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T-1 Chief, CDR

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SECRET: Biographic debriefing of Cleveland G. Hahn

1. Upon arrival at CDR the undersigned attempted to gain a definite knowledge of Hahn's activities in the past, particularly those in the post-war period. However during several preliminary talks it was found that Hahn, who incidentally has a very remarkable memory, could enlarge upon his past in such minute detail that it was impossible to follow all names, incidents, and intricate, as well as delicate affairs with any clarity unless they were taken in chronological order and written down as Hahn related them. Furthermore it was also found that his post-war dealings were so intertwined with his activities during the German occupation of his homeland, which were in turn intertwined with his activities during the preceding Russian occupation of his homeland that it was deemed necessary to attempt to debrief Hahn from his early childhood.

2. During this debriefing Hahn showed complete willingness to participate therein, answered numerous questions quite freely, and was extremely cooperative in giving his life story which he had never told to anyone in such detail and so completely prior to this. Because of the complicated nature of this narrative the undersigned finds it necessary to break it down in the following order:

- A. Pre-war life
- B. The First Soviet Occupation of Latvia
- C. The German and Second Russian Occupations of Latvia
- D. Post-war activities in Sweden
- E. Hahn's work with "CYCLAM"

Inasmuch as Hahn mentions a great number of persons in this narrative regarding whom he has some information as to their past activities and present locations, and since this information, if it were to remain within the body of the narrative could cause some confusion in the mind of any reader, it has been decided that an appendix to his narrative containing the aforementioned information and keyed to a chronological numerical system, would not only give this narrative more clarity, but also permit easy recording of all the names known to Hahn which are of secondary importance in his life story.

3. BIOGRAPHY

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A. Pre-war Life

(1) Hahn's father, Antons, was born in Vecpiebalga in 1884, the oldest of three children. While Antons' youngest brother, Janis, performed the managerial household tasks of the parents' farm, Antons' second brother, Julijs, was shot in later life because of some type of revolutionary activity which Hahn's parents seldom talked about, but casually indicated that it was the 1905 revolution when this incident occurred. Antons himself took the commercial course in the Polytechnic Institute of Riga, which he correlated with a master's degree in Economy. While attending the Polytechnic Institute, Hahn's father joined the well-known Latvian students' fraternity, Colonija, and helped pay his way through the institute by working as a tutor during the summer months. This summer activity brought Hahn's father together with Hahn's mother, Olga Elizabeth Mezciere, whose two brothers, Janis [redacted], and Aleksandrs [redacted], he (Antons) tutored. From the beginning of Antons' association with his future wife's family he noted that Olga's father, Javis Mezciere, a merchant in flax seed, was extremely pro-German, such German sympathy being consistent with the pro-German feeling of all merchants in the Baltic States whose heritage stemmed from the pro-German Hansiatic League. Hahn's father, Antons, being however, quite a nationalist, which was the exact opposite of Olga's family's feeling, occasionally found himself in differences with her family, but nevertheless managed to sway Olga's two brothers toward Latvian nationalism to such an extent that in later life they became well-known Latvian patriots who fought against German as well as Russian oppression and subjugation while participating in the Latvian independence battles, 1914 - 1918. During his days as a member of the fraternity Colonija -- which at that time was the only social center for college students -- Hahn's father continually pronounced Latvian nationalism through anti-German sentiments, and also became an excellent fencer. Despite some of the early opposition by Olga's father to a marriage between Olga and Antons, Olga's family finally consented to such a union and Olga became Antons' wife in 1909. Subsequent to the completion of his studies Hahn's father worked as General Secretary in the firm "Konuus" in Riga, which dealt in artificial manure and seeds. When the war broke out in 1914 there appeared to be a migration of Latvians toward Russia, particularly Leningrad, because of an impending German occupation of Latvia. Consequently Hahn's mother and father moved to Leningrad with their children, Margita [redacted], born 1911, and Ingrida [redacted], born in 1913. After the end of World War I in 1918, Antons returned to Latvia and resided on his parents' farm in Vecpiebalga, where Cleveland C. Hahn was born on 7 June, 1919. Shortly after this birth, in the same year, Antons moved his family to Riga where he procured a position with the newly founded Latvian State. Although Hahn

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does not recall all the details of his father's first job with the Latvian State he does remember that Antons had some kind of position in the Latvian Archives. In 1920 Antons worked in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry as the Director of the Commerce Department. During this time Hahn's father gained some fame as the organizer of the first Latvian Commercial Exposition in Riga. In that same year Hahn's father, along with the first Latvian Foreign Minister, Siegfrieds Meierovics, was delegated by the Latvian Government to proceed to Poland where both were to contact Pilsudski, from whom they were to request aid for the clearance of the Latvian Province Letgale of all remnants of the Bolshevick Army. The two delegates were successful in this attempt, which paved the way for successful Polish recognition of the Latvian State and close, as well as friendly relations between Latvia and Poland. (Incidentally, Hahn's father wrote a book about this assignment which was destroyed by the Communists in 1940.) In 1922 Hahn's father participated in the Bulduri Conference, where an unsuccessful attempt was made to unify the three Baltic states, Poland, and Finland. In that same year, 1922, Hahn's father left the aforementioned ministry and became Secretary to the Board of Directors of the Latvian State Bank. This being a somewhat inactive position, Hahn's father was also a Department Chief in this same bank, with which he remained until the Soviet occupation of Latvia in 1940. In the 1920s Hahn's father created the firm "Agronomi", of which he was Executive Director, and which dealt in farm supplies. This firm had connections with Sweden, Denmark, and England. He remained with this firm until 1930, when it appeared that the firm was about to go into bankruptcy, and in order to avert this the firm was consolidated with "Konsums" and emerged as the famous farm supply house "Turība", an Ulanis-supported project.

From 1935 to 1944 Hahn's father also taught Commerce and Economy in the Olav Commercial School in Riga.

Politically Hahn's father was a liberal, which in Latvia meant that he belonged to the so-called "Democratic Center". Shortly before the Ulanis "coup d'etat" in 1934, Blodnieks, who was the last Latvian Prime Minister, and who wanted to change the existing cabinet at that time, informed Hahn's father that he would propose him as Minister of Finance or as Minister of Commerce and Industry. The aforementioned "coup" eliminated this possibility. Because of his basic belief in the principle of free enterprise and government exclusion from business, Hahn's father was always an out-spoken anti-Ulanis individual. Because of an anti-Ulanis speech which Hahn's father made in Vecpiebalga

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during the early Ulmanis days, and which Ulmanis has always held against him, Antons was not given the position in the administration of the city of Riga for which General Balodis, second in command to Ulmanis, promised him. As with most dictators, Ulmanis attempted to instill a liking for his regime in the school children of that day. This affected Hahn and his sisters to such an extent that occasional arguments between Hahn and his father arose in their home. In order to keep peace in the family Hahn's father slowly became reserved in his anti-Ulmanis attitude until he reached a point where his differences with Ulmanis became quite mild and eventually almost disappeared, though he really never changed his basic ideas of free enterprise. From 1935 until 1940 Hahn's father was Chairman of the Latvian Parent Teachers' Association. Through this position he on occasion had the opportunity to talk to Ulmanis in person, as a result of which his anti-Ulmanis attitude was softened to some extent.

To add to his accomplishments in Latvia Hahn's father also assisted in organizing the YMCA, of which he then became an honorary member.

