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~~FULL TEXT~~

Reinhard Gehlen
(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: To his enemies, the most dangerous man in Europe. To his admirers, the most brilliant spy that's ever been. He has been called "The Man in the Shadows," "The Man with a Thousand Ears," "The Man of a Million Mysteries." At one time he even had a price of nearly a billion dollars on his head. He has shunned being photographed, seldom appears in public save at night or wearing dark glasses. Reinhard Gehlen, Super Spy.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: The year Hitler came to power in Germany, Reinhard Gehlen entered the Berlin War Academy. He was then 31.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: While most of his compatriots had preferred peace-time jobs after World War I, Gehlen had opted for the Army. Undeterred by the Kaiser's defeat, he told one of his closest friends, "The German Army will come back, and I shall be a general."

Gen. Westphal MAN: I did meet Gehlen, at that time Captain Reinhard Gehlen, in Berlin in 1933 when we were together students in the German War Academy in Berlin. We belonged both to the same class in the War Academy from October, '33, to July, '35. I remember that he was not a gay person. He was a very correct character. He was reliable; he was very solid, and he was devoted to his job to be a good officer in the army.

Gen. Wartenburg MAN: I know (UNCLEAR) at the beginning of the war, he was a younger member of the Fortifications Department of the General Staff. As such, he had to do with the fortifications against the East when the Polish fell-- the Polish campaign had terminated, and it was necessary for us to protect this new frontier towards the East.

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During the campaign in France, 1940, he was sent by General Halder(?), as his liaison officer. He apparently made such a lasting impression on General Halder that he chose him as his aide. But he remained in that position only for a short time, before he entered the most noble department of the Army, the Operations Staff.

In this capacity, he had to do with the preparations against Russia, and the southern wing.

NARRATOR: Gehlen's work in planning the German attack on Russia in June, 1941, brought him to Hitler's notice.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: But when the Russian campaign began to go wrong for Hitler, in April, 1942, he put Gehlen in charge of gathering information about Russia's war potential, something Hitler and the Nazis, surprisingly, had not bothered to do before launching their attack on Russia.

(MUSIC AND SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: Thereafter, until his break with Hitler in April, 1945, Gehlen reported regularly on all matters to do with Russia's war effort, gathering his information from agents inside the Soviet Union, some inside the Kremlin itself, as well as from interrogating Russian prisoners of war, studying Russian documents, and observing front-line activity.

(MUSIC AND SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: But his reports were not always believed.

See Warrent MAN: There is one particular scene on the 9th of January, just three days before the Russian offensive at Behrenov(?) at the Vistula started, when a new report of Gehlen's was put to Hitler by General (UNCLEAR), in which Gehlen, among others, said that the Russian Infantry was ten times as strong as the Germans, that the Panzers were in the relation of seven to one, and the guns even of twenty to one.

Then, Hitler went up once more and said in (UNCLEAR) words, "That's completely idiotic. Put the man who said that in a madhouse." Whereupon (UNCLEAR) said, "Then you put me there, too."

NARRATOR: Gehlen was meticulous, insisting that every scrap of information be filed. By April, 1945, his files were bulging, the envy of the Russians themselves. The information they contained had enabled Gehlen to warn Hitler of the disasters impending at Stalingrad, and Quest(?), and Minsk-- warnings that, of course, went unheeded. He'd warned Hitler, too, of Germany's eventual defeat.

But long before that defeat, Gehlen had determined not to let his files fall into Russian hands. He had another use for them. Four days before taking his final leave of Hitler, Gehlen, by now a general, ordered his staff to evacuate his files from their headquarters at Zossen, near Berlin, southwards to Bavaria to the so-called Alpine redoubt, centered around Lake Spitzing.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Spitzing, Gehlen knew from captured Allied documents, was destined to be in the American zone of occupation.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: From Spitzing, the Wehrmacht trucks carrying the files, filling more than fifty large steel cases, took the ten-mile-long forest road to Allepp(?), near the Austrian border.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: They were aiming for Hinderlein(?), where some colleagues awaited them. But the roads to Hinderlein were blocked by advance parties of American troops.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: So they turned more deeply into the mountains, until finally they reached a forest hut, known locally as Ehlen's Augh(?), meaning Misery Meadow.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Here, Gehlen and the nine staff officers with him decided to stop and bury the steel cases containing the files in six-foot-deep trenches which they dug around the hut.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: It was the day the Red Army finally broke into Berlin.

