and friends in West Berlin and in the Soviet Zone that Gerhard B. was a buyer for the Deutsche Reichsbahn in Berlin-Rummelsburg and Elisabeth B. worked as a controller with Mitropa at the Friedrichstrasse RR Station. After 13 August 1961 a new cover-story was required since the MFS assumed that occupational activities in the Soviet Sector might attract attention in West Berlin. Upon "Horst's" urging, B. had to find himself a position as an independent sales-agent in West Berlin. The most important reason was that the independent activities would leave him sufficient time for his intelligence activities. At the time of his arrest, he was a sales-agent for automobile accessories.

After the blockade measures, Frau B. was no longer to work.

As per their instructions, the couple gradually let their connections with the SED and other political organizations die out. They had to hand their membership books (SED, DSP, DFB and FDJ) to "Horst" who continued to pay contributions for them in East Berlin.

For the purpose of transmitting the observation results to "Horst" and to receive new assignments, in the Summer of 1962 a radiotelephone connection on the basis of infrared rays was established. A prerequisite for this two-way radio connection was BUTH's home:

From the windows of his home at Goernallee he directly looked at a house located on the bank of the Trptow-Canal which belonged to the Soviet Sector. The distance was approximately 700 meters. That is where the MFS had established the counterpart of this connection.

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This instrument was used for two-way radio traffic in plain text at previously arranged times, which was absolutely safe from being overheard.

Other ways of communication between handling office and agent couple were

- o lead letterdrops,
- o information in latent writing by use of contact paper to cover-addresses in East Berlin,
- o enciphered radio messages (A-3),
- o meetings in East Berlin.

After the blockade measures of 13 August 1961, "Horst" used to await the meeting-partners at the Friedrichstrasse subway station, at the previously agreed time and personally pilot them through the controls.

The first observation orders which "Horst" gave the agents, concerned East Berlin residents exclusively. If necessary, the observation was to be extended to West Berlin. After 13 Aug 1961, primarily West Berliners were assignment targets. All target persons received cover-names. "Horst" usually gave them a description of each target person which he sometimes supplemented by presenting a photograph. He explained where and when the target person was to be 'picked up' and how long the observation had to last. In some cases B. also knew the target persons' true name. Under the cover-designation 'Graf' the B. couple early in 1963 repeatedly had to shadow employees of the Land Agency for the Protection of the Constitution about 1630 hours (close of business) in order to find out where they lived. All observation results had to be reported in writing - after the establishment of two-way radio connection, also verbally. At the start of their intelligence activities, both Gerhard and Elisabeth B. received DM-West 300 and DM-East 100 per month, also reimbursement of expenses in East and West Marke.

In September 1961 their "salary" was increased by DM 100 a month, and from November 1961 on, their assigners paid them DM-West 450 per month. In addition, they sometimes received a special bonus for certain cases and once an "advanced salary payment" of DM-West 600 which later on, was not deducted.

According to the present investigation results, handling officer "Horst" probably was Maj. Lieutenant *ccq with officer*

Purchase MS Handling Officer of MS Agent GERHARD BUTH
off. assignments
(Lt.) FNU LEIDING @ HORST

who worked with Section 1 of Department VIII of the MGS District Administration Greater Berlin.

2. Office Employee Bruno WILHELM

was employed as a Oberreferent (section chief) with the Ministry for External and Internal German Trade in East Berlin until 1956. His wife Doris was sales-shop branch chief of Konsum in Bestensee near Berlin. Since at her place of employment

Summary of BfV investigation of intell activities

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accusations were raised against Dora W., the couple fled to the Federal Republic in June 1956 and settled down in Hamburg. Early in 1957 they returned to the Soviet Zone since their effort to establish a business, failed. When attempting to again gain a footing in the Soviet Zone, W. came into contact with the MFS and committed himself to carry out intelligence activities. During four weeks W. received theoretical and practical training from his MFS handling officer "Manfred" on the following subjects:

conspiratorial conduct,
photography,
enciphering and deciphering,
use of contact paper.

His wife attended some of the meetings. The MFS had assigned her the task of supporting her husband's intelligence activities. Furthermore, it was being considered to employ Frau W.'s sister, Erna RICHTER, for intelligence tasks in the Federal Republic, together with the W. couple. Erna R. who had already lived at her sister's home for several years, agreed to it.

Early in September 1957, W. "fled" to West Berlin, provided with his Federal personal identity card (which was issued in Hamburg), a camera, a writing-pad with contact-paper, code keys and DM-West 1,000 and according to his instructions, immediately went on to Duesseldorf. He did not request emergency admission. Four weeks later, Dora W. joined her husband who had meantime found work and accommodation in Duesseldorf. As per her instructions, Erna RICHTER joined her sister in Duesseldorf in July 1958. Until the Spring of 1958 she had worked as a technician for electrical technic with the "Deutscher Innen- und Aussenhandel" (DIA - German Internal and External Trade) in East Berlin. In order to attract as little attention to her flight as possible in East Berlin, upon "Manfred's" orders she had to change to a new place of employment with a rather unimportant East Berlin enterprise for the last few months prior to her assignment to the West. In Duesseldorf she at first worked as a typist with an underground construction firm, however, after a year already changed jobs and accepted employment with the Technical Association for Metal Plate Wrappings. In reply to a want ad in a Cologne daily newspaper, in the Summer of 1961 she obtained employment as secretary with the "Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbaende" (BDA - Federal Organization of German Employers' Associations) in Cologne. She hereby completed what the MFS had instructed her to do: to get access to a central economic association in the Federal Republic.

After Bruno W. had found employment with a Cologne branch firm of the Oetker-Combine about the same time, he moved to Cologne together with his wife and his sister-in-law.

Bruno W.'s first assignment was to vet certain persons and to collect information on pipeline routes which had been described to him. His investigations extended to intermediate stations, security measures, ground conditions, control etc. He furnished sketches of partial routes of the pipelines.

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The MfS displayed particular interest in the "Virtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahl" (Economic Association Iron and Steel) in Duesseldorf. W. was to report among other things, on the names, addresses, daily habits and primarily on events of a compromising nature with regard to persons employed there.

After his move to Cologne, W. allegedly was primarily instructed to pass on the information to East Berlin which his sister-in-law had procured from the BDA.

W. informed his MfS handling agency on the results of his intelligence activities either at East Berlin meetings or at meetings with MfS instructors in the Federal Republic and also through reports in latent writing to cover-addresses in East Berlin. Further, he deposited treasonous material in various dead letterdrops which he had established in the Duesseldorf/Cologne area. Moreover, he received instructions from his handling office through coded radio messages. His wife helped him when receiving the messages. Fran W. repeatedly traveled as a courier to East Berlin and from these trips always brought back money and new instructions. For an emergency, all the three agents had been issued falsified Federal identity cards which they were to use on their flight to the Soviet Zone.

Handwritten: In the Spring of 1962, a resident agent assigned by the MfS took over the handling of this agent group. This was Johann SCHNEER, identified economist, of Utmüller/Siegbreis, who in 1956 had moved from the Soviet Zone to the Federal Republic without having received emergency admission. Since about 1958 he had carried out intelligence activities for the MfS.

Prior to his employment as resident agent in 1962, he had been subject to thorough intelligence training at a villa in East Berlin. This extended among others to the following subjects:

- o establishment of dead letterdrops;
- o receipt and deciphering of radio messages via A-3 traffic;
- o preparation of Mikrats and latent writing.

For the completion of his intelligence tasks SCH. also was equipped with a special micro-camera and a radio set.

He received the news destined for him, from his assigners via radio transmissions. Besides, he also received assignments for sources WILLUHN and RICHTER handled by him, from an "instructor" whom he met in Cologne and Duesseldorf at least 8 to 10 times up until the Spring of 1963. WILLUHN knew him as "Jupp". He maintained connection with him through meetings held in Cologne at regular intervals of one or two weeks. He forwarded the intelligence material which the agent group had procured, in compliance with his instructions, to his assigners via dead letterdrops in the Cologne-Duesseldorf Area.

His wife helped him. The dead letterdrops were emptied by a MfS courier.

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SCH. reported on his activities at meetings with his assigners in East Berlin.

The WILLHEM couple, SCHNEER and Erna RICHTER, as well as the MfS courier were in the Fall of 1963.

3. Karl-Heinz LANGNER, Former Oberwachmeister of the People's Police *(Summary of G.V. investigation of INTELL. ACTIVITIES)*

JUNO
fled to West Berlin in 1949. Early in 1950 he returned to the Soviet Zone. In May 1950 a Soviet Zone military court sentenced him to 25 years penitentiary for alleged espionage. At a later date, the punishment was reduced to 12 years.

While serving his sentence, LANGNER was contacted by the MfS. In July 1956 a co-worker of the Soviet Zone State Security Service promised him a premature discharge should he be willing to cooperate with the MfS. L. agreed and committed himself in writing to cooperate. He received the cover-name "Juno". On 27 Aug 1956 he was discharged from prison.

