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DISUNITY AMONG THE ARAB STATES:
THE HASHDITE CONTROVERSY AND ARAB PALESTINE

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Abstract

Deeply-seated rivalries rooted in the habits of a folk society divided by family and clan continue to influence relations between contemporary Arab states. While these conflicts persist, it is unlikely that any effective organization of the area — either military or political — can be affected by the Arabs themselves, the US, the UK, or any neighboring power.

The most disruptive of these feuds is that between the Hashimite dynasty, now ruling Jordan and Iraq, and the royal house of Saudi Arabia. The latter drove the Hashimite dynasty from its control of the Holy Places of the Arabian peninsula in 1925 and has since opposed the Hashimites' aspirations to reestablish their influence in Syria and expand into Palestine. Since the 1920s, this issue has involved all the Arab states. States not directly affected by family and dynastic considerations have often manipulated rival factions to forward their own national ambitions to contain or weaken the power of neighboring states. The UK has actively supported the Hashimite cause, France the anti-Hashimite forces. The Arab League, instead of ameliorating tension between the two factions, itself has been split into two blocs, thus hindering effective and constructive League action.

This split, which made effective united action impossible even against their avowed common enemy, Israel, is now also one important factor preventing a solution of the Palestine problem. Almost as important in Arab eyes as the Israeli issue is the question of which faction or state is to control Arab Palestine. Partly in their anxiety to forestall de jure recognition of the 1948 armistice lines as a basis for a permanent solution, the anti-Hashimite governments have opposed the resettlement of Arab refugees, and through the former mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, have covertly encouraged and financed elements fomenting dissatisfaction, disorder and even assassination in Jordan and have set up training facilities for Palestine Arab terrorist units operating along the Israeli border. Hashimite and anti-Hashimite intrigues have also played a significant role in the succession of coups in Syria since 1949.

In the past year, Arab alignments have been changing, but objectives have remained the same. As Jordan's internal difficulties have increased, the newly-crowned King of Saudi Arabia has attempted with some success to turn Jordan's King Husayn against Iraq by encouraging the young king's fear of losing his throne to Iraqi expansionism. Iraq, meanwhile, has decided to concentrate on Syria rather than Jordan, probably in the belief that once Syria has been won over to union with Iraq, the inclusion of Jordan would be only a matter of time.

As long as Arab loyalty centers on persons rather than institutions and national cohesion remains weak, such conflict and disunity is likely to persist in the Arab world.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Symptomatic of the transitional stage in which the Arab world at present finds itself is the continuing influence of old factional feuds in relations between contemporary Arab states. While Arab governments pay lip-service to the Western concept of regional organisation, traditional schisms based on family and dynastic rivalries have made it impossible for these governments to achieve a constructively united front even against their shared common enemy, Israel. Despite the progressive Westernisation of the political leadership of the Arab world, it remains attached largely to the values and action patterns of a-folk society divided by family and clan. Rivalries and jealousies of the pre-nationalist era still motivate much of their political conduct. Where modernised groups have come to the fore, the same rivalries are often manipulated for the purpose of forwarding nationalist ambitions to contain or weaken the power of neighboring states.

The most disruptive of these traditional feuds is that between the House of Hashim, which claims relationship to the Prophet Muhammad, and its opponents, led by the royal house of Saudi Arabia. The latter drove the Hashimite dynasty from its control of the Holy Places of the Hijas in 1925, and has since opposed the reestablishment of Hashimite influence in Syria and its expansion into Palestine. The irredentist cause of the Hashimites was taken up by its defeated King Nasr's second son, Abdallah, who subsequently became King of Jordan, and by King Faysal's third son, Faysal I, who founded the royal house of Iraq. Since the 1920's, the Hashimite problem has involved all the Arab states, ranging Iraq and Jordan against Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and the most important faction of the Palestine Arabs. The controversy has also drawn European powers into the struggle between the two Arab blocs. The UK, for example, has actively supported the Hashimite cause since the Arab revolt of 1916 - 1918, while France has aided the anti-Hassimite forces, sharing with them an interest in curtailing British influence in the area. The Arab League, instead of ameliorating tension between the two factions, itself has become split into two blocs, thus hindering effective and constructive League action.

The one issue on which the Hashimites and their enemies have always been united is their common opposition to the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Yet hostility and distrust between the two factions precluded their effective cooperation in the face of Zionist-Israeli "aggression" and in considerable measure was responsible for the Arab failure in the Palestine war. The problem of Palestine, as seen by the Arabs, has not only been one of preventing the establishment of a Jewish state; almost equally important has been the question of which faction was to control the Arab share of
Palestine. In the course of the Palestine war, the Hashimites failed on only one front, but the anti-Hashimites were vanquished on two: in addition to military defeat by Israel, they suffered the chagrin of seeing most of Arab Palestine annexed by Hashimite Jordan.

Thus, the intransigence of the Arab states since 1949 against a permanent peace treaty with Israel has stemmed, in part, from the unwillingness of the anti-Hashimite Bloc to endorse expansion of Hashimite power. The anti-Hashimites have resisted the consolidation of Jordan's authority over that remnant of Palestine which the Jordanian Arab Legion occupied at the time of the Armistice (now known as West Jordan). In their anxiety to forestall de jure recognition of the 1948 armistic lines as a basis for a permanent solution, the anti-Hashimite governments have opposed the resettlement of Arab refugees forced to flee from Israel, have covertly encouraged and financed elements fomenting disorder and dissatisfaction within West Jordan, and have provided training facilities for Palestinian Arab terrorist units operating along the Israeli border. They still hope that Israel can be needled into accepting a return to the UN partition proposal of 1947, which would establish an independent Arab Palestine composed of West Jordan and a portion of what is now Israel.

To a significant extent, the Arab regional discord since 1946 is typified by the history of the well-known Palestine Arab leader Hajj Amin al-Husayni — former Mufti of Jerusalem, chief Palestinian opponent of the late King Abdullah of Hashimite Jordan, and self-appointed spokesman of the Palestinian refugees. In a countermove against Abdullah's designs on Palestine, the Egyptian-led anti-Hashimite majority in the Arab League in 1946 pushed through a measure officially recognizing Hajj Amin's claim to speak for the Palestine Arabs before the League and set him up as the ex-officio head of an Arab Higher Executive for Palestine. It has been partly through Hajj Amin, his Arab Higher Executive, and groups organized under his auspices that the anti-Hashimite countries — sometimes collectively but also by separate tactical agreements — in the past covertly attempted to undermine Jordanian rule in West Jordan. They also tried to keep both Israel and Jordan off balance by creating sufficient tension along the Israeli borders to keep alive the idea that present boundary lines were temporary.

