

- 7 DEC 1954

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: EE  
Bonn

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational

22 November Conversation with General HEUSINGER

NOTE: In view of the close relationship between Amt BLANK and U.S. offices, none of the following information is considered suitable for dissemination.

-----

1. [ ] and I had dinner with Gen and Mrs. HEUSINGER at their home in Bonn 22 Nov 54. Two weeks earlier Mrs. HEUSINGER, who is a close friend of the [ ], had spent a full week at their home in Munich. Immediately following her return to Bonn, Gen HEUSINGER called and invited [ ] and [ ] to visit him at the earliest opportunity.

2. We arrived at the HEUSINGER's home at 7 o'clock, had cocktails, dinner and discussions with HEUSINGER which lasted until after midnight.

3. Most of the old problems that we have discussed with HEUSINGER during the past six years have been resolved. Only 37 military personalities are still serving as war criminals and none of these is considered a pressing case. HEUSINGER does not intend to concern himself with the 100-odd individuals from military and para-military organizations who were convicted on criminal charges. Liaison with senior U.S. Army officers--a matter which used to worry him a great deal--is now satisfactory. He noted that he had accomplished more in a few weeks' liaison with U.S. officers competent in various matters than was accomplished in more than two years of planning in Paris. He was also greatly pleased with the position the U.S. took in Paris in opposition to the French proposal that arms for Germany be shipped through and regulated by a Western European seven-nation arms control group. This matter was worrying HEUSINGER as long ago as 1951. All in all, HEUSINGER is extremely satisfied with the Amt BLANK relations with foreign armies and is reasonably optimistic that the treaties will be ratified during the course of the winter.

4. He described the anticipated organization of the German defense establishment. Under the Defense Minister there will be a civilian state secretary to handle all civilian defense matters. At an equal level there will be an

DIST  
3 Bonn  
3 EE  
2 Bonn

Handwritten notes:  
#2/1000  
clcc  
S(FI  
COP

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B26  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2006

3 Dec 54

32-6-12-5  
HEUSINGER 201

Inspector of the Defense Forces who will be a General. The Defense Forces will be unified and under the Inspector General there will be a single General Staff with sections covering each of the normal military staff planning functions. The most interesting of these, from our point of view, is the "EWEHRUNGSTAB" competent in intelligence, plans and operations (i.e., G-2, G-3). HEUSINGER admitted that they had intentionally avoided titles of the past and would not call the staff the "German General Staff." HEUSINGER was fairly non-committal regarding the selection of the German General to occupy the top post but did admit that BLANK had suggested to him that at least initially HEUSINGER, himself, should be assigned to this position and perhaps later move to a post on the SHAPE staff following German integration in NATO.

5. HEUSINGER did not mention KIELMANNSEGG during the entire evening but spoke in glowing terms of the work of Col Kurt FETT--an officer who enjoys a universally excellent reputation with all former German officers with whom I have talked.

6. From comments of Mrs. HEUSINGER during her Munich visit and from our conversation in Bonn with HEUSINGER we got the distinct impression that relations between HEUSINGER and SPEIDEL had cooled somewhat. HEUSINGER considers SPEIDEL to be drifting toward a career as a diplomat leaving him in Bonn to face all of the pressing day-to-day problems. Mrs. HEUSINGER described SPEIDEL as being "too much of a diplomat to be accepted by the Foreign Office and too little of a soldier to be accepted by Ant BLANK." I suspect that there are other considerations involved. WIELAND has apparently become extremely close to SPEIDEL during the course of their assignment in Paris and relations between WIELAND and HEUSINGER are certainly not what they were a year ago. In two long conversations with WIELAND during the past year I have detected some impatient criticism of HEUSINGER. The latter's unwavering support of KIELMANNSEGG and OSTER has certainly been a major consideration. HEUSINGER has lately informed UTILITY and WIELAND that he will take the latter as G-2 only if he places him under KIELMANNSEGG and WIELAND accepts OSTER in his office. WIELAND, who has been definitely influenced by UTILITY's views, feels that this is starting a new job under adverse circumstances which he is not willing to accept. HEUSINGER during the course of our 27 Nov conversation spoke rather harshly of WIELAND's obstinacy on this point and Mrs. HEUSINGER threw in for good measure the comment that WIELAND should have had more wartime service on the front line and less on UTILITY's staff. On the other hand, HEUSINGER confirmed that he, BLANK and UTILITY see eye-to-eye on the future relationship of the G1S and the Defense establishment; this unanimity does not prevail in personnel discussions. Disagreements on the security of persons who fall within UTILITY's WDRZM LI complex seems to be the basic cause of the present difference between UTILITY and HEUSINGER.

