

Air

EASW-569

(8 Nov 53)

Chief of Base, Salzburg      Info: Chief of Mission, Vienna

Chief, EE

Operational/GRDOUNCE

GRDOUND

Ref:      EAVA 4479; SOB/2000

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

1. When the GRDOUND project outline was written in March, 1953, paragraph 4 c, "Current Status of the Project", depicted the state of project operations as of that date; consequently, this part of the outline was bound to become outdated rapidly. At present, it is somewhat obsolete, as reference points out; however, it was written, reviewed and accepted with this point in mind - as are all project proposals - and is not a part of the outline that must be amended as circumstances change.

2. Headquarters comments on reference and on GRDOUND are as follows:

a. Paragraph a, reference: It is believed that paragraph 4A(3)(b) of the project outline is sufficiently broad as to permit the field to develop within the E and E network any courier system or systems of its choice.

b. Paragraph b, reference: We concur; in the over all amendment of the project outline, the words "initial phases of" will be removed from the first sentence of paragraph 4B(2).

c. Paragraph c, reference: See EASW 461.

d. Paragraph d, reference: (See paragraph 1, above) We based our estimate of groups on LAUNCH plans which called for one group

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to retire to the Kamertal, and various individuals of other groups, who cannot remain in place, to organize in the Kitsbuehler Alps and carry on guerrilla activities. The others were earmarked for resistance activities. CALLAUNCH 1 has stated that he envisages no true guerrilla warfare on the part of his organization. Thus, the Kamertal group and the group which was to be organized in the Kitsbuehler Alps became merely a mountain variety of clandestine resistance, and all groups, the total number at that time amounting to 21, could properly be classified as resistance groups.

e. Paragraph e, reference: (See paragraph 1, above) We agree to the extent that the words "and/or underground" are incorrect. Airman will, however, be briefed as to the general (true) guerrilla areas after they have been established and the guerrillas are in operation against the enemy.

f. Paragraph f, reference: (See paragraph 1, above) GROUND speaks of "...a network of 19 agents...being organized..." not of 19 active agents. Our records show eight active agents, seven inactive (spotted, FUG and for CG, not approached) agents, and, since March, four agents either dropped or phasing out.

g. Paragraph g, reference: (See paragraph 1, above) Since GROMBAL was not recruited, as we assumed he would be, the word acquisition in paragraph 4(3)(e) fourth sub-paragraph is inaccurate.

h. Paragraph h, reference: (See paragraph 1, above) Since March Without has phased out of the REPAIR operation leaving REPAIR 3 as the sole agent.

i. Paragraph i, reference: In context, the GROUND statement is accurate. The statement pertained to the majority of "areas and equipment" caches and was not intended to apply to W/T caches.

j. Disagree; the GROUND statement is considered to be sufficient. Actual agent monetary gain, with one or two exceptions, is quite negligible, with most financial transactions consisting of reimbursement for various operational expenses. Further, it is most difficult to distinguish accurately the line between peacetime opportunism and patriotic motivation.

18 November 1953

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