L.'s pledge was preceded by a meeting with one of his former school-mates some months previously, who called on L. at the Torgau penitentiary introducing himself as "a co-worker of the Soviet Zone Ministry of Interior". He simultaneously emphasized that he was a member of a commission checking the premature discharge of prisoners. In reply to a pertinent question asked by L., he hinted that he would also speak for him should he be prepared to cooperate with the "Ministry of Interior".

According to the circumstances, the school-mate was a MfS co-worker. He had instructions to pave the road for L.'s planned recruitment.

A few weeks after his discharge, L. "fled" to West Berlin and requested emergency admission. On 6 Oct 1958 he received permission to permanently stay in the Federal Republic. At first he worked as a sales-agent and later on, as an independent book-keeper in Reutlingen where he had moved in 1957, with the MfS' approval. His mother lived in Reutlingen. Until his final legalization, L. did not receive intelligence assignments. Thereafter, he furnished public opinion reports of a general nature until 1960. Until 1960 L. maintained contact with his handling agencies in writing through the cover-address

MfS Accomodation
Address for MfS Agent
KARL-HEINZ LANGNER
JANZ, Heinz
Berlin NO 55,
Lippener Strasse 18, E Germ

and through meetings in East Berlin. The meetings among others, were held at Café ZENNER and at conspiratorial apartments.

In the Spring of 1960, L. was subordinated to MfS handling officer "Hans-Werner".

He received the assignment from him to "closely befriend" himself with the husband of his cousin, a co-worker of a western intelligence service who lived in Berlin at that time, and attempt to win his confidence. L. happened to meet him at the

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Berlin emergency admission camp already in 1956 and later on, due to the family relations, repeatedly visited him at his home. The MfS knew this.

Upon orders of the MfS, L. now intensified the contact with his cousin and her husband. He reported the conversations they had, to "Hans-Werner". Subject of his reports also were the experiences of a vacation they had spent together in Spain. During the period from 1960 to 1962, L. met his handling agent approximately 13 times at a Villa on Mueggelsee in East Berlin. L. traveled in his car or by plane to attend these meetings. For his air trips he received a falsified passport in the name of

Used by
MfS Agent KARL-HEINZ
LANGNER.

(b) SOLEPP, Herbert,
born on 22 May 1932 in Muenberg, Germany
living in Munich, Kopernikus-Str. 5. W. Germ.

...ist. Once when he drove through the Soviet Zone, Soviet Zone border organs retained his passport for a short period.

L. received orders in writing to attend meetings, and after his training in A-3 traffic, via radio message. He announced his arrival by telegram to the previously mentioned cover-address:

In March 1963, L. received the assignment to install a so-called "radio pick up device-transmitter" at the home of his relative who meantime had moved to Munich. The transmitter had the following dimensions: 40 x 7 x 5 cm. L. took it in his car from East Berlin to Munich.

On 17 May 1963 he overnights at his cousin's home. On this occasion he affixed the transmitter underneath the living-room cupboard. He reported to his assigner on the completion of the assignment. At irregular intervals the transmitter was operated by means of remote control. There also was a device to keep it in permanent operation. This was to start operating when the remote control failed. By turning a button at the front side of the transmitter it could be put into such operation.

No information has yet been learned as to the counterpart of the transmitter.

According to L.'s statements, the MfS intended to win over the member of the western intelligence service or his wife for cooperation. Transmission of possibly embarrassing conversations by the transmitter was to supply the required compromising information for an approach. On 2 June 1963, the transmitter was discovered by chance. L. had received treasonous monies in the amount of approximately DM 5,000.

LANGNER was arrested on 10 June 1963.

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IV. Information as to the Organization of Soviet Zone Services

During the year under review, valuable information regarding the organization of Soviet Zone intelligence services was obtained through the statements of several defectors.

1.) Integration of the Intelligence Section of the Soviet Zone Border Troops into the MfS (Ministry for State Security)

On 7 May 1963, Lieutenant Werner PRETZER, then a member of MfS' HA I, defected to the FRG.

According to his statements (which were confirmed by a second defector) the intelligence section of the Soviet Zone Border Troops was placed under the control of MfS and integrated into HA I - Berlin, Schnellerstrasse, as early as in 1960/1961. HA I, which formerly was exclusively concerned with counterintelligence tasks, is now divided into a counterintelligence section and an intelligence section. Both sections have their central offices at the HQ of the NVA-Border Troops in Berlin-Pasts.

The intelligence and counterintelligence sections have sub-sections at the Border Brigades of the Soviet Zone border which, in turn, have operational groups with the Border Regiments. No intelligence missions are conducted at the Soviet Zone border in the East.

Since early 1960, two operational co-workers of Section XV of the respective MfS District Administration, are assigned to each "operational intelligence group".

A.) Responsibilities

According to PRETZER's statement, Main Department (HA) I supervises the subordinated sections, sub-sections and operational groups, and controls their activity and endeavors are made for close co-operation between the counterintelligence and intelligence section. Work conferences and an exchange of information (however, without mentioning sources) take place regularly.

The counterintelligence section is responsible for the internal and external security of the Border Troops and for this purpose employs a number of unofficial co-workers within and without the Border Troops. The main purpose is to detect and if possible, turn agents of western intelligence services. Besides, the mood and morale of soldiers and Border Troops who are "opposed to the Regime" are kept under constant observation.

A net of unofficial co-workers serves for the security protection of the 500-m protective belt.

The intelligence section has taken over the tasks of the former sub-section 'West', geographically as well as technically, namely in particular, the collecting of information on military and "semi-military" organizations stationed in the vicinity of the border on the FRG-side (Customs Service, Federal Border Police, Bavarian Border Police, German Armed Forces, Allied Troops).

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B.) Working Methods

a) Illegal Border Crossing

A special officer is assigned to each operational group, whose exclusive task is, to organize the infiltration of agents into the FBC and conduct such illegal border crossings in both directions. This applies to secret co-workers of HA I and other MFS Main Departments and Departments. No agency is permitted to infiltrate agents on its own. The only persons participating in the illegal border crossing operation are the special officer, the competent operational co-worker and the person to be infiltrated.

The special officer is to reconnoiter suitable points for the illegal border crossing; for this purpose he uses unofficial co-workers who are familiar with the terrain on both sides of the border, and who can give a plausible reason for their presence in the western border area.

The special officer is to ensure, that the border guards are withdrawn from the border section in which the border crossing point is located and this point is only revealed to the handling agent of the person to be infiltrated en-route to the demarcation line. Should difficulties arise during the operation, the use of the respective border crossing point is completely or temporarily discontinued.

b) Uniforms, Identification Passes

The members of the operational intelligence and counter-intelligence groups wear the same uniforms as do the other Border Troops soldiers; on occasion they also wear civilian clothing.

The members of the counterintelligence and intelligence sections have uniform service passes. A stamp "C" on the second page authorizes the holder of the pass to freely move about in the border area.

c) Border Crossers

Border crossers coming from the West, are apprehended by Border Troops soldiers after they crossed the demarcation line. Documents or items found in their possession are kept in custody without prior control or examination. Border Troops soldiers are not permitted to interrogate border crossers (this includes questions as to personal data), thereby preventing the unmasking of possible recruitment candidates.

Border crossers are immediately referred to the competent operational intelligence group.

3.) Organization and Tasks of the MFS Main Department VIII

A. Organization

The MFS Main Department VIII, headed by Lt. Col. Albert SCHUBERT, consists of 6 departments, each of which is subdivided into 3 sections. The tasks of Department VII at present are still performed by Department I. Department VI supposedly does not yet exist.

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B. Tasks

a) Department I (Chief: Capt. GITTER)

1.) Section 1 with 6 observer groups is responsible for observations in the Soviet Sector of Berlin. "Targets" of such observations are

- o visitors from the West and Soviet Zone citizens who are suspected of "working for the enemy"
- o visitors from the West, who are considered for a possible recruitment, because of their occupation or hometown location
- o unofficial co-workers of MfS (IM - inoffizielle Mitarbeiter) for the purpose of checking their reliability.

Such observations, if necessary, may also extend to GDR-territory.

2.) Section 2 also conducts observations in the Soviet Zone and Soviet Sector of Berlin. This section is exclusively staffed with MfS-co-workers.

3.) Section 3, in addition to observations also conducts executive measures. Besides 9 technical co-workers, this section also employs People's Policemen.

b) Department II (Chief: Major Kurt ZIMMERMANN)

1.) Section 1 is responsible for investigations in the Soviet Sector of Berlin.

2.) Section 2 is also responsible for "conspirative searches". The co-workers of this section must be familiar with "lock"-technics (i.e. they must be able to open locks of various systems with master keys or other means). Master locksmiths are preferably recruited for this section.

3.) Section 3 is responsible for the "isolation" of prominent persons who emigrated from the West to the Soviet Zone. "Isolation" as practiced by MfS means the accommodating and care for such persons in conspirative buildings.

c) Department III (Chief: Lt. Col. Fred SCHUBERT)

and

Department IV (Chief: Capt. HESTIE)

Both Departments conduct observations and investigations in the FRG and Berlin (West). These Departments primarily employ secret co-workers residing in the target areas.

d) Department V (Chief: Major PLASCH)

The responsibilities of Department V include the handling of all technical and financial questions within the scope of HA VIII. It procures technical aids for operational purposes (radio sets, listening devices, optical equipment, etc.), purchases furniture for conspirative apartments (buildings) and administers operational funds.