(2) During his early childhood Hahn was a sickly boy and suffered from chronic tonsillitis and some minor heart ailment. Because of this, at the age of five his parents sent him to the Riga seashore (henceforth referred to as Jurmala) where his mother owned a house. Until the age of nine Hahn spent his winters with his governess in Jurmala and resided with his God-father during the summers on his farm in Izukste. In 1927 Hahn entered the Bulduri Grammar School in Jurmala, which he finished in 1933, having been the top student while attending this school. After an aptitude test which indicated his aptitude in the academic fields, Hahn entered the second Riga city high school, which he also completed as the top student. During his high-school days Hahn developed the idea that it was the city life which was so detrimental to his health -- though he well realized that his active and enthusiastic participation in sports was able to some extent the cause for his heart ailment, and therefore the idea began to shape in his mind that he would like to choose his career in the field of agriculture so as to be able to work in the country and "get closer to mother nature". Although his mother and father objected to this Hahn, having passed the Riga University entrance examination as one of the top aspirants, entered this university and began his studies in agriculture in 1938. In 1939 the faculty of the Agriculture School was detached from the University of Riga and transferred to the Jelgava Academy of Agriculture. Studying during the winter, Hahn worked on farms in the vicinity of Jelgava during the summers, not only to gain practical experience, but also to improve his health. In Jelgava Hahn excelled in agriculture theory but -- as a city resident throughout most of his life -- he lacked the practical experience, with the result that his accomplishments at the

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Academy were not quite as good as those of his previous schools. This, to a great extent, made him feel that possibly he had chosen the wrong profession; however he was stubborn enough not to admit this, particularly to his parents. While at this Academy Hahn got acquainted with Juris Bumeisters, son of the famous Latvian socialist. (Later during the first communist occupation Juris Bumeisters helped Hahn a great deal).

B. The First Soviet Occupation of Latvia

(1) On 16 June 1940 the traditional yearly Latvian National Song Festival was held at Jaugavpils, and Hahn attended it. During the celebration the huge throng attending it felt that something was amiss because, although Ilmanis was scheduled to speak in person he did not appear. In place of this personal appearance Ilmanis spoke over the radio, which speech was transmitted through loudspeakers to the throng and in this speech he made his now-famous statement "you must remain in your place as I will remain in mine". This song festival was the last Latvian national affair in free Latvia. Jaugavpils being very close to the Latvian-Russian border, was entered by the Russian forces very shortly after Hahn's train left for Riga. Upon arrival in Riga Hahn was first informed that the Communists had invaded his homeland, and it was then that Hahn realized that the Russian forces practically followed his train. On the 17th of June the Russian forces had entered Riga and pro-communist elements conducted street demonstrations and engaged in battles with the police.

Seeing this Hahn felt as though life had come to an end; he felt he couldn't stand all the political scenes in Riga where all the old ideas of freedom and independence were being destroyed. He consequently proceeded to leave Riga and went to the village of Krimulda in the vicinity of Sigulda, where he stayed with his older sister for two months. It was there that Juris Bumeisters, who was travelling about extolling the communist system and their "excellent plan for Latvia", looked up Hahn and knowing Hahn's patriotism, and considering him a friend, advised him to do nothing rash and to be sure and undertake no activity against the new Latvian State. Hahn states this was a very friendly meeting in which Bumeisters desired to help a friend, at the same time telling this friend that not all will be quite as bad as he thinks. In this conversation Bumeisters further informed Hahn that the socialist organization to which he belonged had been active in the underground-Ulmanis days, and hence was now very powerful. Bumeisters left with the promise that he would help Hahn as soon as Hahn got over his wild and radical, as well as rash, desires to oppose the invaders. In the end of August another student visited Hahn and suggested that Hahn seek employment in the surveying work which was being done in the country in connection with the Communist Land Reform. This, according to

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Mahn's friend, would not only give Mahn the needed practical experience, but would also provide Latvian nationalists a way to aid the oppressed farmers, as well as an opportunity to earn some money. Since Mahn, because of the currency reform in which most all Latvians lost their savings, could not expect his parents to pay for his schooling, he returned to Lige, procured such a surveying position, and was instructed to proceed to Ekeļiene, near Ceļi, where he was to work in a surveying team consisting of four Latvians. Upon arriving Mahn found that he was the last of the four members, the other three having gotten there before him. Feeling that such work would not proceed without complete Communist control, the other three men naturally assumed that Mahn was the Communist supervisor. Mahn, on the other hand, felt that inasmuch as the Communists must certainly give such an important job to at least pro-Communist thinkers, these three surveyors must be very profound Communists. Shortly thereafter they all realized that every one of them was a true Latvian nationalist and found that they were able to aid the farmers so that they did not lose as much land as the Communists had planned. Mahn remained on this job two months, after which time he proceeded to Jelgava in order to continue his studies.

While attending the Academy Mahn resided in the house owned by Mrs. Brunelis, who was Pastor Kulitis's wife's mother.

In the beginning of the semester Mahn was active in the student chorus group and became assistant to the chorus's director - Medins. A celebration heralding the opening of a new school year, as well as one for Latvia, was organized. The principal speaker at this affair was the head of the communist-dominated Latvian Government, Kirchensteins. The student chorus group was scheduled to open the ceremony by singing the International. However when the time arrived it was found that the Director, Medins, was absent. Consequently Medins' son took it upon himself to lead the chorus and when the International was to be sung it was found that only a few voices were heard, one of which was Mahn's. Seeing that the greater majority of the chorus did not sing, these few voices also subsided. The NKV investigated this incident, with no radical results following. Mahn, however, was removed from the position of Administrative Assistant and Medins, who claimed to be ill that day, was interrogated at length and was completely inactive for a short while thereafter.

With the beginning of this school year Mahn began to toy with the idea that some resistance to the present occupying regime should be initiated. Frequent travel from Jelgava to

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his parents in Riga gave Hahn the opportunity to collect a few of his old and trusted friends and form a resistance group whose aim it was to attempt to infiltrate the Communist-controlled government, permitting so as to be able to restrain some of its radical policies. Realizing Hahn this group consisted of Janis Jansons 47, Mattis Brezins 47, and Augusts Busars 47. Shortly after they agreed that they would work together as a clandestine group, these four members decided that Hahn would try to enlist several co-workers in the Jelgava area, while the other three, who were attending the University in Riga, would do the same in this city. With this in mind Hahn turned to Oskars Vitrevics, who was a fellow student in Jelgava studying forestry. Vitrevics was a member of the nationalistic Latvian organization Venags, as well as the student fraternity Colonija. Because of the fact that Hahn's father was also a Colonija member Vitrevics felt that he could have confidence in Hahn and advised Hahn, when the latter asked him if he knew of any underground organization, to turn to Janis Greste 47. Greste accepted Hahn and requested him to organize a net which would distribute the illegal monthly anti-Communist publication "Zinatajs" (Reporter) and at the same time also enlisted Hahn in the sale of small metal Latvian national color emblems. Greste's advice to Hahn was to attempt to climb the Communist ladder in the academic field so as to be of help in the upper brackets of the Communist structure. In order to accomplish this Hahn decided to turn to Buzisters, who, of course, did not realize Hahn's true reasons. Expressing his desire to join the so-called Culture Commission of Jelgava Academy, which ruled all social and cultural functions, Hahn prevailed upon Buzisters to aid him in joining, which Buzisters did. Shortly thereafter Buzisters, who was convinced that Hahn had had a change of heart and was now working for the Communist cause, requested that Hahn become the student reporter for the Communist publication "Jelgavas Komunisti". For the purpose of averting suspicion of his underground activity Hahn also became active in the following fields: He worked his way into the Academy Bulletin, of which he became editor; He became cheer leader of a group which expounded Communist theory during numerous demonstrations; He also was again permitted to become administrative assistant to the chorus director; he became administrative leader of certain sports.

(2) In the early history of Hahn's resistance group he added to the Riga faction of this group an old friend, Valdemars Petersons 47. To his group in Jelgava Hahn added Karlis Ingelis, Pauls Avens, Janis Lencanis, and Ivars Zemitis.

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C. A.