Thus, the Hashimite controversy emerges as an important contributing factor to area instability. It (1) hinders the establishment of peaceful conditions on the Arab-Israeli frontiers; (2) helps to block Arab agreement on any resettlement plan for the refugees; (3) is to a considerable degree responsible for the intrigue and turmoil which have pervaded internal Jordanian affairs since 1950; and (4) has played a significant role in the succession of coups in Syria since 1949.
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In the course of the following chronological analysis of developments in intra-Arab relations since 1966, however, two significant new threads emerge which could lead to a reshuffling of Arab alignments—though not necessarily with any resultant improvement in Arab unity. These trends include: (1) the readjustment, since 1951, of the political relationships among the Arab states; and (2) a break with tradition in the tactics now being employed by both Hashimite Iraq and the anti-Hashimite leaders for control of a Jordan which has become still weaker particularly since the death of King Abdullah in 1951.

The anti-Hashimite front has been weakened by the exit of King Faruq from Egypt, of ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Assam as Secretary-General of the Arab League, and by the collapse of the Shishakli regime in Syria. Under its present military regime, Egypt is torn between its desire to organize the conflicting parties into a strengthened Arab and Moslem bloc on the one hand, and on the other, to prevent Iraq from becoming too strong a rival. The future of the former Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus axis remains uncertain in view of the failure of either the pro-Iraqi or Saudi and Egyptian supported elements to make a strong showing in the September 1954 Syrian elections. On the other hand, the Hashimite front has also been weakened—by the death of King Abdullah of Jordan and the disruptive effect of Jordan’s annexation of West Jordan, where there is considerable support for Hajj Amin and much antipathy against the conservative Jordanian regime as well as Iraq.

Both Hashimite Iraq and its anti-Hashimite opponents regard Jordan as an unviable and transient political entity. Both groups are therefore maneuvering for control when its expected demise takes place. New tactics, however, are being employed for the sake of old objectives. Newly-crowned King Saud of Saudi Arabia has reversed his father’s hard policy toward the Jordanian dynasty. In response to overtures from anxious King Husayn, the Saudi monarch has recently been attempting to turn King Husayn against Iraq by encouraging the young king’s fear of losing his throne to Iraqi expansion. Iraq, meanwhile, has decided to concentrate on Syria rather than Jordan, probably in the belief that once Syria has been won over to union with Iraq, the inclusion of Jordan, would be only a matter of time.
II. DISSENSION WITHIN THE ARAB LEAGUE

A. Conflicting Proposals for Arab Unity

When the Arab unity movement began picking up momentum in 1943, friction between the Hashimite and the non-Hashimite Arab states intensified. Iraq, seeking to restore the former Syrian kingdom of Faisal I, in 1931 had been the first to make concrete proposals as to the form Arab union should take. The Iraqi plan, expanded in Prime Minister Nuri al-Salih's Blue Book written in 1943, called for the union of Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine, in which the Palestine Jews and the Lebanese were to be given autonomous status if they so desired. In essence, this plan was one for the formation of a "Greater Syria" through union with Iraq of those portions of the Arab world which were most alike in background, development, and outlook.

The Alexandria Protocol — drawn up between September 25 and October 8, 1944 at a meeting of Arab representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, the Yemen, and Palestine — rejected the Iraqi proposal. This rejection reflected (1) the opposition of Egypt, which also aspired to leadership of a united Arab East; (2) the hostility of the Syrian ruling group at the prospect of being displaced by the Hashimites; (3) King Emad Saud's fears of ultimate Hashimite designs against the Hijas once Iraq and Transjordan had strengthened themselves by acquiring control of Syria and Palestine; and (4) suspicion that British influence, through Iraq, would thus increase in the Arab world. The Protocol, upon which the Arab League Pact drawn up on March 22, 1945 was based, provided instead for a loose association of independent, sovereign Arab states rather than for a political union.

In the meantime, the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, under the stimulus of Iraq's Arab unity plan, had intensified his own campaign for a Greater Syria oriented toward Jordan. This project of Abdullah's — like that of Iraq — was motivated by a long-standing resolution to restore the Hashimite rule over Syria which had collapsed when the French drove Abdullah's brother Faisal from Damascus in July 1920. Abdullah also envisaged the incorporation of Palestine when final disposition of that territory would be made. Abdullah objected to the Alexandria Protocol because he considered it a threat to his Greater Syria project. Though Transjordan, probably under the influence of its Prime Minister, Senir al-Rifi, and the pressure of the British eventually joined the League, Abdullah's position in the organisation never was a comfortable one.
The Hashimite program for Arab unity was supported and encouraged by the UK, since it would have resulted in a union of Arab states under the leadership elements most disposed to cooperate with the UK. Following the signing of the Alexandria Protocol, however, it became clear to the UK that the projected Arab League was developing along lines unfavorable to British interests. President Shukri al-Qawwati of Syria, antagonized by British support of Hashimite expansionism, had joined forces with Ibn Saud and the three principal Egyptians (Prime Minister Nahhas Pasha, League Secretary-General 'Abd al-Rahman 'Assan, and King Faruq) to wrest control of the projected League from the British-backed Hashimites.

The intensity of President Qawwati's hostility to Greater Syria is reflected in statements he is reported to have made at the beginning of April 1916 to the effect that (1) Arab unity and the integrity of the Arab League could not be assured unless an end was put to the Hashimite regimes in Iraq and Transjordan, and (2) Abdallah had violated his commitments to the Arab League by signing the UK treaty of March 22, 1916, which permitted the stationing of British troops on Arab soil, without consulting the League.

In an attempt to settle the problem, Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Minister Eden in February 1915 held a meeting in Egypt with King Faruq, King Ibn Saud, and President Qawwati. The subject of discussion reportedly was a Greater Syria plan whereby young Faysal II of Iraq would be King, and Qawwati Prime Minister, of a Greater Syria consisting of Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and the Arab portion of a partitioned Palestine; Lebanon and the Jewish portion of Palestine would remain outside.

This endeavor failed, and the Arab League Pact, adopted on March 22, 1916, provided instead for the loose association of Arab states envisaged in the Alexandria Protocol. The Pact rejected the proposed British principle of a partitioned Palestine and stated in an annex to Article IX that Palestine was de jure an independent state, though for reasons beyond its control it was unable to exercise effectively its independence and sovereignty. It further provided that the Arab League Council was to be charged with selecting an Arab representative to represent Palestine in the deliberations of the

1. None of the Arab states or the Palestine Arabs ever recognised the validity of any of the League of Nations mandates over Arab territory and hence rejected the right of the UK or any international body to partition Palestine.
Council. France threw its weight behind the anti-Hashimites on the
grounds that the Greater Syria scheme would result in British usurpation
of the French sphere of influence in the Levant.

