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October 1952

MY VISIT TO SWEDEN IN OCTOBER 1952

Reason: To meet three or four recruits and to invite them to come to Germany for a short visit for tests.

Cover : Visiting my sisters and friends during my leave time.

PREPARATIONS

The application for the Swedish visa was filed on 20 August 1952, with the Swedish Consulate in Frankfurt. Thereby two passports were mentioned: my TTD, issued by the Combined Travel Board of the Allied High Commission for Germany, and my Estonian Temporary Passport, issued by the Estonian Consulate in London. In both documents the German Re-Entry Permit was missing at that time.

I applied for the Re-Entry Permit (to be stamped into my Estonian passport) in the German Polizeipräsidium, in Munich, on 23 August. I was told that the procedure will take some six weeks.

Why a new Re-Entry Permit could not be stamped in my old TTD and why a new TTD was issued, which, alas, could not be used, are known to the Authority better than to me. [A Berlin TTD had to be issued.]

My Estonian passport with the German Re-Entry permit was returned to me on 18 September. Approximately at the same time I received a new TTD, to be used in case that the Estonian one could not be used.

As there was no possibility to go to Sweden by ship, without crossing Denmark, I applied for the Danish Transit Visa, on 18 September, as soon as my passport was in order, and I was asked to send my passport to the Danish Embassy in Bonn.

Having received back my passport (but still without the Danish visa) I applied for Swedish money in equivalent of DM 200.00. On this occasion I was told in the "Landesbank" that I, as a foreigner, have to file an application for "Zuerkennung der Deviseninländereigenschaft", supplying different documents, among them certificates showing:

- 1) by which authority I am employed and how much paid, and
- 2) that I am registered with the "Finazamt" and paying the income or salary tax.

As I was not in possession of these two certificates and they could not be obtained without a longer delay, I had to withdraw my application for Swedish money.

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Thus I started on 28 September without any Swedish or Danish money, prepared to tell the Authorities, if asked, that I shall be the guest of my sisters who will supply me with some money, too. (The necessary money had to be sent for me to the address of one of my sisters in Sweden.)

I received the Swedish visa without any trouble on 29 September. The Danish Embassy in Bonn had not yet received the authority to issue me the visa, but this was received by phone from Copenhagen on the same day, 30 September 1952.

Aware of the urgency of my visit, I did not stop in Hamburg, although this was planned, but, having warned my sister in Stockholm, arrived there on Wednesday, 1 October, in the evening.

IN STOCKHOLM

On proposal of my sister I attended, on 2 October, an Estonian concert. I found no reason to refuse the proposal as I could not tell my sister the real reason of my visit, and I even found it right to show myself openly together with my sister. During the intermission (Mr.) Karl TALPAK approached me and expressed his regret because of the failure of the enterprise into which he had led me (he was the man who contacted me on behalf of Mr. Rei in December, 1950). I comforted him by saying that this does not matter, this was not his fault, and - maybe - this failure is also good for something - the general political situation may not yet be ready for such operations and we would have lost our friends in vain.

(Mr.) A. VANMA, who happened to be on the same ferry with which I came to Malmoe, and Mr. A. REI attended the same concert, but they did not happen to come too close to me, and I think they did not see or recognize me.

FIRST MEETING WITH MR. HEINSOO

I could not reach Mr. HEINSOO on 2 October although I called at his address twice. Having received his telephone number I called his office and we met on 3 October.

Mr. HEINSOO knows my real name, having learned this from an Estonian paper which wrote about my visit to Stockholm in January, 1952. Thereupon I, to win his confidence, identified myself by showing my old Estonian Army Identity Card.

After I had explained the aim of my visit, he said he was still ready to cooperate but he saw much trouble in settling the visit to Germany. He had been on leave already and had only one week of leave in reserve. He had just promised his boss not to take this leave now because there was a shortage of clerks in the firm. But he thought that he could, anyway, get free

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for two weeks, from 25 October up to 9 November. He promised to start the preparations and to tell me the next meeting of the results and of the possible difficulties.

He promised to contact Mr. Palusaar and to ask him, without speaking of my visit, about his intentions in case that his mother cannot be cared for by the Authority I was representing in January.

Asked whether he has seen some other persons whom I met in January in his room, he described Mr. Palk, whose real name he did not know, and told about having seen him sometimes at dances. He asked whether I would contact this man, too, and whether he will have to be taught and to work together with him - he said he did not like this man. I did not deny my intention to contact Mr. Palk; I asked for his reasons of dislike and said that his visit to Germany and later activity could be arranged in a way that he and Mr. Palk will not need to meet or to know of each other, not to speak of working together with a person whom he dislikes. Mr. Heinsoo said that he had the impression that this man is of exalting and not quite stabilized and developed character and that he dislikes also some friends of him. I had every reason to trust Mr. Heinsoo. Having heard from him such a characterization of Mr. Palk, I told him the real name of the man and asked him to get some information about him.

