

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIENNA

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AUTHORITY: E.O. 13526
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

DISPATCH NO.: MAVA-2239-

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DATE: 16 December 1948

TO : Chief, Foreign Branch M
FROM : Chief of Station, Vienna
SUBJECT: General: Operational
Specific: Iceberg
REF : MAY-W-817

Attention:

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 10-2
DATE: 4 JUN 1981 REVIEWER: 011022

1. permanent home is in Vienna and it has always been our intention that he operate in or near this area, not from Salzburg as you have indicated in paragraph two of your reference dispatch. A check with has confirmed our first impression that the Obet signal plan was designed for transmission between the Vienna area and Linber base, and we are again in a position to request authorization for immediate issuance of the Obet plan to . In the future the project will be referred to as Iceberg Baker, signal plan Obet, as suggested by during his recent visit here. Other Iceberg references will be assigned as operators are trained and introduced to their cached sets.

2. Due to radical changes made in the project within the past few weeks, we believe that it would be inadvisable to attempt to link the remainder of the sources with . As a general rule, with the exception of the projects which we have every reason to believe will retain their security on a stay-behind basis, we think it the best policy to isolate operators from sources until circumstances force us to bring them together. We are working on the problem of planning secure contacts between agents and operators at the outbreak of hostilities through prearranged "blind" meetings, letter drops, or, if proper coordination can be arranged, by giving the operators by radio from the base, instructions on how to make contact with various agents.

3. The attached memorandum (VEM/OGM/102 to Salzburg) is a further progression along the lines of MAVA-1665, and was the outcome of discussions with during which it became evident that any plans for a new base station to replace Linber would have to take into consideration the possibility that, in the face of Soviet pressure, the Western powers might not be able to hold an area within a range of 1000 to 1500 miles to the south of Austria. In that event, and if a base station were to be erected considerably further to the south, our present ESTB-1 equipment could not be expected to operate efficiently over the increased range with any degree of certainty.

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4. From the long range security standpoint, there are very definite objections to connecting agent groups by courier with a larger, central team in the Alpine region. Such a system of funneling numerous agent groups through a single transmitter would involve setting up a large and complicated courier system over considerable distances and through counter-security controls, transportation difficulties, road blocks and so forth which cannot now be assessed. It would also mean a considerable time-lag between the gathering of information and its transmission to the base station.

5. Aside from altering present agent equipment, and presumably increasing its bulk to the point where it would be difficult to conceal in a densely populated and tightly controlled area, another alternative would be the establishment of higher powered stations in the mountainous areas of Austria, Switzerland, Italy, France or Spain, which could pick up and relay transmissions from subordinate stations in Europe to whatever base might be chosen. Some of the advantages in using such a system would be increased range, speed in transmission of reports, and the immediate issuance of usable signal plans to the individual field station operator once the position of the relay station is determined, even though the location of the base station itself may not yet have been established.

6. A number of possibilities occur to us for the protection of relay stations from detection and neutralization. Operators who are well trained in partisan operations and evasion in mountain territory should have a fair chance of survival, particularly since operating a relay station, they would be spared direct physical contact with agent groups, thus minimizing the possibility of exposing the whole system through compromise of any one group. The development of tape transmission equipment would shorten the length of transmission between relay and base stations and render HF operations difficult if not impossible. We understand, however, that tape transmission is still in the planning stage and can not be expected to reach the field in the foreseeable future. Inasmuch as any base station would presumably have sufficient power to transmit directly to subordinate stations, it might be advisable to limit contact from subordinate stations to the relay station to FOX missions, thus reducing relay station transmission by more than half.

7. It is, of course, impossible for us to assess the technical difficulties which would arise from the use of procedures such as those mentioned above. Once a relay site is chosen, we presume that an initial move would be the issuance of special signal plans for relay work to the subordinate station operators. It might also be valuable to consider issuing to field station operators two alternate listening frequencies on which they could pick up operating instructions from a transmitter in the U.S. operating a FOX schedule. This plan is suggested only for the initial instructions regarding setting up of operating procedures, prior to the establishment of a base station in Europe or North Africa, in case events overwhelm us before the approved procedures and permanent base station can be established. The security dangers of prolonged two-way traffic between subordinate stations and the relay station are obvious.

8. Our action thus far has been limited to the attached memo to Salzburg. [] and [] are undertaking a survey of the area in question but it must be anticipated that winter weather will hamper their efforts, particularly in the mountain regions, and that it may be spring before the results are such that we can make more specific proposals. In the meantime we would appreciate your comments and your technical advice on the type of equipment which could be used, choice of transmission sites, and any changes which would have to be made in our present equipment and training setup.

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M. MORANDUM

VIENNA

NO.: VSM/OGN/102

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TO :
FROM : (Thru:
SUBJECT : **Caching of Long Range Radio Equipment**
REF : **MAVA-1597, 1665, 1669, WASH-1597**

DATE: **26 November 1948**

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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: HR 402 *IN*
DATE: _____
REVIEWER: _____

1. Recent discussions concerning technical problems in the stay-behind radio program have increased our interest in caching radio equipment with a range considerably greater than is possible with present agent equipment. The best area for this would be somewhere in the Tyrol region.
2. Your problem will be to develop:
 - a. one or more secure and technically suitable spots for transmission and caching of the equipment and
 - b. one or two operators.
3. The areas chosen for operation of the set must face toward the south, a southern slope of a mountain, for example, and have no mountains or other physical obstructions of any magnitude within a radius of three miles in that direction. To hinder detection by HF units and subsequent neutralization of the set, the area should probably be remote and inaccessible with facilities for quick concealment of the equipment and getaway of the operators. The equipment which we have in mind will have a packed volume of 3x3x1/2 feet and weigh approximately 500 pounds. For easier transportation it can be broken down into three or four carrying loads some of which, however, will still be too heavy to be carried for any distance by a single man.
4. The operators will be somewhat more highly trained than those developed for direct operations with SSTR 1's and must therefore be picked from the best material available. They should have had no connections whatsoever with other agents or projects of this organization and no adverse political affiliations or other factors which would affect their assured security as stay behinds. It might be necessary for the operators of this set to go on a partisan basis when the time comes to begin transmission, and wartime experience in partisan units would be an additional qualification.
5. It should be emphasized that this project is to be connected in no way with your organization.

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