B. Hashimites and anti-Hashimites Contest Right to Speak for Palestine

The question as to who should represent Palestine before the
Arab League sharply exacerbated the contest between the pro- and
anti-Hashimite forces. In response to a suggestion by Syria, the anti-
Hashimite bloc concluded that it would be useful to bring back from
Europe Abdullah's arch-enemy, the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin
al-Husayni, and set him up as spokesman for the Palestine Arabs. The
Mufti, who had actively supported the Axis powers during World War II,
was then in France, where he had taken refuge following the capitula-
tion of Germany in May 1945. Possibly on President Qawwati's
orders, Maluf al-Dewaliki, then legal counsellor to the Syrian Legation
in Paris, issued a Syrian passport to Hajj Amin under a false name.
Hajj Amin, probably with French knowledge, arrived in Egypt at the end
of the year 1945, where the Egyptian Foreign Ministry stated he would be
allowed to remain as a "political refugee."

At the Arab League session held in Bludan, Syria, June 8-12,
1946, a four-member Arab Higher Executive (AHE) was designated to
represent Palestine Arab interests before the Arab League and the UK.
In its composition the AHE represented a victory for the anti-Hashimite
forces; in fact, this Executive of four members (Jamal al-Husayni,
Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi, Ahmad hilmi Pasha, and Emile al-Ghuri), with
the vacant chairmanship reserved for Hajj Amin, was merely the old
anti-Abdallah Palestine Arab Higher Committee under a new name. In
this action, however, the anti-Hashimite bloc somewhat overreached
itself and caused loud complaints that the Executive did not represent
the totality of Palestine Arab opinion. Accordingly, in October 1948,
four new members were added, including Ahmed al-Shugayri who at present
is an Assistant Secretary General of the Arab League.

During the period from the end of 1946 through early 1948, as
the final decision on the future of Palestine was drawing near, the
struggle between the pro- and anti-Hashimites prevented the formation
of a Palestine Arab government to take over when the critical time
came. The Arab League meetings of November 26-27, 1946 were marked by
a stormy debate between the Foreign Ministers of Syria and Jordan
(the latter supported by Iraq) over the Greater Syria project. In
the meantime, however, the Arab League Council at this session charged
Secretary-General 'Assam with requesting the UK to restore Hajj Amin's
civil rights and permit him to reenter Palestine. 'Assam's request,
however, met with a flat British refusal. At the Arab League Political
Committee meeting at Sofar (Lebanon) in September 1947, King Abdullah
was bitterly attacked by President Qawwati for his disruptive Greater
Syria propaganda and finally agreed, in view of the need for Arab unity
at the approach of the UN General Assembly decision on Palestine in November 1947, to postpone further discussion of the Greater Syria controversy for the time being. At this time Soviet propaganda against Greater Syria was particularly strong and stressed that it was "foreign circles" which were behind Abdullah.

With time growing very short, Syrian Prime minister Jamil Hardam during the Arab League Council meeting of February 1948 proposed the formation of a government to represent all of Palestine. This proposal, however, had to be abandoned owing to the opposition of Iraq and Transjordan, who insisted that such a government could be formed only after a plebiscite among the people of Palestine. A move to appoint Hajj Amin as Palestinian representative on the Arab League Council also foundered due to the violent objections of Iraq and Transjordan. After a certain amount of maneuvering, during which Hashemite representation was eliminated, the League evolved a seven-man Special Commission for Palestine composed of League Secretary-General 'Assam of Egypt, Hajj Amin, Taqi al-Din al-Sulh (Lebanon), Ahmad al-Sharabati and Jamil Hardam (Syria), Yusuf Kasim (Saudi Arabia) and Sulayman Pasha al-Shawi (Palestine). This did not satisfy Hajj Amin, however. Frustrated in his campaign to have the Arab Higher Executive recognised as the Palestine Arab government-in-exile, by the end of March 1948 he transferred the AHE headquarters to Damascus, the seat of his strongest support.

III. ARAB DISUNITY DURING PALESTINE WAR

A. Jordan, Gaza Government, and Arab League Disagree

By March 1948 there were three principal opposing Arab groups contesting the direction of Palestine affairs: the Arab League, the Arab Higher Executive, and the partisans of Abdullah. Throughout the Arab-Israeli fighting, both before and after May 15, 1948, each group attempted to undermine the other and carried on a campaign of propaganda and non-cooperation to that end. It was this disunity which was a major factor in the failure of the Arab campaign against Israel.

The absence of a unified Palestine Arab body necessitated the abandonment of the earlier decision at the Inshas (Egypt) Conference of May 28-29, 1946, to allow the Palestine Arabs to carry on the struggle against the Zionist community in Palestine with only clandestine aid from the Arab states. After the Arab armies intervened on May 15, 1948, the effective performance of Jordan's British officered Arab Legion alarmed the anti-Hashemite bloc, as the prospect arose that Abdullah would annex that part of Palestine occupied by the Legion. To counter this developing situation, Hajj Amin, with Egyptian support, sent emissaries to Palestine to prepare public opinion for his arrival in Gaza and the establishment of a government there. This attempt failed, however, owing to threats of physical violence made against Hajj Amin's
Representatives by anti-Husayni refugees from Jaffa backed up by the local population of Gaza. Following this fresh failure, the Arab League on July 9, 1948, established an interim Administrative Council for Palestine under the chairmanship of Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, former treasurer of Hajj Amin’s Arab Higher Committee; it was designated as purely a housekeeping agency and was not to deal with political questions, which were reserved for the League itself.

With the deterioration of the Arab position in Palestine in August 1948, Syria indicated its desire to quit the war and turn over its sphere of interest to Hajj Amin in order to keep it from falling into the hands of Abdallah. In September 1948, Syria, supported by Lebanon, raised the question of a Palestine administration and army. This proposal was opposed by Iraq and Transjordan; Egypt was neutral in the matter and Saudi Arabia and the Yemen did not participate in the discussion. Out of patience with continued Hashimite obstructionism, Syria, supported by League Secretary-General ‘Assam and with Egyptian acquiescence, apparently persuaded the League on September 11, 1948, to form an All-Palestine Government, the existence of which was made public six days later. This, the so-called “Gaza Government,” was made up entirely of supporters of Hajj Amin drawn from the League’s Administrative Council for Palestine, which had never actually functioned. Although this government had been formed without the acquiescence of Iraq and Transjordan, Egypt had insisted that Hajj Amin be excluded from it in the hope of winning Hashimite support. Jamal al-Husayni, Foreign Minister of this new government, was sent to Baghdad and Amman prior to September 25, 1948, to secure Iraqi and Jordanian recognition of the regime. He succeeded in Baghdad but failed in Amman, since King Abdallah remained suspicious of the connection between the All-Palestine Government and Hajj Amin.

When the League-organized National Assembly of the All-Palestine Government met in Gaza on September 30, 1948, Hajj Amin put in an unauthorized appearance at the proceedings and was elected president of that body. This was highly embarrassing both to Arab League Secretary-‘Assam and to King Farouq, who recalled Hajj Amin to Egypt on October 8, 1948, probably as the price of Egyptian recognition of the APG. By October 12, all the Arab governments except Transjordan had recognized the Gaza Government.