Every morning, Gehlen and his aides climbed one of the near-by mountains to look for the approaching Americans, but none came. The Americans had, in fact, been ordered to give the Alpine redoubt a miss for the moment, and to concentrate on mopping up those German troops still resisting around Munich.

On May the first came Radio Hamburg's announcement of Hitler's suicide, and that his successor's, Admiral Donitz, decision to seek an armistice. But still no Americans came anywhere near Misery Meadow.

By May the 19th, with the war now over almost a fortnight, Gehlen felt he could wait no longer, but must seek out the Americans for himself. With four of his aides, he descended the valley, first to the inn at Zitfelviet, where he spent an anxious few days communicating by short-wave radio with those of his colleagues left behind with the buried files.

But he'd learned that the Americans had set up a command post nearby at Fishhausen on Lake Fierfay(?), and that they were treating surrendering German generals with great respect. He decided to give himself up.

But his first meeting with the Americans was an anticlimax, for the young Texan lieutenant merely took down his name and rank and ordered him to an office prisoner of war camp at Miersbach(?), nearer Munich.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Gehlen protested his importance, but to no avail with his young captors, who, by then, had taken prisoner several hundred top German officers and generals who'd been holding out in the Bavarian Alps, and they were pretty balse about it all.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Gehlen had to cool his heels for several days more before being questioned again. This time, the young sergeant who interrogated him knew of him. And so, Gehlen began to be passed up the Allied intelligence ladder. From Miesbach, he was sent to Augsburg, and from Augsburg to Wiesbaden(?).

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: The processing of the prisoners, especially the top-ranking Nazis, was inevitably slow and laborious.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: That Gehlen was given any priority at all was due to one man, The United States' Seventh Army Chief of Intelligence, Colonel William Quinn. It was in Quinn that Gehlen first confided his scheme for buying his freedom with his files, though he wouldn't say straightaway where he'd hidden them.

Col. Quinn
MAN: Well, I think it was just a simple fact that he had an awful lot of beautiful cards in his hand, and they were the cards that we wanted to have--we wanted that intelligence, we wanted that background, that basis, because we had no such basis up until that point as it related to the Soviets.

Gen. Kenneth Strong
MAN: He had been very far-seeing, Gehlen, because he-- his own view was that sooner or later, there'd be a clash between Russia and the West, and he felt that if he kept his officers, who were knowledgeable about Russia, and these documents together, he could, at one point, approach the West with the idea of asking the takeover of this organization after the capitulation of Germany.

Gen. Westphal
MAN: WE had such a paucity of resources as far as the Russians were concerned, and here was Gehlen with this organization he had developed to cover the Soviet military, and had been effective, or at least we assumed that it had been effective in the fighting on the Eastern front-- reasonably effective, and here was something in hand that would take months if not years to duplicate, so why not use it?

Gen. Westphal
MAN: He thought very carefully as to whether he should come to the British or the Americans, but he felt that the Americans under-- would, in the end, understand the problems of Russia and so on, much better-- and the Germans, much better than would the countries-- the other countries of the West, like Great Britain and France, for example.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: Gehlen was flown to Washington, to the Pentagon, in August, 1945, along with three of his top aides. The Americans had dug up his files, and were clearly delighted at what they contained. What's more, the Russians were now desperately searching for Gehlen, since they'd found his headquarters empty of files, were beginning to suspect that something was afoot.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: Gehlen and his aides were housed down the Potomac from the Pentagon in well-furnished villas at Fort Hunt. To see to his every need, Gehlen was provided with an NCO butler and several white-jacketed orderlies.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: His metamorphosis, from a wanted enemy to a courted ally, had begun.

See Kenneth Strong
 MAN: Well, the Americans, I think, were taken by surprise by the cold war. There was quite a big body of Americans who believed that when the War--World War II was over, they and the Russians would become buddies and would cooperate, and that everything in the garden would be lovely.

