To: [Redacted] RC/OSD
From: Chief, BR/CD
Date: 7 January 1952

Subject: Your request C-611 of 13 December 1951

1. Attached are six copies of a BR/CD biographic report on (Haj) Amin al HUSSSEINI and six copies of a State, BI report on the same individual, submitted in answer to subject request.

Encl: 12

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Declassified and released by Central Intelligence Agency Sources Methods Exemption 3828 Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act Date 2008
NAME HUSSEINI, Amin al (Haj)

NATIONALITY Palestinian

PRESENT POSITION Political Exile (Former Mufti of Jerusalem)

LOCATION Villa Aida, Heliopolis (Cairo, Egypt)

GEN. OCCUPATION Political leader

EDUCATION St. George's School in Jerusalem; Al-Ashar University in Cairo.

LANGUAGES Arabic, French, English, German, Turkish

HONORS Made Pilgrimage to Mecca; Enlisted in Turkish Army.

CAREER:

1914-1918 Made Pilgrimage to Mecca; Enlisted in Turkish Army.
1918-1919 Appointed to British Public Security Service in Palestine.
1920 Leter transferred to French Secret Service, Damascus.
1921 Implicated in anti-Jewish riots; fled to Transjordan.
1922 Sentenced to ten years in absentia by British.
1923 Pardoned by Sir Herbert Samuel, British High Commissioner in Palestine; Selected as Mufti of Jerusalem by Arabs and British.
1924 Elected president of the Supreme Muslim Conference.
1925-1935 Active in Arab Independence Movement opposing British Mandate.
1930 Appointed Member of Arab Delegation to the London Shaw Inquiry Commission.
1936 Elected President, Arab Higher Committee, 25 April.
1936-1937 Arab Higher Committee and Supreme Council dissolved following Arab riots and assassination of British Commissioner; Mufti took refuge in Jerusalem Mosque.
1937 Escaped to Jaffa, then to Lebanon, October.
1938 Offered asylum in Italian Libya.
1940 Joined Rashid Ali Gallani in Baghdad.
1941 Participated in Rashid Ali's revolt; Proclaimed himself Prime Minister of Iraq; Signed secret Treaty with Germany and Italy, 10 April.
1941 Fleed to Japanese Legation in Tehran, May.
1941 Disguised as Italian, fled to Rome, September.
1941-1942 Joined Ali Gallani in Berlin; Began broadcasts to Arabs for Axis, 5 November.
1943 Mufti ended pro-Axis Propaganda, 15 June.
HUSSEINI, Amin al (Haj)

Career: (Continued)

1945
Fled to Austria; then to Switzerland; Deported to France, where he was placed under house arrest. 1/3/

1946
Mufti escaped incognito to Cairo; received by King Farouk, 29 May.1/

1948
Established seat of Palestine Arab Government in Gaza, September.1/

1948-1949
Mufti fails to unite Arabs on Palestine Question.1/

1949
Journeys to Saudi Arabia to obtain Ibn Saud's support, October.1/

1951
Visit Damascus to prevent Iraqi-Syrian union.1/

1951
Presides over the World Muslim Conference in Karachi, February.1/3/5/9/

1951
Visits Tehran to contact leaders of Fadayan-i-Islam (Crusaders of Islam).3/

1951
Reported with Pakistan agents promoting defection of seven million Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan to Afghanistan, March.1/3/

1951
Accompanied Ghulam Abbas, Supreme head of the Kashmir Liberation movement, to cease-fire line in URI sector, March.8/

1951
Arrived in Levant as guest of President of Syrian Chamber, Maroun Dawaibaki, to rally support against Israelis, May.3/7/

1951
Mufti praised by Prince Talal, June.8/

1951
Mufti confers with Colonel Shishakli, Syrian Chief of Staff, in Beirut on recruitment of Palestinian veterans into Syrian and Egyptian armies, 4 June.8/

1951
Denounced by Syrian Foreign Office for interference in state affairs, 15 June.10/

1951
Calls for direct negotiations of Palestine Refugees for American aid; Mufti forced to quit Syria; Emil Ghuri to act as Mufti's agent, late June.11/

1951
Mufti and revolutionary leader, Fawzi al-Kufaksi, reported in Druze village of Cornelli, 15 July.12/13/

1951
Member of Mufti's "Jihad Muhadess" party assassinates King Abdullah, 20 July.14/ Accused of Communist affiliations.15/

1951
Calls press conference in Cairo and denies complicity in plot against King Abdullah; Denounces British for seizure of Palestine for Jordan, 6 August.15/17/