If the Arab League and the Arab governments (except Jordan) considered that by removing Hajj Amin from the Gaza Government they could unify the Arab war effort, they were mistaken. Abdallah, eager

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1. Their enmity toward Hajj Amin had been intensified by the Husayni-inspired assassination of ‘Umar Bitar, an ex-mayor of Jaffa.
to advance his Greater Syria project, not only refused to recognise the Gaza Government but quickly exploited Hajj Amin's unauthorised connection with it to organise anti-Husayni elements in Jordanian-controlled Palestine into a pro-union-with-Jordan bloc. Leaders among the anti-Husayni Palestine Arabs met at a conference in Amman on October 1, 1948 and declared the Gaza Government to be an illegal body. The movement set in motion at this conference culminated in parliamentary sanction of the incorporation of Jordan-controlled Arab Palestine into Jordan on April 21, 1950. At the same time, Abdallah was not averse to making peace with Israel with which he had been conducting secret negotiations since 1949.

B. Anti-Hashimites Oppose Jordanian Annexation of Arab Palestine

The reaction of the anti-Hashimites members of the Arab League to Abdallah's annexation of Arab Palestine was extremely violent. On May 15, 1950 the Arab League Political Committee agreed that Jordan's annexation of Arab Palestine was a violation of the League's resolution of April 12, 1950, prohibiting any annexation of Palestine territory. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon voted to expel Jordan from the League, while Iraq and the Yemen abstained. In the end, Iraqi support of Jordan prevented the latter's expulsion from the League, and Jordan on May 31, 1950, paid lip service to the April 12 resolution by stating that the annexation did not in any way impair a final settlement of the Palestine issue, which continued to be an aim of Jordanian policy. Nevertheless, the incident left a deep and abiding resentment against Abdallah in Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

IV. THE ASSASSINATION OF KING ABDULLAH OF JORDAN: A COUNTER MOVE AGAINST HASHEMITE EXPANSIONISM

The growing effectiveness of Hashemite propaganda in Syria, taken together with Abdallah's annexation of Arab Palestine in April 1950, convinced King Ibn Saud that Abdallah would have to be liquidated. Taking advantage of the financial need of a small independent terrorist organisation known as the Arab Redemption Battalions, Ibn Saud through the Saudi Legation in Damascus supplied funds and arms to this organisation for the assassination of King Abdullah in Amman.

1. This government was never recognised by any non-Arab governments. After Egypt recalled Hajj Amin from Gaza, the Jordanian Government somewhat softened its opposition. On November 1, 1948, it acknowledged that the Gaza Government had a right to vote in the Arab League Council since it had been recognised by a majority of Arab States.

2. This move seems to have had at least tacit UK support. The British later included this annexed territory in the area covered by their treaty of alliance with Jordan.
This project was handled by Dr. Amin Ruwayhah, who had been involved with Hajj Amin in the Palestine revolt of 1936-1939 and the Iraq revolt of 191 and who subsequently became an advisor to the Saudi Ministry of Defense. When the would-be assassins lost courage at the last moment, they were encouraged by Ruwayhah to assassinate instead Nuri al-Salid and other prominent government leaders in Baghdad, but this plan, too, misfired. Ruwayhah and Dr. Nash'at Shaykh al-Ard (a relative of ibn Saud's personal physician) in November 1950 were indicted by a Syrian military court. However, because of ibn Saud's threat to withhold a $2,000,000 loan payment and break off diplomatic relations if Saudi Arabia's complicity were further exposed, Colonel Shishakli (then the power behind the Populist government) had the indictment against Shaykh al-Ard quashed and Ruwayhah was never brought to trial.

A successful assassination of King Abdallah in Jerusalem on July 20, 1951 was carried out by a Palestinian terrorist group controlled by Hajj Amin himself. Although there is no concrete evidence that ibn Saud was involved in this project, it is said that Shishakli was aware of it and that arrangements had been made for the assassins to escape through Syria. In view of past Saudi threats to Shishakli, which included an attempt on his life, it is possible that Saudi pressure could have been responsible for his cooperation in this venture. In any case, there appears to have been a joint plan for exploiting the anticipated confusion following Abdallah's death. It seems to have envisaged holding a plebiscite in Jordan to determine the future of the country. In order to assure the desired outcome, a strong propaganda campaign was launched in favor of the annexation of Jordan by Syria.

Meanwhile Iraq, starting with Abdallah's funeral, began an intense campaign to induce the Jordanian public to request the incorporation of Jordan into its sister Hashimitic country and prevent it from falling into anti-Hashimitic hands. Both the Iraqi and the anti-Hashimitic campaign continued through the August 1951 Jordanian elections and during the brief and uncertain reign of Abdallah's mentally ailing son, King Talal. But with the ascension of young King Husayn to the Jordanian throne on May 2, 1953, it became clear to both sides that the regime had been strengthened and that neither was going to gain control of Jordan for the time being. The Iraqi failure was a bitter disappointment to Regent 'Abd al-Ilah, who had hoped to obtain from the union with Jordan a high post to replace the one he would lose with the abolition of the regency at the approaching accession of young King Faysal II to the throne of Iraq. In the anti-Hashimitic camp, it was Hajj Amin who felt the turn of events most keenly, since he had again failed to establish himself in an official position as recognized head of the Palestine Arabs.
A. The Mufti Establishes Working Relationship with Anti-Hashimite States

Following the signing of the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements between February and July 1949, the anti-Hashimite states and Hajj Amin's Arab Higher Executive pursued a policy of organizing and maintaining control of the scattered Palestine Arab refugees, particularly in Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Their objectives were (1) to preserve and strengthen anti-Hashimite feeling among the refugees, (2) to stir up disorders within Jordan, (3) to discourage resettlement in order to preserve a nucleus for an anti-Hashimite, independent, Arab Palestine, and (4) to organize elements to embroil Jordan with Israel with the purpose of either reopening the war or forcing Israel to plead for a return to the 1947 UN partition recommendation.

During the period from 1949 to February 1954, the most active supporters of the AHE program were Saudi Arabia and Syria. Saudi Arabia's support of the AHE was merely another facet of its general policy of giving aid and comfort to any enemy of the Hashimites; Ibn Saud had previously given refuge to Hashid 'Ali al-Daylani after his return from Germany whether he had fled following his abortive coup in Baghdad in May 1941. In the same tradition, following the collapse of Gaza All-Palestine Government in 1949 Ibn Saud took in a number of Hajj Amin's important supporters. Among these was Hajj Amin's cousin Jamal al-Husayni, who was made a Royal Councillor and who subsequently became one of the present King Saud's three top advisors.

Syria's support was less consistent - particularly during the Himawli regime of August-December 1949. It was particularly strong during the period of November 1951 - February 1954. Fundamentally it was the fear on the part of certain civilian and military ruling cliques that union with Iraq on Jordan would mean the end of their power. This attitude was bolstered up by Saudi pressure, both financial and political.