Well, it took a little time, I think, for them to realize-- the Americans to realize that this was not so.

Col. Quinn
 MAN: We, perhaps, weren't as aware as a man like Winston Churchill of the fact that the Russians were going to be very difficult to live with at the end of the War. I think he was the first to recognize that Stalin was out for the Soviet Union, and only the Soviet Union, and that the negotiations which had gone on in Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and so on was jockeying for power positions. The United States was almost diffident in some of those discussions, because we felt that they really weren't too much our concern. We'd never dealt to a great degree with Eastern Europe before, and I think President Roosevelt had confidence that Stalin would allow, quote, "democratic," unquote, processes to take place.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: That autumn of 1945, the Soviet Union was the biggest military power on earth. Already, a sinister Iron Curtain was descending across Europe, and leaving, not only half of Germany behind it, but also the Balkans and much of Central Europe.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: The Red Army was rushing in to fill the power vacuum left in Europe by Hitler's defeat, whereas the British and Americans were demobilizing as fast as they could.

(MUSIC)

MAN: Immediately upon the surrender of the Nazis in Europe, there was an immense "get the boys home" attitude that started in this country, and they were brought home by everything that moved, and I always liked the then Chief of Staff of the Army's comment that it was not a demobilization; it was a rout.

(MUSIC AND SOUND EFFECTS)

MAN: Intelligence, particularly in the military services, is usually the first to go. Why would we need an intelligence service in peace time, which reflects more or less the U.S. attitude towards intelligence. We had existed for nearly 150 years without an intelligence service; why did we need it now?

*See
with* MAN: To begin with, one must realize that the Americans during the war in Europe had been almost entirely dependent on the British for their intelligence. They really never developed any (UNCLEAR) of their own, and consequently, although they weren't critical of the British intelligence, they felt that really this should not happen again, and they must build up something of their own.

*C.I.
Return* MAN: Well, it was two years before we had a legislative intelligence service, but, in the meantime, in January, 1946, President Truman, by executive order, created the Central Intelligence group, which was a pooling together of representatives of all the intelligence services, State, Army, Navy, Air, and others-- ex-F.B.I. people-- which started to acquire some of these wartime organizations which the military were giving up, specifically, German military document section from the Army; the Washington Document Center of the Navy, which was concerned with Japanese documents; the foreign broadcast unit of the Army which monitors open broadcasts, and these were then being let go by their organizations, and these were picked up by what eventually became the C.I.A.

SDNY MAN: When I learned about the conditions which Gehlen had put to the American G-2 for working for them, I was amazed that the Americans had been willing to agree to that-- namely, that he would be independent from any checking of his personnel by any German authority or even by the American Army-- that he was free to develop his own politics, and that he would get the payment what he needed, and that he could operate east of the Iron Curtain, as it was called at the time, as he thought fit.

MAN: Gehlen, in his best years, as a man between 40 and 60, had a very strong impact on every man, I would say, and everybody, and his strong ethic(?) attitude as a latter-day Prussian(?) convinced that he was trustworthy, that he was reliable, and he could offer a specialist's knowledge.

MAN: He wanted the position to be the advisor of the American Army or to share the hard life of the defeated foe. Instead, a round of one comfortable U.S. Army billet after another.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: For a while, he and his staff were even housed in Kronberg(?) Castle, near Frankfort.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Built by Queen Victoria's eldest daughter, and the seat of the former House of Hesse.

Although he promised Washington that he wouldn't employ any former members of the Gestapo or S.S., Gehlen did, in fact, do so, albeit, under aliases, and claiming, of course, that he was unaware of their true identity.

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P. 2-11-48*
MAN: In the headquarters, there were perhaps some political officers which served for a state-- certain time at some Gestapo office, but no really political Gestapo men. They used Gestapo men as agents, and for purposes of contacting--

MAN: Under the bargain with the Americans, he was free to employ whoever-- whomever he considered to be a workable cooperator.

MAN: I think I would describe it at that time as being a case of desperation for some good intelligence on the Soviet Union, because we were pretty devoid of any intelligence, and to join up as a partner with a former immediate enemy was something that had to be considered.

