

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

NOVA

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Chief, SR
Chief, WE

5 March 1952

Chief of Station, Frankfurt

REDSON/Operational

Dispatching of LCHOKELY Operation

Reference: WASH-28570

1. We agree with reference that spring 1953 is the earliest feasible date for the dispatch of the KEMELY operation. As other questions raised in HMMI-711h remain wholly or partially unanswered, we are only able to make conjectures concerning the possible bases of Headquarters' recommendations in reference until further clarification is received. Our conjectures, comments, and recommendations for action based on dispatch in spring 1953 follow.

2. The most important unanswered question remains the earliest date and number of recruits acceptable in the U.S. for training if accompanied by Marie K. Giordano and an experienced American case officer from MAT. In reference, Headquarters recommends the selection of three of the candidates and suggests these candidates be informed they may be called for training in fall of 1952. We would appreciate a clarification of a) the basis of Washington's selection of the three candidates, and b) the basis of Washington's reservation concerning their training.

a. In regard to the selection of the three candidates, we surmise that Headquarters' recommendations may be based on one or more of the following:

- (1) Inability to handle more than three HMMI recruits in training in the U.S. in fall of 1952.
- (2) Belief that [] and [] are not suitable agent candidates.
- (3) Desire to counteract security breaches in Sweden by eliminating two of the candidates.
- (4) Preference for a team of 3 men rather than 5.

b. In regard to Headquarters' reservations concerning the recontact of the recruits in fall for training, we surmise the following possible bases for these reservations:

Distribution:
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 1 WE 1 []
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- (1) Uncertainty as to whether or not training facilities in the U.S. will be available for any HONKLY recruits in time for spring 1953 dispatch.
- (2) Uncertainty as to whether or not the specific HONKLY recruits in question are suitable agent candidates.
- (3) Desire to counteract security breaches in Sweden by informing even the recruits that the operation may never take place.
- (4) Possibility that no penetration operations into Estonia will be authorized or required in the foreseeable future.

3. Our comments on these bases of decision are as follows:

a. In regard to training, we believe that we will be able to provide an experienced staff case officer and a native w/t trainer, in addition to Mario K. Giordano. With the addition of a field assistant and at least a part-time staff course instructor, the personnel complement should be sufficient to handle a 5-man team. Difficulties in language will present some problems, although as Giordano has good knowledge of Russian and English, and some of the recruits have some knowledge of these languages, the situation should be more feasible than the current ARGOB one. We strongly recommend, however, that every effort be made to hire a suitable case officer (or even field assistant) with working knowledge of Estonian before next fall.

b. As to the suitability of the candidates, we have only the assessments of Freal's deputies and of Giordano on which to base selection. We recommend that the candidates be assessed and carried in Germany according to the plan outlined in paragraph 4 below. Concurrently, we recommend that Giordano spot and assess in Germany through his contacts and through ZNELOPK facilities in order to provide us with a wider selection of agent candidates as well as a w/t instructor. On the basis of our present information, we feel that [] and [] should not be dropped if a 5-man team is considered desirable. [] is able and well-motivated, and the only reservations Giordano has as to his use are his eye-sight and his concern over the welfare of his mother if she remains in Sweden. We feel that his emigration to Canada prior to training would solve the latter problem, and suggest a thorough eye examination to determine whether or not he should be discarded on the grounds of poor eye-sight. [] although the weakest of the five, has the peculiar advantage of being able to pose as a half-idiot wounded veteran of World War II. According to Giordano, there are many such persons in Soviet Estonia and their movements are less controlled and less subject to suspicion than those of ordinary citizens. [] might be a very useful addition to a four- or five-man team on whose instructions he could carry out advance patrols and surveys of new areas.

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c. In regard to the security considerations, we feel that the action recommended in paragraph 4 of MUNI-7114 and described in greater detail in the following paragraph, presents a more adequate solution.

d. If Headquarters has reservations about the advisability or feasibility of any penetration operations of Egtonis in the foreseeable future, we would appreciate a detailed discussion of this point. Regarding the desirable size of the team, we request that Giordano's recommendations concerning the dispatch of two and three men respectively be taken into consideration (KPC/MW 1008) (MK/MW 0839).