1951
Plot to assassinate Haj Amin reported, 17 August.18/

1951
Mufti sends six Palestinian war veterans to Damascus to train under Colonel Shishakli, 24 August.19/

1951
Mufti reported ready to ally himself with Russia or U.S., 25 August.20/

1951
Mufti confers with Egyptian and Saudi Arabian Foreign Ministers at Semiramis Hotel in Cairo; gains prestige, 25 August.21/

1951
Suggests next Moslem Conference to be held in Tehran to Mullah Abd-al-Qasim Kashani, 23 September.22/23/

1951
Mufti said to offer terrorists to Moslem Brotherhood for sabotage against Trans Arabian Pipeline, 20 October.24/25/
HUSSEINI, Amin al (Baj)

Career: (Continued)

-- -- -- Urges sabotage against British, Americans, and French to show support of Egypt's abrogation move, 3 November. 311/22/

REMARKS:

Baj Min al-HUSEEINI is now living in the Villa Aida, a luxurious two-story 16 room house of pink stone in Heliopolis (City of the Son) - a suburb of Cairo. There the ex-Mufti is protected by special Egyptian police in sentry boxes outside the garden wall and inside by 20 Palestinian bodyguards. The security Cordon has been tightened since the assassination of King Abdullah of Jordan, so that when he leaves this refuge he is ringed by his bodyguards, all well-armed.

The Ex-Mufti has a retinue of about 70 including his only wife, their five daughters ranging from 9 to 25 years (the youngest being Amine, his favorite) and their son Salab, a 20 year old law student in Cairo. He has four male private secretaries and three chauffeurs to drive his two limousines.

In February 1961 the ex-Mufti began a tour of many strategic points. His first visit was to Karachi, Pakistan, where he was made honorary Chairman of the World Moslem Conference. Although it was reported by a source that Soviet Moslems were invited none attended. Another source inferred collusion between a Soviet agent "Einhorn" and the Mufti.

Early in March the Mufti traveled to Iran where he contacted members of the Fedayyen-i-Islam, the Iranian counterpart of the Moslem Brotherhood. It was a member of this same organisation who on the 7th of March assassinated the Pro-British Prime Minister, Ali Razmara. About this same time the Mufti was reported conferring with Pakistani agents who were inciting Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan to join the Afghans. It was not until May however, that the Afghans began raiding the Pakistan border. On 26 March, Haj Amin was also reported accompanying Ghulam Abbas, Supreme head of the Kashmir Liberation movement, to the cease fire line in the URI sector.

The Mufti's next major move was to the Levant, where Syrian forces were struggling with the Israelis over the question of draining the Buhel Swamp. As the guest of M. Dauabah, President of the Syrian Chamber, the Husseini rallied Nationalists against any peace move with the Israelis. It is interesting to note that, Syrian Chief of Staff, Lt. Colonel Adib Shishakli, traveled to Beirut, Lebanon to confer with the ex-Mufti about the possibility of incorporating Palestinian war veterans into the Syrian and Egyptian armies. This same Refugee Army plan was later presented to the Arab League with the suggestion that it be financed by Pan-Arab funds.

Repercussions against the Mufti's interference in Syrian affairs were soon voiced by the Syrian Foreign Office. Contact was then made with the Syrian Embassy in Cairo to determine how he had entered Syria. Investigations indicated that he had used a passport issued in the Embassy at Paris four years ago in the name of Mohammed Tehir, family name of Haj Amin. (This information could possibly disprove previous reports that the Mufti had used his friend Dawalabi's passport to escape from Paris in 1948.)
Remarks: (Continued)

Lebanon was also included in the Mufti’s travels about this same time. Whether by coincidence or not, the pro-British Premier, Riad el Solh of Lebanon, was assassinated by a Syrian nationalist on 17 July at the end of his four day visit with King Abdullah. In Jordan, Riad el Solh was reported to have discussed means by which the Arab World could work out a modus vivendi with Israel.3/

The Mufti’s conniving in Damascus was suddenly halted when his opponents learned that he was encouraging the Palestinian Refugees to negotiate directly with the United States for aid, rather than allowing the Arab states to mediate for them. With the charge that the Mufti was undermining the Arab Cause, his opponents were able to force his departure from Damascus. Emir Ghuri, the ex-Mufti’s agent was appointed to handle future contacts with the Syrian Army.4/

Urgent attempts were made by the State Department to locate the ex-Mufti after his departure, but it was not until the 15th of July that he was discovered in the Druze Settlement of Crowell in central Lebanon in the company of Faust Kaokki, the chief Arab Guerilla leader during the Palestinian War.5/