It later appeared that Greste was the propaganda leader in some underground organization which at that time was unknown to Hahn, and that Greste had been using him on a trial basis, which Hahn had apparently passed with success. Owing to the fact that Hahn now occupied a pretty solid position within the overt Communist structure of the Academy, Greste decided to turn him over to it. Kirsis, who it later appeared, was the chief of this organization's Military Intelligence Section. With Kirsis Hahn participated in a theft in Riga of a mimeograph machine so that this underground organization might enhance the printing of the illegal "Dinotajs". Hahn found that prior to this theft all arrangements had been made so that he and Kirsis only had to proceed to the office of some tobacco plant and there steal the mimeograph machine. In his initial work with Kirsis Hahn also participated in thefts of World War I arms and ammunition, which was taken from a museum in Riga; it was Hahn's task to hide these items, which he accomplished by storing them in the apartment of Ivars Zemitis.

In the beginning of 1941 Greste was warned that the NKVI was looking for him, and though he hid for a period of two months he couldn't resist visiting his recent bride in Lielvarde, where he was apprehended. Hahn assumes that Kirsis must have had a very good alibi because even though the NKVI was looking for Greste for two months Kirsis was not arrested and continued to live in the same apartment that he had previously shared with Greste. Hahn's assumption regarding Kirsis' alibi is strengthened in that during the aforementioned two months prior to Greste's arrest the apartment was a trap for anyone attempting to enter it. However later, after Greste was arrested he must have revealed Kirsis' complicity in the affair because shortly thereafter Kirsis too was arrested. Kirsis' mother was also arrested by the NKVI in Jelgava and not being able to stand the torture and finding an opportune moment in the toilet in the Jelgava jail she committed suicide by hanging herself. Neither Greste nor Kirsis have ever been heard of since. One of the aforementioned persons caught in the trap was CATSEFF, who was visiting Greste's father, but did not belong or have any connection with the group or any of its activities. CATSEFF was held for two days, interrogated, and then released.

In the Fall of 1940 Hahn informed his sisters of his underground activities for the purpose of procuring their aid in hiding persons working for the illegal newspaper, to report on local situations, and to aid him with funds. At that time Margita, the older, was a teacher in the French lyceum in Riga, while Ingrida, the younger, was a teacher in the Jaunjelgava's School of Commerce. Even though his sisters were skeptical about the usefulness of Hahn's activities, and even though they showed some hesitancy in approving, they nevertheless gave their wholehearted support to him whenever he requested it.

As far as Hahn could determine there was no definite goal that this underground organization had, nor was he knowledgeable of any contact with any foreign intelligence service. He believes that it was hastily organized by a few students and officers with the intention that when it became a going concern they would then decide as to what to do, being guided by the possibilities and situation at that time.

(3) Hahn's father, who at that time was without a job, and not knowing any of Hahn's true activities, believed that Hahn was really a Communist. This belief was also held by many other friends, acquaintances, and relatives, some of whom still feel today that Hahn was too strongly involved with the Comstar. During a New Year's party, celebrating the arrival of the Year 1941, which was held in the home of Mrs. Janson 107, Hahn's Godmother, and which was attended by the Hahn family, Professor Birkhans 117, Judge Teikmans 127, Iruggist Cerbulis 137, and some others whom Hahn cannot recall now, Hahn's father, who apparently did not want to differ with his son who was so openly a Communist, made the statement that the present regime was really not so bad after all; "a person can work, can live, and can breath". All others present were quite surprised and dejected about this statement because they considered Hahn's father an authority in politics, a staunch supporter of freedom, and a person who had never talked that way before. Hahn, who realized the true reason for his father's utterings, felt it his duty to inform his father about his true activities. The father was somewhat alarmed about Hahn's safety and feared that he would take a bad end. Nevertheless he occasionally aided Hahn in his illegal activities. His father agreed that openly anti-Communistic sympathies should not be shown -- on the contrary one should play along with the Communists while in public, but his father was certain that this double life which his son was leading was a little too much for his frail boy.

(4) In the beginning of 1941 Hahn had a chance to climb even higher in the ranks of Communists at the Academy in Jelgava. This occurred when Komsorg (abbreviation for Academy Communist Young Organizer) Pavils Vipers 147, son of Professor Vipers, found, that because of his work load he could not function in two positions at the same time, i.e., Vipers was not only Komsorg, but was Chairman of the Academy Culture Committee, of which Hahn was a member. Giving Hahn the position of Chairman of the Culture Committee, which Vipers was forced to vacate, the latter told Hahn that that is as high as Hahn would ever be able to go in the Communist ranks because of Hahn's parents previous high social standing (they owned a house, etc.). Hahn's reaction to this at that time was that Vipers hadn't been doing too badly, being the son of a university professor.

(5) Through Hahn's friend Janis Jekabsons ^{AB/}, now in Australia, who lived in the same residence as Vipers, Hahn, who later added Jekabsons to his group, had an opportunity to receive reports of Vipers' statements which the latter often made at home. According to Jekabson, Vipers had often expressed himself, saying that the political activities in the Academy were quite an easy task for him -- all he had to do was pound his fist on the table and even the old underground members from Letgale were scared into inactivity.

(At this point an inconsistency in Hahn's narrative was noted in that he had previously stated that he had been given the position of Chairman of the Culture Committee activities because Vipers was overworked; on the other hand at this point it appears that Vipers really considered his work at the University to be a task he could successfully accomplish with great ease. Hahn could not explain this discrepancy and brushed it aside by saying that possibly it was Vipers' Russian soul and moodiness which caused him to have made two contradictory statements, one directly to Hahn and the other to Jekabsons -- of course not knowing that Jekabson would tell Hahn.)

(6) It should be noted here that Hahn believes Vipers to be a very clever, shrewd, and intelligent person. In part this is evidenced by the fact that prior to 1940 the faculty at the Jelgava Academy had often stated that Vipers was the most intelligent student that they had ever seen. Incidentally, Vipers was always the first student in his class.

In order to camouflage his true aims still further, Hahn organized the Atheist Section at the Jelgava Academy. He undertook this task because such a section -- according to the Communist order -- within a body of higher learning was deemed of primary importance, and because such a section had not been formed until that time Hahn felt that another opportunity had presented itself. Furthermore Hahn felt that one Communist position more or less meant little and that there possibly would be no work attached to this. This assumption was quite correct, Hahn was given this position and did virtually nothing for a long period of time. In order to avert suspicion Hahn wrote one atheist article in "Zemgales Komunisti". This article was read by Pastor Kulitis, who lived in the same apartment building as Hahn, and having read this article told Hahn that such articles should never be written and that the way that Hahn has expressed himself was quite contrary to the truth. This article created a great deal of opposition to Hahn among those who lived in the same apartment house and who knew Hahn. A fellow student who knew the true circumstances regarding Hahn's activities informed the apartment house superintendent of Hahn's true activities; she in turn further informed Kulitis

with the result that the housekeeper and his wife were from then on favorably motivated toward Hahn. After he had served a while as the organizer of the Atheist Section, Hahn was asked why he had accomplished nothing during his term of office. His reply was that he neither had supporters nor was there any interest among the students, which resulted in his being removed from this position.

(7) Since in a routine personnel questionnaire Hahn had declared that his father owned a house at the beach, his scholarship was rescinded, forcing Hahn to work evenings for "Oeklu Iksports" (seed export) as a laborer carrying seed bags.

Twenty to thirty Academy students who had also lost scholarships because of either too high social standing or because their families had been members of Aizsargi, or for other reasons, were also forced to seek this type of spare time employment with the aforementioned company. Toward the end of the school year Hahn's "visible reform" which was evidenced by his excellent performance as Chairman of the Culture Commission, resulted in the procurement of the position as bookkeeper for the University kitchen. This enabled Hahn to disregard his job as physical laborer and to get free meals at the Academy kitchen.

