

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

NRKW-11841

6 December 1951

Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

Attn: []

Chief, PCH

KIRTEL 15

1. This memorandum results from a review of the file on KIRTEL 15 and will gear into the general PASTIME dispatch being sent to KCB by [] insofar as this dispatch deals with K-15.
2. Since []'s dispatch deals with the security aspects of the K-15 network in a general way, and requests your consideration of this matter, we thought it might be worth our while to put some of our specific ideas on paper, primarily as an aid to you. Please take into account the fact that some of these ideas may be obsolete or the difficulties may already be solved.
3. The first thing that strikes us in reading over the entire K-15 file is the question of his motivation toward his staybehind operations. We are, of course, interested mainly in having the best possible staybehind units in Germany in the event of hostilities. We are not interested, except incidentally, in having any of these units develop into a core for a future German military machine. There is some indication that K-15's motivation is strongly divided between his erstwhile (and possibly persisting) Nazi or nationalistic leanings, and his desire to have a part in a nucleus of people who would have a large part in any rebirth of the German army. The question then becomes: Has he become thoroughly convinced of the need, from our point of view, of the separate nature of his staybehind operation and of the unlikelihood that his outfit can ever become a part of a German army?
4. Secondly, there is mention in NRKA-33107, Para. 5, that K-15's tactical deployment of his agents is somewhat out of line with your thinking on staybehind activities. This may not exist at present, but it is worth thinking about, particularly in view of present thinking here in the direction of having staybehind activities determined largely by the targets to be attacked. K-15's use and deployment of agents must therefore be in harmony with whatever priority targets we decide upon, as well as in harmony with other PASTIME units. This is especially true since he is running his own show and could easily get out of bounds.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

CHIEF-KOB
PLEASE REPLY
8 JAN 52
[Signature]

Declassified and Approved for Release
by the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 2005

SECRET

-3-

5. In WKA-21761 K-15 mentioned his knowledge of other spy-related activities. Presumably he had ZIPPER in mind. It is apparent from perusing the dispatches that it is felt that his units do not involve either ZIPPER activities or others of our own. This has been mentioned before, and is mentioned again simply because it is extremely important that the KIBITZ section be completely divorced from any German activities. Human nature being what it is, it is entirely possible that K-15 might have slipped his hand to ZIPPER personnel, or vice versa.

6. As we have said before, K-15 is pretty much on his own, and has been doing a fine job of developing what could be a valuable network. This, however, makes it all the more important that he not be permitted to run a little ZIPPER outfit of his own, without adequate control on our part. You know better than we do how far you can let him go in his organizational ability.

7. We continue to keep reading dispatches which necessitate more paper work on your part, but on the other hand, we assure that more attention here to PROTIME activities will be welcome.

[]

SECRET