

~~SECRET CONTROL~~

UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT/WAR DEPARTMENT  
MISSION TO GERMANY  
APO 757

G-5115-532

#1

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LBX-005-106

LBX-005-108

8 January 1946

TO: SAINT, Washington  
FROM: SAINT, AMZON  
SUBJECT: Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service

1. In October it was learned that the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USFET, had in protective custody several former staff officers of Fremde Heere Ost. This office was naturally interested and through discreet inquiries learned some details of the situation.

2. It appears that the Fremde Heere Ost staff under General von Gehlen retreated successfully from Warsaw through Eastern Germany south to Hemmingham and thence to the vicinity of Obersdorf near the Austrian frontier. Von Gehlen, having had control of Fremde Heere Ost intelligence echelon responsible for German intelligence on the Eastern front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, decided to turn himself in to the American forces rather than risk capture by the Russians. This he managed to do, together with seven of his staff officers, most of whom were experts on Russian order of battle both of the Ground Forces and Air Forces.

3. When his American captors suggested that he leave Germany and come to the United States to work with the experts on the Russian Army of the War Department in Washington, he promptly agreed to do so, recommending that the chief of his secret intelligence operations, Major Herman Baun (subject, unnumbered SHARP card, copy attached), who had become separated with a few other officers from the old Stab Walli, be contacted to join the party. Active efforts were made to locate Baun to no avail and the original group set off with von Gehlen for Washington where it is presumed they still are.

4. Baun had meanwhile escaped to the area of southwestern Germany which ultimately became the French Zone. When he realized this, he arranged through a contact with the American Consular authorities in Switzerland to turn himself in to the CIC in AMZON. This was done and the CIC processed him like a normal automatic arrestee through the Third Army cage at Freising, publishing his name on the daily arrest sheets and giving the PIR the normal dissemination.

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5. The arrival of the PIR at USFET caused a considerable uproar and immediate efforts were undertaken to get Baun to Oberursel under an assumed name and to cover what was from G-2 USFET point of view a breach of security involved in publication of the news of capture. The damage, however, had been done and it is understood that the Russian Liaison Officer was immediately instructed by his superior officers to ask for transfer of Baun, von Gehlen and several other members of the same command, to Russian custody for interrogation. Needless to say, this request was not granted.

6. Baun had with him a Lt. Colonel ~~Tesel~~ (FNU) and three or four minor non-coms formerly belonging to Stab Walli. These men are now living at Oberursel in a private house under cover names. They have not been interrogated by any CI personnel and every effort has been made to keep their presence a secret not only from outsiders but also from officers of Counter-Intelligence Branch, USFET. They are in the custody of three junior officers of the G-2 Section, who are using them as advisors on incoming intelligence which concerns the Russian Army or intelligence structure.

7. Also at Oberursel but strictly apart from Baun and his colleagues are several other former Russian officers, including General Malishkin. Malishkin is likewise giving "expert" advice on the Russian military situation. An example of the type of material being provided by Baun is the attached Appendix A, which was furnished at the request of G-2 as a check on Malishkin by Baun himself.

8. It seems apparent from frequent conversations with the officers responsible for Baun, that G-2 originally contemplated setting him up with funds and personnel to run an intelligence net against Soviet Russia. They soon realized, however, that they had neither the facility nor experienced officers competent to run such an enterprise and have therefore asked on a very informal level for the advice of X-2 Branch as to what they should do next. Since the whole situation was a delicate one, we have kept our contact with the responsible officers in G-2 in this matter on an informal level and have advised them to interrogate Baun at length and have nothing to do with his schemes for further intelligence activity. G-2 has so far not followed the first of our recommendations but I believe they will follow the second. We have further recommended that Baun draw up a list of his principal assistants whom he now believes to be in AMSON and that efforts be made to contact these men with a view to interrogating them and discovering if they have any documents. This was done in early December but the results so far are not known here.

9. From the point of view of the X-2 Branch, the most important member of Stab Walli was not Baun nor in fact any of his colleagues but rather Oberstabsarzt ~~SCHILLERSCHLAGER~~ @ Dr. ~~WALLER~~ (subject CHAFF card # 4056), who was head of Section 3 at Stab Walli after August 1941. Frequent rumor stated that he had been captured by the British, but through a contact in the Munich area he was discovered living under an assumed name in Nurnburg. He was taken to Munich where he was interrogated at length by Sgt. Holtzman and a good deal of valuable information

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was extracted. (See MALT material.) Schmalschlaeger has now been arrested by the CIC owing to an indiscretion of his in visiting his home in Nurnburg, and he is now in an internment camp in the Nurnburg section. Efforts are being made, however, to obtain his transfer to Oberursel where he will be subjected to a thorough interrogation. The reason for his not being sent to Oberursel in the first place was that we were anxious not to get him mixed up with the Baun group, and that the original contact with him was made with the understanding that he would not be immediately sent to an internment camp; it was felt that certain documents belonging to Fremde Heere Ost, which have been recovered and are mentioned in the MALT reports, might be jeopardized if he were not carefully handled.

