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MUK-A- 28274

*file*

Attn: Chief. Foreign Division M  
Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

4 April 1951

*Operational*  
KIBITZ Documentation

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NECESSARY IN CLASS.   
 CONFIDENTIAL  
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DATE OF REVIEW \_\_\_\_\_  
*5/5/81*

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1. Your referenced memo comes just as we are deep in the problem of stay-behind agent documentation, and for which we had hoped to have an answer before this. We might say that in approaching this problem we are looking further than what is ordinarily termed documentation, i.e. providing an agent with a false Kennkarte which he is to use as an identification for incidental or routine highway and railroad station police check points, registering in hotels, etc. This is secure only so long as the agent can request liaison with the CIC in order to have his status cleared and be extricated without too serious consequences.

2. Documentation as we think of it in terms of its application to a stay-behind agent consists of all necessary personal papers to provide the agent with a new identity which (a) he can safely assume in the first stages of hostilities while he securely hides out until he is sure that he has not been denounced and is being sought by the occupying security police or; (b) he might require his pseudo-identity at a later date for escape purposes should he find that other elements of his operational team have been captured, and finally (c) if the documentation is properly constituted, he might even maintain both identities; if after a., he finds his true identity is a safe one he can go back and live that life rather than arouse suspicion by his absence and maintain his alter-identity for use in operational activities. Then should his operational identity be blown, he need not flee but can remain in the security of his true and genuine identity until a new false identity can be fabricated.

3. In order that these identities be as secure as we can create them and as the agent is entitled to expect from us, we hope to avoid working through presently existing police or civilian government channels which might very well at this moment be penetrated by Communist observers. If the KIBITZ stay-behind agents are to be recruited, trained and activated independently of other intelligence projects, it appears that the same security should be borne out in the establishment of their alter or operational identities.

4. The problem as previously mentioned is to find a chink in the police and government controls of the civilian population through which we

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could interject the new identity and continue to foster it to the date of its need. Our own investigation of the matter through conversations with people who should know turned up so many inconsistencies that it was determined advisable to engage KIBITZ 13 to do the research under his cover of a journalist. KIBITZ 13, of course, was told that this project of creating identities was only another phase of what he thinks is his original idea of setting up a stay-behind communications net. Attached (as Attachment A) are copies of his reports, page 2 of which suggests several alternatives, which in essence consist of either (a) a new entry into Germany via the avenue of returned PWs and political refugees or (b) buying or falsifying papers necessary for a new identity to register himself with the police and establish himself in the new community, and (c) intercepting the identity of the newly deceased or emigrants. Of "a", new entries, we feel the process entirely too complicated with theatrics beyond the time and capabilities of most people. Of "b", buying or falsifying records to initiate the identity, with subsequent police registered moves until the identity is in the course of time removed from the possible leak, seems most practicable, whereas "c" would probably be the most secure in that we would not be running the risk of the false identity being coincident to some other equally guilty person. In the case of "b" and "C", the mechanics of documentation are somewhat similar and we are now experimenting with them.

5. And, as stated above, we wish to do this without collusion of the police or any civilian officials. We have some confidence in the reports 13 obtained during his visit with the Munich police, that the police are lax in follow-ups required by the Abmeldung and Anmeldung, and (see attachment B, a translation by KIBITZ 13) which require that a person moving from one city to another bring with him a copy of his release from the police registry at his former address and present it to the police of his new address. The police at his new address advise the police at his old address of this new application and ask the police of the old address for a reply which is to include any derogatory information regarding the person making the move. It is reasonable to assume that this procedure bogs down, especially in moves from one large city to another. However, inquiries brought contradictory replies of "yes, we do" and "no, we don't". So it seemed advisable to make our own test which, if producing favorable results, would open to us the simplest method of establishing identities. *This point, however, is not so much what the German police do, but what the Soviet Security forces will be likely to do if they take over.*

6. For this we brought KIBITZ 13 to Munich for a reorientation of the city in the light of the role he is now to play, procured the necessary forms for registering the Abmeldung (moving away) from Munich. Through the agencies of MOB, a genuine police Abmeldung stamp was procured on this form. KIBITZ 13 filled in the required information in his pseudonym and was moved to Stuttgart where he found a room and registered himself with the police as a journalist newly moved from Munich to Stuttgart. He has now been in his new room since the 12th of February and we can only wait for developments. In the meantime, he has been coached for the eventuality of his being caught, in which case he is to insist upon his innocence and that his shenanigans of the false Abmeldung is only his effort to gain journalistic material. If he is not able to extricate himself, he has been advised to request contact with a member of the local CIC Detachment, who has been alerted and will ask for the man's release to them and,

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they in turn will turn him over to us. As an added precaution, [ ] is in constant touch with 13 inasmuch as 13 is also presently engaged in a translation chore for Commo, all of which work is being done in the presence of [ ] in a room of an American hotel in Stuttgart. As such, they have appointments early every morning as they start working, immediately after lunch and sometimes in the evening. So should anything happen to 13, we will know about it in short enough order to take corrective measures.

7. This attempt at the simplest of possibilities for establishing a new identity is proving itself quite complicated and already we have learned of the insistence of the police in some requirements (not mentioned in any laws) covering movements of people within Germany such as the Spruchkammer Bescheid, i.e. a certificate from the denazification board of the individual's entire innocence or degree of Nazi participation which might govern the type of employment which they are permitted to perform. While we know of such documents, we had expected to have need for them only as further refinements in substantiating the new identity, such as driver's license, tax receipts, employment insurance, etc. As it is, the police have already twice sent word for him to present his Spruchkammer Bescheid and he is trying to stall them off until we can have one produced through TAD.

8. Obviously we will be in a good position to go ahead with further documentation once this test proves applicable and the procedure down pat, so that we can in confidence permit 13 to simultaneously register in several cities as a new resident under several identities, and by spending a few days at each address (the intervening time as though travelling on business) simultaneously work at developing life histories which, though he might think are to be for his own agents, can be passed on to other agents. (13 is marked for evacuation.) Further experience might prove simplifications which would permit certain of our agents to proceed on their own in establishing identities in this manner.

9. This research in the development of new identities is incurring expenses not anticipated in our KIBITZ project requested for the period 1 January - 30 June 1951. We must therefore request additional funds for the work. Our present temporary arrangement, dating from 12 January, was based on what we expected to be only a part time effort for 13 at a retainer of DM 75.00 per week in lieu of salary, plus his expenses while away from home. However, we are finding that the work, including translations for which he is fortunately available, is amounting to full time employment all of which is necessarily away from his family. We therefore request a supplementary appropriation of DM 825 to cover the payments to him through March (@ DM 75.00 per week), plus DM 1,500 for a full salary of DM 500 per month for the remaining three months of this period through 30 June. Operating expenses for the six month period, including rentals on notional domiciles, are expected to average out at DM 500 per month for a total of DM 3,000.

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