

MEMORANDUM

*Autumn 1953*

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Forthcoming Discussions with PELOPS

1. When [ ] first told us that PELOPS wished for a meeting he said that PELOPS wished to review the whole basis of our cooperation since he had from time to time interesting ideas which suffered from the necessity of BREITBACH to refer to Headquarters. It would be desirable to find out exactly what these interesting ideas were. Would they consist of F<sup>1</sup> matters or would they involve the sort of thing PELOPS is primarily interested in?

2. AIN/IRAN: Undoubtedly PELOPS will pursue his tactic of keeping us on the defensive by urging that we get to the bottom of the report concerning [ ]/ZIPPER connections. One line which might be taken with PELOPS is that, although we can't divulge the source of this report to him, it still appears authentic. What can PELOPS do to demonstrate the ~~validity~~<sup>falsity</sup> of this? Should the question of AIN/IRAN be discussed at length, we might simply tell PELOPS that AIN's performance there has suffered from the unwillingness of his high-level people to spend any substantial part of their time on joint operations with us and their failure until quite recently to find working-level people who are both competent according to our standards and suitable to exercise authority for AIN. The intelligence take has been very meager from AIN/IRAN and if they can't produce under present operating conditions, is it logical that they will produce under war-time conditions?

3. AIN/PENDANT: It might be desirable to explain to PELOPS the extent to which the success of our training requires first rate interpreters. He should be asked to provide two interpreters at least as competent as Bernard. It might also be desirable to raise with PELOPS the difficulties involved in training large numbers of people. He should be given no encouragement that once

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trained, his soldiers can be evacuated from the Levant and brought back in as a unit. The idea might be gotten across to PELOPS that the type of paramilitary activity, which he can perform most effectively, are the ~~committed~~ agent-type operations. If each of the men we train recruit others not publically identified with AIN in scattered parts of the Levant, this would probably be more effective than incurring the security disadvantage of training all the AINists. ~~(PELOPS naturally won't like this.)~~

4. AIN/PEKOE: It might be pointed out to PELOPS that we have been promised for six months or so the operational data on the men whom his very excellent trainers were working with. It is to his advantage to provide us with this information of biographical operational nature because with it we can offer advice and assistance. In order that this whole activity can be tightened up it might be desirable to make Charles responsible for the details of the operation and have him instruct these men on clandestine operations.

Here also should be explained to PELOPS that it is undesirable to use individuals who are known to be AINists.

5. It might be desirable to have clear understanding with PELOPS that in order to get our FI operations into production our case officer should have direct contact with Bernard and Albert as well as Charles. ~~(It might appear~~  
~~that~~ He is already in direct contact with Daniel and it is likely that he will be in contact with Eugene as PENDANT progresses.)