Egypt's support of the AHE during this period was motivated by a prestige contest with Iraq, though, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Egypt also objected to the Hashimites as agents of British policy. After the military coup of July 23, 1952, in Egypt, Hajj Amin was in the good graces of the Revolutionary Command Council, and was particularly befriended by General Mohamed Nagib and Col. Rashad Muhanna. At least part of the RCC's interest in Hajj Amin seemed attributable to the suspicions of Jordanian designs on the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip, where a local movement for annexation to Jordan was suppressed by the Egyptian authorities in November, 1953.
Lebanon's cooperation with these Anti-Hashmite forces was entirely different in its motivation. The dominant Christian element in Lebanon has long possessed an ingrained fear of being swallowed up by a political combination of Moslem states. Since the great majority of union schemes have emanated from Iraq and Jordan, Lebanon has been receptive to anti-Hashmite propaganda and for its own reasons has cooperated with those forces which were opposed to Hashimite expansionism. Indicative of the importance Lebanese officials attached to Hajj Amin were the kind of reception he received on periodic visits: when he arrived in Beirut from Jidda on November 17, 1953 en route to Damascus, he was entertained by such high Lebanese personages as ex-Prime minister Sami al-Dahh and former Foreign Minister Henri Pharson, and on November 22 was transported to a seat of honor at the Lebanese Independence Day military parade in an official limousine despatched personally by President Shazun. Since 1949, a branch office of the Arab Higher Executive has operated in Beirut with official blessing.

B. Terrorism against Israel

With the collapse of the Arab states' military effort against Israel in 1969, the anti-Hashmite bloc in the Arab League (possibly with the tacit consent of Iraq, but not of Jordan), appears to have agreed to continue the struggle against Israel by guerrilla and terrorist attacks as the armed counterpart to the Arab League economic and political blockade of Israel. It is likely that the AHE was chosen to implement this program since it was not a recognized official government body and as such could not be held accountable for violations of the Arab-Israeli armistice agreements. The center selected for these operations was Damascus. The operation is said to have envisaged the training of small sabotage and commando groups by German and Yugoslav specialists in Damascus and the training of refugees contingents by taking them into the Syrian Army. Arms were to be procured by the Syrian Government. By the spring of 1950, a similar type of training program is reported to have been under way in Cairo.

This effort was characteristically hampered, however, by poor organization of the scattered groups of refugees and by personal jealousies among members of the AHE. This resulted in the appearance of competing terrorist groups; the first of these was the Holy War Fighters which made its appearance in April 1950, with headquarters reportedly in Jerusalem and Cairo. At about the same time, the Military Organization for the Liberation of Palestine was founded. Early in June 1950 its Beirut headquarters requested the All-Palestine Government to proclaim a general mobilisation and arming of Palestine Arab youth to initiate guerrilla warfare in territories occupied by the Israelis. It also appealed to the Jordanian people and leaders to undertake, with the help of the responsible leaders in all Arab countries,
military action to liberate Jordan from its "colonisers" and cleanse it of the agents and tools of the imperialists. Finally, it resolved to take revenge on the UK, the US, and the USSR for their part in the Palestine Arab disaster. The parties responsible for this manifesto were Emile al-Dhuri, then head of the AHE office in Beirut, and Muhammad Nina' l'Awdah, organiser of the AHE Palestine Committee for Guerrilla Action.

In December 1952, Hajj Amin, attempting to exploit the difficult political position of Jordanian Prime minister Tewfiq abu al-Huda, accelerated his efforts to concentrate refugees along the Jordan-Israel armistice line with a view to launching nuisance raids against Israel in the apparent hope that Israel thereby would be brought to agree to the UN 1947 partition plan. Hajj Amin appears to have hoped also that the Jordanian Government would permit him to enter Jordan to take personal charge of furthering his aims. Although Husayni supporters readmitted to Jordan from Syria prepared the way by conferring with clubs, organisations, and refugee leaders in Anilus, Jenin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Jerusalem, Hajj Amin in fact was not allowed to enter the country.

By July and August 1953, the Holy War Fighters and the Military Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine had apparently both given way to a new organisation known as the Vengeance Partisans. This group, which is assumed to be under the control of the AHE and is known also as the Committee for Opposing Peace with the Enemy (i.e., Israel), had its headquarters in Beirut and was said to recruit its membership chiefly from teachers and students at the American University of Beirut. The Vengeance Partisans in November 1953 were reported to be responsible for a large percentage of armed Arab infiltration into Israel. Between August and November 1953, this organisation had purchased arms and set up branches at Jerusalem, Amman, and Hebron in Jordan. The October 13, 1953 bombing at al-Yahudiyyah in Israel, which was cited by Israel as the reason for its retaliatory attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya on October 14-15, 1953, has been reliably attributed to the Jerusalem branch of this organisation.

There was also an agreement between Syria and the AHE for the military training of Arab refugees in the Syrian armed forces. It is reported that during their meeting of December 11-16, 1952, Syrian President Shishakli and Egyptian Prime minister Nagib jointly agreed to accept Palestine refugees into their respective ground forces. There is some possibility that the stimulus for the formation of a "Palestine Frontier Guards" regiment of 500 men in the Gaza Strip was a product of this meeting. Continued activity in this direction was indicated by a Beirut radio report of March 26, 1953 that a large group of Palestine Arab refugees in Syria had requested induction into the Syrian Army in order to "assist in repelling Jewish aggressions."
Two incidents which with a high degree of probability can be ascribed to one of these Syrian-trained refugee bands took place in Galilee in May 1953. On May 31, a truck carrying 50 children was attacked with one killed and three wounded. On June 7, 1953, an Israeli police car was attacked by automatic fire on the Acre-Safad road. Although these raids had been staged from Harun al-Ras's in Lebanon, the raiders are believed to have come from Syria with the knowledge of the Syrian Army G-2 and to have operated from Lebanon in order to avoid involving Syria with Israeli.

An attempt was also made to establish similar training centers in Saudi Arabia. In October 1952 Jamal al-Husayni had almost succeeded in arranging the entry of Muhammad 'Awdh, Hajj Amin's principal terrorist and guerrilla activity organizer, into Saudi Arabia and securing his appointment as secretary and advisor to Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman, brother of the late King Ibn Saud. 'Awdah apparently was slated to direct the training of Palestine refugee terrorists and guerrillas in the Hijazi. However, this move was blocked at the last moment, probably by Ibn Saud. The probable reason is that 'Awdah, of all Hajj Amin's principal lieutenants, has been rather consistently reported as having Communist sympathies and connections, and Ibn Saud would never knowingly have permitted any Communist sympathizer to enter the country.

C. Opposition to Resettlement of Palestine Refugees

Hajj Amin's approach to the Palestine Arab refugee problem has distinguished between two target groups: (1) important supporters and followers among the refugees, and (2) the mass of refugees.

