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18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR/10

SUBJECT : [AESIDECAR/2]

1. Subject who was contacted, assessed and utilized as [a cut-out] to meet and quasi-recruit [] a Soviet athletic coach, at the US-USSR Track Meet held at Stanford University, Palo Alto, California in July 1962 has manifested since then serious doubts in the writer's mind as to his potential usefulness for future [KUBARK] contact operations among Soviet athletes. For reasons set forth below it is strongly suggested that [AESIDECAR/2] be utilized with extreme caution because of his probable compromise to the RIS. out

2. During [AESIDECAR/2]'s assessment in Washington in September 1962 it was brought out that he is an individual who needs recognition and careful guidance. At the time of the visit of the Soviet Basketball Teams to Denver, Colorado, during November 1962 [AESIDECAR/2] was specifically requested by the undersigned to make an assessment of one of the Soviet players with the intent to probe for vulnerabilities perhaps leading toward a recruitment at some future date. [AESIDECAR/2] was not instructed to induce a defection beyond reporting whether it were a possibility. Contrary to the guidance given him in a routine operation directed at a Soviet target [AESIDECAR/2] elected to "shoot from the hip" and try to induce a defection. Although [AESIDECAR/2] later apprised the C/O of a possible defection, subsequent circumstances revealed that he had no firm basis upon which to allege that a defection was at all likely. Moreover, he gave the Soviet target a handwritten note of instructions which ultimately found its way into the hands of the RIS and was a matter of certain derogatory comments in the newspaper, DZIMTENES BALSS, (Voice of the Homeland), a press organ of the Latvian KGB. See [AESIDECAR/2]'s file for details. This inept performance by [AESIDECAR/2] has indeed seriously compromised his usefulness to [KUBARK]. Moreover, his failure to "go slow" and to assess the target properly raises reservations about his prior performance at Stanford where he assessed [] Perhaps he embellishes his reporting. While he wrote considerable about his caper in Denver, there was nothing really concrete in the final analysis to give the C/O a firmer picture of the Soviet target than what was already available before [AESIDECAR/2] was brought into the basketball operation.

3. The undersigned therefor recommends that [AESIDECAR/2] be used with extreme caution in contact operations. As a spotter or source of information on Soviet athletes he can be used successfully. However, he does require careful personal supervision. Under no circumstances should he

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be sent to the Tokyo Olympic games in 1964 to recontact [] without a careful review of his file. Finally, the idea that KUBARK should at some future date sponsor his citizenship in the USA seems no longer worthy of consideration at this time. His overall record of performance for KUBARK does not warrant intervention with INS on behalf of his spotty past, i.e., membership in Latvian Political Police & Gestapo interrogator during WW II. At the time of his entry into the United States he concealed this information. Until such time as the [] operation bears fruit or is terminated [] file should remain restricted with [] file. []

SR/10/Latvia

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