4. Our recommendations as outlined below are based on 1953 spring dispatch of the team following training in the U.S. In order to prepare the recruits adequately with full w/t instruction, this training should begin no later than September. We recommend that the following steps be taken:

a. Arrange meeting between [] and Freel as requested in MUNI-7114 to impress Freel with the need for security control, to discuss with him the problems of attempted political control and security breaches on the part of his deputies and members of his organization, and to reach an agreement with him on the steps to be taken to counteract and control these breaches. In our opinion these steps should include cutting contact between the recruits and HERMAN. We agree with [] comment [] that Freel would not conspire with us against his deputies. However, if the situation is presented to him as one so compromised that drastic action is necessary in order to salvage the operation, we feel that some mutually satisfying agreement can be reached. We believe this can best be accomplished by a personal meeting between Freel and his original American contact, [] and do not think it should be handled locally or by letter.

b. Instruct [] [] [] to apply for admission to the U.S. Army under the Lodge Bill in approximately May. This application will provide cover for a brief trip to Germany in May (during which time they will be assessed and carried by CSOB) and will provide cover for their return to Germany and dispatch to the U.S. for training three months later. Applicants for the Lodge Bill must apply at a recruiting center in Germany (Munich, Frankfurt or Nuremberg) after having established a German residence address (for which a hotel address will serve). The recruits can submit applications and go through the Army assessment and physical examinations in order to carry out their cover, as ZHELOFF is able to withdraw from the Army any candidates of interest to us. After assessment, the recruits can return to their jobs in Sweden to await a letter of acceptance from the Army (which can actually be sent) and can then return to Germany ostensibly to join a U.S. Army unit. The usual wait between application and call-up is from one to three months, and the units formed in Germany are usually sent to the U.S. within one month after formation. Although [] and [] are one to two years older than the legal limit of 30, ratification of age for Army applications is not unusual and should cause no difficulties. It is suggested that [] pass an eye examination satisfactorily, he should be instructed to visit Germany ostensibly to investigate the possibilities of emigrating to the U.S. If

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accepted after carriage and assessment, he will be instructed to return to Sweden and arrange emigration to Canada with his mother where he can await beginning of training in the U.S. [] could be brought to Germany for assessment under the cover of applying for a Labor Service Company.

c. In the meantime Giordano can assess and spot in Germany for other potential candidates and for a w/t instructor. He will be used as an interpreter and interviewer at the ZERLOPE site as a substitute on the 3rd week of March at which time ZERLOPE is assessing 15 Estonians among whom there appear to be several potential candidates. The site has been described to him as an army employment center, and he has been instructed that the center is not concerned with recruiting for operations, and that any recruiting by him must be done by recontacting the candidates individually at a later date.

d. Approximately three months prior to the beginning of training in the U.S., when we are informed about the physical facilities available to us there, we suggest that Giordano be taken to MAF where he can begin the detailed planning of the lectures and training programs in conjunction with MAF training staff, (preferably including the case officer to be assigned to the HMKHY training group in the U.S.).

5. Aside from the plans concerning the actual operation, we are interested in developing to the greatest possible extent the sources of information on Estonia in both Sweden and Germany prior to the beginning of training. In Sweden we have proposed a revision of Freal's Information Service and the development of contact with CAPA. In Germany we propose establishing Giordano under cover of employment by an American Army unit, which will allow him to recontact the HNC heads and other prominent Estonians in Germany for the purposes of gathering information from German repositories, German PWs never fully exploited for our interests, and Estonian escapees. Through these contacts Giordano can also collect information from the older Estonian emigres in Germany still in contact with relatives in Soviet Estonia, can locate sources of maps and Estonian clothing, etc. Until Giordano has made some initial contacts, it is impossible for us to estimate the amount or value of material he will be able to collect, but we believe that with the cooperation of the Estonian leaders sufficient material will be made available to Giordano to substantially increase the scanty information on Soviet Estonia now available to us for training purposes.

6. Copies of this dispatch have been sent through BYCLIP channels.

Note to WASH: A draft copy of this dispatch was taken to Washington by [] on 29 February 1952.

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