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SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM:		EXTENSION	NO.	8P YT-744 10 May 61
			DATE	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across columns after each comment.)
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60-6-117/4

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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
 SOURCES/METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B  
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
 DATE 2006


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YT-744

10 May 1961

SUBJECT: HACKE  
SOURCE: [ ]  
DATE OF ACQUISITION: 8-18-24 April 1961



REFERENCE: [ ] Reports 1/60 pages 6 to 9 and  
2-3/60 pages 7-8.

1. [ ] was asked to give a background of reference material in preparation for the UPHILL visitors who visited Washington during the week of April 24. On the above mentioned dates he reviewed the history of his connections with Nazi and neo-Nazi affairs which is given in condensed form below.

2. It should be noted at the outset that the name HACKE is a code name which [ ] invented for use in his reports. [ ] used this code name to refer to a high-level neo-Nazi conspiracy with particular emphasis on clandestine Soviet control of this conspiracy. To the best of his knowledge the KGB had no code name for the neo-Nazi conspiracy itself, nor for their controlling operations over it. He also does not know of any name which the German members of the neo-Nazi conspiracy had for their organization.

3. It should also be stated at the outset that the lengthy debriefing of [ ] on this Subject did not essentially reveal any further facts concerning the identity of Germans who belonged to HACKE or those over whom the Russians had control.

4. [ ] began his story by relating that when he was stationed in Poznan with the UB as CE Chief in the period 1948-49, he was given the special mission by the KGB Advisor to the Poznan UB Station, MAJONOW, to carry out the interrogation of various high-level Nazis who had been stationed in the Poznan area during the war. The persons [ ] interrogated at this time were: JABGER who had been GAULKITER of Poznan, HEPPNER who had been Chief of the SD in Poznan, STRICKNER who had been HEPPNER's Special Assistant for Germanization in the WARTESZAU and various other purely military figures. From none of these did [ ] get any information on the Subject of HACKE, although [ ] later realized (see below) that the chief purpose of the detailed interrogation requested by the Soviets of these top Nazis was to try to get facts on the secret conspiracy set up by BORMANN at the end of the war.

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5. When [ ] was transferred to Danzig in 1950, again as Chief of CE in the UB Station there, he was surprised to find that the former German GAULKITER of Danzig, FOERSTER, was being held in the UB jail. [ ] learned in time that Col. ROZANSKI from the UB Headquarters in Warsaw frequently came to Danzig for the purpose of interrogating FOERSTER, although for a long time [ ] could not learn what the purpose of the interrogation was and how ROZANSKI was proceeding. At that time the KGB Advisor in Danzig was SHUBAJEV and the Chief KGB Advisor in Warsaw was DAVIDOW. At the same time as DAVIDOW was replaced by BESBARODOW, SHUBAJEV in Danzig was replaced by Major SKLAR.

6. Some time early in 1951 SKLAR invited [ ] into his office and introduced him to General BESBARODOW who was visiting Danzig at that time. BESBARODOW spoke to [ ] about a special mission for [ ] and swore him to secrecy before revealing what it was. BESBARODOW then explained that the special mission had to do with FOERSTER whom the Russians were most anxious to bring to a point where he would talk of his relations with the Nazi hierarchy towards the end of the war. BESBARODOW confided to [ ] that ROZANSKI who had been entrusted with this task had failed miserably to get FOERSTER's cooperation and was being relieved of the case. [ ] later learned that ROZANSKI had used every kind of threat and brutality on FOERSTER from having him led out of the prison to his supposed execution, to beating him up personally, but had still not succeeded in getting him to talk. BESBARODOW informed [ ] that he was responsible only to SKLAR in this matter and was to confide in no one else, including his superiors in his own Service.

7. [ ] read all available files on FOERSTER, discovered that his wife was the sister of Rudolf HESS, and that FOERSTER had personally known Hitler exceedingly well and had belonged to the inner circle of top Nazis. For six months, according to [ ] story, he sat and talked to FOERSTER in the prison cell trying only to restore FOERSTER's psychic balance which had been severely disturbed by ROZANSKI's treatment. [ ] did all this on his own time after office hours, mostly late in the evening. His visits to FOERSTER were kept secret from his colleagues, and the prison officials who knew of his visits had no idea what the nature of his discussions with FOERSTER was. All of the conversations he had with FOERSTER were tape-recorded although FOERSTER did not know this. The tapes were handed personally by [ ] to SKLAR whose secretary transcribed them and translated them into Russian.