Encs: 2 cc Appendix A  
2 cc Baun SHAEF card

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APPENDIX A

General MALISHKIN was Chief of Staff of the 6th Soviet Army, in which VLASSOV held the position of Commanding General. After the VLASSOV Army had been activated, MALISHKIN became VLASSOV's adjutant and G-3 of the army. While he travelled for the purpose of organizing the VLASSOV Army, he made preparations for the re-activation of the Communist Party in PARIS.

An agent who might be able to give more detailed information on this subject is at present detained in an American prison in WALEBURG; this agent could be approached if so desired.

While General MALISHKIN held important staff positions in the VLASSOV Army, he was in constant contact with SOCCOM. He used the following channels:

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G-2

1. Through General FENSHIN, Chief of Staff of the VLASSOV Army and former head of the recruiting area (SERVIGOV. General TRUCHIN has been a member of long standing of the N.T.S. (usually referred to as Natzgalkhiki, National Labor Association); this organization was formed by General KUTJEPOV in 1923 - she was kidnaped in PARIS in 1939 and taken to LENINGRAD - with the purpose of unifying the youth of the Russian emigrants in the BALKANS. Headquarters of the N.T.S. was in BELGRADE. The GPU built its own organization into the N.T.S.; headquarters of this branch of the GPU was in BERN. It was the task of this branch of the GPU to control the Russian emigrants and to build up an additional intelligence net in EUROPE. Through the N.T.S. the GPU had its agents in all important German government offices where Russian youth was employed as interpreters (Ostministerium, RSHA; see SCHULLENBERG report by CSBIC UK). MALABANOV was a leader of the GPU within the N.T.S. in GERMANY.

2. Through JELINKOV, Chief of Propaganda of the VLASSOV Army and former G-4 in the Soviet 6th Army (see above); also through AKUPNI, Chief of Civil Administration of the VLASSOV Army. JELINKOV's uncle is one of the outstanding personalities in the Defense Council in MOSCOW. JELINKOV, his uncle and AKUPNI were regional commissars in MOSCOW in 1918, when only persons considered absolutely trustworthy were appointed to such positions. Communication between JELINKOV and his uncle was maintained through Madame KOLONIAI in STOCKHOLM; however, not the Soviet Embassy but the Soviet Trade Delegation in STOCKHOLM was used as agency in this operation. A Soviet agent by the name of MALINOV in PRAGUE is MALISHKIN's liaison in this connection.

Contacts with PRAGUE are available through a person detained by the American Army in BREISG.

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C  
O  
P  
Y

NAME

BAUN

(Ger)

A

GERMANY

*c/R*

STATUS

Major at Ast Warsaw I H. (Apr 44)

ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION

MISC.

CAREER

Promoted Hauptmann. (1 Jul 34)  
At Ast Warsaw, directing I H activities on the Eastern Front, un-  
der SCHMALSCHLAEGER (q.v.) (from Jul 41)  
At Sofia. (May 43)  
In Berlin. (Jun 43)  
Back in Warsaw. (Aug. 43)

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ODDI FILE

WAR DEPARTMENT DETACHMENT  
APO 797 U.S. ARMY

21 January 1948

Col. R.L. Mohr, Deputy Director of Intelligence,  
KUCOH, APO 797, U.S. Army  
Chief, War Department Detachment, KUCOH, APO 797,  
U.S. Army  
SUBJECT: RUSTY

1. The following reports are of varying interest and reliability. They are passed to you in accordance with our SOP, and it is hoped that they will be of some value in controlling subject operation.

2. A report dated 1 December and evaluated B-2 states that a former German Foreign Office official had expressed himself as follows:

German public opinion is severely affected by evidence of our faith on the part of the United States in demilitarizing the country. Responsible politicians are fully in agreement with demilitarization and feel that Germany can only put on her feet again if she remains aloof from the dispute between the US and the USSR, and especially if she keeps an entirely neutral position toward the problem of a future war. Responsible Germans are therefore shocked to find the US intelligence service using the services of a large organization of former German Abwehr officers in what to them must appear as the preparation for the next war. The facts of American use of the Abwehr for espionage are generally known and widely discussed among Germans, and are kept out of the press only for fear of action against responsible editors.

The subject's own experience was that one young Abwehr officer attempted to recruit him, and three others boasted to him about their new job, even mentioning the chief of their organization by name. He feels certain that the Russians also are fully informed. He himself fears exposing himself by talking too freely about this subject, but is planning to discuss the matter with Mr. Middleberger at the next opportunity. From the point of view of the effect of this action on German opinion in its political intentions."

3. A report dated late December and evaluated C-3 states that a former German Foreign Office official located at Fichtstr 4,

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...Germany, has in his possession through Communist in-  
formation to the effect that the German General was  
...intelligence organization which is being run for  
...

Gordon M. Stewart

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