Compared with the impression I had of Mr. Heinsoo during the first meeting in January, he seemed to be a little more nervous and had started smoking, but made still a very good impression.

LOOKING FOR MR. PALK

No Swede whom I met in Gustavsberg, Gamla Kontoret, knew Mr. Palk. The single Estonian who still lived in the Gamla Kontoret (the old office) Mr. Aleksander Mihkels, said he knew Mr. Palk but said that he had left Gustavsberg long ago. As to his information, Mr. Palk was working with the Firm "Atlas Diesel". Mr. Mihkels was very curious about me and so I had to tell my story: I was Mr. Martinson, knowing Mr. Palk from Tallinn. Mr. Mihkels advised me to go to Mr. Pork, a good friend of Palk, who lives in Gustavsberg and surely knows his new address. He proposed to guide me to Mr. Pork, but I refused, pretending to have an appointment in Stockholm and, having lost much time already, being in a hurry. Mr. Palk characterized Mr. Pork in January as an unreliable person, and I was not sure whether Mr. Pork knew me or not; whether he is an ex-Captain Pork of the Estonian Army who knows me.)

My failure to contact Mr. Palk I reported to Munich in a letter. Then I tried to find the new address of Mr. Palk in the address file of the Estonian Committee in Stockholm, where I asked for addresses of some six or more persons, chatting with the clerk so to distract her attention from the

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names I was asking for. Mr. Palk's name was registered but with a quite old address.

Having seen how difficult it was to find the Gamla Kontoret, as I do not speak Swedish and the Swedes did not speak either English or German, I did not dare to go myself to "Atlas Diesel" and therefore I asked my sister to phone the Personnel Section of this firm and ask for Mr. Palk's address. She did so but was told that such a person is unknown there, does not work with Atlas Diesel.

On my request my sister went to the central registry "Kantalsverket" in Stockholm, but there, too, Mr. Palk was not registered. This means that he lives somewhere outside Stockholm, maybe in some of the many suburbs (like Gustavsberg, some 20 km from Stockholm) which do not belong to the town of Stockholm. Not wanting to contact (Mr. Rebane, who probably knows the new address of Mr. Palk. I left the search for him until having received an answer to the letter sent to Munich.

MEETING (MR. RÄTSEP)

The promised money-letter being not received either by my sister in Stockholm or the other sister in Enköping, I asked my sister in Stockholm on 7 October for a new loan and started the trip to Göteborg, to meet Mr. Rätsep. He too had changed his address, but I learned the new one when calling by phone, using the old number. Mr. Rätsep was not in on two evenings and thus I met him on 9 October.

He said it was quite impossible to come to Germany now. He has a good job, he is receiving 1100 Kronor per month, and he cannot leave the work for weeks without losing the job. Besides, he has been on leave in Germany this summer and it would be striking if he should go "on leave" to Germany again now.

Mr. Rätsep spoke also of his nervousness which makes him fear that he is not suitable for such a long-lasting special work. He thinks he is still able for a short commando-job but not for such a long informant's job where nobody knows when it may finish. Also he spoke of the special danger bound with this undertaking, resulting from the fact that too many people seem to know of it, and among them people whom he personally cannot trust. He told me four names of persons whom he cannot trust fully, but who seems to know of the enterprise: Palm, Laaban, Miller and Linnuste. He finds that Mr. Rebane and his lieutenants have worked too imprudently, approaching people whom they did not know well enough, using ordinary post in their corresponding and even sending letters to the wrong persons: he had received a letter addressed to Mr. Riis and probably Mr. Riis received the letter addressed to him. Mr. Rätsep assured me that he would like to cooperate later

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in some commando-operation, but he thinks it impossible to go on with us now. But he wanted to think the matter over once more and asked me to come back for a second talk. I promised to come although it seemed clear to me that we had lost this man, too.

