

SECRET  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Air

MOON- 13270

26 March 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt  
Attn: FOS [ ] [ ] [ ]  
Chief, EE

KIBITZ 15 Training Materials

REF: MOEA 35595

1. Our delay in replying to reference memorandum has been caused by our desire to have as many case officers as possible read the KIBITZ 15 training manuals. In fact, the person in charge of the staybehind course, which is being planned for early inauguration, has carefully read these materials and has incorporated certain ideas in his course syllabus.

2. It is our feeling that the comments of [ ] and [ ] pretty much cover the reactions of headquarters personnel who have read the K-15 document. These reactions might be summed up more or less as follows:

- a. KIBITZ 15 shows considerable understanding of general stay-behind problems, particularly as regards his questions covering the things which an agent should try to observe and dangers which he should attempt to avoid. Much of the material is, however, directed a bit more toward operational data than is felt consistent with the short-range nature of the staybehind program.
- b. One of the serious gaps in his material would appear to be the lack of suggestions in the area of tradecraft; this lack is, incidentally, felt by headquarters to be rather generally the case in the training of indigenous agents. In other words, it is our feeling -- perhaps through lack of knowledge of what is being done by the field -- that too much in the tradecraft line is being left in the hands of the individual agent. Granted that the agent must exercise considerable ingenuity and adaptability when faced with trade-craft problems, it is nevertheless true that he should be thoroughly briefed on this aspect of his training. He should have some answers, at least, to such questions as the following: How can enemy DFing be inhibited?

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

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Date: 2005

What are the operational conditions likely to be following enemy occupation? What will the arrangements be for contacts with informants; i.e., couriers, letter drops, etc.? You know much more about such tradecraft matters than we do, but we would nevertheless like to call such things to your attention, since it seems to us that one of the primary questions of an agent would be: How can I keep alive for the longest possible period of time?

- c. KIBITZ 15's political and ideological orientation of his agents appears to be a bit on the "purple" side, which of course brings up the entire question of the kind of motivation which appeals to staybehind agents. Since such motivation can hardly be classed as monetary, it must be either oriented toward the U. S. support of Germany or based on the desire of the average German to keep his country from ultimately falling into the hands of the Russians. Perhaps KIBITZ 15's ultra-nationalistic indoctrination is what is needed to turn the trick; we simply raise the question.
- d. He appears to have a good understanding of basic security considerations; i.e., the burning of papers, the necessity of keeping a close mouth, etc. However, as [ ] points out, he nevertheless seems to maintain voluminous files. This causes us to ask what ultimately happens to the K-15 files. Does he turn them over to U. S. case officers for safe-keeping? Does he maintain his own files in a secure place? To what extent does he run around the countryside with a briefcase filled with his materials?

3. There is no need to continue a critique of the K-15 paper, since the other points which were discussed here were also covered by [ ] and [ ]. There are, however, some general questions we have as a result of several recent discussions with the persons preparing the staybehind course:

- a. Have any actual plans been made for the evacuation of KIBITZ 15 and whatever other agents you plan to evacuate, or are these plans still in a rather vague form? We feel that KIBITZ 15 and the other evacuees would feel more secure if they knew that detailed plans have already been made for their evacuation. Also, what plans do you have for evacuating other members of the agents' families?
- b. How do you plan to make crystals and signal plans available to W/T operators? The supposition here is that you plan to give them these materials more or less at the last moment prior to the onset of hostilities. Since there may be no time for this,

have you considered making such things available to some agents as soon as they have completed their training? If they are not secure enough to handle these materials now, then they are not secure enough to have them at any time. Presumably DYCLINCE has some ideas on this matter.

- c. In what detail have arrangements been made for contacts between the agents (informants) and W/P operators during the actual staybehind periods? It seems to us that this can hardly be left to chance, and you have doubtless thought this problem out carefully.
- d. Headquarters personnel are very much impressed by the garden-house arrangement of KIBITZ 10 and suggest similar arrangements for some of the other teams.
- e. There seems to be some disagreement among various staybehind case officers concerning the type of briefing materials needed in the German language. Would you please describe your needs in this respect in terms which we can use?
- f. It is our impression, as we have said before, that DYCLINCE support is one of the main remaining problems to be met before the staybehind effort can move ahead more quickly. We hope that Stockholm will bring back some of the answers to such problems.

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