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Air

WFP-W - 5222

23 February 1951

Chief, Foreign Division W Attns: []

Memorandum for []

Prior to his departure [] requested that
the attached memorandum be delivered to him personally.

[]

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B26
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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Set forth below is an extract from a memorandum written by a CIA representative in Germany following a conversation with General Heusinger about Mr. McCloy's reception for General Eisenhower at Bad Homburg on 22 January.

"a. Neither General Heusinger nor General Speidel particularly anticipated the meeting with General Eisenhower because of the latter's well-known attitude toward the German Generals and Admirals as expressed in 1945 and reflected, less pointedly perhaps, in Eisenhower's book. The concern of Speidel and Heusinger stems solely from the fact that they, regardless of their own opinions regarding Eisenhower, face the eventual problem of influencing German military opinion to a more workable attitude vis-a-vis Eisenhower. During recent weeks Heusinger and Speidel have on several occasions had the opportunity to discuss quite frankly with General George Hays the various problems affecting the attitude of former German officers and soldiers as well as German public opinion. The Eisenhower 1945 attitude regarding German Generals had been touched upon. Heusinger had hoped that prior to the inevitable meeting with Eisenhower the General would make some public statement to clear the air. That Eisenhower actually did this prior to the Bad Homburg reception on 22 January contributed much to the unqualified success that Eisenhower had in his first meeting with the German Generals.

"b. Speidel and Heusinger arrived at Mr. McCloy's home a little late and entered a large living room after most of the guests were present. Eisenhower interrupted a conversation with someone else and came across the room to greet them. This gesture made a distinct impression on both of the German Generals.

"c. Later, Eisenhower asked Heusinger and Speidel to speak privately with him in an adjoining study. Eisenhower commenced by stating that he owed them an explanation. He stated that his firm conviction

SECRET

SECRET

-2-

at the end of the war in 1945 was that the German Generals, the General Staff, and the German Armed Forces had been completely unified in their support of the Hitler Regime. This impression of 1945 had, Eisenhower stated, gradually been modified by things he had seen, read, and heard since that time. Eisenhower described himself as a fanatic fighter against any individual, group of individuals, or government which attempted to suppress human liberties, and that if the necessity should arise, he would probably fight Stalin and the Soviet Army with the same fanaticism with which he had fought Hitler and the German Armed Forces.

"d. The fact that a man of Eisenhower's position was willing to admit a past error in judgment made a great impression upon the German Generals. Heusinger, in discussing it, compared it to President Truman's retraction on his much publicized letter to the U.S. Marine Corps.

"e. The discussion at the Bad Homburg reception did not touch upon remilitarization or related issues; although Theodor Blank (civilian chairman of the Military Committee) was present at this conversation, Eisenhower's remarks were, by their very nature, addressed primarily to the two Generals.

"f. As Heusinger and Spaidel emerged from the room where the above conversation was held, Chancellor Adenauer approached Heusinger and rather excitedly asked what had transpired in the meeting. Heusinger stated briefly that Eisenhower had made a statement regarding his views on the German professional soldier which was highly satisfactory from the German Generals' point of view and provided the basis for a more optimistic outlook on Germany's role in Western European remilitarization."

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