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UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET <small>(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)</small>			
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY			
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO		INITIALS	DATE
1	EE/SO	BS	JUL 27 1952 8/9
2			
3	EE/SO/G/RW		
4			
5			
FROM		INITIALS	DATE
1	EE/SO/G/RW		29 July
2			
3			

<input type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION	<input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE
<input type="checkbox"/> ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/> COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/> PREPARATION OF REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH
<input type="checkbox"/> CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE

REMARKS:

Believe para 9(c) should
be mentioned on your trip.
Will do. BS rw.

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: EE/SO/G/ECC ^{ECC}

NO.

DATE 11 June 1952

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. EE/SO/G				<i>WTR/ECC</i>	
2.					
3. Deputy EE/SO	<i>2064</i>	<i>JUN 12 1952</i>		<i>BF</i>	
4. <i>PO/WJ</i>	<i>"</i>			<i>wj</i>	<i>3-4: wd. like to read, after you.</i>
5.					
6. <i>EE/SO/G</i>				<i>ECC</i>	<i>4-3: most of this is entirely sound. However, I doubt that Hq is able to do much about it, most if not all of these points have been made to the field. If we had an OPS O in Frankfurt.....</i>
7. <i>HH</i>	<i>Please return.</i>			<i>X</i>	<i>wj</i>
8. <i>ECC</i>				<i>ECC</i>	<i>cc detached.</i>
9. <i>PW</i>	<i>2203 K</i>				<i>3-1: wd. like to discuss this w. you and WJ.</i>
10. <i>EE/G</i>				<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>8-9: This has not been discussed with [] & Jessel as yet.</i>
11.					
12.					
13.					
14.					
15. <i>AI/AR</i>					

SECRET**SECURITY INFORMATION****Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : Deputy, EE/SO

FROM : EE/SO/G

SUBJECT: West German Staybehind Planning

DATE: 11 June 1952

1. The following critique of the West German staybehind program is being written for two main purposes: (a) to outline the present status of this effort, and (b) to request the establishment of a more definitive headquarters policy with respect to the future of the program.

2. The basic premise on which this program was initially established was to have an American-sponsored staybehind program in place in the event of an outbreak of hostilities in Western Europe. It was, and is, the feeling that the U. S. should develop such a program regardless of other staybehind efforts (such as ZIPPER) which might be considered as friendly to our cause in Europe, the principal reasoning having been that we should have in place a staybehind program which could be counted on in case other "friendly" efforts might, for one reason or another, go by the board. Subsequently, while the basic concept has not been altered, it was decided to limit the U. S. staybehind effort to a short-range, low-priority program with the main target being enemy OB.

3. Thus far no definition has been forthcoming on the part of either headquarters or the field as to what constitutes a satisfactory staybehind program for the purposes outlined in paragraph 2. What is short-range? What is the minimal effort we can maintain? How many staybehind units constitute a sufficiently wide-spread network to be of any decisive help in observing enemy actions? These and other questions have never received definitive answers. The result has been that the entire staybehind program (i.e., both BOB and KIBITZ) has "grown like Topsy," has received little or no direction from the top, has been a low-pressure development run largely by one case officer, and has achieved no significant results to the present time.

4. On the headquarters level the same story has been true. The West German staybehind program has been shifted from one case officer to another as a kind of part-time responsibility, a feeling has developed both here and in the field that this program is the step-child of EE/SO, and there has been a decided fluctuation of policy at headquarters. The result has been the development of a feeling on the part of field case officers that there is no use appealing to Washington for support, direction or decisions.

5. This indecision on all sides has therefore resulted in lethargy and discouragement, in varying degrees, on the part of case officers both here and in the field, but particularly in the field. The tangible results of this indecision have been, in part, the following:

a. The development of only two "ready" units; one on the American side of the program, and one on the KIBITZ 15 side. The BOB program (PASTIME) has produced not a single staybehind unit to date.

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b. The staybehind units in West Germany have, furthermore, been established to date completely without reference to one of the primary considerations in any such effort - targets. Due to the lack of any assignment of targets by official and knowledgeable sources, and because of the lack of case officers and recruiters, staybehind agents have been recruited exclusively on the basis of their accessibility to U. S. case officers. The result of this procedure is that these agents, ignoring the Berlin program for the moment, are all concentrated in a small area around Stuttgart and Karlsruhe. Worse than this, the potential units have been located in an area which may or may not have any relation to any enemy line of march.

c. There has been little or no training of any staybehind agents other than that afforded W/T operators. Headquarters manuals on tradecraft have been unsatisfactory for field training purposes, and the field officers have not had the time to develop such manuals or training programs. As a consequence, we have been forced to rely on the ingenuity of KIBITZ 15, who has demonstrated considerable ability in writing tradecraft manuals and directions in the German language. Thus far, however, we have had only the faint stirrings of a headquarters critique of the soundness of KIBITZ 15's methods.

d. Another and potentially disastrous result has been the tacit permission on our part to allow KIBITZ 15, in his capacity as a quasi-case officer, to develop a staybehind program which virtually amounts to a "little ZIPPER" outfit. While he has demonstrated great organizational ability and initiative, the question still remains as to the ultimate future reliability and loyalty of those agents he has recruited. The fact remains, however, that we would have virtually nothing in the way of a staybehind effort without the program built up by KIBITZ 15.

e. Finally, the most harmful result has been the indubitable fact that the U. S. sponsored staybehind program would be worthless in the event of an outbreak of hostilities either now or in the foreseeable future. This statement is borne out by the lack of "ready" units, the lack of targets, the lack of well-placed units, the lack of plans for activation of units, and so on.

6. The same statements as in paragraph 5 could be made, with minor alterations, with respect to the Berlin side of the program. Thus far we have only a scattering of partially and fully-trained W/T operators in the Berlin area, and little else. The reasons for this state of affairs are the same.

7. On the constructive side, it can be said that the case officers (and KIBITZ 15) have done an excellent job pretty much on their own and with meager resources. It is also true that - on the KIBITZ side - enough potential agents

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have been recruited to fill out something in the neighborhood of 12 to 15 staybehind units, given the time for further training and development. Furthermore, some progress has been made in (a) the burial of equipment and supplies, and (b) the training of W/T operators.

8. In view of the uncertainty surrounding the program thus far, the question arises as to the formulation of specific recommendations for future developments. One thing is certain: The future development of the staybehind effort should not be allowed to languish on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Once having determined definite action of some kind, the decision comes down to (a) either determining to give up the program, (b) stabilizing it more or less according to present assets, fitting these assets into "ready" units, etc., or (c) determining the number of units which can reasonably and quickly be developed in the immediate future.

9. Put even more definitely, the field should know (a) what targets are to be covered, (b) how many units are needed, (c) how many case officers can be assigned to the future program, (d) where units are to be recruited and developed in addition to current assets, and (e) the terminal date by which we expect to have "ready" units in place. If we intend to develop only those agents presently on hand, then the field should know this and proceed accordingly, instead of continuing to chase down new agents whose future use is extremely doubtful. Thirty or forty W/T operators laid end to end do not make up a staybehind system.

10. The writer, who has now dealt with the staybehind program long enough to be relatively familiar with the general and specific problems thereof, feels strongly that the questions raised in this paper should be dealt with concretely and as rapidly as possible. If future staybehind units are likely to constitute our main intelligence asset in the event of hostilities, there can be little justification for assigning this type of program both a low priority and a low degree of interest.

[R.C.C.]

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