7. EDC planning has all been canceled and surprisingly little of it is immediately useable within the framework of a German National Army. The immediate problems facing REUSINGER include the drafting of a legislative program embracing the establishment of a national army, provisions for a draft, a military budget, basic laws on military discipline and justice, and a variety of minor related problems. Getting this legislation before the German Parliament will require at least six months. The actual rearmament cannot begin until Germany enters NATO. However, REUSINGER is optimistic that ratification by all fourteen nations can be completed by the end of June 1955. Officer training courses will be initiated at SOUTHWEST where casernes are being made available by the U.S. Army. The first class will include approximately two hundred top staff officers of colonel and general officer rank. This course will last two months and will be followed by a second course for field grade officers who will command the initial cadre, school and training units. A third course, also two months, for company grade officers will lead into a training program at the school for junior troop officers, NCOs and specialists. If the casernes that are to be initially utilized for training the German Army are available and ready for occupancy, the cadre training will be carried out at the casernes and not at the SOUTHWEST central school. The induction of the first draftees cannot possibly begin prior to June 1956 in view of the above-cited preparatory steps that must be taken.

8. The Finance Minister has thus far been unwilling to allocate additional funds to the BLANK office until the basic legislation is on the books. On the other hand, REUSINGER cannot proceed with the above listed preparatory phases until he has more funds; specifically he needs one billion Marks immediately after 1 January 1955.

9. The German Army will include 25,000 officers of whom approximately 8,000 will be lieutenants. Obtaining the services of the best available manpower for an Officers' Corps is a matter of some concern to REUSINGER. The Finance Ministry wants to keep salaries to a minimum. REUSINGER feels that a lieutenant should receive DM 400, a married captain with one child DM 800, and a colonel approximately DM 1800. The figures proposed by Finance Minister SCHNEIDER have been at a considerably lower level and would not, in REUSINGER's opinion, attract high quality officer material.

10. During the course of the evening it became clear that the internal German political situation and the increasing opposition among the German youth to participate in a German National Army cause great anxiety in Amt BLANK. REUSINGER again and again stressed the need for a propaganda program to counteract the growing negative feeling in the German population. He believes that this must be done only by an information or propaganda office subordinate to the Chancellery. He rules out the Amt BLANK, the Interior Ministry, the SAIGER Ministry, ZUMMER, Allied Intelligence organizations and other German officials offices as being highly unsuitable, for one reason or another, to carry out such a program.

He believes that the Otto LANGE proposal last spring was exactly what was needed and that LANGE was probably a good man for the job. It was only unfortunate that it was handled politically as it was. Otto LANGE, as a person, and any office remotely resembling the "RECHENBERG" are now out of the question. He does believe that a very large program could be started very quietly and inauspiciously by the Federal Press Office and by other offices in the Chancellery. He cited JANN's "ADK" as the most successful effort in the Federal and exactly the sort of program that should be expanded greatly. He was not too well acquainted with either the personalities or the activities of, for example, "Die Gesellschaft fuer Wehrkunde." Rather wistfully but not without a distinct twinkle in his eye, RECHENBERG noted that the psychological situation developing in Germany today was not unlike that which existed when RECHENBERG, back in the thirties, was given the task of capturing the German mind and marshalling support of German rearmament.

