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SECURITY INFORMATION

MGQW-14547

9 June 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Attn: [] []
Chief, EE

Training of W/T Operators & KIBITZ Progress Report

REF: MGPA-6519

1. Thank you for sending us further information in reference memorandum concerning additional details of your schedule for the training of W/T operators. As evidenced by recent full clearances granted KIBITZes 177, 180 and 182 (see WASH 42007, 43006, and MGQW-14018) it would appear that other clearances should be coming through fairly rapidly within the near future. MGQW-14332 covered the clearance situation in detail in answer to MGPA-6501.

2. We should like to comment at some length on paragraph 5 of reference memorandum even though some of our comments may be repetitions of past exchanges on KIBITZ 15. First, we appreciate your attitude concerning K-15 and your efforts to place him under somewhat better control. As you know, we have long felt the need for such procedure although we have no desire to see K-15 hobbled too much, nor do we want to see him clamped down on to such an extent that he might lose his enthusiasm. There is no reason why he cannot continue to canter along even though the reins may be pulled a bit tighter.

3. In particular your remarks in paragraph 5 are relevant to several discussions we had with the appropriate authorities here when the KIBITZ project came up for renewal. In the last of these discussions it was stated that, since the number of commo links in Germany will be limited because of technical difficulties, an effort should be made (a) to make sure that the agents and teams will be such as to insure future staybehind possibilities in the event of hostilities, and (b) possibly to restrict the KIBITZ program to agents and teams of known reliability.

4. Put concretely, there is some fear here that the K-15 complex might not be devoted to U. S. interests in the event of actual staybehind conditions, and therefore we wonder whether to place the major emphasis on the U. S. case officer side of the KIBITZ show or on the K-15 side. It is felt here that the U. S. side may have come up with the more reliable agents

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and teams; on the other hand it has been the K-15 side which has showed the greater initiative in developing agents and teams. The decision here is thus based on the following considerations: (a) how many teams should be developed as real staybehind units; (b) how many members should each final team have (the opinion here favors two-man teams); and (c) whether to bet on the U. S. or K-15 side of the program for the best future reliability. It would be better to have two reliable staybehind units than twelve whose future reliability is in doubt.

5. No final decisions have been made here concerning the future of the program. We should welcome any thoughts and specific suggestions you may be able to give us, since we will be guided to a great extent by what you think.

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