

VIA _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SPATCH NO. EGQ-A-81840

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

Info: Bonn
CACROZE

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Station, Germany
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Liaison

DATE: 10 September 1956

SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Information re General Heusinger

1. [] attached Memorandum for the Record, dated 9 September 1956, covering the visit of General Heusinger and wife 5-8 September 1956, is self-explanatory.

2. Also attached is a copy of a cable note setting forth suggested topics for Harrison to discuss with General Heusinger. This cable note was rather hurriedly prepared but includes the points presently uppermost in our minds. It would be appreciated if you would provide us with your reactions as a basis for identifying whether or not we give the same issues priority. The significance of this list is that once we are in agreement it can, in effect, be our current political EEI's for West Germany.

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Attachments: a/s (2)

Distribution

- 3 - EE w/1 copy ea att a/s
- 1 - Bonn w/1 copy ea att a/s
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9 September 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Visit of General Heusinger and Wife, 5-8 September 1956

1. The General and wife were my house guests from 5 through the morning of 8 September 1956 as a prelude to several weeks' vacation in Athens.

2. During the course of their visit I had the opportunity to have several substantive discussions with him. It is my impression that throughout these discussions he was aware that he was speaking to a KUBARK officer rather than just to a friend. Some of the points below may have been mentioned by him during his visit in Washington last month and, therefore, may be repetitious.

a. Suez Crisis:

Heusinger is convinced that Nasser will never give in to the 18 nation proposal. He is also convinced that the British and French will not resort to use of force. It is his opinion that use of force is too late (he mentioned that British and French should have parachuted troops in to seize the Canal immediately when the trouble started and he is convinced this would have prevented all of the difficulties). He considers this crisis more acute than even the Korean War. He claims it is now exclusively a political consideration. The British and French realize that use of force by them would result in (1) Nasser blowing up the Suez, and (2) Arab nations will band together and bloc all or the majority of the oil distribution. Obviously, neither France nor Britain are willing to take this risk. On the other hand, French General Ely informed Heusinger that failure to achieve a settlement of the Suez will result in loss of Algeria for France. Heusinger stated he is in complete agreement with John F. Dulles' position in this regard, and he personally has no solution to offer. Heusinger remarked it is clear that the Soviet Union will come to Egypt's aid if hostilities occur. If Nasser wins out, Heusinger is convinced that this will unite the Arab world and in short time Israel will be pushed right out of the Middle East. Heusinger likened Nasser to Hitler, stating that the dictator always has the upper hand in situations of this kind; where a dictator need merely make a decision, the democracies must consult, negotiate and win a majority of opinion before they can act, and usually by then it is too late, at least too late to achieve immediate counter success.

b. The Radford Memorandum:

Upon Heusinger's return from Washington, he spent three hours completely alone with the Chancellor at Buehle-Hoehe. He found Adenauer very discouraged with the recent Washington developments, as well as with his own political situation in the Federal Republic. Even after Heusinger briefed Adenauer on his findings, talking to various officials in Washington (Wilson, Maxwell Taylor, etc.), which should have allayed some of the Chancellor's worst fears, he found the latter still very suspicious that "the U.S. has deceived him." All of the reassurances that Heusinger brought back to Adenauer did not shake his pessimism. The Chancellor's gravest concern is that the U.S. and the USSR, as the two great atomic world powers, will eventually come to an agreement that will sacrifice Germany, and possibly the rest of Europe. Heusinger added that no matter how right or wrong this view is, "it is the old man's feeling." The Chancellor is completely convinced that conventional troop units are necessary for the preservation of peace. This view is not purely political, but rather is shared by the military leadership as well. Heusinger went into considerable detail on this point, citing the inability of nuclear forces to quell local "brush wars" such as Algeria, possibly the Suez, etc. In summation, Heusinger stated that the Radford memo has had the most disastrous effect upon Adenauer. The latter feels that continuation of this U.S. military concept will definitely ruin the Chancellor's chance of winning the next election. As pertains to the political position and extending into the military in this regard, Heusinger stated that should the SPD come into the government after the next election, there is a strong possibility that reunification will be achieved by conceding to German neutrality. In Heusinger's opinion, this could very well set the stage for a "coup d'etat" similar to Czechoslovakia in 1948. Heusinger feels certain that if this happens and the U.S. defense is geared to the nuclear concept, he doubts very much that we would step in to assist or prevent this Soviet success. The use of atomic equipped forces denies the opportunity to handle local situations and keep them local.

Heusinger spoke of Asham in the most glowing terms. He stated he had a several hour discussion with Asham at Ambassador Krekeler's home in Washington.

c. West European Council Meeting:

Heusinger stated this meeting was called by Germany for the express purpose of discussing the Radford memo. Reportedly, the possibly new U. S. concept has been discussed with the French in considerable detail. Heusinger claims the French are in complete agreement with the German position (outlined above).

d. Bagdad Pact:

Heusinger claims that there are many signs of dissension among the participating membership. He stated the only true friend of the U.S. is Turkey, and we stand a good chance of losing out with her if we do not make some effort to give Turkey economic aid or grant. Turkey is economically over-extended and cannot retrace from their commitments. He stated that the Federal Republic has recognized this problem and has placed orders for small arms and ammunition for DM 600 million. If the U.S. does not grant some economic assistance, Turkey will be forced to deal with the USSR. The latter remark was made by the Turkish Prime Minister to Heusinger during the latter's visit to Turkey in 1955.

e. Reunification:

