

Chief, EE  
Attn:             
Chief of Station, Frankfurt

Security Information 21 Feb 1952  
**SECRET**

OPERATIONAL

Operational Clearances (KIBITZ)

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1. Your memorandum reports of difficulties encountered in obtaining approval for projects involving agents who have not received operational clearance. This is understandable, but it would be most inappropriate if this stringency were applied to KIBITZ which, by definition, is a developmental project for the recruiting and developing of future agents. In essence, the KIBITZ program consists of our penetrating the German society, searching out and evaluating qualified potentials and converting their ideologies and/or abilities to pledges of dangerous clandestine activities for a foreign government. The Field Project then, as submitted for approval, is not for work the KIBITZES (in general) are doing now, but for our own work in finding, developing and getting them cleared to work for us later on. And, in the few cases where we have had to turn to KIBITZES such as 13, 15, 171 to perform for us now as salaried agents, we have conformed with established directives for the employment of such agents. The views apparent in referenced memo, para 3, could have us required to obtain full operational (agent) clearances on all potentials before we would be permitted to find, recruit and try to develop them. We trust that a reconsideration of the KIBITZ project in its basic perspective will gain us approval.

2. In this light then, the other points of your memo regarding operational clearances specifically for KIBITZES 10a, 11a and 12 become another matter of getting operational clearances for all KIBITZES in general. In this you are painfully right as we must appear to be derelict in getting agents under development properly cleared with Washington. However, we must beg for further grace in this delinquency until we are able to solve the administrative binds here in the field. As yet, there just never seems to be enough administrative personnel running around loose to give us an assist in getting our paper work out. And, in the few hours of the week when we can detach ourselves from the clamor of needs in the field, we find administrative urgencies and the fight for logistical survival such that the PRQs seldom find their way to the top of the work basket.

3. We might, however, gain some reprieve if we were allowed to rest on some of the original concepts of Staybehind development techniques.

✓ EE-2  
COS-1  
FOB

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy  
(2)(B) Methods/Sources  
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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From its inception, we never intended to obtain operational clearances for all KIBITZ elements. As inferred in MAV-W-1291 ( [ ] & [ ] ) and threaded through most all our correspondence, we have always been of the belief that full operational clearance would be required of only the radio operator and those few others to whom we will be required to give highly classified training or information. This concept was established on security standards and operational techniques which, due to the variegations of international relations and politics, requires our approach, i.e., sales line, to the agent to be shaded or even slanted to the times. (And too often these variegations are most inopportune for sitting down with an agent to fill out his PRQ.) But basically, one of the security factors which we have always wanted to guard has been any unnecessary disclosures that KIBITZ is a 100% American project. And, operationally, working through the security of cut-outs, we are also spared the many problems of constant demotivation due to bad press and adverse politics. In turn, we must often reconcile ourselves with only name traces plus, and for example, KIBITZ IO's trust that in the event of hostilities, he can call on IOa to do or die. Such trusts have developed through years of close friendship and if an agent is willing to place his life in the other's hands, it somehow means more to me than any assessments I could make in a few risky clandestine meetings.

4. However, we appreciate the desirable precaution of eventually having full clearances on all KIBITZ elements and as time passes we are trying to accumulate curriculum vitae to someday furnish PRQs on all KIBITZ people. In the meantime, we are most impressed and gratified for the number of KIBITZES you have managed to clear for us based on meagre information found in our old memos. It is indeed heartening to find such support from the Home Office.

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