(8) In the end of January 1941 Hahn, as one of eighty students from all over Latvia, went to Sigulda, where a winter rest camp for pro-communist students and college activities was located. The head of this camp, which was located in the Fekstnieku Pils (author's castle) was A. Talcis [17]. According to Hahn there were some cases of students who were permitted to attend this rest camp on scholastic merit, but those were very few and the camp was always considered as a camp for Communist sympathizers. Hahn and his friend, Janis Jakobsons, were permitted to take advantage of a two week rest period in this camp upon the recommendation of Virpers. In this camp Hahn had a chance to acquaint himself with many leading young Communists such as Vera Kacena [18], who was a political organizer at the University of Riga, another organizer being Aldermanis [19] (not present in this camp), Uldis Irgaus [20], FNU Sapiro [21], Ilja Henins [22], Stanislavs Ruls [23], Jakabs Grauzis, Jozeps Lipkis [24], Javils Virpers, A. Kravis [25], Velts Lukins [26] (Virper's mistress), Monita Ieksons [27], and FNU Pauluks [28].

During his stay at this rest camp, Janis Mikelsons [29], chief of all camps and rest areas, arrived at this camp for the purpose of inspecting it.

(9) After his rest at this camp and his subsequent return to Jelgava Hahn had his first contact with the NKVI in February 1941, the circumstances being the following: In the

beginning of February Professor Pauls Galenicks 47, a botany professor at that time, called Hahn to his and informed him that he was to report to the Jelgava City Executive Committee, which was located in the former city hall. In the talk with Professor Galenicks Hahn sensed that the professor felt quite odd in ordering Hahn to report at that time as if an inevitable fate. In answer to Hahn's question as to the reason for this, Galenicks replied that he was not knowledgeable of the reason and that possibly some job or other must be done; nevertheless Hahn did not find out the reason for his impending visit. Although Hahn was not certain of what this visit would bring he took all necessary precautions by informing his co-workers that he must visit the NKVI and that the possibility may exist that they may force him to become an informant. Hahn's friends advised him with some reluctance that if such a job were offered to him that he take it. At home he told Mrs. Bruncol, the apartment house supervisor and owner, that she was to turn all incriminating evidence if he did not return within two hours. He later found that she, fearing the worst, turned everything immediately after he had left. Upon arrival at the city hall Hahn found the Chairman of the Executive Committee awaiting him. After some preliminary questions the Chairman informed Hahn that he had a job for him which would enable him to make some extra money. This job consisted of taking inventory of all textile stores in Jelgava, this being in accordance with the nationalistic program. The interview was curt and brief and ended with the Chairman's instruction that Hahn wait for a while. Hahn was conducted to a room where he waited all alone for a short period of time. Then the room was entered by an individual who Hahn later found was the Chief of the Jelgava NKVI, FNU Melnikova 47; Melnikova sat down in a corner of the room and said nothing for a prolonged period of time, during which Hahn became very uncomfortable. Then slowly Melnikova began his interrogation, which lasted for three hours with the end result that Melnikova did not like two points regarding Hahn. -- (a) Hahn's activities within the Vaspulka (the Latvian 4th Club), and (b) Hahn's connection with the fraternity Colonija. Having committed himself to nothing Melnikova left. Hahn was forced to wait for half an hour and passed this time by attempting to gain some knowledge of his fate through listening to the subdued conversations next door. In this attempt he was not successful. When Melnikova returned he informed Hahn that he could go, to which Hahn replied that he desired to know whether he could have the job. Melnikova answered curtly and in the tone of "go away little boy, you bother me" and said "you will be notified later".

After this episode Hahn felt that he now had to be more careful because he was known to the NKVI. Through

Jakobson Hahn found that Višņeva was knowledgeable of his talk with Kolnikova.

(10) In February 1941, during a yearly University celebration, Hahn met Valdemars, who was at that time serving in the motorcycle unit territorial group (the base for the Russian-controlled Latvian army) and was stationed in Slika. Hahn had known Valdemars as a former student from high school days and hence, feeling secure enough, approached Valdemars with the proposition that he join his underground group. Although Valdemars felt a bit uncertain about joining because of a small unpleasant incident on 18 June (Latvian Independence Day) in Slika, he nevertheless agreed to join and informed Hahn that the unit in which he served was an extremely nationalistically motivated group and would no doubt never fight for the Communists. Since Valdemars frequently travelled to Līga on duty, a way for Hahn to contact Valdemars in Līga through Hahn's friends was arranged. After Valdemars joined the group he was caught #701 for two hours and sent to a corrective camp which was stationed at times on the Latvian side of the Latvian-Russian border and at times on the Russian side, the last location of this unit in 1941 having been in Rēplaka.

(11) In March and April 1941 a large number of persons, including some of Hahn's fellow conspirators, were arrested. Besides Kirāis, Kreslins, and Jansons, also arrested were Edvins Bumanis 42, and Hugo Verģs, 43.

One girl who was knowledgeable of Hahn's participation in the underground was arrested in Līga and was questioned under torture. Later, when released, the girl informed her sister in Jelgava, who was one of Hahn's co-workers, that even though she had revealed nothing about Hahn to the NKVD that his name was known to them and that he best be extremely cautious.

At the same time P.N. Vanaga arrived at the Academy in Jelgava and warned the students there that Hahn was a Communist; he made the same statement regarding Hahn's sister who was at that time attending the French lyceum in Līga. Vanaga cautioned all to be very careful of Hahn, who, having heard from Kreslins that Vanaga was a Communist, began to believe that this was some act of provocation.

(12) Just prior to the end of April 1941, Oscars Vitrevis introduced Hahn to another group so as to be able to utilize Hahn's capabilities more fully, because practically all members of the group Hahn had been working with had been arrested or had been compromised. Vitrevis introduced Hahn to Janis Vanags 44, who requested Hahn to organize support points on

the Latvian-Lithuanian border, which were to be utilized by persons crossing Lithuania on their way from Germany to Latvia and vice versa.

In accordance with Vanags' desire Hahn organized three support points on the Lithuania-Latvian border, in the districts of Ierakone, Lucava, and Kaletu. These support points consisted of farm houses, parades, and lines which would lead a possible infiltrator or exfiltrator to or from Hahn in Jelgava. From there Hahn had arranged lines which would lead to or from Vanags in Riga.

In the end of April 1941 Vanags informed Hahn that some clandestine activity of his group in Riga on the left side of the Lucava, had been discovered, had resulted in a shooting, and that twenty persons from this group were caught. Due to this Vanags advised Hahn to take cover. It was at this time that Hahn found that the leader of this group was Likard, who along with Vanags, had managed to escape during this shooting.

(13) About the same time Hahn's older sister arrived in Jelgava with the advice that Hahn better be careful since the NKVI had come to their apartment and even though they had indicated they were looking for someone else, she was sure that they were using that as an excuse and that they were really attempting to find Hahn.

(14) Because of the previously-described series of alarms, Hahn began to feel very unsafe toward the end of April 1941, and began spending many nights away from home, staying on such occasions with friends. He finally decided to leave the Jelgava Academy.

In the very last days of April 1941 Hahn was approached by a female member of the Academy chorus who Hahn had always thought quite pro-Communist. This girl then quite openly informed Hahn: "Comrade (Hahn) you will be arrested". Hahn, thinking this some sort of provocation, assumed the usual line and with great importance asked this girl whether she realized with whom she was speaking (meaning of course, that he was the Chairman of the Culture Committee, etc.). Nevertheless this girl stated that her boyfriend was in the militia in Jelgava, where he saw a warrant for Hahn's arrest. The reason for this arrest, according to the girl, was the fact that illegal meetings were held and nationalistic songs were sung in Hahn's apartment. Hahn obtained this information in the course of an Academy party, which was the last Academy function that he attended. Not desiring to show any fear or emotion, Hahn stayed until the end of the ball, slept that night with friends, and in the morning checked with the janitor of his apartment building to determine if anyone had come to look for him, and found that such was not the case.