Section E, which is attached to this Department, procures documents, passes, stamps, letter heads for cover-firms, sign-boards for such firms, etc.

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e) Department VII (Chief: Major LINDNER)

Since early 1963, Department VII was staffed with specially selected co-workers from throughout the entire Soviet Zone. They are to ensure an intensified control of visitors to the Soviet Sector at the control points of the Berlin sector border.

f) Personnel Composition of an Observer Group

An observer group, in addition to the group leader, consists of group-members (Brigadiere) and unofficial co-workers (IM). The required strength of a group is 13 men; the group leader and the 'Brigadiere' are members of the Ministry of Interior and are exclusively assigned to the MFS; they have a police rank and possess a service book and People's Police badge. The 'IM' (unofficial co-workers) are also full-time MFS-co-workers. A feigned employment is entered in their personal records for cover purposes only.

g) Recruitment of Secret Co-Workers for the Observer Groups

Every co-worker of Main Department VIII is obligated to recruit new 'IM' (recruitment quota per co-worker: 1 to 2 new co-workers per quarter). The MFS co-workers may obtain pointers as to possible recruitment candidates, in three different ways:

- o Through the examination of People's Police helpers records at the People's Police Offices in East Berlin;
- o through the examination of the records of discharged members of the 'NVA' (National People's Army) or other "armed organizations", at the competent registration offices;
- o through the examination of cadre-records in "socialized enterprises";

Such record checks are made primarily with a view to ascertaining subject's political reliability, which is determined on his "social activity" and SED-membership. West-contacts are considered undesirable. If a candidate is found suitable, confidential investigations are made either at the subject's employing enterprise or in his neighborhood, depending on the circumstances. Only if the inquiries have brought forth no detrimental information, is the candidate approached at his home. On this occasion the prospective co-workers basic willingness to co-operate and his suitability are determined as far as this is possible. The next six months are considered as a probationary period. Minor information-assignments are to accustom the recruitment candidate in co-operating with the MFS. The actual recruitment is preceded by a thorough background investigation of subject's entire relatives. The results of all these measures are to be laid down in a several-page recruitment proposal, to be signed by the Department chief, and only then will subject be obligated in writing. An assignment is then given to Department M for a check of all incoming and outgoing mail to ascertain whether subject has any connections which he has so far kept secret. All MFS-co-workers are subsequently subjected to such mail censorship at irregular intervals.

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It is often particularly difficult to inconspicuously terminate the 'IM's' previous employment.

h) The Conducting of Observations

All operational departments of MfS are authorized to give observation assignments to Main Department VIII. There is a special card file, containing the names of FRG-citizens and Berliners (West), whose observation after their entry into the Soviet Sector is considered of interest. Copies of this card file are available at all border crossing points. One or several observer groups are kept on the alert at conspirative offices in the vicinity of each border crossing point. Should a competent officer, during the pass control, notice a name of a person entering the Soviet Sector is in the observation assignment card file, he will notify an observer group, which immediately takes up the observation. The observers are merely given a personal description (if necessary also car license number) and a cover-designation; they do not learn the target person's true name. The observation is conducted uninterruptedly -also at night- and does not end until target person's exit from the Soviet Sector.

The observer groups are equipped with the following aids: passenger cars, motorcycles, bicycles, open and concealed cameras and, if necessary, Japanese walkie-talkies.

A detailed report is to be made as to each observation. Conspirative photographs of the target person and all persons with whom he was together, are to be included.

As a matter of principle, the observer groups are kept ignorant of the MfS' assigning department.

3.) The MfS "Passport and Tracing" Department (APP - Abteilung "Pass und Fahndung")

In the Summer of 1962, the MfS-Department "Passport and Tracing" (APP) was set up, to ensure an intensified control of intersectoral traffic. This Department is to co-ordinate and ensure greater effectiveness of all control and tracing measures at the border crossing points to the FRG and Berlin (West).

Valuable information as to the organizational structure and working methods of this Department was obtained from Heins SCHNEIDER of Harbke, County Oschersleben, a former Sub-Sergeant of the NVA -Border Command-, who defected to the FRG on 13 Mar 1963.

SCHNEIDER was a member of APP since its establishment on 1 Jul 1962, and was primarily engaged in passport control at the border control point (KPP - Kontrollpassierpunkt) Marienborn-Autobahn.

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A. Organizational Structure and Personnel of 'APF'.

The "Passport and Tracing" Department within the Ministry for State Security is headed by Col. ZWITTALK (phon.). The "Chief of the State Border West of the APF", who has his office in the building of the KPP Marienborn-Autobahn, is responsible for the entire activity of APF at the demarcation line toward the FRG. He supervises the "KPP-chiefs of APF" at the Border Customs Offices (GZA - Grenzsollsaeter) at the border crossing points to the FRG.

All key-positions within APF are held by full-time MfS-members. In part, these men were previously assigned as liaison officers to the Soviet Zone border control offices and to a considerable extent, members of the Soviet Zone Customs Administration were also recruited for the establishment of APF. As a rule, customs officers were taken over as full-time MfS co-workers and given a similar rank. Middle-grade customs officials (Zollunterfuhrer) (like SCHNEIDER himself) were assigned established posts in the NVA-Border Command.

On 1 Feb 1963, the "Passport and Tracing" Department was subdivided into

- a) Tracing Groups,
- b) Passport Groups;

both groups working independently. At the KPP Marienborn-Autobahn, at present 4 shifts of each group take turns at duty stations.

The duty officer (shift leader) of the Tracing Group holds the dual position of "operational officer" and as such, outranks the shift leader of the Passport Groups.

All members of APF perform their duties in Soviet Zone Border Troop uniforms.

B. Working Methods of APF

a) The Tasks of the Passport Group

The official duties of the members of the Passport Group include the following tasks:

1. Checking of foreigners
2. Transit control
3. Checking of buses
4. Checking of Fair-visitors

In all these cases their task is essentially confined to a passport and identity control. Fair exhibitors are subject to special handling and are given priority, whereas Fair-visitors are controlled with a view to ascertaining whether they were born in towns located in the present territory of the GDR. If necessary, they are questioned. Travelers, who previously resided in the GDR and fled to the FRG, are referred to the operational officer, who decides whether the Fair-visitor may or may not proceed.

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The members of the Passport Group also have instructions to examine the temporary Berlin identity cards as to the occupation of the holder. Persons with "interesting" occupations are referred to the 'shift leader' of the Passport Group for informational questioning.

b) The Tasks of the Tracing Group

Depending on the traffic situation, besides the operational officer, the Tracing Group places 2 to 4 tracing controllers on duty; a specially secured room at the control barracks is placed at their disposal. From the passport counter, all documents which international travelers are required to submit are passed through a small wall slit into the adjoining tracing room. The tracing controllers will then check, whether the passenger's name is listed in one of the available card files. In an adjoining room, the so-called "documentation room", there are facilities for photostating of identity documents.

SCHNEIDER stated that, according to existing directions, for example, all car license papers and identity documents of Federal Republic persons traveling by car, are to be photographed.

Passengers, whose names are listed in one of the tracing card files and whose file cards do not contain a special entry (for example: "notify operational officer"), as a rule are apprehended by members of the Tracing Group.

C. APF-Card Files at the KPF Marienborn-Autobahn, for the Control and Supervision of Interzonal Passenger Traffic

a) 'Wanted Persons' Card File

The most essential aid of the Tracing Group is the 'Wanted Persons' Card File which, according to SCHNEIDER's estimate, contains at least 20,000 names. This card file is consulted for all card file and identity checks. Compared hereto, the Soviet Zone "Wanted Persons List", which contains the same names, is rarely used in practice. The 'Wanted Persons' Card File contains printed cards of a yellowish brown color, size DIN A 6. This card file exclusively contains the names of persons incriminated or suspected in a criminal or political respect. In addition to the personal data of the wanted person, the cards contain entries as to the wanting authority, the nature of the offence and directions as to the measure to be taken, should the wanted person appear. The cards of "deleted" persons are provided with an appropriate note and filed separately.

b) Code Number Card File

The Code Number Card File is of special importance from the intelligence viewpoint. For internal purposes it is also called "Agent Card File" by APF-members. This card file is prepared by MfS and contains about 300 to 350 cards. SCHNEIDER believes, that this card file contains the names of persons, whom MfS suspects of working for a western intelligence service, but also those of MfS-agents active in the FRG. Each card has a code number (arabic figures), the personal data of the person concerned and a note as to the telephone number to be called, should the person appear. The telephone number entered on the majority of the cards is that of the operational officer. If necessary strikes, he is only to be notified as to the

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code number. The operational officer has a work file at his disposal, in which the code numbers are interpreted in detail.

c) Special Card File

An Automobile Card File (about 70 cards) contains certain FRG and Berlin (West) car license numbers.

A Business Card File contains data as to business firms, motorized vehicles and drivers who are involved in commercial traffic between the FRG and Berlin (West) or the Soviet Zone, and pass through the KPP Marienborn-Autobahn.