It was considered, but we felt that the fact that we would-- might have to take the risk of criticism was warranted by virtue of the dividend. It was--really a very serious crisis point as far as we were concerned of being able to develop an intelligence system inside the Soviet Union.

(MAN)

NARRATOR: German prisoners of war returning from Russia were a ready source of information for Gehlen.

(MUSIC)

GEHLEN: He saw to it that they were all interrogated thoroughly, and it was from the unusual stones with which one of the returning prisoners had fashioned a cigarette lighter while in Russian captivity, that Gehlen was able to tell the Americans that the Russians had now discovered uranium, and were no longer dependent on foreign supplies.

(MUSIC AND SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: It was from those Germans, forced to leave their homes in the Eastern zone, that Gehlen recruited many of his agents.

(MUSIC AND SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: After suitable training, many of these D.P.'s, displaced persons, were secreted back into the Eastern zone. Gehlen shared their hatred of the Soviets.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

Strong
MAN: Gehlen's anti-Communism, anti-Socialism, I think, must date from the War, really. And it's, I suppose, understandable. Here he was, a Major General in a great and powerful army, being defeated by the Russians. He saw what he believed or was told was atrocities by the Russians, and he never really had a very opinion of their(?) military capabilities.

He once said to me that what was so very difficult to discern in the Russians was not their plans or their place of attack or something like that, it--one never knew how many men they had. You'd kill a lot, and yet, more would come on, and so, I think he-- there was another element in the problem: he was afraid of these Russians, and he felt sooner or later that they'd overrun Germany, and that Germany would be absorbed by Russia.

MAN: I think he was-- he had never been able to reflect all his war experiences and war-- ideas of war to a political shape, so he remained a soldier, living in the idea, the foe, the enemy, must be kept under control, and if necessary, be defeated.

MAN: He was a crusader against Communism, there's no doubt about that, but at times, he would probably turn against-- the same way, fanatically against the government of Cairo, or I don't know-- whatever job was given to him. He is, in a way, a pure professional officer who does the job he's given.

NARRATOR: The U.S. Army camp at Oberertzel(?), near Frankfurt, was Gehlen's first headquarters, his American patrons providing him with \$600,000 a year, which he was soon to up to nearly \$20,000,000 a year. His staff also grew, from less than 400 to more than a thousand. Oberertzel became no longer big enough. In the autumn of 1947, the same autumn the C.I.A. was established, and Gehlen's organization transferred to it, he persuaded his American patrons to spend three million dollars modernizing this former S.S. model housing estate at Pular(?), near Munich.

Once Martin Bohrman's headquarters, and before that, Rudolph Hess's, its seclusion was a boon to Gehlen.

(MUSIC)

He made it into the most up-to-date espionage center in the world.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: His family and the families of his staff were all moved within the compound and discouraged from ever venturing outside. A school for their children was established within the compound, and American-type shops provided American-type rations.

(MUSIC)

This, at a time when most Germans were on bare subsistence.

(MUSIC)

Gehlen had only to ask, and the Americans, it seemed, were only too eager to provide.

MAN: One would have to really know a lot more to say whether the United States really did get value or not.

Cal. Quinn MAN: I would say, that without being cynical, if we didn't get value for it, it wasn't the only effort that we wasted money on, because we were learning by experience, and occasionally, the experience was not good.

NARRATOR: These were the years when Russia's "nyet," was delivered at one international conference after another...

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: ...and the face of this man, Vlashov Molotov, came to symbolize every cooling of the cold war. Every cooling of the cold war, every hardening of Russia's attitude toward the West made it easier for Gehlen to loosen the Americans' purse strings.

The late 1940's saw Russia dishonoring her promise concerning Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, as she'd already done concerning Poland. The Communists took over in Czechoslovakia; a Communist-inspired civil war raged in Greece, and a Communist state was formed in East Germany. Russia blockaded West Berlin, and threatened Yugoslavia's independence. Moscow-backed parties looked like coming into power, even in France and Italy.

To the West, the Soviets were an enigma, and so the West became ever more hungry for information for information of the Soviets' intentions.

