DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION **S E C R E T**	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. **EASA-5259**

TO **Chief of Station, Vienna** INFO **Chief, EE (Attention:** ⌐ ⌐	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. **6-124-27/9**

FROM **Chief of Base, Salzburg**	DATE **28 October 1959**

SUBJECT	RE: "43-3" — (CHECK "X" ONE)
ORCROUND/ORLAUNCH/OPERATIONS ORLAUNCH Termination Planning	MARKED FOR INDEXING
	NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ACTION REQUIRED	**XX**	INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED
See paragraph 9.		BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY

REFERENCE(S)

a. EASA-5151, 27 December 1958
b. EAVA-21479, 13 January 1959
c. EAVW-12528, 9 February 1959
d. EAVW-13423, 10 September 1959
e. VIEN 6156, 8 October 1959
f. DIR 48098, 12 October 1959

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

1. The total effect of references is to place us in a position where we can terminate the ORLAUNCH organization immediately without having to recruit a replacement nucleus. We are now faced with the problem of the method of termination, a problem to which we have given considerable thought and to which there is apparently no perfect solution. In the following paragraphs we have set down, for your consideration and comment, our ideas on the best and most practical method of accomplishing secure and amicable termination of the ORLAUNCH agents. These are preceded by a short discussion of the operational conditions and "atmosphere" which have bearing on the problem.

2. The following is a brief summary of the training, knowledge and experience of ORLAUNCH-1 and ORLAUNCH-2 plus a breakdown of past financial expenditure.

   a. ORLAUNCH-1 [   ] has been employed since 1948, first as a KUTUBE agent under the OROMET Project, then (in 1950) as a PA/Organizer of the ORLAUNCH Project. He has received no formal KUBARK instruction, but through operational briefings by a succession of case officers (he has had twelve) and from his wartime experience as a tank commander, is well trained and qualified for guerrilla warfare. He has an intimate knowledge of all ORLAUNCH affairs including the locations of some fifty Landing Zones and Dropping Zones and, we suspect, the locations of all W/T caches.

   b. ORLAUNCH-2 [   ] was recruited in 1950 to act as the project's indigenous training officer and was later reassigned as chief radio operator. He completed the twelve-week comprehensive KUCAGE course at Grafenwoehr in 1952. Previous to this he had completed training as a W/T operator. He is an ex-fighter pilot, a very competent radio operator and is well versed in the concepts of guerrilla warfare and E & E. He has located and documented approximately fifty LZ's and DZ's, knows the location of five radio caches and has been briefed on the latest air drop and agent W/T procedures. He has had at least ten case officers and knows or has met five communications officers and some fifteen other KUBARK staffers whom we are unable to identify. His knowledge of ORLAUNCH Project activities is almost as great as that of ORLAUNCH-1.

   c. Taking into consideration only the salaries, expenses and equipment given to ORLAUNCH-1 and ORLAUNCH-2, we have expended, at a conservative estimate, $55,000.00 over the past ten years. ORLAUNCH-1 has received more than $13,500.00 in salary and expenses; ORLAUNCH-2 more than $18,000.00 and the value of equipment expended equals approximately $23,500.00. Add to this the money paid out in the past to ORLAUNCH agents no longer employed and we suspect that the total expenditure for the ten-year period would exceed $100,000.00.

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3. From the preceding paragraph Headquarters will understand that these agents are well trained, intelligent and very competent. They have amassed a large amount of knowledge not only on general UW tactics, but on our particular modus operandi. There is one additional point in reference to these agents' operational knowledge which we feel deserves special attention. At one time (mid-1953) there were some seventy-four persons connected with the GRLAUNCH program for whom we had clearances or had requested traces. There were many other individuals who had been spotted and possibly approached, but who were not identified to us. The "74" were divided into nucleus groups through which larger organisations were to be recruited in various sections of Upper Austria, Salzburg, Styria and the Tirol. There are good possibilities that these projected lines of recruitment and/or the unidentified persons may cross existing or terminated nuclei of the GRHLAMED or GRREFAIR complexes. It is also possible (we shall check this out) that GRLAUNCH-1 has kept a card file on these people similar to the one he turned over to us in 1950/51 on I3 personalities in the Tirol.

4. The current attitude of the GRLAUNCHER's concerning their relationship with our organisation is that we, for the past few years, have been biding our time waiting for a propitious moment to terminate them. This has been brought about by a number of factors:

    a. Continual orders to cut back operations,
    b. Periodic salary decreases,
    c. Instructions to decrease expenses,
    d. Pressure on GRLAUNCH-2 to find legitimate employment.

GRLAUNCH-1, in fact, has twice commented that we will probably terminate them in the near future now that GRLAUNCH-2 is gainfully employed - implying the only reason for delay was that we did not wish to have a financially destitute GRLAUNCH-2 on our conscience at the time of termination. We have continually tried to dissuade GRLAUNCH-1 of this opinion, but to little avail. This cynical and slightly bitter attitude will probably magnify into one of contempt and possibly open antagonism unless we can convince them of our sincerity and good faith and of our continued interest in their projected wartime activities. We must do this in order to preserve friendly relations, maintain a minimum degree of post-termination control, preserve the integrity of the Tirol as an operational area and to protect our equity in these agents whether or not we ever call upon them for wartime activity. The best way to attain these goals, in our opinion, is to terminate the GRLAUNCHERS on the basis of a deactivation or "sleeper" program. In the following paragraphs we have outlined a plan which we believe to be the best and most workable solution to the problem.

