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DATE: 18 March 1952

TO : Chief, EE
ATTN:
FROM : Chief of Station, Frankfurt *1/8/52*

SUBJECT: GENERAL— OPERATIONAL
SPECIFIC— Progress Report - KIBITZ

Ref: MGKW-11841

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REVIEW DATE: _____
5/3/81 REVIEWER:

1. We have long been wondering how to satisfy your referenced memo, not only as it regards Kibitz 15, but as it could apply to all such agents. Though we have always fully felt the responsibility of our assignment to find and exploit the best Germans available for the job, we also appreciate Washington's possible feelings of the inadequacy of not having personal contact with these people. And, unfortunately, the substitute contact by the proxy of the case officer becomes even more vague in this instance where the desk does not know the case officer. So however many additional words the case officer may employ to portray an agent, it still remains in essence the case officer's basic judgment, much as it was in the first place; that he is the best German available for the job to be done. *We agree*

2. However, since KIBITZ 15's ability and effort have earned him such a prominence in our field, we are fortunate in having had a visit from *1*, introduced as a touring Washington dignitary who, if properly sold, could probably put in a good word to the right people back home. KIBITZ 15 thereupon took off on an approximately two hour extemporaneous disortation on his work. This was followed by a questioning by *1* and we have a feeling that the COS went away feeling not dissatisfied with K-15 personally, his motivation, or his modus operendi. *Comment*

3. Based on the areas of interest indicated by *1* in the above visit and further guided by the questions asked of us by *1* during his recent tour, we can probably now present a report more acceptable to Washington.

a) Motivation: There has been no change in our original estimate of motivations; K-15 and all others are of the type who want to do their part for Germany in alliance with the Western Powers in the fight against Communism. We had presented the Kibitz type project as an essential mission and the then most immediate form of activity. However, while motivations have not changed, circumstances have. The formation of Germany's western defense units brings us all the problems of any employer in times of possible mobilization.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EE-2
COS-1
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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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b) Militarization: To say that we are threatened by mass desertion to the military would be wrong, albeit that since we have avoided professional intelligence agent types in our recruiting, a position in a line military unit might appear by many to be a more reputable form of activity. However, we must face the fact that some of our people have, or think they have, special qualifications which would make them subject to re-call. In any event, with the collapse of the Wehrmacht, there was no clear policy regarding the German equivalent of our reserve corps or national guard units, but we can assume that some men fall into a comparable category and might be called up under total mobilization. Certainly those agents who are the equivalent of our military academy men can be expected to be called up. We are thus plagued with uncertainties which were not to be anticipated before very recent times when Germany's military contribution became clearer. Now then, we hasten to assure Washington that our individual teams or the entire effort shows little signs of developing into a core for a future military machine. But just as this agency is at this very moment trying to stabilize its present personnel by tagging all military reservists for re-assignment to the agency for continuation in present duties, we too would like in some manner to stabilize our Kibitz personnel. And to say that we can afford to lose a few isolated individuals would not be in agreement with the circumstances. The isolated few whose qualifications might warrant their recall are as likely of the qualification which has earned them leadership on their team. Rather, we feel it is time we faced the reality and came up with an inactive reserve type of component, probably threaded through NATO cadre (and possibly later convertible to equivalent rank in their own national units, but continuing on detail to us). In this we do not feel we are being too far fetched. It was common practice to grant reserve status to behind the lines agents of the last war and we certainly should be permitted to anticipate history a bit by planning for like procedure in our planning for the next war. We have at hand a study on the matter prepared for transmittal to Washington over J's signature. However, it is awaiting his return for revisions as suggested by COS's comments.

c) Deployment and Targets: We fully agree with your views which reflect Washington thinking that direction of our activities should be determined largely by targets to be attacked; and further that our deployment of agents should be in harmony with whatever priority targets Washington will decide upon. But until such time as these decisions are forthcoming, we can console ourselves for having had these invaluable few years headstart in getting personnel lined up and teams organized. And though we might be found off base on some of the target designations, we have a few particularly selected agents who are free to move and would require only moderate subsidies to get them settled in selected target areas. In the meantime, we can hardly feel justified in expending funds to re-locate agents or staking out staff recruiters on our own estimate of which targets will be decided upon.

d) Personnel: Recurrent comment and criticism regarding the number of people being recruited warrants field comment; however difficult. First and foremost, it must be pointed out that we are dealing in base human nature with its many facets, each subject to influences beyond our control.

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