MAN: I don't think Gehlen had any particularly new or novel methods of working. I think he had learned, however, one thing from his experience, namely, that if first you are making an intelligence estimate, then you've got to take all sources of information into consideration. That includes what a spy may produce.

Col. Quinn MAN: I think in intelligence there's just so much you can get by formal training; the rest has to be by experience. Of course, the British Intelligence Service, being perhaps the oldest continuous service in history, had had a great deal more of this experience, which was passed on down the line.

*How
Belle
Beck* MAN: I think probably Gehlen found out what many people have found out before-- that of the information available for-- to make a report or an estimate, probably four-fifths of that information comes from-- oh, general sources-- newspapers and so on, and probably only one-- say, one-fifth of it, if as much as that, comes, shall we say, from secret agents, or similar secret sources.

MAN: Today, with modern intelligence collection, overhead reconnaissance satellites-- photographic satellites, and the vast expansion of communications intelligence, where you listen to every sound-- perhaps you can go as high as 90 or 95-- certainly, four-fifths is a conservative estimate of how much comes from completely overt, easily obtainable non-clandestine methods.

MAN: Well, I read-- I've read one or two spy stories, and they never seem to me to have any real substance of truth in them. What one must ask of oneself about a spy is not how he

got the information, what were the ingenious methods adopted to procure it. What one's got to say is, "What information did he get, and what use of it was made when he got it?"

NARRATOR: Gehlen set up some sixty schools for his agents at various Bavarian stately homes. This mansion of Amahlanberg(?) at Bad Viser(?) was one. In all, he trained some 5,000 spies to work behind the Iron Curtain.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: One of their biggest early successes was in September, 1948, when they learned Russia was arming with so-called East German People's Police.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: In the Spring of 1949, Gehlen was also able to tell his C.I.A. masters that the Russians had a new jet fighter, the MIG-15.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: But besides pushing spies into Eastern Europe, Gehlen was instrumental in encouraging the United States to set up Radio Free Europe, near his Poulansk(?) headquarters. Radio, in fact, loomed large in Gehlen's activities.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: The 1950's saw a hot war confrontation in Korea and a Communist witch hunt under Senator McCarthy in America. A newly-elected President Eisenhower, and more especially his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, began to talk of liberating the captive peoples in Eastern Europe-- talk that was in tune with Reinhard Gehlen's own political beliefs.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: These were also the years when West Berlin, with its direct access to the East, was the espionage capitol of the world.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: More than 7,000 spies and informers were based here-- most of them helping Gehlen earn his title of "Spymaster of the Western World." Three-quarters of the West's intelligence concerning the East came, it was said, from Gehlen. He even procured a copy of Kruschoff's secret denunciation of Stalin from the Soviet leader's own Kremlin office, and he helped unmask such Soviet agents as George Blake, Gordon Lonsdale, the Ambassador, and the Krogers. In gratitude, the C.I.A., in 1956, gave him a quarter of a million Deutschmarks with which to buy for himself this house on Lake Stahberg(?), near Munich.

With the establishment of the West German Republic, the Americans had honored their promise to Gehlen ten years before, to hand over his organization to the new regime. Gehlen, in effect, became head of the West German secret service.

MAN: In this capacity, he had not so much more to do-- and not only to do with the Russians, but with all the interesting(?) countries of the world and with political questions, too. But, even then, as far as I know, he never went to Berlin-- very seldom; he always had this man whom he sent there.

*How
Betley
Becker* MAN: I had served in a side branch of intelligence during the war, supervising the Russian agents' intelligence radio, so I knew from the war one man or the other who had joined the Gehlen service, and they asked for contact to Spiegel(?) and me in order, perhaps, to get some information and conversation or ask one of the other questions, or influence speakers attitudes toward Gehlen and I proposed to them to do a cover story of the Spiegel, which was rather a well-known news magazine already then, because there had been lots of wrong information about Gehlen, derived from British publications, and Gehlen's associates asked him, and he agreed that somebody who, as a former intelligence man, would be reliable and trustworthy would do a cover story in the news magazine. So I met him, and the circum-- the technical circumstances-- well, I was-- I traveled to Munich and had to wait in my car at a certain point, and from there I was invited to another car, and we toured through Munich, and after a while, the car stopped, and then another car and another man took me over, and took me into a small street with very small, small mans-- little houses, and just in one of them, before one of them or at one of them, the car stopped, and I was led into the house, and an elderly lady, who, as an agent, I suppose, lived there as a widow or so, and served me some coffee and chatted with me and the man who accompanied me. After a while the doctor, Doctor Schneider appeared, with his darker glasses and his little hat, and just how very few photos exist from this time showing.