Other card files contain data concerning the entire Berlin traffic on certain occasions (for example, anniversary of the erection of the 'Wall', meetings of 'Regional Associations' in Berlin). However, these card files are only used upon special instructions.

C. The Soviet Intelligence Services

I. General

In 1963, 84 cases of attempted or completed recruitments for the Soviet intelligence services (KGB and GRU) have come to notice (1962: 76). About 6% of the total number of known recruitments were effected by the Soviet intelligence services.

Fifty-nine of the approached persons originated from the West, twenty-five from the Soviet Bloc's power sphere.

II. Recruiting Methods

No essential changes were noticed as to the recruiting methods of the Soviet intelligence services. They are still largely identical to those of the Soviet Zone intelligence services. The occasions of recruitment primarily were private or business West-East contacts, immigration or emigration plans or ties of relationship to the West or East.

About 60% of the recruited persons actually became active in the intelligence sphere.

1.) Soviet Intelligence Service Recruitment in Soviet Zone Reception Camps:

In 1963 several cases again came to notice in which immigrants or returnees in Soviet Zone Reception Camps were approached by members of Soviet intelligence services, with a view to their intelligence recruitment. In part, suitable persons were introduced to the Soviet intelligence services by MfS. The known cases proved, that the Soviet intelligence services also increasingly endeavored (after the blocking measures of 13 Aug 1961) to recruit agents in the Soviet Zone Reception Camps.

Late in July 1962, the electrician Edmund T., a resident of the Ruhr area, illegally entered the Soviet Zone near Helmstedt, for family reasons. During his interrogation at Camp Barby he furnished information regarding British ammunition depots in the FRG. T. thereupon was introduced to three members of a Soviet intelligence service at Camp Barby. After several interrogations, T. was obligated for an intelligence co-operation by the Soviets. He was given the assignment to return to the FRG, to further procure information as to the ammunition depot, to photograph

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documents and to bring along only the negatives to the next meeting which was to take place in Berlin (West). He was to announce the date of the meeting in a couched language to a Magdeburg cover address.

After he had received DM 50 to cover his expenses, T. was deported to the FRG via Marienborn. During the check at Helmstedt, he kept his intelligence contacts secret. T. then returned to his family.

Late in September 1962, he received a reminder, mailed in Berlin (West). T. thereupon again entered the Soviet Zone illegally. When he was apprehended by the Soviet Zone border patrol, he requested, that he again be taken to Camp Barby. There he again met the Soviet Intelligence Service co-workers, who had recruited him. After having reported verbally and in writing, T. was given the assignment, to return to the FRG, to look for employment and accommodation in the Brunswick area and to keep an eye on concentrations of German and British Troops in this area. If necessary, he was to announce a meeting to the Magdeburg cover-address. Future meetings were to take place in Eastberlin.

T. was given DM (West) 160 against a receipt. With the assistance of Soviet Zone Border Troops soldiers, the Soviets then infiltrated him back into the FRG near Luebeck.

Immediately upon his return, T. disclosed his contact to the intelligence section of the Police. - - - -

In September 1962, the commercial employee Klaus M. illegally entered the Soviet Zone with his 19-year old girl-friend, in order to marry there. After having crossed the demarcation line, he was questioned by Soviet Zone Border Troops officers as to police officials stationed at his hometown, as well as his brother-in-law, who served with the Police in Bonn. M. answered these questions obligingly. After their assignment to the Reception Camp in Pritzlar, M. and his girl-friend applied for permission to return to the FRG. MFS-co-workers told them that their application could only be granted, if M. would obligate himself to co-operate. M. agreed to do so. During a subsequent meeting with an MFS-member, M. was introduced to a co-worker of a Soviet intelligence service. M. again expressed his willingness to co-operate in the field of intelligence to the latter, and signed an obligation. The Soviet intelligence service member gave M. a Magdeburg cover-address and assignments targeted against German Armed Forces installations in Lower Saxony. M. was instructed to come to a meeting in Eastberlin in Mid-December 1962.

M. was provided with R.R. tickets and traveled with his girl-friend back to Hamburg via Schwanheide.

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2.) Recruitment of Russian Emigrants desiring to be repatriated

The Soviet intelligence services still continue their practice of giving intelligence probation-assignments to emigrants desiring to be repatriated, prior to granting permission for repatriation.

Late in 1959, the radio-mechanic Paul S. of Munich (who originated from the Soviet Union) contacted the Soviet Embassy in Bonn, with the request that he be permitted to return to his brother who lived in the Ukraine. The Soviet Embassy referred him to the "Repatriation Committee" in Eastberlin. After contacts had been established in writing, S. was invited to come to Eastberlin for a personal interview. After having announced his arrival in writing, in May 1962, S. traveled to Eastberlin. At the Friedrichstrasse R.R.-Station S. was being awaited by an alleged co-worker of the Repatriation Committee. During a conversation at the office of the Committee, S. was questioned in detail as to his employment and friends. His question as to his repatriation was not answered. On the contrary, he was instructed to send West-German newspapers and periodicals of Russian emigrant organizations to an Eastberlin private address. He also was to travel pro-communistic persons in Munich and name them on the occasion of another meeting in Eastberlin. After having received a refund of his travel expenses, S. traveled back to Munich.

Early in October 1962, S. again traveled to Eastberlin. He was again met at the Friedrichstrasse R.R.-Station by an alleged member of the Committee. He was then interrogated by the Soviets as to the results of his investigations. S. who had merely sent a few periodicals in the meantime, but had not taken any other steps, claimed that he had been prevented by illness. In reply to his question as to the date of his repatriation, he was told that it would take several months; in the meantime he was to complete the second assignment. Upon his return to Munich, S., who had been overcome by doubts meantime, disclosed the facts to the Criminal Police.

In December 1962, the 37-year old Russian emigrant Michael S. intended to return to his mother in the USSR. In 1942, S. had been conscripted for work as a foreign laborer in Austria. From 1944 to war's end he had voluntarily served with the Waffen-SS. After the war he primarily lived in the FRG.

Upon his transfer to the Soviet Zone, S. was referred to a Soviet agency in Chemnitz. Members of this agency reproved him for having fought on the German side during the war and not immediately returning to his home-country after the war.

The Soviets instructed S. to return to the FRG, where he was to procure information regarding German and allied military units. He also was to vet persons who cooperated with Russian emigrant organizations or participated in the publication of emigrant newspapers.

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S. was given DM (West) 100, as an advance payment and was promised that his mother (who lived in the Ukraine) would be notified and supported.

The next meeting was to take place in the Soviet Sector of Berlin; he was given an Eastberlin cover-address to which he was to announce the meeting date.

3.) Recruitment of late Re-Settlers

During the year under review (1963), information was again received, confirming the continuation of the Soviet intelligence services' previous practice, namely to approach late re-settlers with a view to their intelligence recruitment, prior to their exit from the USSR.

Alexander U., who was born in the Ukraine as the son of German parents, at war's end lived in Berlin. After the invasion of the Soviet Troops in 1945, he was deported to the Soviet Union. In 1946 he was sentenced to 5 years forced labor on charges of alleged "counter-revolutionary" agitation and, after completion of his sentence deported to Siberia, where he married an Estonian. Due to an amnesty, the couple U. was permitted to return to Estonia.

Ever since 1960, U. endeavored to obtain permission for his repatriation to Berlin. In 1961, when he again contacted the passport office, he was approached by a KGB-member named "BORIS". Thereafter, "BORIS" maintained contacts with U. The meetings, in the majority of cases, took place in hotel rooms. "BORIS" promised to assist U. in procuring an exit permit, provided he (U.) would also do him a favor. U. agreed to do so.

He was given instructions, upon his arrival at Berlin (West), to build up a sound existence and resume his contacts with his former friends and acquaintances. "BORIS" also named some re-settlers who (as "BORIS" mentioned) had failed to maintain their contacts with the Soviet Union. U. was to trace their whereabouts in the FRG. He also was to send detailed reports as to Berlin living conditions to his wife, who was to remain in the Soviet Union for the time being. "BORIS" would be advised accordingly, since these letters would be censored by his agency. Later-on, U. would be visited by a contact-man in Berlin (West), who would give him further instructions.

Upon his arrival in Berlin (West), U. disclosed his contacts to the Criminal Police.

4.) Recruitment of Federal Republic Citizens

Since April 1962, the chemical engineer Herbert B. was employed at a construction site in the USSR on behalf of his West-German firm. In November 1962, he was apprehended by the Soviet Mifilia, while trying to purchase gold from a Soviet citizen. This deal had been arranged by a Soviet interpreter. B. was interrogated by local police authorities, and threatened with an 8-year prison sentence on the grounds of an "offence against the currency law". Later KGB-members intervened and told him that he might evade punishment, if he would prove his "Loyalty to the Soviet Union".

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B. was then released to his quarters, but was instructed to again meet the KGB-members the following day at a hotel. On this occasion the Soviets tried to induce B. to inform on his co-workers. When he failed to attend the subsequent meetings, the construction supervisor was notified that B. was to immediately leave the Soviet Union.

It is believed that, in this case, KGB tried to intimidate B. through a provocation, with a view to his intelligence recruitment.