X  
11. Using this reference to the Third Reich as a point of departure, RECHENBERG launched into a lengthy and troubled examination of the question: "Can this young German democracy survive the stresses and strains that will be brought about by rearmament of Germany with a National Army?" He reviewed the developments following WW I, going back into the conditions that existed within the German Army during the last months of 1918. Like most of the older German officers, RECHENBERG has given much thought to the factors which resulted in almost no deterioration of discipline in the German Army in the face of complete defeat in 1918, as contrasted to the almost complete breakdown of discipline in the final months of WW I. His conclusion, which has guided his work in Amt BEANE, was that most of the undesirable aspects of the old German Army prior to 1918 had, in fact, been eliminated during the reconstruction of the German Army prior to and during WW II. The old, clear-cut distinction between the German General Staff and the line officers in the German Army had largely disappeared by the end of WW II. Further, the relationship between the German officers and the enlisted man was not a cause of serious difficulty during WW II. Military service never has been and certainly could not now be made a thoroughly attractive career for a young man even in Germany. The best that Germany can hope for now is to carry out in a moderate and sensible way reforms to correct those remaining deficiencies that have been noted in the more recent German Army. RECHENBERG places the utmost emphasis on getting the new Army off to a good start with the best possible officer material, casernes, military leadership, weapons and equipment. If the first increment of draftees which are to be inducted in 1956, according to present plans, emerge with the feeling that the German Defense Ministry is doing the best it can under the circumstances, Germany will have gotten over a major obstacle. However, if the officers are bad, if the equipment is second class and if the entire rearmament program is not accompanied by an active information and education program for both soldiers and citizens carried out by the government, the act of recreating a National Army can, in fact, destroy the good start that has been made to create a German democracy. One could not escape

the impression that WEISBERG does not really feel that the Germans have much more than a fifty-fifty chance of accomplishing this. EDG, he noted, had had an attraction for the German man-on-the-street and the German youth that is entirely lacking in remilitarization with a German National Army.

12. The final problem proposed by WEISBERG dealt with the quality of the arms that will be delivered to Germany by the U.S. All the critics of German rearmament will be gathered to subject to the most minute and critical inspection the weapons that are given to the first German youths. He emphasized the importance that the first German combat teams or divisions to be formed be equipped with the best available American weapons. If the U.S. is, for example, able to provide only the cadre units for a single division with our most up-to-date equipment, this equipment should be delivered as the first since this will be the critical moment in which German public opinion on the question of American arms will be formed. He particularly emphasized the disastrous psychological consequences that would result from the delivery of out-gated American tanks, since the tank, more than any other weapon, can be easily compared with Soviet tanks of the same type and class. WEISBERG asked that we bring to the attention of American policy makers this point. We assured him that we would do this (see WOLA 11,678).

13. Leaving the subject of German militarization, WEISBERG noted that GERTENHAUER would probably have a difficult time during the next three years as president of the Bundestag. He described him as a man of excellent idealistic qualities who is probably neither sufficiently cold-blooded nor untemperamental to discharge his task. Carlo SCHINDT, he felt, would, except for his SPD affiliation, have been, by a great margin, the best available replacement for EHLERS. He further noted that EHLERS' death leaves a complete vacuum in the event of ADENAUER's illness or death. In this respect he noted that ADENAUER, with whom he had spent several hours that day, appeared in excellent health and had given an amazing performance of being alert in both body and mind in his talks with General Irvine Cook and several other foreign visitors.

14. We discussed the legalization of NSP AR which WEISBERG feels must be delayed until after the sovereignty treaty has been ratified. WEISBERG also expressed the conviction that the German Intelligence Service should be subordinate to a State Secretary in the Bundeskanzleramt in the same way that each of the U.S. Armed Forces is responsible to an Under Secretary of State who assumes responsibility before Congress and who represents the interests of the permanent government agency such as an intelligence service or an element of the Armed Forces within the ruling political coalition. He also noted that STUBBINS should expect tremendous difficulty in getting adequate salary ratings for his senior staff members and expressed the hope that STUBBINS was utilizing every effort to complete this type of detailed planning prior to the date of legalization.

6014 11 773  
3 Dec 54

15. We discussed at length the experiences of his daughter Ruth who is currently spending a full year as a college student at Hunter College, New York, under the immediate personal auspices of Dr. Schuster, Hunter College President, formerly Military Governor of Bavaria. The reports that the HENSHAWERS have received from Ruth have been glowing and there is no doubt in the General's mind that his daughter will benefit tremendously from her year in the U.S. General HENSHAWER has not changed basically throughout the past six years that we have been closely associated with him. We do consider him a convinced democrat and feel that he will do all that is possible to keep Germany on the right track after it has regained its sovereign status and is engaged in the creation of a National German Army. We should continue to consider him one of the truly important and long-standing friends of the U.S. in the German government and should attempt to continue the present relationship with him.