MAN: It was a very peculiar trait of Gehlen's-- this desire for secrecy. He gave up his title of General, I think, and became Doctor, I think, was one of the titles he took. One never was told where his private dwelling was and where he lived, and, if one went to see him, you were never certain that he would be there.

MAN: He tried to create such a-- such a figure of James Bond-- yes, dark glasses, never make a picture, his hat, and so on. And I think that the practice of intelligence service in the (UNCLEAR) is quite different.

MAN: He spoke in a low voice; he tended to wear dark glasses always, when one spoke to him and met him. I would think that he was a very determined man; he was simple, like the German General Staff trained officers are-- they see their objective very clearly, and go for it, and I think Gehlen was like that. He saw what he wanted, and he went for it. He's a fanatic.

MAN: A fanatic in his job, a fanatic in his personal life, and a fanatic in his attitude against me.

NARRATOR: Gehlen doesn't smoke, touch spirits, nor eat meat. The few friends he has are connected with his career.

MAN: I felt that he did at one time want to-- Gehlen did at one time want to become head of NATO intelligence. I never saw any documents or proposals in writing about it, but there may have been some. I would think it would be-- it would have been very exceptional if he had done it.

MAN: Particularly the French would have opposed it-- opposed it until the end, you know. They never would have agreed that Gehlen would be put into that position. They were very studious about Gehlen right from the beginning.

MAN: He claims on many occasions to have given exact notice of the--to his authorities, the German government, of what was likely to happen, and I think in Cuba was one; I think the Six Days' War was another; Vietnam, I believe, was another; Korea, I think, was another-- and so on.

Well, I can't, of course, say that's not true; I have no way of knowing. But I will say this about an intelligence officer-- it is exceptional they can ever give an exact timing on an exact date, or an exact description of what is going to happen. What he can do-- he can paint the circumstances; he can show what the options are, or the likelihood of this or that happening.

NARRATOR: Besides Cuba and Korea, Vietnam and the Six Day Israeli War, Gehlen also claimed to have foretold the 1953 uprising in East Berlin, the 1956 uprising in Hungary. He hoped to establish a secret service for Nasser in Egypt, but when Nasser let himself be wooed by Moscow, Gehlen saw to it that Israeli agents were infiltrated into Cairo.

But the 1950's also saw the first of the many disasters that were to hit Gehlen in the years to come-- the celebrated telephone tunnel, built between West and East Berlin, and meant to tap the most secret conversations of the top East German leaders.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Built at a cost of six million dollars to the C.I.A., it was betrayed in April, 1956, after only nine months of operation, by one of Gehlen's own colleagues. Indeed, as the years went by, more and more East German agents were infiltrated into Gehlen's organization.

MAN: Returned agents for assignment in Germany, and this agent came under the identity of East German refugee who crossed the borders-- defected to Berlin-- yes, it was done before the Wall, the Berlin Wall, was built. And they were debriefed usually by the Berlin organization, and the interest(sic) story which was planted to these people came to be really interesting for this organization. A number of these people were hired, yes, by the Berlin organization(?).

NARRATOR: In 1961, Heinz Felsen, one of Gehlen's top aides, who had worked for him for ten years was discovered to be a Russian spy. It was disclosed, too, at his trial that he'd been a member of the S.S., and of the Hitler Youth.

