



process cannot begin before Germany enters NATO and since a number of financial questions remain to be settled, responsible officials feel that the first draftees cannot possibly be inducted before June 1956. The Finance Minister has thus far been unwilling to allocate additional funds to the Blank Office until the basic legislation is on the books. On the other hand, the Blank Office cannot proceed with the preparatory phases of rearmament until it has more money. Specifically, one billion marks are needed early in 1955.

5. Since military service is not and never has been an attractive career for young men, General Heusinger feels, the future pay scale for officers should provide for adequate compensation. This would mean, for instance, four hundred marks a month for a lieutenant, eight hundred marks for a married captain with one child, and approximately eighteen hundred marks for a colonel. Finance Minister Fritz Schaeffer, who wants to keep expenses at a minimum, has proposed considerably lower figures which, in General Heusinger's opinion, would not attract high-quality officer material.
6. Under present plans, the German army will include 25,000 officers of whom approximately 8,000 will be lieutenants. Officer-training courses will be initiated at Sonthofen where casernes are being made available by the U.S. Army. The first class will include about two hundred top staff officers of colonel and general officer rank. This course will last two months. It will be followed by a second course for field-grade officers who will command the initial cadre, school, and training units. A third course for company-grade officers, also of two months' duration, will lead into a training program for junior troop officers, non-commissioned officers and specialists. If the casernes that are to be utilized for training the army itself are ready in time, the cadre training will be carried out there rather than in the central school at Sonthofen.
7. At this stage, General Heusinger is quite satisfied with American handling of German rearmament problems. This applies in particular to American opposition to the long anticipated French proposal that arms for Germany should be channeled through a West European seven-nation arms-control group. Liaison between the Blank Office and senior American officers has been similarly satisfactory to Heusinger, who feels that it has produced more in a few weeks than had been accomplished in Paris in over two years of planning.
8. Heusinger believes that historic developments since 1918 may provide some answers to current remilitarization problems. He points out, for instance, that many of the undesirable aspects of the Imperial German army had disappeared in World War II. These aspects include the sharp distinction between officers and enlisted men and between general staff and line officers. The difference in behavior and morale displayed by German soldiers in 1918 and 1945 is regarded as a possible result of these improvements. Similarly, Heusinger believes, other moderate and sensible reforms could further improve public morale, and could thereby help to protect the young German democracy from the strains of remilitarization. The proposed measures would include a good start for the new German army, with the best possible officer material, casernes, military leadership, weapons, and equipment. If the first increment of draftees emerges with the feeling that the German defense ministry is doing the best it can under the circumstances, Heusinger feels that a major obstacle will have been overcome. On the other hand, if the officers are bad, if the equipment is second-class, and if the entire remilitarization program is not accompanied by an active information and education program for both soldiers and civilians, the act of recreating a national army can, in Heusinger's opinion, destroy the good start that has been made in fashioning a German democracy. In this connection, Heusinger has found that EDC had an attraction for the average German, and especially for German youth, that is entirely lacking in the prospect of a German national army. As a result, he gives even a good government-sponsored education program not much more than a fifty-fifty chance of succeeding.
9. One of the most critical tests of the new program and of American prestige in Germany, according to Heusinger, is the quality of the weapons that will be delivered to Germany by the U.S. He expects all the critics of German rearmament to subject to the most minute and critical inspection the arms that are given to the first German youths. If the U.S. is able to provide only a relatively small body of troops,

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such as the cadre units for a single division, with the most up-to-date equipment, he proposes to have this equipment delivered first since it will constitute the basis for shaping German public opinion on the question of American arms. By the same token, he anticipates disastrous psychological consequences especially from a possible delivery of outmoded American tanks since the tank, more than any other weapon, can easily be compared with Soviet tanks of the same type and class.

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