

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Summary of DCI Meetings with General Gehlen,  
24 and 25 September 1961

1. On 24 September 1961, beginning at 1720 hours, the DCI, in a meeting held at his home, met with General Gehlen. The meeting had been requested by General Gehlen, who made a special trip to the United States for the purpose, apparently at the instruction of Chancellor Adenauer. The meeting may be summarized as follows:

a. According to General Gehlen, he had not actually seen the Chancellor personally, but was given instructions for the present U.S. trip by Dr. Globke, who was transmitting the Chancellor's views and desires. The Chancellor had been concerned over remarks reportedly recently made by Mr. McCloy in talks with certain German industrialists, especially Dr. Fritz Berg. In essence, the McCloy remarks, as relayed to General Gehlen, urged that West Germany should itself take the initiative in opening up dealings with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on various matters including the Oder-Neisse line. Reportedly, Mr. McCloy stated that the President was of the same opinion. Apparently, General Gehlen had been commissioned to find out whether it was true that the U.S. Government wished West Germany to take the initiative on its own with the GDR. For his part, the Chancellor, according to Gehlen, felt that this initiative would mean giving Khrushchev what he wanted before real negotiations between the West and the Soviets actually began. The remarks of Mr. McCloy were reportedly made in San Francisco after previous attempts of McCloy to elicit an invitation to visit Germany from Mr. Pferdemenges had failed. General Gehlen also made reference to statements attributed by the press to General Clay indicating that some major accommodations between Germans would soon have to be made, but Gehlen pointed out this particular incident had occurred since he had received his trip instructions from Dr. Globke.

b. The DCI stated his surprise and skepticism to Gehlen about the reports attributed to Mr. McCloy, expressed the view that if there was in authoritative quarters in Washington any desire for a German initiative, as alleged, this would certainly have been made known through

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2005

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

appropriate official channels. The DCI advised Gehlen that no such desire had come to the attention of the DCI. General Gehlen's attention was drawn to the fact that Mr. McCloy has been assigned no responsibilities with respect to the Berlin situation, but had been concerned with the disarmament problem.

c. With respect to political developments in West Germany, Gehlen indicated that a main task of a new German government would be to enact an emergency law, already extant in draft form. The purpose of the law would be to provide the internal security provisions necessary to facilitate a military build-up. (Note that Gehlen has previously mentioned the theme of the necessary military build-up in connection with his opinion, expressed to the DCI, that the West would probably have to make some sort of an accommodation with the Soviets on Berlin because a really hard position was impossible, since NATO is not combat ready.) Reference was made to the fact that a two-thirds majority of the Parliament would be required to pass certain provisions of the law, and that should a full emergency be invoked under the present draft law, the Chancellor would be required to form an all-party government.

d. General Gehlen said he believed the situation in France had somewhat improved. He felt that even if General De Gaulle resigned, the danger of the People's Front would not be as eminent any more.

e. The DCI expressed the view to Gehlen that the BND had been harmed to a certain extent by the reporting they had been disseminating in connection with the Berlin crisis. The DCI stressed the need for adequate background -- the backing of hard intelligence.

1. The UJDROWSY case was briefly discussed, and the DCI expressed reluctance to provide illegal entry assistance. For his part, Gehlen said the BND had been advised against illegal entry by the Federal Attorney's office, and that plans had therefore been abandoned.

2. In a second meeting on 25 September, the DCI brought Gehlen together with General Maxwell Taylor, and Gehlen repeated his story for Taylor's benefit. It was made entirely clear to Gehlen that the rumors troubling the Chancellor were not to be credited, and that the official American viewpoint had been clearly communicated both to Brentano and to Carstens. The hope was expressed that Gehlen would make clear to the Chancellor that the United States government would express its views through appropriate channels and not indirectly. The DCI and General Taylor stressed the importance of making this point clearly to the Chancellor.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

**SECRET**

3. In a discussion with Gehlen about the German political situation, it was difficult to separate Gehlen's view from those he attributed to the Chancellor. Gehlen expressed the opinion that Adenauer would not agree to head a one-party minority government, but that he would instead seek an alliance either with the FDP or the SPD, or possibly would try to work out a grand alliance of the three to meet the present crisis.

4. The State Department was advised concerning the Gehlen visit and the views he expressed. The fact that the German Foreign Office and Washington Embassy knew nothing of his trip was emphasized by Gehlen. The Department was apprised of this point.

**BEST AVAILABLE COPY**