Originally, Hajj Amin had planned to take care of his relatives and important supporters by appointing them to the All-Palestine Government, which he expected to control. This plan was disrupted by the disintegration of the Gaza Government due to Hashimite opposition and its failure to secure recognition abroad. Eventually, only 'Abd al-Rahman, his secretary Rafaq (or Muhammad Tawfiq) al-Lababidi were left in the Gaza Government. In 1949 Hajj Amin became alarmed at the possibility his supporters might defect to Abdullah if Jordan succeeded in annexing the portion of Arab Palestine it then occupied. He took the precaution of having them taken care of by certain Arab governments, notably Saudi Arabia.

In dealing with the mass of the refugees, the AIE has pursued two main objectives: (1) to preserve Hajj Amin's influence over them, and (2) to exploit for his own ends the general Arab policy of discouraging their resettlement outside of Palestine, keeping them concentrated along the Arab-Israeli armistice lines, and encouraging them to hope for repatriation. This policy was officially directed
at preserving conditions favorable to a return in principle to the
1947 UN partition resolution, which called for the creation of an
Arab state from those areas not originally awarded to Israel; this
would include the territory annexed by Jordan as well as about 25
percent of present Israel. Since such a state would clearly be unviable,
the Arab League (except Jordan) probably envisaged a plebiscite to
determine with which of the surrounding Arab states the population
would wish to affiliate themselves. Hajj Amin and the AHE have
attempted to build up their position among the native inhabitants of
West Jordan and among the refugees against the day when they will be
able to bargain with the leaders of any prospective annexing state as
spokesman of the Palestine Arabs.

D. The Mufti's Activities in Syria and Lebanon

The AHE offices in Beirut and Damascus, set up in 1949, are the
principal agencies through which Hajj Amin works in these areas. Since
1950 both Hajj Amin on periodic visits from Cairo and the local AHE
staffs have kept up a constant pressure on the refugees in Syria and
Lebanon to refuse settlement and demand repatriation. In Lebanon,
Hajj Amin and the AHE have been permitted to do this not only because
of Lebanese fears of Hashimite union plans, but because most of the
refugees in Lebanon are Moslems and Lebanese policy is to refuse the
settlement of Moslems in Lebanon for fear of endangering the Christian
supremacy in the country. In Syria, Hajj Amin's influence on Shishakli
helped at least until March 1954 to prevent any effective resettlement
of refugees in that country.

The effectiveness of such methods was made particularly clear
early in November 1953 when, owing to such pressure, 900 wavering refugees
finally rejected resettlement on an UNRWA project east of Damascus. In
November 1953 Hajj Amin opposed Eric Johnston's US-backed Jordan Valley
plan on the ground that it was inconsistent with the repatriation of the
Palestine refugees. Finally, owing in part to Hajj Amin's opposition,
the Arab League Council in April 1954 voted against Arab refugees emigration
to the US as provided for in the US Refugee Relief Act of 1953.

E. The Mufti's Activities in Iraq and Jordan

In Hashimite Iraq and Jordan, the position of Hajj Amin and the AHE
is naturally less favorable than in the anti-Hashimite area. Hajj Amin
has not appeared in Iraq, where he is persona non grata, since his partici-
pation in the Hashid 'Ali revolt of 1921. As a result, the 8000-10,000
Arab refugees in Iraq are under little if any influence by the AHE.

In Jordan, Hajj Amin and the AHE have been able to operate somewhat
more effectively than in Iraq. The chief asset of Hajj Amin and his
entourage in Jordan is the support which they claim from the traditional
followers of their respective families, which in some cases goes back as
far as 500 years. The chief area of their strengt
is the portion of West Jordan lying between Jerusalem and Nablus, where the core of the Husaynis' Palestine Arab Party strength lay during the days of the British mandate. Opposition to Hajj Amin and his AHE came not only from the British in Jordan and the circle around the Hashimite throne, but also from those Palestine Arabs who before partition were either hostile or neutral toward the Husayni-led Palestine Arab Party. Since 1948, and in some cases even before, these anti-Husayni elements had largely gone over to Abdullah, who made a special effort to win their support by appointing them to offices in the Jordanian Government. Nevertheless, Hajj Amin appears still to command a considerable degree of latent loyalty in the Jerusalem area. As in Lebanon and Syria, AHE tactics are to exploit for its own aims the general Arab policy of combating any attempt to resettle the refugees away from their original homes. The AHE is believed to exert its influence in this direction both through a cell system in refugee camps and through its influence on the Arab-language Jordanian Jerusalem press, the most important representatives of which joined in the denunciation of the Blandford resettlement plan in the summer of 1952.

While King Abdullah was alive, he was able to keep the pro-Husayni elements in check by the expedients of imprisonment, exile, support of their enemies, or buying them off. Since Abdullah's assassination in July 1951, however, their influence has increased; this has been due not only to the absence of a strong hand in the central government, but to the rise of Palestine Arab influence in Jordanian affairs since the annexation of the West Bank in 1950. Although the pro-Husayni position has weakened since the summer of 1952, it could easily be revived under favorable conditions.

Following the Qibya raid of October 1953, and acting upon a request for assistance by Jordan, the Arab League discussed the question of contributing to the support of the Jordanian National Guard. However, after initial contributions mainly by Iraq and Egypt little if anything was forthcoming. Hajj Amin and his supporters thereupon concluded that if they could themselves get control of the National Guard, it would be a valuable asset to them in attaining their objectives against the Hashimites and the British in Jordan. In December 1953, therefore, the AHE is believed to have instructed its supporters in Jordan to try to exploit for its own ends the widespread desire to remove the National Guard from Arab Legion supervision and put it under the control of West Bank Palestinians, among whom Hajj Amin's strength was greatest.

I. See IB 1511, Anti-British Elements in Jordan Strengthened by Qibya Incident, November 6, 1953, SECRET.
VI. THE MUFTI ATTEMPTS TO BROADEN HIS SUPPORT

A. The Islamic Congress for the Palestine Cause

By the autumn of 1953, Hajj Amin had reached the conclusion that the time had come to give formal organisation to his supporters and program in Jordan. Although he attempted to gain entry into Jordan, reportedly with the assistance of Syrian President Shishakli, he failed. In creating this organization, he planned to establish it on as broad a base as possible and to constitute it principally of Moslem religious personalities; the latter device was designed to appeal to the religious sensibilities of the West Bank masses and also to make it more difficult for the Jordanian Government to attack the group. Furthermore, in order to give the impression that his organisation had backing from the Moslem world at large, he adopted the technique used earlier by the Pakistanis for gaining additional support for their cause in Kashmir and their leadership in the Islamic world. He assembled, on December 3-9, 1953, an "Islamic Congress" in Jerusalem, Jordan, with delegates ostensibly representing as many Moslem countries and organisations as possible.

