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MEMORANDUM

TO: PLANS/C 1 (1707 L Bldg.)

FROM: RE/SO/C/E 1

SUBJECT: West German Staybehind Review

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1. In line with our conversation of several days ago, I am sending you herewith a brief review of the West German staybehind program. If you desire more details than are presented in this paper, please let me know.

A. KIBITZ Activities:

(1) Recruiting of Agents. The recruitment of agents is in two phases. One phase is under the immediate direction of U. S. case officers; this has resulted in the recruitment of 30 indigenous staybehind agents. Of this number, 2 are fully trained Commo agents, 8 are partially trained in Commo, 11 are non Commo agents or head agents, and 9 are undeveloped. The second phase is under the virtually independent direction of a German agent, KIBITZ 15. His net involves 46 agents in various stages of development, plus 25 to 30 agents who have been spotted for future recruitment. Of the 46 agents, 11 are Commo personnel--1 fully trained, 4 partially, 6 untrained--while the remaining 35 agents represent potential head agents, agents, couriers, etc.

(2) Staybehind Teams. Thus far the total KIBITZ program has resulted in the formation of approximately 15 units consisting of from 2 to 8 members. Three teams are now ready for the assignment of equipment and signal plans.

(3) Burial of Radio Sets and Equipment. Thirteen radio sets, in some cases together with guns, ammunition, etc., have been buried since October, 1948. Four of these sets have been exhumed and found unuseable; hence, it may be presumed that the other 9 are now worthless. Additional burials and caches are contemplated during the spring months of 1952. Case officers also plan to exhume currently buried sets and replace them with useable sets. *Has this been done. Ask field.*

Review (4) Locations of Teams. Virtually all of these units are located in southwest Germany between Munich and Coblenz, with a concentration of personnel around the Karlsruhe-Stuttgart area. Considerable expansion will be needed before all of West Germany may be said to be covered.

B. Berlin Staybehind Activities--PASTIME;

(1) Recruiting of Agents. Berlin case officers have recruited approximately 8 agents as W/T operators. Only 2 of these have been fully trained, and no staybehind teams have been formed as yet.

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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(2) Burials of Equipment and Radio Sets. Fourteen radio sets—some of them together with other equipment—have been either buried or cached by BOB. Of this number 3 of the sets have been scratched for security reasons, 1 set was examined and turned over to Commo for examination, 1 set was turned over to OPC, and the remaining 9 sets are still buried or cached. Some of these sets must be regarded as unusable.

(3) Locations of Radio Sets. Seven sets were originally buried in Berlin and environs, the remaining 7 sets were buried or cached in the East Zone, including one set buried on the island of Ruegen.

C. Conclusions:

(1) Targets. The primary target of the West German staybehind program, in the event of hostilities, is enemy OB information. No effort has been made as yet to recruit staybehind agents who would, for example, be used for penetration purposes. The main reason for this is the headquarters assumption that the West German staybehind program is a short-range one. (The writer of this paper does not agree with this assumption.) *not I (not completely) Rev*

Should be remedied
(2) Priority. The staybehind program has been assigned a very low priority and has consequently been rather slow in developing. It is felt, however, that with the ZIPPER staybehind program the West German program will offer fairly good coverage of both West and East Germany.

(3) Size of Teams. In contrast to ZIPPER, the West German staybehind teams have gone considerably beyond the concept of the two-man team, to the extent that several of the KIBITZ units involve as many as 8 members. An effort will be made to cut down the size of some of the larger units since it is felt that security decreases as the size of the particular team increases. *too large*

(4) Problems. While the KIBITZ portion of staybehind plans has made reasonably good progress, the total staybehind picture in West Germany is not particularly favorable. The chief problems are and have been (a) lack of adequate headquarters support, (b) lack of adequate numbers of case officer personnel in the field, (c) inability of both the field and headquarters to obtain a basic list of targets, and (d) inadequate Commo support.

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