

15646
032
10/1/44

9 September 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Meeting with Captain ERNST PETEL RIEDEL,
Assistant German Air Attache in Stockholm on 7 Sep-
tember 1944 at "Club 49."

FROM : 155

XAR-28364

1. Riedel said he still had misgivings about "full co-operation" with us, especially as to anything which would offend his oath as a German officer. However, he said he would like to work with us after the war if he thought we were working along lines with which he concurred. Among items as to which he could cooperate with us, he mentioned an item which had been under discussion; it is the gathering, and procuring others to gather, information concerning Nazis and the Gestapo, such as the identification of personnel and records, and places as to where records are concealed. He also has an idea that after the war ends he might write a book of memoirs concerning his experiences and observations in America, relating among other things the state of military unpreparedness which existed not only in the United States, but also in Canada and Great Britain in 1938 and 1939, and in the United States as late as 1940. He would also tell of the reception he had in Germany on his return there in 1942 when, as he says, he told the German authorities of America's huge war preparations and what could be expected in the way of results. His principal purpose in all this, he says, would be to destroy the myth Hitler and his gang built in the German people's mind as to "international encirclement of Germany." Riedel does not believe that an effective and continuing activist underground can be developed in Germany at this time. He believes the people are too weary of war to want to continue fighting once the issue has been decided. Further, he believes that such an underground is successful only if fed, nourished and directed, and supplied from some sustained outside base. Another negative factor against the possibility of a successful underground is that Germany is thickly populated and it would be relatively difficult, if not impossible, to effectively keep such an organization going when a large proportion

part of the expected conquerers, particularly the Americans and the British. However, says he, should we join with the prospective Vansittart Plan and as a consequence really leave the German people either to "stew in their own juice," or economically so restrict them that no civilized life could survive, then he believes an activist movement would arise of itself; and thereafter those Germans who had indicated willingness to work with us would gradually, either of their own vol-

WBR
WBR
WBR

WBR
WBR
WBR

SECRET

CS COPY

NOV 23 1946
K.F.P.

(X)

9 Sep. 44

ition or because of the opprobrium of being designated as collaborators, be forced to terminate further cooperation. A state of tension and perhaps an ill-concealed state of war would arise between the occupying forces and the local population. He added that it will be very unfortunate if we bring in American colored troops, stating that the experience following the occupation of World War I, when French Colonial Troops were brought in, is evidence of the serious consequences of this possibility. He does believe that punishment and execution of established war criminals will have no bad effect in a conquered Germany. In fact, if the facts concerning the individuals and their acts were well publicized it might result in much good. He says the German public is quite completely unaware of the cruelties which have been inflicted on innocent people by the Gestapo in occupied countries.

2. With regard to information of the moment from Germany, Riedel says that recently the Nazis and the Gestapo took over the German intelligence services. This was accomplished, he said, under the guise of streamlining these services, and in the new organization the control positions have all been filled with Nazis and Gestapo. In the new intelligence organizations the established service branches such as Military Intelligence, etc., have become only supplementary sub-divisions.

3. The following is not absolutely clear to the author, but is related for whatever value it may have to those branches of our services which may tie in with this information:

Riedel says the new chief of all intelligence services is Brigade-Fuhrer ~~X~~ Streckenbach. Streckenbach succeeded Colonel Hansen who was executed for having been involved in the Hitler assassination plot. Riedel says Canaris is in disfavor and may have been implicated in the plot, but that the evidence against him was apparently too weak to warrant positive action. Riedel says the Air Intelligence Service (Luftwaffe-Fuhrungstab) lost its chief in the recent plot. The new chief of this branch is Kreipe. According to Riedel, the L-F is divided into two divisions; one for Western Europe and the other for Eastern Europe. The organization as a whole is divided into:

EINST I-B
EINST I-C - (Chief is Colonel ^{H D H} Wodarg, who is about 39 years of age and very ambitious)

^{H D} Colonel Engineer Schwencke is the chief of the Technical Branch, covering foreign countries. (He is a friend of

 SECRET

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

Riedel and was Assistant Air Attache in the German Embassy in London about 1938). Schwencke later served under Milch, who is now number two man under Speer. Schwencke's superior in a certain way is ^{W. O.}one Diesing, a Ritterkreuz man and in some sense a successor to Udet. Diesing is about 32 or 34 years of age. Riedel believes Wodarg is about equal, perhaps slightly above Diesing, in rank. The chief of L-F West is a Major ^{W. O.}Owe, aged about 32 years. The chief of ^{all} Air Attaches accredited to foreign countries is a Major ^{W. O.}Merkowitz, who is about 30 years of age. As an additional note on the general organization of intelligence under Streckenbach, Riedel says it is divided into five branches - A, B, C, D and E:

"A" covers organization administration and is headed by an Obersturmannsfuhrer;

"B" covers West and is headed by Major Owe, whose predecessor, incidentally, was involved in the assassination plot;

"C" covers East and is headed by Major ^{W. O.}Ohletz who is a General Staff officer and is a member of the SS;

"D" covers counter-intelligence, and the chief of this branch is the man who freed Mussolini;

"E" covers communications such as radio, W/T, etc.

4. As an incidental note that the German people do not believe stories about the atrocities committed by the Gestapo, Riedel cited the German airplane manufacturer, Bucker, who recently visited in Stockholm and who was horror-stricken when he saw some comments in the Swedish press as to the German atrocities. (Incidentally, Bucker was the German industrialist who after the last world war established a German airplane factory in Malmo, Sweden).

5. In discussing Gestapo personnel in Sweden, Riedel says a Von Gossler, nominally a railroad official, is considered the chief of the Gestapo in Sweden. ^{W. O.}Wagner is also a member of the local Gestapo, whose chief function is counter-espionage -- a job of watching German Legation personnel. Colonel ^{W. O.}Wagner and Captain ^{W. O.}Utermark are members of the Abwehr. Wagner was recently on the skids but his removal was postponed. The paymaster of the German intelligence services in Stockholm until recently was Fichte, who, because of certain local conditions, was recalled. Kraemer is probably a Party man and was formerly connected with the Gauleiter of Hamburg. Riedel's new intelligence chief in Stockholm is a man by the name of Wenzlau, about 43 years of age, who formerly worked five years in the administrative division of their intelligence, and was at one time

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

stationed in Portugal. He is a personal friend of Kraemer. Major Golcher is one of the superior new intelligence officers in Sweden. With him is one Thienemann who succeeded Major Busch. Thienemann is not a member of the Abwehr, and is perhaps in Sweden largely because of the fact that his mother is Swedish.

6. As an illustration of the Air Losses Reports which the German Air Ministry sends to its attaches abroad, there is the following. The figures without the parentheses are the German losses, and the figures within the parentheses are the Allied losses:

<u>WEST</u>			<u>EAST</u>
Aug. 31:	-	4 (5)	5 - (56)
Total for Aug., (Over Reich):	-	798 (1868)	
Sept. 1:	-	7 (6)	0 - (80)
" 2:	-	0 (2)	1 - (32)
" 3:	-	0 (5)	2 - (32)
" 4 and 5 combined:	-	4 (33)	2 - (73)
Sept. 6:	-	0 (6)	2 - (36)

SECRET

Reclassified Per
Memo of 25 Oct. 46
K.P.P.