Most of the delegates were from the Moslem Brethren, with whom Hajj Amin had established a close working agreement at the time of the Palestine War and in the course of his activities at various Islamic conferences in Karachi. Other delegates included exiled North African nationalist leaders in Cairo and a representative of the Iranian extremist leader Ayatollah Kashani. The resolutions adopted by the conference were as follows:

1. All Moslem must work for the liberation of Palestine.
2. The Israeli occupation of Palestine is invalid and Israel's displacement of the Palestine Arabs and usurpation of their rights is an aggression against every Moslem.
3. Consideration of peace with Israel or dealing with Israel is treason.
4. The proposed internationalization of Jerusalem is a conspiracy against the Moslem world.
5. There should be popular mobilisation for an active struggle to help the refugees regain their homes. Until this is achieved the refugees' condition must be improved.
6. A Moslem Palestine fund of 55,000,000 should be established to finance plans for economic revival in Jordan and financing the general struggle.
7. The powers that established and have aided Israel will have
the enmity of all Moslem peoples until they cease this aid.
Moslem peoples are to be encouraged to pressure their
governments to adopt a similar attitude toward the great
powers.

8. The 27th of Safar (April 11, 1954) is to be observed as
Palestine day.

Secret resolutions were taken also, but the only known one is that
which designated the AHE as the body responsible for negotiating the
future of Palestine. This resolution is reported to have angered Jordan's
King Husayn. The nature of the other unpublicised resolutions may be
judged from the fact that while Conference delegates were touring the
Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm triangle area on December 5, 1953, Algerian delegate
Sheikh Bashir al-Durhami is reported to have urged refugees to commit
acts of theft and terrorism in Israel in order to show their determina-
tion to their Arab neighbors and thus improve their chances for getting
aid.

On the organisational side, the prominence of the Moslem Brethren
element is indicated by the election of Sayid Ramadan, of the Moslem
Brethren in Cairo, as Secretary General of the Conference. The General
Islamic Council for the Palestine Cause, with a seven-man permanent
office in Jerusalem, was made a permanent body which was to meet in
Jerusalem every three months. The General Assembly of the Congress was
to meet annually in one of the Moslem capitals. However, owing to the
opposition of the Jordanian Government and the hostility of the Egyptian
RCC toward the Moslem Brethren, this organisation in 1954 was obliged
to transfer its activities to Damascus.

The significance of this program is fairly clear. Firstly, Hajj
Madani's objective is to secure his return to the West Bank and establish
himself and the AHE as the spokesmen of the Palestine Arabs vis-a-vis
the Jordanian Government and the other Arab states. Secondly, he aimed
to set himself up as acknowledged leader of all Palestine Arab resistance
to Israel and, in that capacity, to organise attacks from Jordan on
Israel with the double aim of (a) attracting the sympathy and aid of
the Islamic world at large and (b) using this aid either to eliminate
Israel or force it to come to terms with him. Thirdly, his public appeals

1. This organisation was banned by the Egyptian Government on January 12,
1954, but though the ban was rescinded in July 1954, Ramadan was
deprived of Egyptian nationality in October 1954, and took up residence
in Syria.
for financial support are to be directed not toward governments but to unofficial and religious groups throughout the Moslem world. In March 1954, it was announced that the Permanent Office for the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem would establish an office, headed by the exiled Algerian nationalists Muhammad al-Bashir al-Ibrahim and al-Fudayyil al-Wartalani, to carry on propaganda for "relief projects" in the Jordan armistice zones. On March 27, 1954, a Congress delegation left Baghdad for Indonesia, India, and Pakistan to collect contributions for Palestine armistice line villages.

3. Financial Support

The Arab Higher Executive appears to be totally dependent financially on funds supplied by Hajj Amin, who in this way is able to keep his followers in line.

Initially, the AHE (as an official representative of the Palestine Arabs recognised by the Arab League) received its operating funds from an Arab League war-chest of $200,000 ($300,000) which had been collected personally by Hajj Amin and by the Arab League — principally from Pakistan, Arab communities in South America (to which the League sent a mission in 1947), and Saudi Arabia. After May 15, 1918, the League is believed to have cut its monthly allotment to Hajj Amin because it discovered that he was receiving funds from the Egyptian Cabinet and Foreign Ministry. In June 1918, he is said to have despatched a delegation including prominent Moslem Brethren members to Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan to raise funds and disseminate propaganda. This campaign turned out to be most successful in Pakistan, for a documentary statement later issued by the AHE stated that $100,000 had been collected from Pakistan in that year.

In May 1919, reportedly at the intervention of King Saud, the Arab League is said to have released to the AHE all of the $200,000 collected in 1917, half of which had been frozen by the League. The only contribution reported for 1950 is $90,000 ($252,000) from Pakistan sources, which the Pakistanis claimed was intended for the aid of refugees. In 1951, after the Arab League denied him the privilege of handling funds for refugee aid, suspecting that he was using them for his own personal political purposes, Hajj Amin instituted a very successful drive for financial support from other quarters. Between March and December, he is reported to have received $140,000 from Pakistani and Indonesian sources and the AHE's own statement asserts that it received $69,586 from

1. al-Wartalani is an Algerian Berber who represented the Moslem Brethren in the Yemen in 1917 at the time when they were involved in a conspiracy resulting in the assassination of the ruler of the Yemen, the Imam Yahya in February 1948.
Pakistan alone. During 1951, Saudi Arabia is also reported to have contributed considerable sums. At the same time, Hajj Amin is believed to have been receiving his personal expenses and $300 ($960) per month from secret funds of the Egyptian Cabinet.

Two reports of September and December 1951 allege that Hajj Amin was receiving funds from the USSR, in one case via Pakistan, but there is no specific corroborative information available. Moreover, other reports say that in February 1950 and November 1952 Hajj Amin and one of his supporters in Jordan had been approached by local Communists with offers of collaboration, but they turned the Communists down. Hajj Amin probably recognizes that if he were to accept Soviet or Communist aid he would forfeit the support of Saudi Arabia and other conservative Moslem sources to whom his appeal is now strongest.

In February 1952 Hajj Amin again visited Karachi for financial purposes. By March-April 1951, Hajj Amin was said to be receiving $1,000 ($2,800) per month from the Pakistan Government and sporadic payments from then Pakistani Prime Minister Nissar al-Din, Chaudhri Khaliq al-Zaman of the Moslem People's Organization of Karachi, and Aman Iftikhar al-Din, Pro-Communist head of the Aesa Party. Similar reports were made in September 1952 concerning Muhammad Hatta, Vice President of Indonesia, and a former Minister of Afghanistan in Cairo. In none of these cases, however, has it been proved that the respective governments were supplying funds to Hajj Amin; it is possible that they merely transmitted funds from private Moslem organizations. Nevertheless, Hajj Amin as late as March 1952 enjoyed considerable prestige among high official circles in Pakistan, for in that month the Pakistan Cabinet requested the Governor General to invite him to Pakistan as a state guest.

