

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	FORM NUMBER AND NO. EUCA 82- 960
TO :	Chief of Base, Salzburg (ATTN: Chief, KUCLUB; Chief, EE Chief of Station, Vienna Chief, NATCA)		QUARTER FILE NO.
FROM :	Chief, EUCA <i>W</i>	DATE <b>14 SEPTEMBER 1962</b>	
SUBJECT :	Operational/GRCROOND GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9 Communica- tions Training	REF "23-3" (CHECK "2" ONE) MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED DESK ONLY	
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3828 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007 <i>copy filed - 6-124-27/g</i> <i>GRCROOND/GRLAUNCH DPs</i>			
<p>1. GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9, in the company of [ ] were met by [ ] at 0830 hours, 27 July at a safe-apartment in Munich. Communications instruction and refresher training was given there on 27, 28 and the morning of 29 July. At approximately 1300 hours, 29 July, GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9 departed via private automobile for their return home, with [ ] leaving shortly thereafter for his return to Frankfurt.</p> <p>2. GRLAUNCH-2 had been in Frankfurt in November 1961 for a period of training in the BYCINE/U type signal plan along with associated systems and procedures, all of which were subsequently issued to him. Since GRLAUNCH-A/9 was unable to attend that training session but was also to be issued the BYCINE/U signal plan, the suggestion was made to [ ] at that time that GRLAUNCH-A/9 be brought in for formal training in the new systems and procedures rather than to rely entirely on briefings by GRLAUNCH-2. Further, it was considered desirable that GRLAUNCH-A/9's primary cryptographic system be changed from numerical to literal in conformance with the other GRCROOND agents, which could also be accomplished at the same time. When [ ] met with GRLAUNCH-A/9 in July to arrange for the briefing session, GRLAUNCH-2, also attending the meeting, requested that he, too, be allowed to attend the briefing for additional refresher and on-the-air training.</p> <p>3. Training for GRLAUNCH-A/9 at this session began with an explanation of the BYCINE/U signal plan and an explanation of the activation instructions prepared by NATCA which the agent received from [ ] earlier in the month. He then read the ZIBALT/11 cryptographic document and was given a thorough explanation of its use for both enciphering and deciphering messages. Prior to his departure, [ ] was given a set of literal text cryptographic pads (9 encipher and 6 decipher) to be cached for GRLAUNCH-A/9 as a replacement for his present cache of numerical pads. GRLAUNCH-A/9 was issued a new security check to conform with the literal system (the digit "1" to be replaced with the letter "I" in both the security check and as confirmation character), which becomes effective concurrent with the change of cipher pads. GRLAUNCH-A/9 was then given an explanation of the BYDEX UTFT indicator system, after which he was given an UTFT message, enciphered in the new literal system, to decipher and interpret.</p> <p>4. GRLAUNCH-2 was reviewed in the use of his BYCINE/U signal plan, UTFT indicator system, activation instructions and cryptographic system. Because GRLAUNCH-2, as in the case of several of the other GRCROOND agents, had written down the memory phrases for his emergency cryptographic system and brought them thusly to the previous training session, it was decided to cancel the memory system for both GRLAUNCH-2 and GRLAUNCH-A/9, issuing instead to each agent a package of two encipher and two decipher "FR" pads which are to be cached separately for use in the event their primary pads are compromised or unavailable.</p>			
FORM 89b 1007 100	USE PREVIOUS EDITION. REPLACES FORMS SI-29, SI-20A AND SI-23 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.	CLASSIFICATION <b>S E C R E T</b>	PAGE NO. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED 1 of 2

5. Both the broadcast and contact portions of the SECURE/ training signal plan were activated on 27 July for use by the agents during their training period. Further events had to be held at the LIMBER Base station during broadcast as the 100W transmitter was in extremely poor propagation conditions. Since that broadcast was to provide them with URM indicators for authenticating the contact portion of the plan, copies of the broadcast message were provided the agents. Each agent deciphered his message unassisted and the signal plan was prepared for use. Two two-way contact schedules with LIMBER on 27 July were unsuccessful. Failure was attributed primarily to the poor propagation conditions prevalent (Burich observatory reported a sunspot count of "0" on 26, 27, and 28 July). The extremely poor operating site--a very small apartment in the heart of the business district with accompanying high-noise level from traffic, streetcars, and other electrical appliances--a further contributing factor. The broadcast on the morning of the 28th, a repeat of the message broadcast the previous day, was heard and copied by both agents. Three two-way contact schedules were attempted with the LIMBER Base station on 28 July but were only partially successful. On the first schedule, contact was made, a URM passed and the Field passed 11 groups of a 24 group message before his signal faded out completely, after which neither station was able to hear the other. On the second schedule, Field reportedly was unable hearing the Field very faintly although at other times the signal faded out completely and Field heard the Base station but with a never established. The third schedule was also unsuccessful as Field was never able to hear the Field. Again poor propagation conditions coupled with the poor operating site, were considered responsible for the lack of success.

6. Because of the failure to make contacts with the Base station, reduced distance contacts were held between GELAUNCH-3 and GELAUNCH-A/8, using HF-3 sets tuned on (many bands and operating from separate rooms in the same apartment. The training officer also worked the separate agents as covered in the contacts. One of the more serious errors noted were the use of the wrong call signs from the signal plan if a third set was required and the failure of GELAUNCH-3 to use his assigned security code and correct confirmation letter when deciphering a message. These, along with minor discrepancies in procedure, were noted and brought to the Agent's attention at the end of each contact. Some difficulties were encountered by GELAUNCH-A/8 when tuning the HF-3 on the high band after using on the low band because he failed to change all of the switches to their proper positions.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, HQA



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