5. In general we should tell the agents that the operation has reached the end of its preparatory phase. Their operational training has been completed, the W/T operators are fully prepared and equipped, basic operational planning and spotting has been carried out and arrangements for contact upon the outbreak of war have been made. Therefore, we are ready to enter the inactive or sleeper stage wherein the agents are to undertake no operational activity and where we must discontinue direct contact with them. They will be given a cover address through which they may get in touch with us, but it is to be used only in case of serious emergency or compromise. Salary payments will have to be stopped, but in appreciation of the work they have done and as a sign of good faith on our part, each man will be given the equivalent of six months salary and we will advance the rent for the Steinberg Safehouse for the period of the current lease (until 1963 @ AS 1,500.00 a year).

6. More specifically, we should discuss in detail the activities they are supposed to engage in following the commencement of hostilities. They are to undertake no guerrilla activity until instructed by us. Initially they are to organise the various action groups for the sole purpose of limited training. At the same time they should begin collecting and transmitting local Order of Battle, political and economic intelligence. Other than intelligence collecting, they are to remain entirely passive until they receive specific instructions. The first of these will probably be to initiate a black propaganda campaign designed to incite the populace against the occupying power. They will not be told to engage in aggressive action (open resistance, guerrilla warfare, sabo-

tage) until we are sure that it would be of definite aid in bringing about the liberation of Austria. We actually may find it to be more advantageous to have them engage in defensive holding actions to prevent the enemy from destroying strategic targets such as major rail and highway bridges, airport runways suitable for jet aircraft, hydro-electric power plants, major communications installations, etc. To further add credence to this part of the briefing, we might give them recovery instructions for one of the older arms caches - the 1952 or 1954 ten-man cache near Lofer - or tell them there is a cache in that area for which we will give them recovery instructions by radio. They would be told that these weapons are to be used for training purposes only, but that when we instruct them to begin guerrilla or holding operations we will tell them where other caches are or air-drop arms to them.

7. We come now to the question of W/T sets and wartime communications. We believe it best to leave all of the equipment (five complete agent radios with pertinent accessories) in the ground and tell the agents - with a reasonable degree of truth - that we have determined through much experimentation that W/T caches such as theirs have a life expectancy of six years or more dependent upon the type of ground and average moisture conditions in the area (example: QRLAUNCH-2's Rimn Cache which, when unearthed after four years of burial, was water-soaked and corroded, but transmitted and received "5 by 5"). We feel sure, therefore, that their sets, which are relatively new and in good locations, can be relied upon until at least 1965. If, for some unforeseen reason, their radios do not work, we will air drop new equipment. This part of the plan will be activated only if we have not heard from them by D plus 30. To convince them of our sincerity, we shall prepare and present to them a complete pre-arranged air drop plan accurate in every detail. This would include: two or three alternate and well chosen drop zones; a technically correct and flexible flight plan - i. e., the first three nights of the full moon period after D plus 30 at 2300, 2400 or 0100 hours and repeat every full moon phase thereafter until contact is made; a set DZ lighting plan with appropriate recognition signals. We should also provide an outline of proposed contents of the drop (two complete radios with hand generators and nickle-cadmium batteries, small arms and ammunition or recovery plans for one of the arms caches in their area, emergency rations and/or barter items) and allow the agents to suggest additional items within reason. As part of the briefing they would be instructed to make radio contact on the first regularly scheduled contact after the drop according to their signal plans. They should also be given a special phrase which must be included in the initial message to indicate they are not under enemy control. Failure to include the phrase or any variation in the set word order will constitute evidence of control.

8. The other side of the communications problem is that of maintaining the proficiency of the radio operators during the proposed indefinite period of inactivity. As we do not wish or intend to continue the W/T refresher training program, we have devised the following plan which, at a cost of less than $100.00, we believe will provide answers to any of the questions the agents may ask and which should be a workable "self-maintenance" program. We should inform the agents that for a number of reasons we shall not continue the annual W/T refresher training courses:

    a. Security: They are to have no more contact with Americans, nor are they to go on any more unexplained long trips;

    b. Logistic: Reduced training capability which requires all effort to be concentrated on untrained and less experienced radio operators;

    c. Research: We wish to test this program, thus at the end of an indefinite number of years we will recontact them and test them on standard equipment to determine the degree of proficiency they have maintained (we have no real intention of following through on this, but the general concept is worth further investigation in connection with other operations).

We propose, instead, to issue them one Trix tape recorder with a set of special tapes incorporating simulated radio traffic from a "Base Station" which is to be used jointly by GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9 to maintain their receiving proficiency. In addition each agent will be given: a.) one practice "key" with which to maintain their sending speed and which they can use as an improvised "table circuit" to send messages to each other; b.) two sets of "one-time pads" with which to practice encoding/decoding; c.) an instruction sheet in German on how to set up and put into operation the RS-1 and RS-6 agent radios; d.) a table of "pro-signs" and "Q" signals in German. (The total cost of these items should not exceed $60.00, the Trix with tapes being the most expensive item at approximately $35.00.) We are fairly confident, considering the training and experience of GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9, that regular and conscientious use of this equipment will enable them to retain their present level of proficiency.

9. We believe the program outlined in the preceding paragraphs satisfies all of the requirements of termination and at the same time protects our equity and ensures entree to the GRLAUNCHERS should we ever be forced to call upon them in a hot war situation. We request Headquarters' comments and approval to carry out this plan of action.

Distribution:
2 - Vienna
2 - EE

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