Less important sources of funds reported in 1952 were Lebanon, Egypt, and the refugees themselves. President Khuri of Lebanon is said to have initiated a grant of $600 per month to the AHE and President Camille Chamoun who assumed office in September, 1952 is believed to have continued this grant. The refugees, upon whom the AHE is believed to have spent little or nothing except for propaganda, are reported to have contributed $1,000 to Hajj Amin in 1952. King Farouq is said to have stopped payments to Hajj Amin early in 1952, possibly because of the latter's suspected implication in the January 26 riots in Cairo and his relations with the Moslem Brethren. This action by Farouq may at least partially explain the rapport which is believed to have existed between Hajj Amin and the Free Officers both before and after the Egyptian coup of July 23, 1952. In June 1952 Hajj Amin was reported to be receiving a monthly stipend of $720 from the present Egyptian government.

The only reported receipt of funds by Hajj Amin in 1953 is $140,000 from Saudi Arabia, which he is said to have received during the pilgrimage in August. The Jerusalem Islamic Congress fund-raising mission to Indonesia, the Moslems in India, and Pakistan will probably account for the bulk of contributions in 1954.
VII. SAUDI-JORDAN RAPPROCHEMENT: A REACTION TO IRAQI CAMPAIGN FOR UNION

The contest between the Hashimites and their enemies reached a significant turning point in 1954. The principals in the current maneuvering are Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

At the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo on January 10, 1954, Iraqi Prime Minister Fadil al-Jamali introduced a new version of the longstanding Iraqi proposals for political union of the Arab states, by suggesting that the eight League members unify various key ministries of their governments, e.g., Foreign Affairs, War, Education, Finance, and Economy. Before and after the January meeting, Iraq reportedly exerted efforts in Cairo to enlist Palestinian Arab and Egyptian Government support for Iraqi-Jordanian union. The argument used by Iraq is said to have capitalized on anti-British feeling by maintaining that Jordan is under British domination and that it was in the general Arab interest to remove UK influence from Jordan and by implication replace it by that of Iraq. Egypt, however, remained indifferent to the Iraqi arguments. Opposition to the plan, led by Saudi Arabia and Syria, resulted in the Iraqi proposal's being pigeonholed by the League.

Actually, the Iraqi plan as believed to have been presented to the League did not fully represent the concept of unity held by Prime Minister al-Jamali. In a private conversation of January 25, 1954, he revealed that what he actually had in mind was the division of the Arab world into three spheres of influence linked under the Arab League. Iraq would dominate Syria and Jordan, Saudi Arabia would have the Yemen in its sphere, and Egypt would have the Sudan and Libya within its orbit. Jordan, said Jamali, would federate with Iraq if the US and the UK would agree. He characterised Syrian President Shishakli as a principal obstacle to the execution of the Iraqi plan.

In the meantime, Iraq was actively pursuing this objective on several levels in Jordan and Syria. Iraq had made efforts, possibly financial, to influence certain Jordanian cabinet Ministers in favor of union and there are indications that similar methods were used to insure favorable comment on the scheme in the Jordanian press. Iraq was also giving aid and comfort to anti-Shishakli elements in Syria and Baghdad, who on February 25, 1954 succeeded in overthrowing the Shishakli regime and driving the President out of the country. Shishakli took refuge in Saudi Arabia.

Both King Saud and King Husayn have reacted to these Iraqi moves in a manner different from that of their predecessors. King Husayn has viewed the Iraqi pressure for union as a threat to this throne, since there would be little chance of an important place for him in an Iraqidominated state formed by union with Syria and/or Jordan. His determination to preserve the integrity of his family's rule in Jordan has been encouraged
by Queen Mother Zayn and her brother, Sharif Nasir, who in February 1951 was believed to have been receiving a subsidy from the Saudi Arab Minister in Amman.

King Saud, concerned by Iraqi activities in Syria and Jordan, by reports of impending US arms aid to Iraq, and by negotiations regarding Iraqi adherence to the Turco-Pakistani pact, eagerly accepted King Husayn’s overture of a meeting at Badanah in northern Najd on January 23-25, 1951. The meeting between the two monarchs was marked by more agreement than had been manifest in any previous meeting between the representatives of the two opposing blocs. In stressing the Iraqi threat to Husayn’s personal position, Saud found a willing listener. Saud also pressed upon Husayn the necessity of taking active measures to carry out the perennial Arab League project of restoring the destroyed portion of the Hijaz Railway between al-Ahdafar in Jordan and Medina in the Hijaz. Finally, he is believed to have contributed JD50,000 from his personal funds to King Husayn personally and to the Jordanian National Guard and to have offered to station Saudi forces near the Jordanian border. Such troops were to assist Husayn in the event Iraq attempted by force to annex Jordan.

The initial success of the Saudi attempt to create a Damascus-Amman-Riyad axis against Iraq — as it was characterised by Iraqi Prime Minister Fadil al-Samali following his visit to Amman of February 11, 1951 — suffered a setback with the subsequent uprising against the Shishakli regime in Syria. Both Iraq and Saudi Arabia were reportedly employing financial as well as political means in Syria to ensure that a friendly regime would emerge following the September 1951 elections. Although neither succeeded, the army clique which continues to be the power behind the scenes in Syria sees eye-to-eye with Egypt on the necessity of opposing the expansion of Iraqi influence.

VIII. THE OUTLOOK

As long as Saudi Arabia and Egypt continue to be preoccupied with the real or imagined threat of Iraqi expansion and as long as the final disposition of Palestine remains unsettled, it is doubtful whether Saudi Arabia and Egypt will cut loose from such a strongly anti-Hassimite Palestinian leader as Hajj Amin. For Egypt’s Premier Gamal Abd al-Nasir, even Hajj Amin’s close connection with Nasir’s rival, General Magh, and with his most-powerful domestic opposition — the outlawed Muslim Brethren — is outweighed by his desire to contain or weaken Hassimite power. Hajj Amin’s present objective would appear to be the re-establishment of the Gaza Government under his control. To this end, Hajj Amin has also been strengthening his position within the Arab League by placing his relatives and supporters in the League’s Palestine Office. In the October 1951 elections in Jordan, however, the Liberation Party, which is believed to contain adherents and sympathisers of the Mufti, won only a single seat.
The clan-based feuds between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as between the Husaynis and their Palestinian and Hashimite foes, have been a major hindrance to constructive and united action in the Arab area. In no small measure these feuds have also contributed to area instability. While this dogged contest for power continues, it is unlikely that any effective organization of the area — either military or political — can be affected by the Arabs themselves, the US, the UK, or any neighboring power. It is therefore to be anticipated that the Egyptian-led attempt to organize an Arab-Moslem "third force" bloc on the basis of the Mecca Islamic Congress will be plagued by the same enmities which have hampered the operation of the Arab Collective Security Pact. The West will also continue to be faced with this obstacle in its attempts to solve the Palestine question. Such Arab discord is likely to persist as long as political conflicts in the Arab World center on personality kinship and factional alignments, and loyalty to effective impersonal institutions and national cohesion remain weak.