

SECRET

20 Nov 61

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: General Gehlen Suggests Briefing for Chancellor
Adenauer on Nuclear and Military Matters

1. This memorandum is for your information. The essence of the information provided below was given to Mr. Foy D. Kohler on November 18, 1961. According to Mr. Kohler, present planning already includes briefing of the Chancellor on the subjects in question. The information is also being given to Mr. McGeorge Bundy at the White House.
2. On the morning of November 18, 1961, two CIA staff members (Mr. James H. Critchfield, Chief, Near East Division, DDP, and Mr. [redacted] Chief of Munich Liaison Base) had a lengthy discussion with General Reinhard Gehlen, President of the West German Federal Intelligence (BND). During the course of this talk, General Gehlen said he had met with Chancellor Adenauer on November 16th and had briefed the Chancellor on several subjects, including the question of the balance of power between East and West. In this connection, General Gehlen had the following comments.
3. The Chancellor is not convinced that the United States holds nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Chancellor questions estimates of the percentage of Strategic Air Command retaliatory force which can be expected to reach their targets in event of nuclear war. He specifically asked Gehlen whether BND estimates are based on information supplied by the United States. While Gehlen acknowledged to the Chancellor that an information exchange occurs, he assured the Chancellor that the BND estimate, which coincides with United States views available to him, had been arrived at independently. (NOTE: Through arrangements with the Air Force, General Gehlen was recently briefed by SAC in Omaha. Gehlen himself appears to be thoroughly convinced of United States superiority. In the conversation with Critchfield and [redacted] Gehlen referred to an estimate that 50 percent of attacking planes would get through to their targets, but it is not clear whether this is what he had told the Chancellor.)

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4. Commenting that the Chancellor has not taken into account the Polaris and other nuclear capabilities, Gehlen observed that the Chancellor is after all very much of a layman on military matters. Then Gehlen recommended that an effort be made to convince the Chancellor of the nuclear superiority of the United States and to brief him on other matters pertinent to western military strength during his visit to Washington. Finally, Gehlen urged that the Chancellor should under no circumstances become aware of the fact that Gehlen had informed CIA of the above, or that he had suggested a special military briefing for the Chancellor.

GORDON M. STEWART
Chief, Eastern European Division

cc: DDCI

DDP/EE/G: [] :bk (20 November 61)

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