The Mufti’s complicity in the assassination of King Abdullah 20th July was immediately inferred from the identity of the assassin, Shukir Ashou, a member of the Jihad Mukadees, an extremist Arab organisation created by the Mufti in 1948.6/ A reign of terror followed as refugee camps were raided for possible persons involved in the plot.7/ The ex-Mufti then appealed to Ibn Saud for both financial aid and political mediation with the Jordan government to stop the atrocities.8/ While funds were given to the ex-Mufti, the Saudi Arabian monarch refused to become involved in the dispute regarding the suspects and disorders.10/ As the ex-Mufti was employing every means possible to deliver four of the six sentenced men (two were sentenced to death in absentia),11/ it was reported that the Regent, Nabi, Bibas Pasha and the Jordanian Prime Minister were equipping assassins to even the score with the Mufti.12/

The Jordan Government’s claims were formally answered the ex-Mufti at a press conference held on 5 August in Cairo. There he denied complicity in the plot against King Abdullah and stated “Political assassinations are not in the interest of the Arab countries and could only have dire results.”15/ At this press conference he also denied having a nephew named Musa Da’ud al Hussein, described in the Egyptian Gazette of 7 August as the principle person involved in the plot.16/ (Other reports refer to Musa Da’ud as the ex-Mufti’s cousin).19/ He also attacked the Jordan government for their note to Egypt demanding that his activities be stopped, and charged that foreign eye-witnesses could verify his claims that the major atrocities were committed by the Jordan Police and the Arab Legion.23/

Early in September the Mufti renewed his efforts to bring about Muslim unity against the British by suggesting to Mullah Abd al Qasim Kashani of Iran, (that a Muslim conference similar to the one held in Pakistan be held in Tehran.24/ (Mullah Kashani is the chief of the fanatical terrorist organisation, Fedayan-i-Islam whose members are held responsible for six murders since approximately July 1950).25/ Mullah Kashani has guaranteed the Mufti full protection and all the necessary travel visas for his entourage.26/
According to the Beirut source, who received information third-hand from a Lebanese Communist, the Mufti is supposedly receiving money from the Communists. He suggests the possibility that the Soviet Union may have decided to use a Pan-Islamic movement to gain control of Iran rather than employ the obviously Communist Tudeh Party. It should be noted however, in considering the working possibilities of the above leaders that the ex-Mufti is a Sunnite while Mullah Kashani is a prominent Shiite leader.21/

A usually reliable source states that the former Grand Mufti has combined the forces of the Muslim Brotherhood with his own terrorists in order to sabotage the Trans-Arabian pipeline within ten days (report dated 26 October 1951.) Motives for such sabotage may be questioned since there appears to be no proof that the Israelis are receiving oil from Sidon, and furthermore the Trans-Arabian Oil Co. has recently presented $25,000 for the relief of the Arab refugees.22/

The strength of Husseini's influence has fluctuated considerably in the last several years. In the winter of 1948 his prestige suffered by his inability to unite the Arab World on the Palestine Question but more recent reports indicate that his power is growing.

Husseini is said to command the loyalty of over 90% of the Palestinian refugees. Another source indicates that his influence within the inner circle of the Arab League has weakened although his prestige in the Arab World at large is still high.9/ The latter opinion is substantiated by Arab League leaders prohibiting the Mufti from administering funds for the Arab refugees. It is reported they fear his possible connections with Moscow and the fact that he might use their funds for his own political purposes.9/ Possibly as a consequence, the Mufti encouraged the Palestinian refugees to negotiate directly with the US for aid as opposed to the Arab states administering such funds.9/ Whereupon he was accused of undermining the strength of the Arab Cause and forced to leave Syria.9/

The Mufti's policies are clearly directed toward the maintenance of the Palestinian refugees as a political entity and has therefore expressed concern over those still in Lebanon and UNRWA's efforts to resettle the refugees abroad. He stated recently, however, that he would not oppose their reintegration into Syria where some are already in the Syrian Army.16/

The major part of Husseini's bargaining strength now depends upon his political affiliations with the Arab states. One of his most persistent struggles has been against the Hashemites (rulers of Iraq and Jordan).1/ The ex-Mufti's antipathy has been aggravated by the Hashemites consistently pro-British policies, which Husseini feels has delayed Arab independence and unity.1/

Husseini realises that Egypt's primacy among the Arab states depends upon the Hashemites weakness.28/ His relations with King Farouk are superficially good. According to one source the ex-Mufti is distrusted by King Farouk, but the latter recognizes the Mufti's political prestige--especially enhanced by the assassination of King Abdullah, and feels he would be a valuable ally for the future.28/

The ex-Mufti has also maintained good relations with anti-Hashemite Ibn
HUSSEINI, Amia al (Ha)

Remarks: (Continued)

Saud, whose apprehension over the Jordan Arab Legion is well known, 39/ Although
King Ibn Saud distrusts the Mufti, he feels that he is the only strong champion of a
free Palestine. King Ibn Saud has openly favored the restoration of the independence
of Eastern Palestine and the holding of an impartial plebiscite there. 16/ This may
be one of the reasons the Mufti insists on the entity of the Palestinian Refugees.

