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THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL REINHARD GEHLEN

[Article by Ivan Drenski; Sofia, Anteni, Bulgarian, 19 November
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"Germans, attention! Some 15,000 intelligence agents from the socialist nations are working in your nation!" -- this by itself is sufficient in order to figure out the purposes. If we add to these discoveries Gehlen's assertion that he knew that Hitler's deputy Martin Bormann was a trusted agent of Soviet intelligence and of persons uninitiated in politics and intelligence, it becomes clear that all of this has been pieced together to fan the espionage mania in the West, and to prevent an improvement of the situation in Europe and the world.

For almost 30 years, General Reinhard Gehlen was engaged in espionage against the Soviet Union and the socialist nations. The key points in his espionage activities were: at the beginning of 1942, he was appointed as the chief of the "Foreign Armies East" department in the headquarters of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht. After the capitulation of Nazi Germany in 1945, he offered his services to the

American Command, and from them he received enormous amounts of money to collect the still living Nazi spies, saboteurs and murderers into the "Gehlen Intelligence Organization." Under his leadership, this rabble became one of the main bodies of the Cold War in Berlin and generally in Germany. In 1955, the "Gehlen Organization" changed its name to the "Secret Information Service of the German Federal Republic." In 1969, Gehlen retired on pension.

As can be seen, Gehlen began his work in the mire of German espionage under Hitler, he changed allegiance to the CIA, and achieved his "flourishing" under Chancellors Adenauer, Erhard and Kiesinger! The service of many lords under the tattered banner of anticommunism!

For many years, the reactionary press in West Germany has created the aura of an incomparable intelligence agent around the personality of General Gehlen. For himself, Gehlen did everything in order to maintain the illusion in the West German government that he alone possessed a secret information monopoly.

And in his memoirs, at present he has achieved this. In seeing in the person of the Nazi Admiral Canaris an individual who overshadowed him, Gahlen consciously and disdainfully passes over him in order to emphasize his own importance. This has evoked dissatisfaction from the still living associates of Canaris, and they were quick to bring up some of Gehlen's defeats.

Gehlen himself does not write anything about this, but it must be remembered that they were known not only to the former associates of Canaris. They were also known in the socialist nations where a number of Gehlen's spies had been discovered and condemned. In parallel with this, several of his closest assistants long ago abandoned him, and sought political asylum in other nations.

It sounds humorous, very humorous, when an individual such as General Gehlen asserts that he was an enemy of Hitler's, and that he did not have time to participate in the work of the organizations of the opposition officers. After the attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944, when many officers and generals were executed without trial and investigation, the Gestapo did not think about Gehlen, as at that time he was in sick bay. "I was in sick bay and simply forgotten," he wrote. If one wishes, one can believe that the Gestapo forgot their enemies so easily.

But in order to raise his value, the spy Gehlen asserts that the East German intelligence service had put a price of 1 million marks on his head. Scarcely anyone in East Germany would have any use for Gehlen's head. It is more probable that Gehlen himself truly has cause to malign East Germany, because precisely there his efforts to cause harm and spy failed, without mentioning the protective measures which were carried out there on 13 August 1961 and which dealt him

a stunning blow. Gehlen intentionally does not mention anything of the causes for the suicide of several of his associates in October 1968. Among them were Admiral Hermann Luedke, Maj Gen Horst Wendland, director Hans-Heinrich Schenk, Lt Col Johannes Grimm, the secretary Gerhard Boehm, and others. These suicides occurred in a short period of time, but at a time when he [Gehlen] was turning over his job to Gen Gerhard Wessel.

The reader of the memoirs of Reinhard Gehlen understands that the author becomes particularly loquacious in describing the activities of "foreign" intelligence agents discovered in West Germany. The purpose is quite clear. He is trying to frighten the reader that there are no corners in the nation where one would not be observed by the organs of foreign intelligence. In the chapter entitled "What Dangers Are Involved in the Eastern Policy of Willy Brandt," the author feels that the rapprochement with Moscow will bring new intelligence agents into the nation, and the struggle against them will become even more difficult. In essence, precisely due to these warnings by Gehlen about the dangers which are involved in contacts between West Germany and the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations, the reactionary forces are making such a great to-do about his memoirs.

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