Just one week before the fall -- as Hahn began to feel more and more uncertain because of the aforementioned incidents -- he had asked the chief of the communist-sponsored students' professional organization, A. Jekans ⁴⁵, for a reference about his work in the academy. Hahn sought this reference because he felt he needed a job to fall back upon in case he ever had to abandon his location and seek cover. Hence, having procured this reference, he approached the Agriculture Commissariat, where he contacted the Personnel Chief, PMU Stein ⁴⁶, with the request that he be given a job in his field. In this fashion Hahn procured employment at the Soil and Vegetation Research and Experimental Station in Jeternieki, 12 kilometers northeast of Jelgava.

On the morning after the fall -- having found that he was not being looked for -- Hahn went to the Voyerkonat where he registered that he was leaving Jelgava and proceeding to his place of employment in Jeternieki.

(15) The chief of this experimental station, Professor PMU Konrad, as well as most other employees, believed Hahn to be a Communist observer because Stein had sent with Hahn an order to the professor that Hahn is to be employed by the station. Despite the fact that everyone at the station disliked him, Hahn found that his position was very good in that he could not only continue his clandestine activities, but also had the opportunity to do a great deal of travelling, which his job at the station called for. Several times after he returned from some business trip or other -- having on the side also accomplished some of his underground work -- he was informed by Professor Konrad ⁴⁷ that some NKVI people had been looking for him. Such visits strengthened the suspicion of Konrad and his staff since they believed that the persons who had come to visit Hahn were his buddies from the NKVI.

In the beginning of May 1941 Stirevics introduced Hahn to a new underground organization whose leader was Indulis Grosskopfs ⁴⁸, who it later developed, had connections with Kirsis' group which consisted of members of the Riga University Riding Club. The assignment that Grosskopfs gave to Hahn consisted of spreading written instructions to Latvian farmers, as well as other rural inhabitants so that they would know how to protect themselves from thefts, and other acts of violence in time of war. Even though this is an act of self-preservation which would come naturally, it was felt that these instructions were needed because of the possibility that war may spread panic and no one would really know what to do. At that very time Grosskopfs was awaiting the second part of these instructions, i.e. instructions pertaining to sabotage and armed resistance, which he was expecting daily to arrive from Germany. On a pre-arranged

date Hahn had all his correspondence ready to spread these instructions, which however did not arrive from Germany, and therefore this project had to be abandoned because Hahn considered it impossible to get all his assistants together again. During the last Hahn-Grosskopf meeting in the middle of May 1941 the latter expressed fear that the NKVD was to arrest him, that he could not fulfill his influential position. Grosskopf did not appear at their next scheduled meeting and when Hahn called his residence -- using the alias Jakabs Gangis -- Grosskopf's sister informed Hahn in a sobbing voice, that her brother was not home. Hahn gathered from these words as well as from her tone of voice, that Grosskopf had been arrested, and therefore, worried about the written instructions which he was to distribute, he asked Grosskopf's sister if he could come and see her. Receiving an affirmative answer Hahn proceeded to Grosskopf's residence in great hopes that he could salvage all the material that had been so difficult to prepare (particularly difficult was procurement of paper in Latvia at that time), and for which many people were waiting; he felt that if he could not get all or a part of this material he could at least clarify the circumstances surrounding Grosskopf's apprehension.

Hahn claims that though he realized the risk of going to a residence which could easily turn out to be a trap was very great, he was young, enthusiastic, and somewhat foolhardy and proceeded anyway despite all the possible consequences. Arriving at the residence Hahn was informed by Grosskopf's sister that the latter had been arrested somewhere on the outside. Nowhere in the residence could Hahn find the aforementioned first half of the instructions, though he did find all the paper upon which they were to be printed, and taking this paper Hahn left the apartment house. On the way downstairs he noticed two men who seemed to be observing him and feared that he had fallen into a trap. However he passed these men on the stairs and left the building without incident.

(16) In the end of May 1941 Vanags introduced Hahn to some unidentified man who Hahn later learned was a member of Fikards' organization. This man informed Hahn that through him he could get pistols which Hahn was to distribute to his Jelgava Academy underground, as well as his Liga group. Another assignment was then given to Hahn which consisted in organizing an information center in Liga to which information regarding Russian troop movements in the provinces and Liga would flow, such information being gathered by Hahn's organization and/or any recruits they cared to enlist in this work. The unidentified individual was to become the recipient of all this information. For this purpose Hahn set up a safe house address on Kr. Barons Street in Liga. The house-owner's son, Voldevars Librechts ⁴⁹⁷, was also recruited for this assignment. In the collection of

such information the following persons were active in the Liga area: Ilvare Klivics 47, Bruno Lette 47, and Iomans Sternbergs 42 (and some others whom Hahn cannot recall).

(17) Through several Academy students in Jelgava Hahn got to know another underground group which, however, was only a local group. Hahn soon learned that this group was getting arms from somewhere and was distributing them in the Latvian province jungle. One lot of such weapons, Hahn was told, was buried in Landemals, near Jelgava. One of the leading personalities in this group was PK Lossbergs. Through Klivics, a messenger for this group, (for the Liga area) Hahn was put in contact with Tirumnieks, a member of Lossbergs' group. Tirumnieks gave Hahn a safehouse address with an accompanying parole to which Hahn was to proceed in case of war so as to receive arms. This address was six kilometers from Jeternieki in the direction of Liga. It was to the vicinity of this safehouse that the Germans were to send paratroopers as soon as war broke out.

The night of 13-14 June 1941 disrupted all activities in Liga because of the extensive raids, searches, and deportations. Hahn looked up Klivics who advised him to sit tight and wait until all quieted down. During this night Hahn was in Liepaja, having just come from one of the safehouses on the Lithuanian-Latvian border. The corner of this house was also deported during this night, after Hahn left. Hahn stayed with his Godfather in Liepaja during this night and though they arrested a next-door family, neither Hahn nor his Godfather, the famous Latvian patriot, Janis Mazciens, were disturbed. The following morning Hahn returned to Liga where he checked to see whether his parents were deported and found them alive and well. After that he returned to his experimental station and remained there without contacting anyone until the breaking out of hostilities between Russia and Germany.

On the following day the Germans began to beat Russian units on the Liga-Jelgava road. Having the first indication that war had begun Hahn proceeded to the aforementioned safehouse with Janis Leja, whom he recruited as an aid and who had been working at the same experimental station. At the house Hahn and Leja found that the inhabitants were not knowledgeable of the parole and therefore Hahn and Leja left. They asked some passer-by who the new occupants might be and were told that the old inhabitants had been arrested and that inside were Communists. (Later after the Germans had chased the Communists out of Latvia Hahn learned through Tirumnieks that the Communists inhabiting the house had followed Hahn and Leja, but since they had gone through the woods they were unable to catch them. Tirumnieks further told Hahn later that the Lossbergs group had been completely disrupted by the deportations, Lossbergs himself having also been deported.)

Finding no contacts at the residence both Hahn and Leja returned to their jobs at the experimental station. On 25 June Hahn left the station and proceeded to Lige in order to clarify the present situation and to attempt to locate a no contact or other which could then give him an idea as to further action. While in Lige he accidentally met Sternberg, who asked Hahn to come to Lielupe, where Sternberg was in charge of a "Pioneer" (Communist Youth) group of summer camps. Sternberg told Hahn that he was hiding several persons at this camp, one of whom was Marija Jusova 43.