MEETING (COLONEL MAASING)

I visited Colonel Maasing on 13 October. He told me that the secrecy of my mission seems not to be guarded well enough. So Mr. Klesment, Member of the Estonian Panel of "Free Europe", and Mr. Kaiv, Estonian Consul-General in the States, visiting him, have spoken also of me and of my work. This shows that both have been informed by somebody of it. I understood that Mr. Klesment as well as Mr. Kaiv are both interested in intelligence work, too, the former for "Free Europe" and the second for some American Senators. I do not think that the American authorities had informed the above-named Estonian personalities of my modest role in this. Nor could this have been done by Col. Maasing or Col. Saarsen, who do not know much of it and who surely know to keep silence. Thus remains the circle around Mr. Rei, Mr. Rebane and other leading members of the ERN as the possible source of the leak. I can understand that Mr. Rei could trust Mr. Klesment, his deputy in ERN and member of his Government. I learned, too, that Mr. Klesment and Mr. Kaiv are good old school-friends and may thus trust one another. I have also nothing to say against their knowledge of my work and against the fact that they spoke of it to Col. Maasing who is highly estimated and trusted by the majority of the Estonian refugees, but can we be sure that if leakage exists, this is not reaching to other, less reliable persons, too?

As to the difficulty of the situation in Estonia, concerning intelligence work, Col. Maasing thought that there is no alleviation to see, except one: the daily "Rahva Hääli" can now be obtained much easily. Col. Maasing offered me a complete collection of one month's copies. I thanked him but did not take the offered papers, referring to the risk of being searched when passing the many frontiers and such material could bring some inconvenience to one harmless person who has visited his sisters and friends. Besides, I thought in my mind that these papers are not so very seldom in the American hands in Munich, too, as I have seen some copies when visiting the Estonian Section of the Voice of America in Munich.

FINAL MEETING WITH MR. HEINSOO

On 14 October Mr. Heinsoo told me of his suspicions that Mr. Rei knows of this enterprise. He asked me directly whether this is so or not. I had to tell the truth. Thereupon Mr. Heinsoo said that in this case he cannot continue to cooperate with us. He said he had tried to find out, after our first meeting, whether he could go on with this enterprise in case that Mr. Rei knows of it, or not. He said he had found confirmation of his fear that the enterprise is endangered if Mr. Rei, and through him the whole

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ERN, know of it. He has proof that the Swedish authorities know already of the enterprise. He revealed to me that he collaborates with the Swedish counter-espionage and that his Swedish boss has asked him, not too long after my first visit in January, when he will jump into Estonia? This was asked in a joking manner, and he answered the same way that he did not yet know the date. He had reasons to fear that the leakage is coming from the ERN and he is not sure whether this is going only to the honest Swedish authorities, or to the communists, too. He asked whether the American Authorities have received all the six photographs and his original life history written by him in Estonian. For the German translation of the life history, he had to sign a blanco questionnaire before this was filled in. He feels not sure that one copy of his life history has not been given to the communists together with his photograph.

Mr. Heinsoo thinks that if going to Germany he will have to inform his Swedish boss (of counter-espionage) of the real cause of this journey, and this, he understands, would not be in our interests. He even thinks that he will not be given the Swedish Exit- and Re-Entry Permit under these circumstances. Asked whether he would cooperate if he does not need to go to Germany but could use the cover of emigrating to Canada, he answered that on this way, too, he would have some trouble: he has a good girl whom he does not like to give up dishonestly, leaving her behind when "emigrating to a surer country."

He would like to work for his Country together with the American Authorities, and likes also me as an intermediary; he finds nothing to blame us for, as we have worked with due caution, but he can't say the same of the ERN by whose help the contact was reached. He trusted Mr. Rebane because the latter was trusted by his elder brother who served in the Finnish Army together with Mr. Rebane, and because Mr. Rebane participated in helping his brother and other Estonian ex-soldiers to go from Sweden to England, in 1945. But now he can't trust Mr. Rebane any longer, especially because of his too leftist political friends and his close contact with the ERN. He knows of an Estonian organization in Sweden which is led by very sure people, and in whose ranks he, too, has the possibility to work for his homeland when the time will come. This idea seemed to comfort him in his uneasy situation of refusing the cooperation with the Americans in this enterprise.

Asked about Mr. Palusaar's attitude he said that Mr. Palusaar sees no possibility of cooperation if the Organization cannot care for his mother.

Asked about his dislike toward Mr. Palk, Mr. Heinsoo said that he personally would not work together with him because he finds him being at least too imprudent in making friends. Mr. Heinsoo suspects one of Mr. Palk's friends, Mr. E. Tiits, of some clandestine contacts because this man, having been unemployed for two months, had enough money to buy an expensive photo-camera.

