

EMA-3804

SECRET

FEB 25 1954

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Chief of Base, Bonn

INFO: EE ✓

OPERATIONS/LIAISON

CAUSA Briefing by the DDI

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Under separate cover is a Memorandum for the Record covering the meeting between the DDI and CAUSA on 11 February 1954.

Enclosure: SEPARATE COVER
Memo for the Record (in dup)

23 February 1954

Distribution:

- 3 - COM, w/encl in dup
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting between Mr. Robert Amory (DIA) and Staatssekretär
Dr. Hans Globke, Bundeskanzleramt

1. Bonn Station arranged for a meeting between Mr. Amory and Dr. Globke on Thursday, 11 February 1954, at 1530 hours, in the Staatssekretär's office, Palais Schaumburg, Bonn. Present, besides the two principals, were [] and [].

2. After appropriate introductions, it was explained to Dr. Globke that the purpose of the visit was to put in the hands of the German Government (as the Director had provided Berstenmaier and Hallstein during their last visit to the US) an outline of American experience with the organization of national intelligence. Mr. Amory pointed out our admitted interest in the future organization of German intelligence; we realized that the pattern of organization developed from American experience might not apply completely to the German situation, but we wished to ensure that they were adequately informed, on the highest level, of the exact nature of this American organization in case they wished to draw upon its experience for their own purposes.

3. It was pointed out that American experience had led to the conviction that intelligence must be integrated on the national level and provided for use of the Government as a whole. Our National Security Act of 1947 set up an integrated intelligence structure, designed to incorporate the lessons of World War II and avoid the gaps and duplications in intelligence which occurred with a system of competing intelligence agencies. The purpose is to produce "national intelligence" or integrated intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency. It seems probable to us that the German Government will also wish to have some such integrated system. The US Government has achieved it by use of a committee system to coordinate departmental intelligence, plus the formation of a central agency whose sole business is intelligence and which provides a clearing house and support for the activities of other agencies. Along with this agency-plus-committee system, there is, in the United States pattern, a Director of Central Intelligence. It is important to note that Mr. Dulles is more than the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He is the Director of Central Intelligence (including the agency) because of his position as adviser to the National Security Council and Chairman of the IAC (Intelligence Advisory Committee).

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4. The importance in the American structure of the National Security Council was pointed out. Dr. Globke was given a copy of the current Newsweek magazine which included an article on the NSC and photos of the chief members. Dr. Globke was also handed a chart labeled "National Intelligence Production Structure" to which reference was made during the explanations of the integrated intelligence system. The functions of the DCI as an adviser to the NSC were explained and emphasis was put on the predominant position of the NSC as the top advisory body. Using the chart to illustrate the units involved and the work flow, an explanation was given of the role of IAC as a medium through which formal national intelligence is made available to the policy makers. A requirement for a National Intelligence Estimate on Yugoslavia was hypothesized and it was shown how departmental agencies and the various sections of DIA would collaborate on producing the intelligence basis for the formulation of national policy.

5. At the end of this explanation, Dr. Globke expressed his interest and appreciation. He stated that he had previously been aware of the general nature of the system but had never before so clearly seen the relationships or the process of coordination. He was provided with a copy of the "National Intelligence Production Structure" chart, a copy of the legislative booklet on CIA, and was promised a translation of an explanatory essay including a glossary of the alphabetical agencies listed on the chart.

6. Dr. Globke then posed some questions to clarify certain points to his own satisfaction. He wished to know if State Department reporting were available to the intelligence evaluators and if covert reports were available to State Department. He was informed that this cross-fertilization was conducted on current and continuing subjects through DCI. He then alluded to DDF (which along with DDA had been mentioned only in passing) and reverted to the example of Yugoslavia. He presumed there must be covert collection within Yugoslavia and wondered how the Ambassador, as senior US official, could endanger his status by directing such operations. He was informed that no clandestine operations were conducted from a diplomatic establishment and that, at the most, there might be a point of reference on the Embassy staff, but no direct contact with operations. (This query may reflect an attempt of the Auswaertiges Amt to establish its own intelligence agency.)

7. Dr. Globke also pointed out the German problem of drawing a line between internal and external CI/CE responsibilities. He asked how this was regulated between the FBI and the Agency. He was told that the FBI had its jurisdiction within the national boundaries. It was, for example, an intelligence responsibility to detect and monitor a hostile operation in Mexico but it was turned over to the FBI once it had crossed our border. Naturally there was an area of operations calling

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for cooperation and joint action rather than rigid definitions, and this had to be worked out by friendly liaison. Dr. Globke mentioned the difficulty of making these distinctions because of the current division of Germany and the necessity of security operations against subversive elements working within the Federal Republic but based outside its present territory.

8. Dr. Globke reiterated his appreciation before our departure. He made no commitments, of course, concerning the future course of action within the Federal Republic but he must certainly be now convinced that the Americans are not interested in a "small solution" for legalising intelligence activities.

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