At this camp Hahn also found in hiding NKVD Maria 44. In the next few days several more underground workers arrived, their identities being the following: Janis Jekabsons, Janis Cembars 45, Viivaldis Inelitis 46, George Jannsons 47, Marijs Krievins 48, and Algerts Ozols. Not knowing what to do and having no arms these men stayed in this "Pioneer" camp where they had sufficient food and shelter. On the 27th of June German forces had entered Lielaja and on the 29th were approaching Sloka. In view of the impending German occupation of Juruala (where this "Pioneer" camp was located), the Militia that was stationed there, retreated toward Lige on the 27th of June. On that same day Hahn and his friends found that the Russians had blown the railroad bridge across the river Lielupe prematurely and were unable to move one armed train and one weapons and supply train. No other Russian forces being in the vicinity the Militia, just prior to leaving, ordered the Baldurs volunteer fire department to guard these trains. The members of this volunteer fire department found a stock of liquor on the supply train and proceeded to get inebriated, which enabled Hahn and his friends to take command of the train under the leadership of a local inhabitant Teodors Lebins 49, whom they chose as their leader because they felt they had no one experienced or old enough to assume this position. During the day from dusk to dark this group guarded the trains and moved arms and ammunition to the camp; at night the train was left unguarded, since they feared that in the dark a superior armed force might come upon them. On 29 June the members of the volunteer fire department advised the group to abandon the train lest they run into difficulties with the retreating Russian army which was about to arrive. Nevertheless on 29 June they returned to the trains and found that an NKVD detail had just arrived and was preparing to blow up the pontoon bridge leading across the river Lielupe. Hahn and friends disrupted the efforts of this NKVD detail which hastily departed after Hahn and his friends opened fire on them. On 30 June Hahn and friends watched the Russian army retreat across the river toward Lige and on 1 July 1941 saw the advance elements of the German army pass through their area.

C. The German Occupation of Latvia

(1) Hahn and Filenda arranged with the arriving German forces that the former would patrol the Jurmala area and seek out remaining Communists for which purpose they were permitted to retain their arms. Their offer to go along with the German forces and fight the Communists, however, was refused. The first few days of the German occupation brought Hahn and his friends news that the two foremost Latvian Communists, Augusts Kirchensteins and Vilis Laciis were hiding in the Jurmala area. All efforts were made to find these two individuals, however, these efforts were not successful and it later developed that one could judge with reasonable certainty that the news that they were in this area was erroneous.

On 4 July 1941 Hahn proceeded to Līga with Boris where both of them contacted the Latvian Col. Weiss, who was organizing the so-called Latvian Internal Protective Forces (Selbstschutz). Hahn and Boris reported the Jurmala situation to Col. Weiss and volunteered to aid the Colonel in any way possible. After a few days' wait Hahn was ordered to proceed to Jägona where he was to assist in clearing the area of any remnants of the Communist forces; this clearance was under the command of the Latvian Capt. Bucenieks. When Hahn returned to Līga he requested that his friend, who had remained at the former "Pioneer" camp, return to Līga because the Latvian Internal Security Force was being formed. When they returned to Līga some of his friends returned to their families, however eight members of the Jurmala group, including Hahn joined this security force, were assigned to a bicycle squad, whose leader was Karlis Lamberts, were armed, issued the pre-war Latvian army uniforms, and, as a part of the 40 men group, under the command of Latvian Lt. Col. Berge and Latvian First Lt. FNU Armentins, proceeded to clear the woods along the left side of the river Jaugava of remaining Communists. This group also aided the local population in setting up security forces, as the group itself was too small to cover a large area, and since remnants of the Communist army which had turned into gangs of robbers and cutthroats were terrifying the countryside. When this 40-man group arrived at their final destination in Bauska the recently appointed local German army commander, a major, called this group "Latvian bandits", disarmed them, arrested them, and held them for further investigation. After the local German commander had received confirmation from headquarters in Līga about their status they were released and ordered to return to Līga unarmed. In Līga the group found the Germans had outlawed the Latvian Internal Security Force, causing Hahn's group to disband. Hahn and Lamberts ⁵¹ decided to proceed to the headquarters of the Perkonskrusts ⁵² because they heard rumors that Gustavs Celmins, the chief of this organization, was at that time in Berlin awaiting permission to form a national Latvian army, which he hoped to get in the very near future. In the headquarters of

the Perkonkruste Hahn met Litvics, who informed him that all the underground work that Hahn had performed during the Communist occupation -- with a few exceptions -- was an either direct or indirect effort from Feliks Likards' group. Hahn was requested to write a report outlining all his activities in Jelgava and Luga; this report was then given to Likards' assistant, Aleksandrs Mitenbergs AM.

(2) The Perkonkruste, which during the very early days of the German occupation, was the leading indigenous element in Latvia, made the following request of the population:

That persons register in the following categories --

Category A - Those persons who had been members of the Perkonkruste prior to 1940.

Category B - Those persons (who wished to register) who had worked in the anti-communist underground during 1940-41 under the leadership and guidance of the Perkonkruste or its members, yet who had never been members of the Perkonkruste.

Category C - Those persons who wished to join this organization but who had never been members nor who had never participated in underground activities sponsored or led by the Perkonkruste organization.

All of this registering was obviously voluntary and was carried out with the intention that having been the pro-German faction prior to 1940 the Perkonkruste would now become the Latvian puppet government under the leadership of Golbins, yet under the complete direction of the German occupying authorities. Hahn, as a well-qualified person, joined the aforementioned category B, not because of political concurrence, but rather because he believed that well-qualified men with good intentions belonged to it.

(3) The registration, as outlined above, having been completed in the very early days of the German occupation, two very definite groups appeared to take shape within the Perkonkruste: (A) Sondergruppe B (Likard) -- the assignment of this group was to investigate all Communists' affairs, locate remaining Communists, and press prosecution. This group could be considered a type of internal political security police. The results of the investigations conducted by this group were turned over to the German authorities, who prosecuted political offenders. It later developed -- and Hahn thought this odd -- that in addition to investigating Communists and persons suspected

of Communist sympathies, the R group also investigated former, as well as present political enemies of which the former probably were members of the Latvian Savieniba (farmers' Union), and the latter was the newly emerging Valstsmaiba faction which began to compete with the latter for the role of indigenous peasant government. For example, the group investigated such persons as Julius Kriva 54, Arturs Protors 55 and Latvian Captain T. Steinsbergs 56.

It should be mentioned here that the Mikard group was divided into the following sections: Section A - External Section, with the assignment of counter-intelligence activities, particularly the uncovering of existing and/or remaining Communist underground forces and activities. Section O - the Operations Section, with the assignment of gathering of intelligence, coordination and consolidation of information and reports, and of investigating former Russian collaborators; keeping of complete operational records and files of all persons and activities which the above-mentioned A section either investigated or performed. Section K - Personnel section of Perkonkrusts members only. Administrative section - which performed all normal administrative functions. (d, Sondergruppe A (Arajs) 57 assignment - execution of Jews and Communists. Shortly after the R and T groups emerged entities the A group completely left the Perkonkrusts and came under the direct command of the SD in Latvia.

(4) Hahn tired of waiting for the formation of a Latvian National Army and organizing a small five-man group, consisting of former fellow students, and proceeded to the country where this group reaped the harvest of abandoned farms, the owners of which had in most cases been deported. Besides Hahn this group consisted of: Sternbergs, Jakobsens, Roberts Krastins, and Aleksandra Vilsons 58.

This little group worked in the country of their own volition for two months and during this time managed to reap the harvest on four farms in the vicinity of Tukums. In the end of September they received news that the Perkonkrusts was accepting applicants for the Latvian National Army. With all haste they returned to Riga and registered for this army, and found after a few weeks that the German authorities had changed their minds and did not allow the formation of a Latvian National Army.

With the aid of Mitrevics Hahn joined Sondergruppe R and was assigned to Section O. This section was further divided into two subsections, (a) the investigation subsection, and (b) the operational files subsection. Hahn was assigned to subsection (a), his duties consisting of filling in personal data on various cards which were then filed.

Fearing that too many persons, particularly university students believed that Hahn was an out and out communist Hahn decided against continuing his college education; furthermore Hahn also wanted to continue fighting Communist activity and not be bound by such a rigid cover as attending a university would constitute.

(5) Because the Mikard group is today commonly referred to as the Latvian cardfile group (Kartoteka, it is worthwhile to note that this name for the Sondergruppe R was originally created in the end of 1941 or the beginning of 1942. When this change in name only occurred the activities of the group did not change. The reason for the change although not known, is assumed to be the fact, that, to the Latvians working for this group the term "Sondergruppe" sounded too German.