8. In the spring of 1952, after [ ] had been talking to FOERSTER for six months, he succeeded in getting FOERSTER to tell of certain historical events which were brand new to [ ] at the time and which created a serious problem for him because these were all matters which, if true, shed light on a number of diabolic plots which he did not think the Russians would be happy to have him know about. These were: How Stalin wiped out the pre-war Polish

Communist Party, the role HEYDRICH had played in inspiring the original Soviet distrust of the Polish Communist Party, the story behind the TUKACHEWSKY conspiracy, and finally the true story behind the KATYN massacre. The Soviets were tremendously upset when [ ] reported these matters and handed over the tapes, and claimed vigorously that these stories were all a diabolic provocation on FOERSTER's part. Nevertheless, they told [ ] to continue. Evidently in the attempt to convince [ ] that FOERSTER's stories were provocations but that in any case [ ] must not even mention them to anyone, he was invited to be interviewed by ROMKOWSKI on one occasion and on another occasion was seen again, this time in Warsaw, by HESBARODOW. Despite Soviet high-level assurances [ ] states that he felt there was much truth to FOERSTER's contentions and that he [ ] first had his faith in the communist system and the Soviets shaken by these revelations.

9. Around May or June of 1952 [ ] in his chronological pursuit of Nazi history with FOERSTER, had finally reached the point of the German defeat at Stalingrad. [ ] in drawing FOERSTER out on the topic of how the top Nazi command at the time had begun to face the possibility of total defeat after Stalingrad, noticed that FOERSTER gave some indication of knowledge of Nazi plans first conceived at that time to prepare for a post-war continuation of their efforts, underground if necessary. When [ ] reported this to SKLAR, the latter who had been exceedingly patient throughout the whole period of [ ] interrogation of FOERSTER, suddenly came to life and prevailed upon [ ] to do everything possible to get FOERSTER talking about this subject. One evening shortly after this, when FOERSTER was in a particularly good mood, [ ] sprang the question on him concerning the preparations BORMANN might have made for a secret conspiracy of top Nazis who would continue working after a possible German defeat. FOERSTER was at first frightened by the question and didn't talk. Then [ ] suggested that he might prefer talking to some other interrogator about this subject, after which he left. SKLAR, when [ ] reported this, seemed upset and ordered [ ] to get back to FOERSTER as soon as possible and to press with every means he could to get FOERSTER talking. At the next session FOERSTER said that he would refuse to talk to anyone else besides [ ] and would be willing to tell him a little in answer to his question. This little turned into an all-night session. Once FOERSTER began to talk he evidently was anxious to relieve himself after the pressures he had been under for so many years and he delivered to [ ] the information contained in the latter's report #1/60. After telling all this, FOERSTER appeared sorry he had done so. [ ] on his side felt that now that FOERSTER had opened up, [ ] could keep him revealing further facts about the neo-Nazi conspiracy. [ ] early the next morning he reported the results of his interrogation to SKLAR, the latter immediately called HESBARODOW in Warsaw; thereupon reported to Warsaw personally, and returned to Danzig the next day with a Soviet Lt. Col. and a

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Soviet Major who had evidently come straight from Moscow and who removed FOERSTER from the Danzig prison and took him back with them to Moscow on a special plane which had been ordered for the purpose. ( ) never heard anything about FOERSTER again. ( ) later learned from SKLAR that the Russians had secured permission from ALERUT to remove FOERSTER from Poland since FOERSTER had been waiting there under the death sentence which had been continuously commuted only, as it turned out, for the purpose of continuing interrogations.

10. A few days after these events, BESBARODOW visited Danzig and personally thanked ( ) for his achievement. Shortly after this ( ) was promoted to the rank of Major, almost a year ahead of expected time, and was told by SKLAR that this was out of gratitude for his work beyond the line of duty with FOERSTER. On this occasion SKLAR again swore him to secrecy.

[ ]

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