

KIBITZ-15

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Air

MGQH-177

10 Sept 52

Chief of Station, Frankfurt  
Attn: [ ]  
Chief, EE

Operational/CASE  
General Remarks on KIBITZ

1. May we call your attention to MGQH-14936. We are willing to do whatever we can to get the project reapproved, but we need your evaluation of the KIBITZ effort as a basis from which to work.

2. We are glad to note in MGPA-6663 that you have taken a firm hand with KIBITZ 15. We feel that this thing might as well be thrashed out right now. If there is the slightest chance that No. 15 is going to kick over the traces at our insistence that he is only a passenger, whereas we are doing the driving, it would be better to have this happen now so that we can begin building up some separate and independent networks not based on his personal whims. There is no need to state that such an attitude on his part following the outbreak of hostilities would be quite a blow.

3. In relation to the above paragraph, it is the opinion here that the K-15 network is as large as we can safely tolerate (perhaps already too large). A quick perusal of the files here shows that you have assigned, or tentatively assigned, numbers to 137 sub-agents of K-15. Even assuming that 15 will be loyal to our cause - and this is not too certain - we feel that recruiting should be called to a halt until you have consolidated the present agents into a more coherent and ready-to-operate organization. Of the present personnel of the KIBITZ-15 effort, only one net is actually ready to operate. There are entirely too many loose bodies and unknown quantities in the picture. No more agents should be spotted, recruited, or even considered until the present KIBITZ-15 mob is completely taken care of. The next few months should be spent in completing the training of W/T operators, working out assignments of personnel to individual nets (at least on paper), assignment of nets to specific targets (at least on paper), general briefing of the nets - including the intelligence-collecting members - and a general consolidation and reorganization of the K-15 organization.

4. Once the KIBITZ-15 group has been boiled down into a given number of nets, and these nets have been located vis-a-vis targets, we will be better

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

- (2)(A) Privacy
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able to evaluate the advisability of permitting him to continue to recruit further personnel. It is, however, our opinion at this time that he should not be allowed to expand his effort beyond its present size and scope. Once his present personnel have been consolidated, we should then be content to maintain the status quo, while directing our efforts toward the build-up of other nets of considerably smaller size. It is not a good practice to put all our agents in one net.

5. This matter of having too many loose ends waiting to be buttoned up also applies to the American-recruited side of the KIBITZ picture. More time should be spent getting these nets ready to operate. We would like to see all the present KIBITZs buttoned up before any more are recruited; then we would like to see each future net recruited and buttoned up before moving on to the next.

6. Another problem of the present KIBITZ effort, namely the geographic location of the various nets, will be discussed concurrently in another pouch.

7. We realize that the KIBITZ efforts have been seriously handicapped in the past by lack of personnel (case officer personnel), lack of adequate Headquarters support, and lack of specific directives regarding targets, extent of coverage desired, and assignment of equipment. However, some improvement in the amount and type of support we can give you is expected in the not-too-distant future.

8. To recapitulate: let's get the existing personnel trained, at least tentatively assigned to teams and targets, and briefed; then we can start looking around for more agents.

9. Please let us have your comments on the above, especially paragraphs three and four.

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