In August 1961, 21-year old Heike K. of Frankfurt/Main accepted a position as children's nurse with an American diplomat, who served with the US-Embassy in Moscow. In Moscow she made friends with a German couple who led a very sociable life. At their home she made the acquaintance of members of foreign diplomatic missions, as well as Soviet citizens. In November 1961, this couple introduced her to a Soviet teacher (f.), with whom she made friends in order to learn Russian. Late in June 1962, at the home of this teacher, Heike K. was approached by two KGB-members, who accused her of being an American spy and of having conducted black-market deals with various Soviet citizens. After threatening to imprison her because of this offence, the KGB-members relented and arranged for another meeting with her on the following day. Finally, she was obligated to strict secrecy. Up to the end of July 1962, K. met six times with the KGB-members. The meetings and conversations took place either in the KGB-members' car, in a conspirative apartment or in restaurants. K. was requested to give a detailed description of her friends and acquaintances and identify persons known to her on the basis of photographs.

She also was to establish new contacts at the American Club. She was permitted to maintain her contacts with her teacher-friend and not prohibited from discussing her intelligence contacts with the latter.

When, early in August 1962, Heike K.'s employer returned to Moscow from a longer trip to another country, she disclosed her secret to him.

She was thereupon sent back to the FRG.

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III. Command and Communication Channels

In 1963, primarily the operational offices of the Soviet Intelligence Services in Eastberlin, Dresden, Leipzig and Magdeburg came to notice. The majority of all intelligence operations directed against the FRG, continued to originate with the operational office in Eastberlin. In the majority of cases, meetings took place in the Soviet Sector of Berlin, whereas only individual meetings took place in the FRG or in neutral foreign countries (mainly in Vienna).

As regards the Soviet intelligence services' conspirative communication methods, no changes worth mentioning were noted.

IV. Intelligence Targets

In 1963, 225 intelligence assignments made by the Soviet services came to notice. The majority of all assignments known, were targeted against military objects.

The following is a breakdown of assignments:

a) Preparatory assignments (vetting, spotting, recruiting)	23 %
b) Political espionage	16 %
c) Military espionage	33 %
d) Economic espionage	2 %

Approximately 145 assignments (- 65 %) were carried out.

In order to obtain political information, the Soviet intelligence services attempted to penetrate mainly important Federal authorities. The following case is a typical example:

In the Fall of 1961, the MfS contacted Karl N., precision mechanic in Eastberlin. After several meetings, the MfS member spoke of N.'s sister Monika who is employed by a Bonn Ministry. At a subsequent meeting, besides the MfS member, a Soviet IS officer was present who then handled the case. N. was ordered to write his sister in Bonn a letter inviting her to come to Eastberlin, which he did. However, Monika N. did not comply with this invitation.

N. received an intelligence training from Jan until Oct 1962. His Soviet handling officer demanded a background report and photo of his sister.

N. and his handling officer made several visits to Berlin (West) as preparation for a trip through the West, on which occasion, he was fitted out with western clothing.

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In mid-Dec 1962, by order of the Soviet IS, N. traveled to Bonn. For this trip, his handling officer had given him a falsified Berlin (West) identity card and DM-West 700; besides, he helped him pass the Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse control point and went with him to the Bahnhof ZOO (RR station) where he stayed with him until the departure of the Interpersonal Train.

N. was to look up his sister in Bonn and establish whether she was willing to give the Soviet IS information as to her work, "for the maintenance of peace". In case of danger, she could at any time go to the Soviet Zone, Austria or Switzerland, and, possibly, they would open bank accounts for her in these countries.

Monika N. declined this attempted recruitment. Offices of the Allied Forces stationed in the FRG, also were targets of Soviet intelligence services.

On 17 Dec 1962, Georg D., teacher of languages from Altenhof, county Eberwalde, disclosed at the LFV (Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution) in Stuttgart, that the Soviet IS had assigned him to travel to the FRG. His interrogation produced the following facts:

D. gave Russian language lessons at the Goethe School in Eberwalde. Early in 1961, he was contacted by the Soviet IS. At first, he had connections with members of the Eberwalde local Soviet IS office for whom he was to carry out vetting assignments in Berlin (West) and work as informer in Eberwalde. In Mar 1962, Soviet IS officers from Berlin-Karlshorst took over D.'s handling. At a meeting in Sep, he was ordered to travel to the FRG during the autumn vacation and meet a female person there. Last arrangements for his mission were made in a conspirative flat in Berlin-Karlshorst. D. was given a Federal identity card with his photo, however made out to

Erhard BUCHTA, residing in Ahlen/Westf., Humboldtstr 12

and DM-West 800. Previous to this he had been ordered to get himself new clothing in Berlin (West). D. was to travel to Baden-Baden and contact Tatjana A. who worked in a French office in the Hochhaus. For the time being, he was not to attempt to recruit her. D. completed the trip without being molested, however, did not get into contact with Mrs A, therefore he repeated the trip in mid-Dec 1962. This time, he was given more comprehensive assignments. D. was to eventually go to Mrs A.'s flat, attempt to recruit her for intelligence co-operation and give her an advance payment of DM 1,000. He was to start his conversation by giving her greetings from Erich JAKOBI, an acquaintance of her's.

Under the cover name Erich JAKOBI, in 1958, the Soviet agent Wensel RENNER had come to the FRG in order to spy out French offices in Baden-Baden. Until the end of the trial, RENNER denied any intelligence activity, however, due to witnesses' statements, he was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment by the Karlsruhe Superior Land Court on 14 Apr 1959 on the grounds of an offence against Par 100 of the Criminal Code.

In case Mrs A. threatened to inform the Police, D. was to point out that she had made wrong statements as witness in the penal case against "JAKOBI". The Soviets would not hesitate to inform FRG authorities on these facts.

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D. made the second trip to Baden-Baden the occasion of his disclosure, since he considered this assignment too risky. He never did return to the Soviet Zone.

V. Legal Resident Agents

In 1963, numerous cases again became known, where members of Soviet Missions in the FRG or Berlin, completed intelligence assignments, illustrated by the following examples:

1) Case NIKOLAJEV

← Alekszej Dimitrijewitsch NIKOLAJEV, 2nd secretary of the Soviet Embassy at Rolandseck, had been in the FRG since 1 Sep 1960. He presumably worked in the Soviet Embassy's Consular Affairs Section. NIKOLAJEV held a diplomatic status. Summary of V info on intel activities →
Until his departure from the FRG, he carried out the following intelligence assignments:

- a) On 28 Jul 1961, NIKOLAJEV appeared at the flat of Hermann B., technical Oberamtsmann with the Federal Agency for Military Technig and Procurement in Koblenz. N. told Mrs B, he wanted to reciprocate for her husband's assistance on the occasion of a traffic accident in Mar 1961, near Frankfurt. Since B. was not at his home, Mrs B. asked N. to come again in the evening. At about 18,00 hrs, N. again was at the flat. He told B. of the assistance rendered after the traffic accident occurred and that he owed his life entirely to him. B. tried to give B. a present, however B., who explained to N. that he was not identical with the person he allegedly was looking for, refused to accept the present, and N. thereupon left the flat. On 11 Aug 1961, N. again appeared at B.'s flat. He wanted to give Mrs B. a flower bouquet to excuse his conduct at his last visit. He again talked about his life having been saved and feelings of gratitude and tried to press the flowers on Mrs B., who, however, refused to accept them.
- b) On 9 Oct 1962, NIKOLAJEV went to the Federal Defence Ministry's library to get the "Directives for the stipulation of the individual medical classifications of draftees". The manager of the library advised N. to apply to the Military Medical Agency. The same afternoon, N. went to the Military Medical Agency and was received by Surgeon Major Dr med. Kurt P. N. presented his diplomatic identification together with his visiting card. N. again asked for the "Directives". Dr. P. said that the regulation was not available at present and asked N. to return on the morning of 10 Oct 1962. On 10 Oct 1962, at 11,00 hrs, N. again appeared at Dr. P.'s office and said that, in a show window, he had incidentally seen a book, by a Dr med P. and entitled "How Medicine Helps", and asked P. whether he was the author. Dr. P. confirmed this. Meantime, N. obviously had vetted Dr. P. The book was published five years previously and, according to Dr. P.'s statements, was no longer displayed.

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Dr. P. told N. that the "Directives" he wanted were official regulations and that he could not give them to him. Despite this explanation, N. tried to induce P. to give him the documents, at least for half a day or some hours, since he presently had to collect all documents as to sanitation.

Dr. P. promised to inform N. in case he found suitable material for him. Thereupon N. took leave, but was visibly disappointed. On 26 Nov 1962, Dr. P. received a letter N. had sent to his home address. The letter was mailed in Beuel, without the sender's address on it, and read as follows:

"Alexej NIKOLAJEW
Bonn/Venusberg
Robert-Koch-Str 16

Bonn, 17 Nov 1962

Dear Mr P.,

Having found your address in the directory, please excuse me for applying to you by mail. I choose this way so as not to bother you at your office.

My work is almost finished, but one part is needed to complete for which I require the statements you so kindly promised me.