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MEETING COLONEL SAARSEN

I visited Colonel Saarsen twice: on 3rd and on 16th October. The first was a plain courtesy visit and we hardly touched the real aim of my trip. He asked me to give him a ring later, as his daughter, too, would like to meet me. I phoned on 15th and we agreed for a meeting on the next day, early in the morning, as he had a day off. This time Col. Saarsen seemed to be a little bothered and warned me to be very cautious in my undertakings and contacts because these have been reported to the Swedish authorities. He said it was luck that my activity was reported to the Swedish military authorities and not to the civilian one, but he was not sure that these will not hear of it soon too, and therefore he personally is prepared that he, too, will be asked about my activity, because he interceded for my visa in January, 1952.

MEETING THE REPRESENTATIVE OF (DYCLAIK) IN STOCKHOLM

A young gentleman brought an envelope with money to my sister in Stockholm on 8th or 9th October. My sister had to sign a receipt over 3100 Swedish Kronor. The bearer said that he would like to meet me after my return to Stockholm and had promised to ring my sister on Tuesday, 14 October. The meeting, then, was fixed for the next day. My sister introduced me to the gentleman and left us alone. I returned 2600 Kronor, which I could not use and gave my receipt for further 500 Kronor, so that the 3100 Kronor, which my sister had received, were balanced. As the visitor could not return the signature of my sister, I asked him to sign a new receipt stating that he has received back the 3100 Kronor handed over to my sister. This signature is with my sister now.

The visitor was prepared to receive from me some voluminous things, but I had nothing to give but the money. He told not knowing anything of my affairs. As I had no answer from Munich concerning Mr. Palk's new address, I asked the visitor to report my worry to his boss, giving only the first name and the first letter of the family name of Mr. Palk which I thought being enough for the visitor's boss to understand whom I sought. I asked the visitor to give a ring to my sister during the next day if there were some new information, mentioning that in the opposite case I shall leave Stockholm on Friday morning, 17 October. No call came.

Thus I saw no possibility of meeting Mr. Palk and left Stockholm for Göteborg, being already one day too late to meet Mr. Rätsep as was agreed upon earlier.

In Göteborg I tried to contact Mr. Rätsep in the factory where he works. Asking by phone for Mr. Rätsep, I was told a long story in Swedish, which I could not understand. I then called at his address and was told by the landlady that Mr. Rätsep was neither in nor in the factory, would not come back that night and probably even not the next one. So I left Göteborg without having met Mr. Rätsep for the second time. I did so because I was

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sure that his refusal was quite firm on the first meeting and he would probably have nothing to add that could have been of special interest to our enterprise.

Not liking to be seen by some Estonians back in Göteborg, I started for Malmö the same afternoon, 17 October, with an occasional rural train. Having spent the night in Ängelholm, I arrived in Hamburg on 19 October in the morning. There I stopped to take out the German money I had sent to my own name "Postlagernd" when starting the journey from Bonn, and arrived in München on 20 October at 1130.

RESUME

Of the five men we had in reserve in Sweden none is left:

1. Heinsoo resigned, finding the enterprise endangered by the participation of the circle of the ERN.
2. Rõtsep resigned, finding: a) himself being unfit for such an enterprise of long duration; b) finding it impossible to come to Germany now, and c) that the enterprise is endangered because too many "politicians" know of it, among them possibly some of two leftist inclination.
3. Palk could not be located and was characterized negatively by Heinsoo, who can be trusted. His consent to participate given in January, was based upon emotional grounds and not on logical reflection.
4. Palusaar resigned because nobody will care for his mother. Also he is handicapped by his nearsightedness.
5. Toomla was disqualified before this visit to Sweden, mainly because of his head wound.

Of the three men whom I tried to contact personally, two had changed addresses, the change being unknown to us. It was good that no letters were sent to these old addresses: these could have fallen into false hands and could have caused much trouble. Thus my journey, although having only negative results as to the continuation of the work, was justified on security grounds.

The enterprise is lost in its first, preparatory period, and is to be given off. The main reason of the failure is the participation of some politicians in it whom the best of the selected aspirants did not trust because of their too leftist political relations and because of the too imprudent way these politicians worked when starting the enterprise.

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It is impossible to start new recruiting in Sweden.

There are only bad prospects of finding suitable recruits among the few and mostly old and sick Estonians who remained in Germany. Besides, recruiting and teaching of such people now in Germany, after the unhappy story with the BDJ, can hardly be recommended. 1

There are still some few thousand Estonians in England. But recruiting among them would probably cause interferences from the British authorities.

It remains to try find recruits among the Estonians in the States, where their selection and tuition would not be bound with such special difficulties as we would meet in Germany, Great Britain or Sweden, caused by the alien nationality of the recruits as well as of the staff workers seen from the sovereign standpoint of the country where this would be done.

