



6. The Evaluation Group formerly received CIC reports and some top secret summaries but Colonel LIESEL put an end to this by deciding the group would have to rely on German reports for evaluation purposes. In addition to their evaluation work briefs were prepared for agents. There are no geographical subdivisions within the group and each section is responsible for all areas covered by RUSTY except in the military field. According to HILGER (political intelligence) coverage of Rumania is very good, fair in Austria, Czechoslovakia good, but poor in Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and USSR. They are just beginning work on strategic (long-range) intelligence.

7. HILGER knew little of the Monitoring Unit other than that it consisted of about five people, with offices in Frankfurt, headed by one BANNER (pseudonym).

8. HILGER made no mention of BAUN until specifically asked about the man. Even then he appeared very reticent but agreed that friction existed between Von GEHLEN and BAUN and that this resulted from BAUN's attempts to make RUSTY his own independent organization. HILGER considers BAUN a strange individual who had never been a "big" man but possessing genius. He was born in Odessa, educated in Germany, worked as Abwehr representative in consulates of Odessa and Kiev from 1923-1937, and led a big intelligence operation in East Prussia during World War II.

9. HILGER feels strongly about the value of Operation RUSTY and apparently was urged by Von GEHLEN to seek additional support from responsible American officials while he is in this country.

D. G. HUEPNER