I want to thank you in advance and will keep my promise.

Very truly yours,

(signature) "

Thereupon, with the consent of the FRG Armed Forces Office of Security, Dr. P. sent photostat copies of medical magazines to N., who then no longer contacted Dr. P.

c) The FRG Armed Forces soldier Wolf Ruediger H. went to the Soviet Embassy at Rolandseck, in mid-Nov 1962, in order to report there as deserter and ask for political asylum in the USSR. After he entered the Soviet Embassy, he was directed to NIKOLAJEW. H. presented his unit pass to N who made some notes. He informed him that he (H.) could go to the Soviet Union, however, before this, would have to do something for him at the FRG Armed Forces, which he would pay for. He was specially interested in regulations as to combat training and use of arms. He attached great importance to obtaining regulations, classified "For Official Use Only". H. assured him he was ready to procure the information wanted. N. gave him the cover name Horst NAUMANN and ordered him to write to the Soviet Embassy on anything special, by using this cover name. He gave him a text in which he was to put in his information in a couched language. H. and N. agreed to meet the following day, at 13,00 hrs, at the Postress EHRENBREITSTEIN and H. received DM 70 to cover his travel expenses. The meeting took place as agreed upon. H. handed the FRG Armed Forces' official regulations requested to N., who gave him further DM 40.

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Since H. had not been able to go to two further meetings, N. went to Koblenz. H. then gave N. a regulation as to antitank defence, for which he received DM 30. Since H. wanted the regulations back shortly, they agreed to meet on 13 Jan 1963, at 18,00 hrs, in front of the firm G & A in Koblenz. N. then returned the regulations to H.

In the course of further meetings which took place in Koblenz, on the 2, 9 and 10 Feb 1963, H. gave N. regulations on "explosions" as well as the bolt and grip of the NATO gun G 3. N. always returned the delivered material at the following meeting.

At the last meeting, N. gave H. DM 200 and ordered him to procure an antitank mine DM 18, and establish whether the FRG Armed Forces were using a Spanish manufactured gun.

H.'s girl friend Erika E. also joined this meeting. In the course of the conversation, N. pointed out to Mrs H. that he also wanted to use her for his intelligence operations. He asked to see Mrs H.'s identity card, noted her personal data and said that he would contact her in writing. He would use a German name as sender.

Due to the established facts, investigation proceedings were taken against H. On 13 Feb 1963, a warrant of arrest was issued against him:

d) William L.R., US citizen, served with the US Army until Jul 1961. Thereafter, he was owner of a financing enterprise in Darmstadt. Late in Jan 1963, R. made a telephone call to the Soviet Embassy. He gave his name and address and asked for a meeting with an Embassy member, in turn the Soviet conversational partner inquired the reason for his call. R. answered, he was an American and could not tell anything over the phone. R. was requested to apply to the Soviet Embassy in writing.

R. then wrote to the Embassy, saying, he was an American and could give them interesting information about which he would like to talk with an Embassy member.

On 27 Jan 1963, R. received a telephone call from N. at his office. N. stated to belong to the Soviet Embassy and mentioned that E.'s letter had reached them. He requested R. to immediately take a train to Bonn and meet him at the news stand in the main RR station, at 14,00 hrs.

R. did not attend the meeting, however, on 28 Jan 1963, phoned N. at the Soviet Embassy and excused himself for having cut the meeting. On 29 Jan 1963, R. received a letter from NIKOLAJEW announcing that he would shortly visit R.

On 31 Jan 1963, at about 10,00 hrs, N. phoned R. and informed him that he and his wife were already in Darmstadt, and that he would come to his (R.'s) office at about 11,00 hrs.

Already at 10,30 hrs, N. appeared at the office. N. showed R. his official identity card, and made a note of the essential statements of H.'s passport.

N. asked R. for a written report as to military personnel, his acquaintances, their work places and colleagues. He also inquired of R. whether he had connections with the Heidelberg Army Headquarters. R. replied that he had two or three old friends there, one of them working in the Counterintelligence Section.

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N. then asked R. about his income and told him that he could earn double as much if he delivered suitable information. At the end of the conversation, N. stated he would give more detailed instructions. On 5 Feb 1963 already, without previous announcement, N. visited R. in his office. He immediately demanded a list of the names of those US Army members R. knew. Since R. could not establish this list at short notice, N. ordered him to hand it over during a meeting at the Bonn main RR station on 8 Feb 1963. R. was to inform N. upon his arrival in Bonn, by phone, saying 'Charles had arrived'. They agreed upon a further meeting in the 2nd floor of the Frankfurt Airport mainbuilding, on 22 Feb 1963, at 14,00 hrs. Upon comprehensive preliminary investigations by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, N. was stopped at this meeting and identified by officials of the Security Group and the Hesse Criminal Police.

The Foreign Office then informed the Soviet Embassy in Bonn on 23 Feb 1963, to recall N. from the FRG within 48 hours, otherwise he would be declared a "persona non grata". On the same day, N. and his wife left the FRG.

2) Attempt to contact a Russian emigrant in the FRG:

The Soviet intelligence services, especially legal resident agents still continue their attempts to contact Russian emigrants living in the West, by misusing their familiar relations in the USSR.

The following is a typical example for this:

Dr. S., director of the "Institute for the Research of the USSR" in Munich, late in Nov 1962, was visited by a Russian who introduced himself as NJEKRASSOW. The visitor conveyed greetings from a brother of Dr. S. who lives in the USSR and whom he pretended to know very well. However, his report about their acquaintance produced contradictions. Thereupon Dr. S' wife and son assumed a threatening attitude towards the visitor, who, by presenting a diplomatic pass, proved his identity as Eugeni Sinowewitch SCHABARDIN, 2nd secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Bonn. He explained to have given a wrong name in order not to bring Dr. S. (in view of his position) into an embarrassing situation.

In the further course of the conversation, the diplomat offered to re-establish the interrupted connection to the brother in the USSR, by conveying letter. By referring to the changed conditions in the USSR, he also attempted to induce Dr. S. to return and asked the son to visit the Soviet Union.

His proposals were declined.

3) Attempts to recruit Berlin (West) Students

In several cases, Berlin (West) students, particularly those from Technical Academies, were approached by members of the Berlin (West and East) Soviet Legal Residents with regard to intelligence co-operation. Typical of these approaches were the attempts to first - during a longer period - establish personal relations of trust to the recruitment candidates.

The following is an example of this:

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Student Georg L. of Stuttgart studied at the Technical University in Berlin in winter 1961/62 and summer 1962. In Oct 1961, after having attended a Bert-Brecht-lecture, a Russian approached him on his way home, in the Berlin (West) Hansaviertel, and accompanied him to the S-Bahn RR station Bellevue. They talked about personal matters as well as about Russian and German literature. The Russian, who, by presenting a visiting card, had introduced himself as Grigorj TATARNIKOV, attaché of the Soviet Embassy, asked to continue the acquaintanceship.

In mid-Dec 1961, upon previous agreement, T. visited L. at his accommodation (Students' Home). Both met again at a lecture on the poet William GOYEN in the Kongresshalle, in mid-Jan 1962. T. was accompanied by another Russian, called Nikolai GORBATSCHOW. Until Jul 1962, G. and L. met seven times in Berlin (West), mostly near L.'s home. He stated that, during these meetings, they had only discussed art, literature, theatre, film and space research problems.

L. denied G.'s invitation to visit the Berlin Soviet Sector. He was ready to accept an invitation to go to Potsdam, provided, he could bring a student along with him. At first G. did not agree to this. Finally, when L. reproached him with his "secretiveness" (a West German could not understand), he gave in. Details as to the trip to Potsdam were to be discussed at a meeting to be agreed upon by telephone. The visit did not take place, since G. did not contact L. anymore.

G. is co-worker of the SOWEXPORT-FILM-Agency in Berlin (West), T. an "attaché" with the Soviet Embassy in Eastberlin. Both presumably are KGB members or co-workers.

According to the established facts, the above case was an unsuccessful contact attempt by a Soviet intelligence service.

4) Conspicuous contact attempts by members of Soviet foreign missions

In the course of the last year, members of the Soviet Embassy in Kairo conspicuously attempted to contact German Embassy members. Late in 1962, 2nd secretary Wladimir LOBANOW, without perceptible reason, appeared in the German Embassy Press Section. LOBANOW's official work has nothing to do with press affairs. He is a member of the Soviet IS.

At about the same time, a 3rd secretary of the Soviet Embassy made efforts to establish connection to German Embassy members. Early in 1963, he appeared twice in the Embassy's Political Affairs Section, in order "to introduce himself, exchange opinions as to the general situation and, on this occasion, brush up his German knowledge."

Besides, a member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Kairo attempted to establish personal contact with a German Embassy member.

They all spoke of continuance of the contacts and promised private invitations. They were mainly interested in public affairs and development aid.

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At the same time, similar attempts by Soviet Embassy members, were noticed at the Japanese Embassy in Cairo. The German Embassy in Teheran also noticed contact attempts by some Soviet Embassy members. It is assumed that members or co-workers of the Soviet intelligence services were involved in all these cases, who, with their contact attempts, were carrying out intelligence missions.