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CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN

1. The politicians in general and the exile politicians in particular, must not be mixed into the details of intelligence work which is made by help of the refugees. This work has to be done by thoroughly checked, very reliable specialists who are conscious of the need of full-scale secrecy and conspiracy, and are able to keep to this.
2. Nothing, not even on the very general level which is not bound with details, can be done together with politicians who themselves or whose friends are under some suspicion and whom the active bearer of the work, the agents, do not trust.
3. A person can be contacted with the aim of recruiting him for intelligence work only if the contacting authority is to some reasonably degree sure that the person will be able to do such work and is reliable. This sureness can be obtained only by long systematic observation of the life, contacts and habits of a person.
4. A person who was contacted and gave his consent for cooperation has to be put through all necessary final tests as quickly as possible. Long delays may bring different new factors which may influence the first honest and weighted decision of the aspirant.
5. It is very difficult to take the recruits from one country to another without attracting the attention of the lurking enemy agents and of the authorities of the third countries. Therefore the recruits have to be found in the same country where they will be checked, taught and prepared for the work.
6. It is very difficult to find among the refugees good people who are ready to leave their normal life and jobs which they have obtained by hard work, to be taught and used in intelligence work during this time of political indecision. It is also difficult to take persons out of their daily lives to be taught in special courses for possible future special activity. Could the physically and psychologically checked and selected young refugees not be taught in all the main subjects needed for an agent during their compulsory military service, without speaking to them of going to work as agents and without binding the people by anything in their future decisions? During this special tuition period the teachers will have the possibility to find out which of these people are able and could consent to immediate use as agents in their native country. These people could be contacted in due time by appropriate persons, and if they consent, if necessary, after being released from the military service, they will be ready to start after a short final instruction period.

Such a unit where the refugee-soldiers could be taught does not need to consist of only soldiers of one nationality. There may be many nationalities together; only some subject, like Geography of the corresponding country and subjects bound with different languages, have to be taught separately. Or there could be American soldiers together with refugee-Americans of one other nationality. Such young people, having lived for a longer period in this at-

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mosphere of a family of elite soldiers, and being not bound too closely with everyday life, will surely consent more easily or even ask themselves for the possibility to work as agents in their own country, then anybody out of normal life who, although a good patriot, would find it difficult to throw away his comfortable and safe living conditions for something that is quite unknown and very dangerous.

The main part of such soldiers, who will not be asked to work as agents, and these who will refuse such a proposal, will constitute a good reserve of well-trained people for future commando-operations or for open fighting in the very special circumstances in which the re-liberation of the now communist-occupied countries will sometime have to be done.

7. The part of the intelligence work to be done by the agents is the heaviest and the most dangerous, but not the most efficient one. Much more is obtained by minute study of different written materials like books, magazines and newspapers still obtainable even from Estonia. When because of such study a good picture of the conditions and of the situation in one country is obtained, the agents can be sent out well equipped, well instructed and with precisely fixed missions. Then only they will be able to procure valuable information and reliable answers to the questions put to them for checking and for completion of the already available picture. Then only an agency can answer for the great risk into which it is sending the agent, then only this risk and the possible casualties are justified. There are not too many ways by which these materials are still available from behind the Iron Curtain. We do not know when the communists will close these last ways quite hermetically; this may happen any day. Therefore much stress has to be laid on securing and procuring of great stocks of old materials as well as of the new ones so long as this is still possible, and on minute study of these materials.

8. Overlapping, in principle, is necessary in intelligence work, but it must be systematic and coordinated. If too many independent and competitive bodies are trying to do intelligence or similar clandestine work in one and the same small country (like in the Estonian case the CIA, the Free Europe and different other surely well intended American interests, plus many other groups out of Great Britain, Sweden and who knows from which other countries), then this will bring no good results but can lead to great misunderstandings, if not to great disaster in the target-country where the agents of different organizations will fight or trouble each other. To avoid such a fatal mess, resulting from chaotic work, a coordinator of activities has to be found for every object country. This must be an esteemed and reliable personality of whose anti-communist attitude can be no suspicion, who cannot be accused of other political extremities, and whom the majority of his own national group of refugees could respect as their leading military authority. Such a personality, if silently acknowledged and supported by the U.S., could help a great deal to organize the work on a solid national basis and to avoid misunderstandings between different interests. (Giordano suggests [redacted] as a suitable personality. When [redacted] pointed out the difficulties, especially his resident in Sweden,

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Giordano said that he thought [redacted] would be agreeable to moving to the U.S., since he is planning to send his child to college there. [redacted] said he would pass the suggestion along to Headquarters, but was not hopeful.

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