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ATT TO P-2917
MGKA-A-27980

Chief, Foreign Division M
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

29 March 1951

Operational
KIBITZs 6 and 10

REFS: MGKA-11471 and MGKA-11585

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1. We are happy with Commo's reports, MGKA-27571 and MGKA-27572 which certify KIBITZs 6 and 10 as qualified field radio operators. As it happened, a vacancy until 10 March occurred unexpectedly at MISSOURI when an out of Mission trainee failed to appear as scheduled, and the time was offered to KOB. A hurried check of our agents revealed KIBITZ 6 most readily available in that he was completing some term examinations and would thus have a short break in his University schedule beginning with the evening of 27 February, whereas KIBITZ 10 would not be available until 5 March.

2. It was therefore decided to take advantage first of the availability of KIBITZ 6 so we drove down to Tuebingen on the night of 27 February to pick him up and delivered him to MISSOURI at 0001 hours of the 28th. In a progress check on 2 March, we found that by dint of cramming, #6, always a diligent student, had progressed so well that he could be released as a competent communications man within the next few days. So arrangements were made to terminate him early on the morning of 5 March to make room for KIBITZ 10 whom we had arranged to be standing by in Munich with availability 5 - 10 March.

3. As the above referenced memos indicate, this brief period of MISSOURI's time was most profitable and, except for #10 who should have a few more hours, we can say that these two men after a little more than a year of intermittent sessions at MISSOURI can now be fielded for VULTURE operations. This now points to the operational planning for the utilization of these agents unless Washington already has specific slots in mind for them, we offer our estimate of their potentialities in setting up further developments.

4. As for KIBITZ 6, our estimate of his intelligence, character, initiative and idealism is such as to suggest setting him up tentatively as an independent operator without ties to other current stay-behind nets. He is biographically qualified to function as a military observer in his own right, and Tuebingen, his likely base of operations, is the hub of all main transportation routes through the central Black Forest area.

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5. Of course, as time permits, consideration will be given toward rounding out his team to consist of covering personnel and other observers. However, we are as yet in mutual agreement that he should refrain from recruiting among his fellow University students, whose fraternal camaraderie might lead to breaches of security. Rather, #6 has been banking heavily on 6 X, a former Wehrmacht Corps staff major with whom #6 has had several talks on the matter and in whom #6 places implicit trust. But as yet, lack of salesmanship has prevented #6 from concluding the recruitment to our satisfaction. However, inasmuch as we ourselves are not yet prepared to assign specific targets or directive training to supporting team elements (MGKA 24379; KIBITZ 6), we do not consider conclusive recruitment momentarily essential, but trust that his inherent qualifications will suffice in supporting #6 should hostilities begin before we can provide constructive developmental training.

6. Nonetheless, even though no further training were possible for #6 or his teammate, he could from this date be productive as a basic Phase A agent in only the time necessary for him to set up his equipment. We therefore must be giving time towards establishing operational facilities for this man. We have already secretly cached VULTURE J within his reach and he is surveying the near countryside for an operational site. However, our recent findings upon digging up VULTURES B, C, & D, were so unsatisfactory (MGKA-26457 and 26903) that we are recommending more direct and positive planning to supplement the underground cache project. The referenced memos on VULTURES B, C, & D are a complete report on those experiences. However, we wish to review several points for the purpose of this record. Essentially, buried radios present a terrible risk in their recovery (the recoveries of the three radios B, C, & D could well have cost us two recovery teams had they been stay-behind agents) and require dangerous transporting to sites of operation and sources of power and finally might turn out to be hopelessly inoperable from underground burial. Why not prepare several operational sites with available power and communications equipment already secretly installed? MGKA-26903, paras 4 and 5, have already indicated our thinking on this matter and though there has not been time for Washington's views, we are so hopeful that we wish to include such thinking in plans for KIBITZ 6 (and 10), our only trained agents and upon whom we can therefore well afford to expend our present planning initiative. Basically we would propose preparations for agent operation which could eliminate these now precarious and undesirable steps of having to recover equipment for operations. Instead, we see strong reasons for acquiring an operational property site for the agent (a room or a small apartment in the case of KIBITZ 6) structurally suitable to secreting and wiring of communications equipment behind wall cabinets and floor boards. Most essential would be the immediate availability of a functioning operational receiver upon which KIBITZ 6 could maintain listening watch on a certain prescribed frequency through which we can contact him and give him further instructions with a medium security cipher. These instructions could be for activating his single operations or, if desired, for triggering other agent activities with which we might be caught without communications liaison.

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7. In this thinking we envisage as a foregone conclusion the need for each agent to: (a) to be prepared with an alternate residence in his alter identity to which he could retreat in safety at the first signs of danger; (b) each communication agent shall have to have an operational base and though these sites will have to be changed from time to time when we can offer no assistance, we can have the first base in preparation now so as to be ready with a minimum delay and set-up risk. Knowing this, it is time to pull our heads out of the sand of our past hopes for a lessening of housing restrictions which would allow free and unrestricted housing. The housing authority (Wohnungs Amt) is still not about to assign living space without sufficient proof of justifiable need for such housing, backed up by police clearance of the applicant. As we write this we are mindful of the seemingly plentiful "free" or "unlisted" rooms which offer accommodations to the professional frauleins, but we are finding that these desirable "private entrance rooms" are really allocated to families who cramp themselves a little more in order to take advantage of the highly competitive market in black rooms which are rented on a short term basis of DM 10 per night, or if rented at an equally prohibitive monthly rate, occupancy is maintained only at the temporary whim of the owner.