The Adenauer note delivered to Moscow entails an old and unacceptable (to the Soviets) limited neutrality proposal. Heusinger stated that everyone knows this proposal cannot be accepted by the Soviets. Heusinger had very little new to say about reunification, except for the possibility mentioned in (b) above. He added his personal view that if there is to be any reunification it must come in the next five years or else it will be too late. He stated this view is shared by many government leaders.

f. Adenauer and the 1957 Election:

Heusinger feels that Adenauer is in serious political trouble at this time. This is caused by:

- (1) Suspected shift in U.S. foreign and defense policies
- (2) Loss of minority parties in the Federal Republic
- (3) Ban of KPD (increases membership in SPD)
- (4) Lack of unity in own party; CSU party playing own politics (Schaeffer one of biggest trouble makers for Adenauer). Heusinger stated that if Adenauer is to have any chances for re-election, the U.S. must give him some real support immediately after U.S. elections and starting before the end of this year. There is ever increasing anti-Adenauer propaganda in the Federal Republic that the Chancellor is becoming "a has been." Only in reference to this item (f) did Heusinger specifically ask that we bring some assistance to bear, at least in focusing to U.S. leadership the seriousness of the problem.

g. Federal Republic Military Matters:

- (1) Troop Strength: No problems foreseen in meeting quota of 96,000. Voluntary enlistments are ever on the increase. Existing troop units are own best advertisement. Each enlisted man is given an extra day's leave for each new volunteer he recruits. Also, new plan will give volunteers more pay (DM 8.00 per day) than conscriptees (DM 3.00 per day). This has also increased the rate of enlistment since no one knows at this time the exact period of conscription and the Defense Ministry is accepting two (2) year enlistments.
- (2) Conscription: Still the knottiest unresolved problem. Heusinger feels the chances of getting 18 months through Parliament are virtually nil. Considers this another serious political problem for Adenauer, i.e., split in own party ranks this issue. Recent British propaganda to do away with their draft has not helped the situation any. Heusinger stated that Defense submitted a proposal which may be acceptable. If there is no 18 month service, they suggest 12 months, with added two months' active service reserve training every year for five (5) years.
- (3) Top Leadership: To be beefed up in very near future. A new lieutenant general will be appointed as Chief of Army Staff over Major General Legeler. It is hoped to eliminate General Speidel's position in the near future. When Marshal Juin retires, the Defense Ministry hopes to assign Speidel as Commander of Army units, Central Europe. Parliament is not interested in increasing the responsibility of the top military leadership and therefore, except for the Speidel position, little change is expected in the near future. The 8,000 officers were selected from approximately 50,000 officer applicants. Heusinger is well-pleased with the general calibre.
- (4) MAAG and Other U. S. Assistance: MAAG support is considered excellent. Particularly good is the armament delivery program. Five tank battalions have received a total of 75 M-47 tanks. There is a problem right at this moment in getting replacement.

spare parts. However, Heusinger is convinced that this will be resolved in the near future. The training and facilities support is not running as smoothly. Defense, and particularly Wehrbereich officials feel that there is too much red tape involved in getting local unit support, which under present procedure requires USAREUR approval. The CG of Wehrbereich VI, General Pemsel, has discussed this matter with Consul General Page, who has sent a cable to the Embassy and Department. On 6 September, during a cocktail affair I had for Heusinger, Page discussed this same matter with the former. Apparently, it is a Germany-wide problem and one which must be straightened out with USAREUR.

- h. Contacts: Heusinger is quite satisfied with the contacts he has through MAAG, the Defense Attaches, and Elin O'Shaunessy. He stated he prefers the KUBARK contact to be restricted to our personal relationship. He feels it would not be a good idea to extend this any further as people are apt to draw the wrong conclusions.

3. Heusinger and wife will spend the 25th of September with us upon their return from Athens.

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SECRET

COPY

CABLE NOTE 02/07 SEPT., PRIORITY

TO : MUCO []

FROM: FRAN []

TOPICS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST. REALIZE SEVERAL VERY TOUCHY AND LEAVE YOUR DISCRETION HOW TO HANDLE.

1. SUEZ AND ANYTHING RPT ANYTHING BEARING ON IT. SITUATION VERY TENSE AND ALL FACTS DESIRED.
2. ADENAUER ATTITUDE RE RADFORD MEMO ON U.S. REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ATOMIC VERSUS CONVENTIONAL ARMY.
3. ADENAUER AND GERMAN PLANS FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNCIL MEETING TO BE HELD 15 SEPT.
4. GENERAL'S VIEWS RE NEED FOR U.S. CONTACTS. DOES HE FEEL NEED FOR THEM OR HAS HE SATISFACTORY CHANNELS? WHAT DOES HE KNOW ABOUT ADENAUER VIEWS ON SAME POINT?
5. HOW GERMAN MILITARY BUILD-UP PROGRESSING BOTH AS TO MEN AND EQUIPMENT? WHAT ABOUT LENGTH OF INDUCTION PERIOD?
6. HAS HE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT VIEWS RE RUSSIAN PLANS FROM LAST TIME YOU TALKED?
7. WHAT IS HIS MOST REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF REUNIFICATION ISSUE?
8. DOES HE SHARE ADENAUER'S FEAR OF POSSIBLE EAST GERMAN ATTACK WEST GERMANY IF CONVENTIONAL ARMY GIVEN UP BY WESTERN POWERS FOR ATOMIC TYPE. IDEA HERE TO TEST IF ADENAUER TAKING PURELY POLITICAL POSITION OR ONE SUPPORTED BY MILITARY.

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