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EVALUATION:
SUBJECT: Soviet Intelligence in the French Zone

1. Since June 1945, the Soviets have managed to spread their official and secret nets throughout the French Zone.
2. Their aims were the following:
 - a. Forced repatriation of all former Soviet citizens, especially those who were irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet Union and could later become their open opponents. This work was assigned to Soviet Repatriation officers and to special mobile teams of NKVD.
 - b. Establishment of a secret espionage net
 - (1) Military - in charge of Razvedupr
 - (2) Political - in charge of UNO/NKVD, KRO/NKVD, and members of the Komintern
 - c. Since August, help to the KPD with propaganda among the German masses.
3. These aims are still being worked for. NKVD officers were able to work without obstacles, sometimes even receiving support from the French authorities, and travel by the NKVD mobile teams was uncontrolled. Freedom of movement is the big contribution of the French to the RIS.
4. These mobile NKVD teams checked, arrested, and interrogated anyone they pleased, including the Germans. They searched private apartments. They set up control points on the streets and demanded identification papers from all pedestrians.
5. In December 1945, there was a regular Soviet terror activity in Wangen, lasting about five weeks. NKVD agents in distinctive leather jackets, with a red star on their caps, searched and plundered apartments and arrested people at will. On 18 December 1945, a mobile team of NKVD agents broke into an UNRRA restaurant and took all the non-perishable supplies and wine and whiskey.

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6. At that time, no control was exercised over Soviet Repatriation activities. Since that time, a change has taken place, for arrests ceased in March 1946, and the number of Soviet officers was limited to seven. French officers began to accompany the Soviet Repatriation representatives, and the French gendarmerie posts had lists of Soviet representatives and were instructed to arrest anyone whose name was not on the list.

7. Thereupon the RIS switched to work among the Germans. Many PWs released by the Soviets returned to their homes in the French Zone with instructions for intelligence work. Their first task was pro-Soviet propaganda: when German rations were cut in the French Zone, comparison was made with the excellent food situation in the Soviet Zone of Germany.

8. The French authorities started to combat these Soviet efforts. Known Soviet agents were not arrested, but a list of them was kept, and a list of German Communists was also compiled. The French IS used former Abwehr personnel for this work.

9. The pro-Soviet, pro-Communist propaganda continued unabated, however. The press was especially noticeable, for even the French army paper, LA PATRIE, which was formerly pro-DE GAULLE, became filled with pro-Soviet propaganda. LA PATRIE has now been replaced by LES NOUVELLES DE FRANCE ET DU MONDE, but the pro-Soviet articles continue to be printed. Evidently the French authorities are helpless in taking any counter measures.

10. NOTES:

a. Communist influence on the French soldiers is very slight, although much propaganda is directed towards them in the press and in motion pictures.

b. The German Communists of the French Zone control the two German papers, the SUEDE-KURRIER and the TUEBINGEN TAGEBLATT.

c. Soviet agents who were former PWs are very active in Reutlingen and Tübingen, where they have a large network. They have organized the Communist cell system and have a good courier service between the various cells.

d. The French police organ SGT and the French Communists have begun propaganda for a pay raise in order to be prepared for strikes to greet the new Socialist French government.

e. The dominant majority of the French Army officers are pro-DE GAULLE and anti-Communist. They openly express their fear that the French Communists will organize a civil war in France.