

14 November 1952

SUBJECT: Impressions of KIBITZ-15

TO : German Desk

1. I met K-15 with [ ] in Heidelberg about a year ago. I was introduced as a staff officer from Washington, generally interested in the stay-behind problem but not specifically briefed on his operation. He gave me a briefing.

2. "My first concern at that time was the apparent confusion between important and unimportant details in the briefings that K-15 had prepared for his stay-behind sources. You may recall the long lists of questions in these briefings, covering everything from the most insignificant sociological information to broad speculative questions concerning the Soviet capabilities to wage modern or even futuristic war. On this point K-15 rebutted that he had to gauge his questions to the character of the agent and since his arrangements with his agents was based upon their idealistic motivation he could not suggest too bluntly that they were spies primarily engaged in the collection of OB in support of the American Army. Apart from that consideration he seemed to have a very good grasp of the essentials of military intelligence collection.

3. "There can be no doubt but that K-15 is a commanding and persuasive personality. I got the impression that our relationship to him, at that time at least, was one of an alliance between a German military adventurer and a foreign power and that our control over him was weak."

4. In weighing the impressions I received at that time against other evidence, it would appear to me that K-15 is egocentric, ambitious, adventuresome and desirous of power, but that he is not well-connected in the higher strata of the German Army or German society. He would appear to be anti-communist in the sense that being against communism is a natural reaction on his part but more importantly this position provides him with a means of overcoming the restrictions of a narrow middle-class life and realizing some of his more romantic personal ambitions.

5. I feel that a man so motivated can be of limited value to us but we must avoid making an excessive investment in him. Were we to allow him to call the tune, a good part of the time we can devote to stay-behind operations would be consumed by him. There being no guarantee that he will not sometime go sour, change his point of view, blow his net inadvertently or turn himself into the German authorities, we cannot afford to devote too much to his operation.

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They are merely for your  
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*MKE*

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