(6) Attached below is the organizational chart of Wenderson Co.

The only individual mentioned in the narrative in the name of Latvian section, with no other name mentioned in the narrative, is approximately the German language of Latvia, and in Munich, since because the name was used, it was not possible to identify the individual, only one name was mentioned in the narrative, the name of the German language, and the name of the cases, which were referred to Latvian.

Subsequent to the war of 1945, Gerine remained in Latvia where he was believed to be the publisher and editor of illegal underground paper "Little Latvia" (Little Latvian).

The reason that M. believes that Gerine is the publisher of this paper is the fact that Gerine had been active in the newspaper field during his entire adult life; furthermore in the fall of 1945 when M. was hiding in the Latvian woods, and when this paper was already being published, M. heard that Gerine would like to meet him so that they could coordinate the efforts of the underground in Riga. Unfortunately M. was not able to meet Gerine at that time. While in Sweden in 1947 M. heard that one of the Dietrichs former co-workers in the Berkestrasse was in Germany. They began to correspond and M. found that Dietrichs also believed that Gerine was the editor of the aforementioned underground paper. A further indication that this belief has some basis of truth was the fact that when Valdman came to Sweden from Latvia in 1947 he expressed the opinion that he too was quite certain that it was Gerine who was at that time still publishing the paper. There is no subsequent substantiation that the paper is being published at the present time and/or that Gerine is the editor.

(8) The headquarters of the Rikard group was located in Riga in the T. D. bldg. which also housed another group which was divorced from the activities of the Rikard group though not from its control. This group consisted of former Latvian officers who overtly — as far as the Germans were concerned — were working for Rikard, but covertly, as far as M. knows, were performing the task of building a clean nucleus for a Latvian army which would be activated at the proper moment. The chief of this unit was Captain Rudolf Veldmanis (55), Veldmanis had three assistants: 1st Lt. Arvils (secretary) (60), 1st Lt. Friedrichs Lucis (61), and 1st Lt. Arvids Indulis (62).

(9) The INCA building further housed another group which was, however, completely divorced from the R. group and had no connection with it whatsoever. This group was known as the "Anti-Semitic Institute". The only three workers of this institute that M. can recall are Harijs, Maldonis (63), Mintauts PAKIS (64), and Peteris Martinsone.

In the summer of 1943, while M. was in jail at Riga, the letter told M. that Peteris Martinsone had been a J. agent and disappeared from Latvia in 1941. In the beginning of 1944 the British requested from M. in writing, if M. and/or anyone in his group had any information regarding Peteris Martinsone. This request came from Lt. Krauja. This name (Krauja), M. believes, is a cover name for either the former Latvian Air Force Lt. Colonel Janis Bucalis, or former Latvian Lt. Colonel Adolfs Lucis. M. believes that it is more probable that it is Bucalis than Lucis because, in his initial letter to M., Krauja mentioned a substantial amount of historic information regarding himself as a Latvian nationalist who fought side by side with all Latvian nationalists during the German

occupation on land as well as in the air; another indication which points to Rudelis is the fact that he mentioned that he attended the Riga University which Bulle did not attend. Another indication pointing to Rudelis is the fact that in his original letter to Mahn he stated that in his (Rudelis) health he is unable to enter into these affairs. This statement coincides with the truth for never has Mahn recalled any correspondence of Rudelis while Bulle has occasionally received such possibilities.

The above mentioned British request for information about Martinsons stated that Martinsons had studied law in Riga, came from Sweden, from whence he moved to Germany, after the war, and had worked for the YMCA. Mahn believes that Martinsons' name was purposely camouflaged by including another name in the request; the other name, which cannot be recalled, was that of a 60-year old farmer. The letter further bore the following request, that the letter itself be immediately destroyed subsequent to memorizing the names requested.

Since Mahn truly could not recall either one of the names and since he could not connect the Peteris Martinsons who worked for the Anti-Semitic Institute with the Robertis Martinsons regarding whom the British were requesting information, Mahn's reply was that he had no information regarding either individual. It was not until much later, when this letter again recurred to Mahn, that the similarity in names as well as incidents regarding Martinsons occurred to him.

(10) Gustavs Galvins, who was the chief of the Perkonkruste was also considered Eikard's chief though he rarely if ever interfered with Eikard's activity except in that he was the overall and general policy planner and executor shuttling between German directives on one hand and his own Perkonkruste interest on the other. This continued until December 1941, at which time the German army forbade the Perkonkruste to function as an organization. Oddly enough this pre-war fanatically pro Fascist organization was the first organization to be outlawed

by the German authorities. This act eliminated the necessity for a chief of the Perkonists and therefore caused Celmins to leave the position as chief of the entire complex. Shortly thereafter Celmins and his secretary, Feliks Rivins, served on the staff of General Ozeras Dabkars, (64/), indigenous chief of a Latvian quisling government (General Direktor des Landes).

Despite the fact that the Perkonists was nonexistent, and hence Celmins was not the leader, he still had an indirect contact as well as some limited jurisdiction over the B group because the Perkonists continued to exist illegally supported by its former members, most of whom worked for Rikards. Consequently Celmins was very knowledgeable of most all of the activities of Rikard's group.

(11) One month after M began to work in the (a) subsection of the O Section of Rikard's group he was transferred to the more active subsection, the (b) subsection of the O section. In this subsection M had to interrogate witnesses who had information regarding pro-Communists who were either in Latvia at that time, or had fled Latvia when the Russian forces retreated. As most outstanding M remembers the case of the former Latvian Supreme Court Justice Janis Ankravs/66/ who had been forced by the NKVD to become an informant. The reason that this case is so outstanding in M's memory is the fact that M knew ANKRAYS family personally, because Ankravs was such a highly placed person in the pre-war Latvian judicial system because Ankravs himself freely admitted cooperation with the NKVD, and because Ankravs wrote a long, detailed narrative regarding his NKVD recruitment, meeting, and activities.

(12) In the very end of 1941 Rikards received a lot of complaints, particularly from the Jelgava area, regarding M's pro-Communist activities during the previous Russian occupation; these complaints were not primarily based on personal prejudices but rather expressed the fear that M may have infiltrated the Rikard group as a true Communist. In a meeting with Rikard M found that Rikard was quite knowledgeable of M's true purpose and activities and advised M that it

was not necessary for the latter to prove in writing or by documentary evidence any of his former activities. At that same time his former Academy friends informed him that in their investigation of former staff persons in Jelgava they had discovered a document which indicated that H, along with Karlis Janulis and M. Seldris, were slated for arrest by the KVD because of illegal anti-communist activities in the Jelgava Academy. (It was Seldris who actually uncovered this information in the end of 1941.)

When Nahn was in Jelgava shortly after the above-mentioned incident, H took the opportunity to visit the office of the Latvian Political Police Chief, MRU Metra /67/. There H talked to one of Metra's assistants Peters Cinals to whom H expressed willingness to write a complete report outlining not only his activities at the Academy during the Communist occupation, but also the activities, names, and other data about other Communists known to him. Cinals expressed regret that H did not do this in the very first few days after the Russian retreat and stated that at this time the entire matter was self-evident to the political authorities and there was no need for H to write such a report.

Metra, incidentally, was a secret informant for Kikard.

(12) After working about a month in the investigations sub-section, H began to feel that his work had little if any importance and would not lead him to his ultimate goal, the active fight with Communism. This feeling developed when he realized that all the persons he was interrogating were or had been small fry in the Communist machine; He also felt that his lack of experience in interrogations was the cause of his personal apprehension, and that this lack of experience also caused him to believe most all of the information elicited during such interrogations, which

them made him feel too sympathetic toward the person he was interrogating. All in all it could be said that N was dissatisfied with himself inasmuch as he was of the firm conviction that such petty acts, were not leading him to his ultimate goal, the destruction of Communism.