The Mufti is no doubt aware that certain factions in Syria would oppose the
union of Iraq and Jordan because it would isolate her from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 30/
Doubtless with this in mind, the ex-Mufti pressed for the training of the refugees under
Colonel Shishakli, head of the Syrian Army, perhaps in preparation for future guerrilla
wars. 31/

The Mufti's relations with Jordan are undergoing a decided change due to
both King Tal'al's anti-British reputation and his sympathy for the Mufti's cause. 31/
It is also significant to note that one of Hussein's most active supporters, former
commander of the Haseini al-Fatuwah, was elected recently to the Jordanian Parlia-
ment. 32/ Furthermore Tal'al is now enroute to visit King Ibn Saud ostensibly to end
their feud. 33/ Hussein's participation in a conference with Saudi Arabian and Egyptian
Foreign Ministers, presumably to prevent a Hashemite Merger, further indicates his
political strength. 35/

His attitude toward the "West" has varied. He has remained adamantly
opposed to British interference in the Islamic World, 1/ but until recently had avoided
any public statements against the U.S. 34/ In August the American Embassy in Cairo
reported that the ex-Mufti was prepared to ally himself with the Russians or the
Americans. If he were to ally himself with the U.S. he would expect support in the
reestablishment of an Arab Palestine, and his family as its hereditary rulers. In
return he promised to effect an anti-Communist front. 35/

Another source indicates the Mufti's ideas have changed with international
developments, and though he hates the Zionists he must be realistic. 34/ He feels
that the Democratic elements in the Middle East are too weak to constitute an effective
front against Communism and implied that only through an Islamic appeal could the U.S.
expect to gain the support of the Arab world. 34/ Recently it was reported, however,
that the ex-Mufti had urged his men to sabotage American, French, and British interests,
which may be a move protesting America's condemnation of Egypt's abrogation move. 36/

The ex-Mufti's connections with Russia have been skillfully camouflaged.
There is little doubt he has had contacts with Soviet agents, but other than reports that
he is receiving money from Moscow, little is known about the nature of the affiliation. 36/ One reliable source stated the Mufti had said, "We Mohammadens will never
be Bolsheviks," nevertheless, he indicated that his best propaganda support was coming
from the Soviets not the West. 38/ Recently the ex-Mufti received assurances from the
Soviets that they would not alter their stand for an independent Arab Palestine. 34/

Musa Bey Al-Alami, a relative of the Mufti by marriage and a reliable source,
stated that the Mufti is a cunning, shrewd politician who will go to any ends to obtain
his goal and that he is capable of getting rid of his enemies "if this furthers the Arab
Cause." 37/ Practically all sources concur that the ex-Mufti is one of the shrewdest

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Remarks: (Continued)

of Arab leaders, rather unanimously distrusted, but none the less to be feared.

SOURCES:

1/ State BI Files Report, 24 April 1951, Confidential.
3/ Nowzad, 7 September 1951, Unclassified.
4/ State, D-352, Damascus, 25 May 1951, Confidential.
6/ Army, MA R-13/19, Pakistan, 28 March 1951, Confidential.
7/ FBI-147, 24 July 1951, Restricted.
8/ CIA, SO-67894, 30 June 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
9/ CIA, SO-67826, 26 June 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
10/ State, D-728, Damascus, 15 June 1951, Confidential.
11/ CIA, SO-88339, 25 July 1951, Confidential.
12/ State, D-7, Beirut, 15 July 1951, Confidential.
13/ CIA, CO-W-14383, 13 October 1950, Restricted.
15/ State, D-357, Cairo, 7 August 1951, Unclassified.
16/ CIA, SO-72230, 24 September 1951, Confidential/Control/US Officials Only.
17/ Army, MA R-341-51, B-2, 10 September 1951, Restricted.
19/ Time, 17 September 1951, Unclassified.
20/ New York Times, 8/21/51, Unclassified.
21/ CIA, OO-B-37977, 3-5 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
22/ CIA, SO-73714, 27 September 1951, Secret.
23/ Army, MA R-380-51, Israel, 7 August 1951, Unclassified.
24/ CIA, SO-72831, 28 September 1951, Secret.
29/ Army, Intelligence Review #186, October 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
30/ CIA, SO-73021, 14 August 1951, Secret/Control/US Officials Only.
32/ State, D-25, Jerusalem, 22 August 1951, Unclassified.
33/ New York Times, 6 November 1951, Unclassified.
34/ State, D-325, Cairo, 10 August 1951, Secret.

*No information in CIA files on a Russian Agent by the name of 'Einhorn.'*