5) Members of the Soviet Military Missions

in the FRG, also in 1963, were frequently noticed carrying out visual investigations. Main intelligence targets were military objects of the German and Allied Forces, in particular barracks, ammunition depots, rocket launching sites and radar installations. Soviet Military Mission members were especially often observed watching maneuvers. Only a few cases dealing with violations of forbidden zones, came to notice.

D. The Polish Intelligence Services

In 1963, 59 recruitment cases of the Polish IS came to the BIV's notice; so, the counterintelligence result is similar to that of the previous years (1962: 57 and 1961: 65).

In 34 cases, the persons approached for purposes of espionage against the FRG, lived in the Polish power sphere; 25 persons lived in the FRG or in Berlin (West) at the time of the recruitment attempt.

In all cases, the intelligence contact attempts were due to already existing west or east connections.

I. Recruitment Methods

The Polish intelligence services still continued to approach persons travelling in both directions, and German persons from the Polish-administered German East-territories who desired re-settlement, for the purpose of secretly procuring information from the FRG. Besides, they tried to recruit persons who have relatives in the FRG and, in individual cases, sent agents to contact the persons in question at their homes at that time in the FRG.

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1) Re-Settling Projects:

It has been one of the practices of the Polish Intelligence Service for numerous years to approach persons of German origin of Silesia, East Prussia, Pomerania and the former province Posen, who wish to re-settle in the Federal Republic. From statements taken from persons who were interrogated in 1963, it showed that if a person refuses to commit himself for intelligence cooperation, this will often lead to a temporary rejection or at least to a considerable delay in the handling of the application for re-settlement. However, later efforts were sometimes successful without the Polish Intelligence Service making another attempt.

This explains why the instances where re-settlers were approached for intelligence cooperation (which became known this year), often date back a number of years.

The re-settlers did not disclose an intelligence contact in all cases after their arrival in the Federal Republic, as is shown by the following example:

A technical engineer (machine construction) of Upper Silesia had since 1956 applied for re-settlement to the Federal Republic.

In September 1958, his application was rejected without giving a definite reason. Due to his protest, the Mayor of his town referred him to a SB-member (SB - Polish Intelligence Service) who might be able to help him. As was expected, this person would only grant him the exit permit if he declared his willingness to be active in intelligence. The engineer agreed, all the more so since he was promised that his re-settling application would be speedily handled. Actually, in November 1958, after a short intelligence training, he and his family were able to depart. In the Federal Republic, he withheld his intelligence commitment and took up employment with a well-known electrical firm. He then wrote to a cover address in Warsaw, informing them that he had been legalised. In the Summer of 1960, he met his handling officer in Vienna, as agreed, and on this occasion, made a report on his employing firm and their production. Thereafter, he allegedly tried to gradually put an end to the intelligence contact. After he had been neutralised, he stated that he only wished to carry out his intelligence activity until a relative from Silesia had re-settled; he did not have enough courage to confess at a later date.

2) Trips to the Federal Republic:

In 1963, a few examples also became known as to the Polish Intelligence Service methods, to assign persons within their jurisdiction, who wished to travel to the West for private or occupational reasons, with certain intelligence missions.

In view of the total number of Polish national entries, the number of recognized intelligence cases was small. However, it must be remembered that it is nearly impossible to keep all Poles under surveillance, who enter the Federal Republic for a temporary stay. On the other hand, the persons concerned usually disclose their intelligence contact only if they do not intend to return to Poland. Normally, an informal intelligence approach is made when the passport is handed over, before the trip. A written obligation usually was not requested. The tourists were given target assignments, sometimes, however, they were just instructed "to keep their eyes open" at their

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destination and upon their return, give an accurate report on their impressions.

Seamen, calling at Western ports during their trips, were often used as couriers by the Polish Intelligence Service.

- 3) Trips to Polish Territory:
Federal Republic citizens and West Berliners, who travel to Poland for private reasons, for business discussions or for occupational reasons (seamen) must be prepared for being approached by the Polish Intelligence Service. According to 1963 intelligence results, recruiters were most successful with merchants, who are interested in Eastern trade.

In the past year, Polish Intelligence Service recruiting attempts of German seamen who entered Polish and German ports (under Polish occupation) were relatively numerous (especially in Stettin). At first, the persons approached were taken to the harbor-police because they had either exceeded their shore leave and missed their ship, had attracted attention at drinking-bouts by engaging in fights, or had helped East Zone seamen to escape. During the interrogation by the harbor-police, the Polish Intelligence Service usually interfered, extensively questioned the person concerned, and gave further assignments (procurement of city maps and similar items). They did not commit the persons concerned in all cases.

Typical is the case of a certain sailor, who was a cook on a coal transport, which navigated between ports of the Federal Republic and Stettin. During a stay in Stettin, he missed his ship's departure and was taken to the Polish Intelligence Service by the harbor police. After he had been placed under pressure by threatening him with a lengthy prison term, he rendered the requested information on his ship and its crew. He also answered questions (as far as he was able to) as to the Federal and Allied Armed Forces. Finally, the Polish Intelligence Service committed him for intelligence cooperation and gave him the assignment to collect intelligence information on military coastal installations in the Federal Republic. When his ship re-entered the Stettin harbor, he was released. It had been agreed upon that the next time, his ship called at the Stettin harbor, he was to give his assigners a report on the results of his espionage activities. The sailor disclosed his intelligence mission in the Federal Republic and meantime, mustered out thereby evading further contact with the Polish Intelligence Service.

- 4) Intelligence Approach in the Federal Republic:
In 1963 again some cases became known where citizens of the Federal Republic or West Berlin were visited at their home by representatives of the Polish Intelligence Service and requested to become active in the intelligence field.

When verifying the statements of these persons, it was mostly found that previous intelligence contact had existed or could be assumed. In June 1963, the watchmaker ROMUALD W. reported on such a recruitment attempt:

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He was a Pole, married to a German. In 1960, upon his wife's initiative, he filed an application for re-settlement. Allegedly, he got a permission therefor under great difficulties, after paying 120,000.00 Zloty as a bribe. Three days after he had paid this bribe, a member of the Polish Intelligence Service approached him and by referring to the punishable nature of his attitude, pressured him into intelligence cooperation. At a subsequent meeting in Warsaw, he signed a written declaration of commitment. He was to use his brother's address as a cover address and mark the letters for the Polish Intelligence Service by drawing wavy lines under the place of residence. He was only ordered to get accustomed to living in the Federal Republic, to build up his occupational career, and keep in contact with the Polish Intelligence Service through a cover address. Berlin meetings had been scheduled at a later date, which had not yet been fixed. Re-settlement was made in the Fall of 1960. In the ensuing period, he held correspondence contact with the Polish Intelligence Service, as agreed, however, only reported on personal matters.

On 21 Apr 1963, W. allegedly was visited quite unexpectedly at his home by an unknown person, who spoke Polish. The unknown man brought him presents and a letter from his brother. He then requested to have a private talk with him. He then reminded him of the bribe he had paid, as well as his obligation, and threatened that his brother would have difficulties if he did not fulfill his obligation. The unknown man gave him contact-paper and a cover address in Poland, where he was to write within 2 weeks.

On 7 May 1963, W. allegedly was again approached by another unknown person, who reminded him of the cooperation he had promised. Three days later, in the evening, 2 unknown persons again approached him at his residence. One person wore police uniform. Both persons had come by car and requested W. to get in. In the car, they again requested his cooperation by threatening him. He was ordered to meet another person on 2 June 1963. This meeting was held. The meeting-partner requested him to file an application for a visit to Poland at the Polish Military Mission. There, instructed by his meeting-partner, he was to undergo intelligence training. The partner called himself chief of a section for Polish foreign espionage, also questioned him as regards possible debts and offered him DM 2,000. W. allegedly refused to take the money. The man further ordered him to open a watchmaker's shop at his place of residence. He would then have to travel a lot. His shop was to serve as a meeting-place for agents.

After this last meeting, W. made a confession at the Criminal Police. He and his family had been registered at Friedland in October 1960. At that time, he had not rendered any statements as regards the bribe affair and his subsequent obligation. After he had re-settled, he had correspondence contact with his relatives (mother and brother, allegedly an officer in the Polish Army). After his confession, he was again twice reminded of the cooperation he had promised, partly under threats.

Up to now, it was not possible to verify W's statements. Therefore, it cannot be established with certainty whether his statements are true. The contact-paper, which he handed over, was genuine. If his statements are true, this would be the first known case in which the Polish Intelligence Service

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so crudely tried to force a person to stick to his obligation.

II. Handling and Communication:

The information obtained in 1963 as regards handling and communication of the Polish Intelligence Service, did not show any special characteristics in comparison with the previous years. After recruitment, which in the majority of cases was effected within the Polish sphere of power, the agent received a cover address, possibly contact-paper with the instruction, to notify them after his return to the Federal Republic, or after his successful re-settlement. Usually, after the approach, a first meeting was scheduled and planned in detail. Now as before, the meeting was the most important means of handling by the Polish Intelligence Service, at least as long as the agent had proven his suitability and the contact had become profitable for the Polish Intelligence Service. The Polish Intelligence Service, as far as possible, tried to have the meetings take place within its own sphere of power, or at least, on Eastern territory. Only then, after the reliability of the agent for the Polish Intelligence Service had become established, meetings were arranged in neutral or Western foreign countries. In such cases, sometimes, meetings were only held upon request of the agent or the handling office, while contact mainly was maintained through one or several dead letterdrops.