5700 J. L. L. MAN: It destroyed right away his reputation-- particularly in America. Because I remember reading in The New York Times or Washington Post, today begins a trial in (UNCLEAR) which destroys the reputation of a man who had been considered by American intelligence, the C.I.A. particularly, as the most efficient agent of the world, and we have spent millions or billions, as they say, for nothing, because the Soviets knew exactly as much as Gehlen.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

MAN: I was sure that there were some people who were Russians, because Gehlen had taken on S.S. officers who had been taken prisoner by the Russians, and it(?) was said, "Now, you'll be shot, or you go free to West Germany and work for us."

MAN: Mr. Gehlen accepted into his service all(?) of his World War II colleagues. Many of these colleagues were in a prisoners camp(?) for a long time, and these people, under the tremendous pressure from their masters in these camps, and one cannot wonder that some of these people were broken-- yes, and agreed with the future cooperation.

(SOUND EFFECTS)

NARRATOR: Fel^D betrayed nearly 100 of Gehlen's top agents in East Germany. Their show trials in the East led to much public criticism of Gehlen in the West, particularly when the paraphernalia of their spying was paraded before the East German television cameras.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Gehlen looked round for friends in the West German press to take some of the pressure of him.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: The news magazine, Der Spiegel, was compiling a profile on the West German Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, who was one of Gehlen's most fervent critics. Gehlen offered to help, but when the profile came out, Strauss realized its writers must have had access to confidential government papers. He suspected their source, but his methods of combatting Der Spiegel were clumsy, and they rebounded on him, forcing him to resign.

Gehlen, for his part, was nearly arrested, and among those who were imprisoned and charged with high treason was Der Spiegel's then managing editor, Hans Stifler(?) Becker.

MAN: The Spiegel affair, or the law suit initiated for alleged betrayal of state secrets in an article to which Gehlen's organization had contributed some information, and on which it had cooperated in verifying certain data. Undoubtedly, this lawsuit, if it had ever come out, would have been much less spectacular, had there not been a political controversy about

*Hans
Becker
Becker*

Strauss's nuclear policy, smouldering between Mr. Strauss on the one hand, and the forces in the Bundeswehr(?) command and the Army command and in Gehlen's organization on the other hand. The fact that the United States supported Strauss's enemies additionally affected his position towards Gehlen's intelligence service, which had been taken over then from American aegis by the German government. Strauss believed in a conspiracy between officers of Gehlen's organization and Der Spiegel--this will explain the comparably spectacular course taken by relatively unimportant press affair which Britain would have been settled by (UNCLEAR) notice.

NARRATOR: For Gehlen, Der Spiegel affair was the beginning of the end. An enforced retirement was only avoided by a further cooling of the Cold War. But his fate was finally sealed by the so-called Picard Case in the winter of 1967 to '68. Maurice Picard, a former security chief of the French Ministry of the Interior, was charged with supplying information to a foreign power which at first everyone took to be Russia. But when it turned out that it was, in fact, West Germany, and that he was a spy for Gehlen and had collaborated with the Nazis during the war, the then West German Foreign Minister, Willy Brandt, insisted on Gehlen's retirement.

But Gehlen had hardly retired before yet another scandal burst around him. In October, 1968, a number of prominent people in West Germany, including Gehlen's former deputy and the man whom he had backed to succeed him, General Ventlandt(?), died in mysterious circumstances. Officially, they had committed suicide, but others said they were summarily executed.

*French
Fidelite*
MAN: After the invasion in 1968, I was a (UNCLEAR) man who defected from Czechoslovakia. In '68, defected two peoples, and one of these men who was closely related to the German department, and he knows what is going on in the ground service(?), and he revealed the story, in spite of the studied (?) and made the story publicly. But in headquarters it was known that the deputy chief of the Gehlen organization, General-- Major General Ventlandt died, because he was regulated by this man. The same as the question of Admiral (UNCLEAR)-- yes. Both were Czech agents, these people. I don't know the other prominent society-- there were about six or seven others in the society in a period of a very short time. It is called Bloody October-- yes-- in Germany.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: Today, Gehlen lives in seclusion in his house on the banks of Lake Stanberg, near Munich...

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: ...the lake in which mad King Ludwig II of Bavaria drowned himself nearly a hundred years before.

(MUSIC)

NARRATOR: He, too, had seen himself as a savior, of sorts.

(MUSIC)

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