

# SECURITY INFORMATION

AIR

EO 1.4-5241

## SECRET

28 AUG 1953

Chief, EE

Info: COM

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/ZIPPER  
Visit with General HEUSINGER in Austria

1. A first encounter with Heusinger since his return from the United States found him visibly weary and depressed. He attributes his condition to the excessive climatic conditions in Washington and other parts of the country and the very bad flight hours in the course of which three motors conked-out. He'll take a skip from now on if it is at all possible. As for Blank, he hasn't been too well for some time, and Heusinger believes that a combination of heat and pace was most responsible for the exacerbation of his heart and circulatory condition.
2. The general's depression may be attributed to what he considers adverse trends in current developments and conflicting attitudes on high levels. Our conversation never deteriorated to a question and answer session since he was on an extended vacation and obviously not in the mood for such a discussion. However, while walking, swimming and dining he gradually divulged some of his American impressions and his concern over international policies and negotiations. They are summarized below.
3. Heusinger said that he was quite surprised by "an apparent uncertainty of policy direction among the State Department people with whom he had spoken". Queried as to what he meant, he replied that he was asked by them what policy should be followed towards a Four Power meeting - whether the United States should agree to one or not. According to his understanding, "at first they seemed to be opposed to it and then later in favor of it". (The undersigned does not know whether the conversations were in English, but if they were, it should be pointed out that Heusinger doesn't understand English nearly as well as he appears to). When asked what he answered, he said that he was non-committal because the entire delegation had been instructed by the Chancellor prior to departure not to engage in any policy discussions.
4. Heusinger stated that he was perhaps most astonished by the truly powerful though intangible French influence in our government among high officials. Considering old historical ties, the last two wars, and the current Indo-Chinese war (which he claims was more vital to us than to the French), it was understandable to him, but he had never realized that the French had such a strong position in America.

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3 - EE (Direct) w/1 attach  
3 - COM -w/o attach

*Heusinger - 201*

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5. Despite traditionally close Franco-American ties, Heusinger does not believe the EDC treaties will ever be ratified for the following reasons:

- a. The French do not believe that a Russian menace still exists in Europe.
- b. France's irrational fear of the resurgence of a strong Germany.
- c. French insistence that their army be numerically superior to the German army.
- d. The fall of de Gasperi and the weakening position of the Italian government,

6. During Heusinger's last visit to France, Marshal Juin told him that the EDC would never be signed and ratified by France as it now stands. According to the Marshal, a new protocol delineating the gradual build-up of German forces in a weaker ratio to the French army over a period of three to five years would be a prerequisite to any further consideration. Heusinger asked Juin why they were so opposed to ratification when the entire EDC concept was conceived and sponsored by the French themselves. Juin laughed congenially and replied that Poincaré would never have promulgated the idea if he and others had anticipated its consequences two and one half years later - the consequences being a new German army stronger and more influential than the French army which, for reasons of empire, must necessarily be weaker on the continent of Europe.

7. As far as Germany and legalization of EDC is concerned, Heusinger heard that the Supreme Court at Karlsruhe would decide against the government. Seven points are involved and all seven would be declared unconstitutional. This decision and the points mentioned above doom the EDC to ignominious (entehrende) death.

8. Heusinger believes the CDU will easily win the election but the FDP will probably lose votes. He envisages a coalition government with little change except for the replacement of the FDP by the BHE.

9. In connection with the German elections, Heusinger brought up the subject of ZIPPER's legalization. He related his discussions on the subject with Aschan and Monroe (thought Monroe must be one of Aschan's top advisors on Germany) reiterating that the greatest danger to ZIPPER's legalization was UTILITY's persistence in the field of Special Connections (35). He said that he had been warning UTILITY for the last three years and that upon his return to Bonn he intended to advise him once more of the inherent dangers of such activity and the wisdom of dissolving his myriad contacts which generate so much suspicion in government circles. Heusinger said that all of the time he was with ZIPPER he had never seen anything that might be called a report emanate from Special Connections nor had he seen one since he had severed connections with the German organization. (Brautigam told the undersigned in Bonn that he had found it very difficult to evaluate political information when he was ZIPPER's AS/P because he never once had received a

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report of any kind from Special Connections and that every report, sent directly to Markar, was never seen by 45). Therefore, he could only conclude that Special Connections served no other purpose than intrigue.

10. Continuing, Heusinger said that the Washington suggestion of the replacement of UTILITY as head of the German organization was out of the question. He has very strong lines to the Chancellor and Grotke and a great reservoir of loyalty among the ZIPPERites. Nor did he believe that Markar could take over and still hold the organization together. Sooner or later the Economic Section (45/W) would be taken over by the Economic Ministry, the DB Sections (45/H and 45/L), by the Defense Ministry, etc. and the concept of a central intelligence service would be destroyed.

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11. Heusinger expressed alarm at the growing mental relaxation of ranking European officials towards the Russian menace which he considers as serious as ever. The reported vacuum of power since the death of Stalin and the growing influence of the Red Army should not breed complacency. The Russians cannot be expected to ease their pressure. He believes that they did not even mention the dissolution of the EDC as a prerequisite to a Four Power meeting because they well know that the EDC can be no threat to them in the near future and may never materialize (see the attached editorial from the Frankfurter Allgemeine).

12. General Heusinger and family are expected to arrive in Munich on 28 August 1953 for a brief visit with ZIPPER and then proceed to Bonn the early part of the following week.

Approved: