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SECRET

27th July 1945

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous notes on the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Europe.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL, Chief Referent group VI B. RSHA.

ITALY

1. In Italy the Japanese and the Italian intelligence Services shared certain common spheres of interest, especially in the Near East and in India. This led to a degree of collaboration far beyond the customary exchange of intelligence between the intelligence services of two Allied nations. Several missions laid by SIM appear to have been planned and executed in conjunction with the Japanese. The intelligence produced by those missions benefited of course both partners. An SIM officer told Dr. HOTTL in 1944 that in India alone altogether 300 agents have been committed. Also the Italian Colonial police which was active in intelligence matters on the African continent maintained certain contacts with the Japanese the exact nature of which is unknown to DR. HOTTL.

RUSSIA

2. The Japanese did extensive spying in Soviet-Russia, mostly from bases in the South-East, foremost among which was Rumania. The chief agents were as a rule Japanese press representatives and also members of the Japanese diplomatic staffs. Dr. HOTTL had the opportunity to observe that the situation was somewhat similar in Turkey. Besides, Dr. HOTTL learned from the reports of well informed persons on the spot, that Japanese intelligence was especially well represented on the Caucasus. Through Armenian contacts Dr. HOTTL learned that several Caucasian, esp Georgian groups in Germany drew substantial Japanese subsidies. This region was of particular intelligence interest to Japan because, as a prominent Georgian explained it to Dr. HOTTL, the Japanese look at the Caucasus as a boundary of their Western sphere of interest.

METHODS & RESULTS.

3. In all instances mentioned so far the Japanese operated with indigenous agents and only the net itself was managed by Japanese. In some isolated instances the Japanese managed to draw whole national groups into their service, but primarily they availed themselves of the services of paid agents. In Dr. HOTTL's opinion, also shared by competent members of the German Intelligence Service, the Japanese ND in Russia was highly successful. This view was shared e.g. by a British engineer in Budapest, chief agent of the British secret service in that city, who mentioned to one of Dr. HOTTL's agents that he considered the Japanese Intelligence Service in Russia was even better than the British Secret Service.

NACHRICHTEN-LADEN KLATT.

4. KLATT (at present held by SCI in Salzburg) got excellent material on Russia through the Japanese ND, provided Dr. HOTTL's supposition that KLATT worked with that organization, is correct. - See special report on KLATT -

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Army

JAPANESE SPYING ON GERMANY

5. Two outstanding characteristics of the working methods of the Japanese Intelligence Service were its lack of scruples in the choice of means and remarkable technical accomplishment in the execution of its mission. In summer 1943 the Japanese Intelligence Service succeeded in getting hold of the strategic plans of the German Army Group Nord against Russia. In the opinion of experts this was quite an accomplishment, unique and without precedent in German military history. The plans were found to have been photographed on micro-films. The films had been wrapped tightly around a thin piece of wire and inserted into the rim of a rubber preservative. Another part of the film had been inserted into the apertures of a brush where the bristles are set in wood. The film reels were about the size of a pin-head. This particular espionage mission had been laid on by the Manchurian Legation and executed by 'national' Poles, who were found to be hiding their true identity in the garb of handmen for the legation. In the course of the investigation it transpired that the Japanese (like the British) made extensive use of the services of national Poles.

According to Dr. HOTTEL, it was incomprehensible to the German authorities what induces the Japanese to spy against their German Allies, in particular since Ambassador OSHIMA had been kept au courant of Germany's plans by HITLER personally.

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One possible explanation, Dr. HOTTIL believes, could be advanced, viz that the Japanese Government which was known to put very little trust into OSHIMA's reportage - TOJO is supposed to have referred to OSHIMA at one occasion as a German spy - and tried to check up on him.

The case, incidentally, had no diplomatic sequel and the whole matter was hushed up as well as possible.

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