8. The only alternative we see is to buy into property, either old or new, for operational use, costs in proportion to size and quantity: DM 2000 and up. By buying into property we are referring to the practice of the Baukostenzuschuss, a payment of rent in advance as a loan to the owner/builder to finance construction of a certain number of rooms to which the tenant is then entitled free of housing authority control, and at a rent proportionately reduced until the loan is amortized. This entitlement, as a lease, is resaleable. Which means one can buy into entirely new construction, or existing construction, either part or whole, and resell either part or whole. With such flexibility real estate agents are able to offer accommodations to most any housing needs.

9. If Washington agrees with this feeling of need to prepare operational bases, we will go further in planning for at least one such site in each of the capital city areas of Frankfurt, Karlsruhe, Stuttgart, Augsburg/Ulm, Munich, Nuernberg, and possibly Kassel and Heidelberg. (The latter is of little promise as it is overcrowded with very little construction going on). Thus we would have fair coverage of these zones of responsibility. And while some of these developments can be made with specific agents in mind, others will be blind developments as caches which can be turned over to whichever agent is best suited at the time of need. For example, while any such developments in this area would be made with KIBITZ 6 presently in mind, we might later find that KIBITZ 16, who shows promise of a higher quality of production is ready to activate his show and the facility could instead be turned over to him. In any event, with Washington approval and time permitting, we have our sites on seven or eight strategically dispersed bases prepared as springboards for the stay-behind activity.

10. KIBITZ 10 on the other hand presents a different type of operational potentiality in that, in addition to his biographical qualifications, intelligence, initiative, and idealism, he is characteristically more aggressive and would lend himself to action type planning. In a review of his background, one finds that he has had wartime service of a field soldier in addition to staff intelligence

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work in intercept and intercept evaluations. This orientation then has influenced his thinking toward action group work and though we do not intend to concern ourselves with setting up action groups, we see how KIBITZ 10 could also become the liaison key to action group activities. This concept is supported by his being geographically located in the eastern plains of West Occupied Germany (south and west of Regensburg) and therefore most likely to become the first of our agents to be overrun by any armies advancing from the East. As such he would probably be of most value in a Phase A effort and we therefore will want to provide him with an operational site for immediate transmissions. In discussing the matter with him, we have explored several possibilities and have settled on the following plan. Because of cramped living quarters in his small village of residence, it does not seem likely that he would be able to set up operations from the village. Rather we looked for the possibility of an operational site just outside the village (See attached sketch) and on the basis of his findings recommend the construction of a garden house on a small piece of community-owned property at the outskirts of the village (shown in deep green) which is adjacent to a considerable area of uncultivated marshland which could be used as a drop zone (shaded green area). The garden house then could be prepared as a communications site and also as a drop zone reception center. This particular site has been chosen because of a fortunate circumstance of having previously had a small construction on spot, the basement foundations of approximately 11' x 14' x 5' deep still remain. He has for some time prepared the community, and the Burgomeister particularly, for his plan by inquiring of available ground outside the city for a vegetable garden as most villagers have. He has had such a garden on the property of his teammate, 10-A and upon whose ground he at one time hoped to build his garden house. However, this teammate owns this property with his brother and it was decided that any construction of clandestine adaptation would not be secure from the brother. However, 10-A was able to convince the brother that their family needed all of their gardening space and thus provided a logical reason for KIBITZ 10 to seek a new gardening area. It was then not seemingly unusual when KIBITZ 10 asked the Burgomeister for permission to do a little gardening on community property just south of town at DM 5.00 per year fee which of course includes permission to build a garden house. A word about these garden houses. Staff members who have been in Germany will recall that the construction in most villages is so close together as to preclude the backyard gardening that we know at home. Therefore the villagers do their gardening (and farming) on the land outside of the city where they then construct tool sheds in varying degrees of spaciousness, the most primitive of which often have small porches with furniture so as to make a small retreat where the gardener and his family can rest and enjoy the open air and commune with nature. This idyllic idiosyncrasy affords us an opportunity to prepare an operational site. Namely we suggest financing KIBITZ 10 in constructing such a garden house after which we would secretly develop the basement with false walls behind which sealed operational facilities could be installed. He suggests that the garden house be of an artificial stone structure popular in that area due to the lack of wood and which will then give the structure a permanence against demolition (as in the case of a shortage of firewood) should he lost personal control of the property. His estimate of DM 1000 seems a little optimistic to us and we are more inclined to an estimate of DM 2000 which should then also be sufficient to pay for any construction materials we may need for developing the basement.

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11. In a roundout of this team KIBITZ 10 has 10a as his chosen teammate, plus the subject of MGKA-21834, who can provide safe reception to anyone who comes in 10's name, or can act as contact/cutout to anyone seeking 10. (Details will be covered in our FOLD reports.) We request Washington's views of these developmental plans for implementing agent activities. And though we are in no position to estimate the over-all urgency, we wish to point out that operational developments such as referenced to KIBITZ 6 can require as long as six months of negotiation, construction, and modification, while the KIBITZ 10 development must logically coincide with the spring planting time. Cabled reply is therefore requested for immediate work in 10's project while approval of the #6 type projects will be requested by individual cable as practicable properties are located.

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