Another means of contact used by the Polish Intelligence Service consisted in making use of Polish citizens' Western contacts. The Polish Intelligence Service used these contacts to request its agents in the Federal Republic in an inconspicuous way, namely by way of private letters, to observe meetings.

III. Assignment Targets:

Within the reporting period, no changes of previous assignment targets or new intelligence interests were established.

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E. The Czech Intelligence Services

In the reporting year, in comparison with 1962, a slight decrease of recognized cases was noted. Thirty-five persons were recorded (compared with 45 in 1962), who had been approached or recruited by a Czech Intelligence Service.

I. Recruiting Methods:

The already known tendency of the Czech Services, to approach visitors from the Federal Republic and tourists or re-settlers to the Federal Republic, continued in 1963. Typical for this practice is the following case:

In January 1963, the ^{acc.} cabinet-maker Horst KIEHNACKL of Neusattal, District of Falkenau CSSR, received a summons to appear at the Military Office at Falkenau. There, the commander (a Lt.Col.), introduced him to two Intelligence Service members, who, after a political test conversation, requested him to visit his brother Rudolf K. (who lives in Kassel) on an intelligence mission. After initial reluctance, K. agreed since he feared that otherwise, he might suffer personal and occupational disadvantages. ILLEGALLY CROSSED AUSTRIA 18 AUG 63, TRAVELLED TO KASSEL AND SURRENDERED TO GIV.

On 30 July 1963, K. received induction orders as a camouflage. His intelligence officer awaited him at Falkenau and went with him to a conspirative house near Bad Koenigswart. There, K. received about 3 weeks' intelligence training. His instructor specially informed him on the geographic, political and military conditions in the Federal Republic.

In conclusion, assignments were discussed in detail. K. was to enter the Federal Republic on an accurately established route via Austria, and try to recruit his brother at Kassel, who was manager of a US-Club, for the Czech Intelligence Service. Through him, the Czech Service hoped to get some information on German and Allied Armed Forces units in the Kassel area. K. received a falsified Federal identification in the name of

Horst FOLK,
born 7 Dec at Bruenn,
residing in Munich,

was fitted out in Western clothing and was paid DM 800.- and 450.- Austrian shillings to carry out this assignment.

In the early morning of 18 Aug 1963, Czech intelligence officers helped M. to illegally cross the Czech-Austrian border. At the barbed-wire fencing, they used a small underpass, which was secured by a locked door. K. traveled to Linz, in compliance with orders, and from there traveled on via Munich, Nuremberg and Kassel. He informed his brother of his intelligence assignment and at the same time, asked him to contact the Criminal Police.

II. Handling and Communication:

The handling means of the Czech Intelligence Services did not undergo basic changes in 1963. Of all intelligence means used, the meeting still played the most important role, even though contact had been maintained for a longer period over A-J radio traffic, dead letterdrops or cover addresses.

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As regards the establishing of meetings, no common trend was noted; meetings were held by couriers, within their own jurisdiction, in neutral foreign countries, and in the Federal Republic.

It was noted that the agents' equipment was gradually improved. A number of agents were found in possession of falsified passports or identifications, which were issued in the name of persons living in the Federal Republic, as had been practiced by other Eastern Intelligence Services. These falsifications were excellent. All agents coming from the CSSR were outfitted with Western clothes and equipment (luggage, toilet articles).

Also, when using cover addresses, a certain differentiation was noted, to the effect that the agent could not write to the cover addresses according to his own discretion, but had to use a certain address for a certain type of information.

In the past year, in one known case, the Czech Intelligence Service abandoned its practice of training agents individually, send them to the Federal Republic and have them operate there on their own.

The two Czech agents

CITICENT SECRETARIA
SECURITY AGENCIES

→ Georg CEMELICZEK
born 19 Aug 1920 at Maria-Estern/CSSR,
and
→ Jan HOFMANN
born 2 June 1928 at Gablons/CSSR,

were trained together in the Summer of 1963, and illegally crossed the Bavarian-Czech border to the Federal Republic on 14 July 1963. They had the assignment to survey all Danau-bridges in the Federal Republic, in addition, they were to establish hotels and inns, best suited for the overnighting of Czech agents. Their tasks were divided insofar as CH. was to photograph all important targets with a LEICA, and was to safekeep the films, while H. was to prepare the pertinent descriptions.

Another good example for the detailed care, the Czech Intelligence Service lends to its actions, is the fact that agent activities were covered by pro forma induction orders, or such, so that family members, colleagues and acquaintances do not get suspicious.

III. Assignment Targets:

The evaluation of all assignments of the Czech Intelligence Service recorded in 1963 (108) showed that the main emphasis of the hostile intelligence activity now as before is placed on the military sector. Apart from this, preparatory assignments and assignments against political targets are also of some importance.

F. Yugoslav Intelligence Services

The number of recruitments by Yugoslav Intelligence Services, established in 1963, increased to 15 as compared with 1962 (9). During the reporting year, no changes as to working and handling methods were noted.

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Also in 1963, agents were almost exclusively Yugoslav nationals, whereby in most cases, approach was made on the occasion of a planned trip to the Federal Republic. As regards the assignment aim, interest in information on Yugoslav emigration is still most important. One case became known in which the Yugoslav handling agent declined the offer to supply military information, made by an agent who was active on the emigration sector.

Apart from emigration, most assignments concentrate on military and economic targets in the German Federal Republic. The above-mentioned example not only shows the strict handling of agents, but also a clear division of procurement tasks at the Yugoslav Service.

In the cases which became known during the reporting year, agents were exclusively handled by members of Yugoslav missions in the Federal Republic (Yugoslav Liaison Office at the Swedish Embassy at Mehlem, Yugoslav General Consulates in Hamburg and Munich). According to the available information no other means of handling were used (radio, dead letterdrop, invisible writings). Only in a few cases, where an intelligence activity did not come about due to a disclosure, cover addresses in Yugoslavia were stated, which, however, were only to be informed of the entry and successful legalization. It may be assumed that in these cases, too, future handling was to be effected by members of the missions.

In 1963, a member of the Yugoslav Liaison Office at the Swedish Embassy at Mehlem was requested to leave the Federal Republic due to intelligence activities. Whenever Yugoslav nationals appeared at the Mission in order to have their passports prolonged, or for some other reason, he tried to recruit them for intelligence cooperation.

0. Hungarian Intelligence Services

The number of recorded recruitments by the Hungarian Intelligence Service has remained about the same. While 9 cases became known in the past year, 10 recruitments were registered in 1963.

The information obtained hereby, does not indicate a change in the former working and handling methods of the Hungarian Intelligence Services. In a single case, it was striking that the opponent had permitted the contact to be inactive for a number of years.

In 1958, a former Hungarian national, who now holds German citizenship, had repeatedly been ordered by the Hungarian Intelligence Service to observe a meeting in Vienna. Although he 3 times traveled to Vienna to observe same, and each time, had informed his handling officer of his visit in writing, no meeting came about. In the ensuing period, contact with the Hungarian Intelligence Service came to a complete standstill. Only in April 1963, did the hostile Intelligence Service again make a contact.

The placed assignments were directed, almost without exception, against military targets in the Federal Republic.

4. The Roumanian and Bulgarian Intelligence Services

Information which became available on the Roumanian and Bulgarian Intelligence Services in 1963, was even less than in 1962. Only 4 recruitments by the Roumanian and 2 by the Bulgarian Intelligence Service became known. From the assignments placed on this occasion, no conclusions can be drawn as to the afore-mentioned Services' main points of interest in the intelligence field.

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J. Survey on the Satellite Intelligence Services
A summarizing study of all Satellite Services showed 125 recruitments or recruitment attempts in comparison with 129 in 1962. This figure constitutes a 9% participation of Satellite Services in the recognized intelligence activities of the Soviet Bloc.

These Services were mainly interested in getting information on the military sector.

Of 265 registered assignments of the Satellite Services, the following breakdown of targets was established:

34% Preparatory assignments
46% Military espionage
16% Political espionage
2% Economic espionage
4% Counterespionage

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L. Valid Sentences

In 1965, 269 persons were validly sentenced by FRG Courts on the grounds of treasonable relations to Soviet Block Intelligence Services.

In 250 cases persons were sentenced because of establishment or maintenance of treasonable relations (Par 100 e StGB), in 4 cases because of treason (Par 100 StGB), and in 7 cases because of an offence against Par 7 Annex A to the Status of Forces Agreement.

The following persons were sentenced:

250 persons because of treasonable relations to Soviet Zone	- IS
9 persons because of treasonable relations to Soviet	- IS
5 persons because of treasonable relations to Polish	- IS
3 persons because of treasonable relations to CCSR	- IS
1 person because of treasonable relations to Yugoslavian	- IS
1 person because of treasonable relations to Hungarian	- IS

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