

26 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/CI/R&A

SUBJECT: Sefton Delmer's Articles on Gehlen in the
Sunday Telegraph

1. These two articles are subtly and maliciously slanted, either as a result of British distaste for German militarists or a more sinister intent to serve Communist ends. Here are a few examples:

a. Delmer says that at the end of the war Gehlen was "in command of all anti-Soviet operations". He wasn't. He was in command of German military intelligence against the USSR. Then as now, he was mainly concerned with OB.

b. "For his own work had shown him that OSS had not even begun to function in the Soviet Union" (by the end of the war). True, it had not. But there is a nasty implication here that Gehlen had been busily at work against the OSS and had been so successful that he knew what it was doing and what it wasn't.

c. "For most of that first conversation Gehlen was examining General Patterson, not Patterson Gehlen." Here Delmer is describing Gehlen's first postwar contact with U.S. intelligence. How does he know? He wasn't there. The invention is in line with Delmer's consistent attempt to show Gehlen as very clever and very sinister.

d. "And it was in Washington that Gehlen made his all-important deal - the deal which was the dream of Himmler and Schellenberg, the deal which enabled him to revive a section of Hitler's General Staff and lay the foundation of German rearmament at a time when such rearmament was still anathema...." This is distorted and vicious. Gehlen laid the foundation for postwar German intelligence, not the General Staff or armaments.

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e. "For not only was he able to turn his unit into a shadow of German General Staff but more important still he was now in a position to supply the Americans with the kind of intelligence which would make them feel that it was essential to recreate the German Army to help in the defence of Europe against the Russians." The same twist is evident here. Some of Gehlen's key people were and are officers; others were not. The model on which the organization was fashioned was, naturally, the FHO (Fremde Heere Ost) of the OKW, not the General Staff itself. And Gehlen's product was not diabolically altered to pit us against the Soviets or to lay the groundwork for the remilitarization of Germany. Here and elsewhere, Delmer portrays the Americans as the naive dupes of the subtle, scheming Gehlen.

f. Delmer also charges that Gehlen's organization recruited many former SD and Gestapo members. This is an old Communist canard. Most of Gehlen's people were straight G-2 types, a few were Abwehr, but very few were SD or Gestapo, precisely because Gehlen knew he could not afford them politically - and also because these types were looked upon with distaste by the professional officer class.

g. The second article starts, "Berlin remains the main battlefield in the war between the two rival gangs of Hitler's former Secret Service men." The main lie here is the assumption of moral - or immoral - equality between East and West. This lie is basic to Communist propaganda. Another lie is the "Hitler's Secret Service men" - i.e., SD and Gestapo, as noted above. As a matter of fact, some of Gehlen's key people were part of the military plot against Hitler.

2. The two articles are, in effect, mischievous. Their net effect is to render a service to the East, not the West.

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CI/R&A

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25 Oct 61

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: General Gehlen's Recent Mission to DCI
and Similar Demarche by Klaus Dohrn

1. This memorandum is for your information and recommends no action.

2. Attached at Tab A is a summary of your conversations with General Gehlen on 24 and 25 September 1961, subsequent to his urgent request for a conference with you and his special flight here for the purpose. Essentially, General Gehlen called to your attention the uneasiness of German officialdom, and this may also be reflected among the populace, with respect to present United States policy on Berlin and Germany.

3. You may also be interested in Tab B, a portion of a letter from Klaus Dohrn, roving Time/Life correspondent in Europe and mirror of West German CDU opinion. Dohrn has excellent contacts with Dr. Adenauer and Dr. Gieblo, as well as other leading CDU lights. He also maintains a relationship, the details of which are not precisely known to us, with General Gehlen. We do not know whether the Dohrn letter is based upon his relationship with Gehlen, or with the CDU. At any rate, the Dohrn letter was written on 23 September 1961, precisely the day General Gehlen set out on his urgent flight to see you, and seeks to convey exactly the same message. Dohrn assumes that his material is brought to the attention of persons with influence at a high level in the United States Government.

4. Also of interest in this context is the recent visit of Mr. Eric Warburg. When he talked to me on 2 October 1961, the subject uppermost in Mr. Warburg's mind was the need to restore confidence and to

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clear the air between the leaders of opinion in Germany and those in the United States, and, of course, between the two governments. He wanted someone of the stature of Mr. John McCloy to go to Germany and lecture in Hamburg and the Ruhr. In fact it was his intention later in the afternoon of 2 October to extend an invitation to Mr. McCloy to visit Hamburg for that purpose. The invitation was to be issued on behalf of Mr. Pfordemenges, also mentioned in both Tabs A and B.

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief, Eastern European Division

Attachments:

Tab A - Summary of Conversations

Tab B - Letter from Klaus Dohrn

cc: DDCI

DDP/EE/C: [redacted] :vob (25 Oct 61)

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