As the German occupation of his country progressed toward the German announced goal, the occupying authorities began to engage in various anti-Latvian activities, making N realize that this is not a case of friendly cooperation to achieve the destruction of Communism, but rather that a new enemy has arrived intent on destroying Latvian nationalism. Despite realizing that it is no doubt this monstrous German force alone which could destroy N's arch enemy, nevertheless N and several other nationalistically inclined friends began to think that they were duty bound to insure the re-creation of the Latvia state if and when Communism were destroyed. Momentarily that entailed preservation of nationalism and nationalistic institutions which the Germans with all haste were in the process of destroying. So that such anti-Latvian acts be recorded N and Nitrevis began to write down and collect all such acts including changes in street names, high taxes, German privileges, particularly those concerning food, etc.

Since N had numerous friends, particularly in Jelgava the collection of such German activities was not difficult and resulted in a steady flow of such reports.

An excellent opportunity to enhance this activity of N's presented itself when Rikard personally talked with N and requested that he accept an assignment to work for the SD. Rikard explained to N that in this position N would have to check various applications of Latvians applying for positions with the German occupying authorities, for telephones, etc.

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Rikard further explained the N's time was to observe the inner workings of the SD as well as its plans and intentions in Latvia. It was then that N was informed that Martina Balodis was already assigned to the SD and working in the same event as well as a covert operation; N with his excellent German language qualifications was to replace Balodis, who could not handle this language. Balodis was therefore recalled to his original assignment in Rikard's group. N accepted and was assigned to SD, Abteilung III, and worked in its card file section. The chief of Abteilung III was Captain Liehrman; N's immediate supervisor, the chief of the card file section, was Sgt. Fritz Grimm of Westphalia, whose assistant was Sgt. Goltz of Bavaria. (It was Goltz who later arrested N.)

The following persons (Latvians) also were in the service of the SD, but not with the covert assignment that N had: Mrs. Alpe/69/, Mrs. Vidins /70/, FNU Mazpirciniks/72/, Vilis Bens /72/, FNU Rodums /73/, Oļberts Dreimanis /74/, L. Purmalis /75/, FNU Briedis /76/, FNU Zarins /77/, Bruno Beks /78/, Janis Bankavs /79/, FNU Petersons /80/, FNU Didrichsons /81/, FNU Goids /82/, FNU Porovs/83/, FNU Lukins /84/.

Working in this capacity N had the opportunity — being very cautious— occasionally to glance at the records of more or less famous and outstanding Latvians, known organizations, and situation reports. Occasionally N had the opportunity to get a glimpse of some important documents, which were known in the Latvian circles as "books". One such, and possibly the most important document which Nahn saw was Himmler's and Hodem's /85/ disputes and proposals regarding future plans for German colonization of Latvia. /86/. N also had the opportunity to see and later report to the individuals concerned, information pertaining to high individuals' anti-

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German sympathies as was known to the SO. All that H observed was recorded from memory and transmitted to Rikard who, Hahn feels, passed this information on, though he doesn't know a copy of this material was also given to Colinas. At one time H seriously considered making photographic copies of all information he saw, but thought the risk too great and therefore abandoned this idea.

In the beginning of March 1942 — because of the extensiveness of the information at the disposal of Hahn, he began to record this information (typewritten) in a bi-weekly summary being assisted in this job at that time by Romane Sternberg.

(13) As this information that Hahn was receiving assumed very voluminous proportions, enabling him to write extremely lengthy bi-weekly reports, Mitrovice thought it a good idea to excerpt such covert information from these reports that would be of interest to the German authorities and supply them with a similar bi-weekly report. Behind all this was Mitrovice's idea that if sufficient interest in such a product were aroused in the German authorities it could give Mitrovice the opportunity to form an information section attached to Rikard's group. The covert purpose for such an information section being a nationalistically-motivated anti-German espionage center.

(14) As the gathering of such information progressed successfully, further compilations were made of such items as foreign broadcasts, particularly those of the BBC and some American broadcasts, current and anti-German jokes and puns, and rumors.

The BBC monitoring was performed by H and Ferner Blumensau and several others whom Hahn organized into a little group so that all could be observed.

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After approximately three months' activity and assignment in the SD, Mahn began to feel pressure and asked Captain Lieber for a release, basing his request on the fact that Mahn did not feel comfortable among all the Germans who worked in the organization. Being a very understanding and particularly to Mahn, sympathetic individual, Lieber granted this request. It should be noted that M felt pressure because on several occasions when he was reviewing through various files he was observed in this activity by Sgt. Golts, in whose mind M had aroused some suspicion — although at the time Mahn could satisfactorily explain away his curiosity in files with which he was not concerned.

(19) Returning to his original organization from the SD, Mahn was assigned to the job of block leader in addition to his other normal duties. (A block leader, and in this case particularly Mahn, was a person who had under his jurisdiction between 30 to 40 persons who were members of the Perkonkrusts and whom he had to visit once a month, collect dues, report changes in policies, and directives, and other incidental organizational news, and whose suggestions and views he was obliged to report back.)

Apparently Mahn satisfactorily completed and performed all his assignments and therefore he was informed by the chief of the cardfile subsection that he had been accepted by the Perkonkrusts as one of "the old fighters" (alter Kämpfer).

In the summer of 1942 Mahn received an order from Colins, through Richards that he was to proceed to the rural sections of Latvia to determine the general mood and thinking of the population and to contact all the covert members who were reportable to the headquarters through the open mails. On this trip Mahn was accompanied by Roman Sternberg. ^{on} Travelling about they arrived at the conclusion that because of the political lines which the Perkonkrusts has taken during the initial phase of the German occupation,

most rural inhabitants were not favorably inclined toward the BERKONKRUSTI. Consequently any new informants which Hahn and Sternberg recruited were purposely non-Berkonkruste members, and consisted mainly of young teachers with whom Sternberg, a teacher himself, was personally acquainted.

Returning to Riga H found that the now famous break between Celmins and Rikards had occurred. The reason for this break was that Rikards, Adolfs Schilde, Evalds Andersons, and Edmunds Nikols disagreed with the extremely pro-German line Celmins was taking. This break, which occurred on the initiative of the above mentioned person created no changes within the structure of Rikard's group or any of its workings; the only effect it had was that those persons siding with Rikard's views could really not be considered any more as members of the Berkonkruste, but rather as plain employees in the Rikard's group, and Rikard's personal supporters.

In the fall of 1942 H got acquainted with a Latvian religious sect (Dievturi) which propounded a rationalistic Latvian religion based upon the ancient Latvian Gods. The leader of this sect was Ernests Brastins/R7/. Hahn was put in contact with this sect by Martins Balodis and Jakabs Sildegn (both members of Rikard's organization). Hahn slowly got to know several of the adherents to this religion and was eventually informed that within this religious sect there existed an underground organization, to which many former Latvian army officers belonged, who were serving at the time in the police force in Riga, (It should be noted that not all of these persons belonging to the underground organization were necessarily followers of this religious movement.) One of the leaders of this underground group was a member of the Riga criminal police, Ims Metzargi. Hahn was informed that this underground was quite interested in procuring his as well as Mitrevics' services; however, talking it over with Mitrevics, he and Hahn decided not to join because they could not determine the entire structure of the organization, or any of its aims. In the end of 1942 the German authorities discovered this activity and arrested a large number of policemen, thereby disrupting

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this underground movement.

Also in the end of 1942 ~~the~~ it could clearly be seen that the German authorities opposed and were striving to destroy all Latvian nationalistic and any of its organizations and supporters by at first beginning to arrest some members of Rikards group as well as the nationalist organization Tautas Balss (Voice of the People), whose chief was fru Caupals, (of this organization the Germans arrested its leader and some 200 members).

Shortly thereafter they also arrested 1st Lt. Parups and Arturs Neputis, who were both accused of spying for the British.

(16) In the very end of 1942 an article appeared in Hahn's covert bi-weekly summary describing Celmins' activities in Berlin prior to the outbreak of the war. Celmins, who was very perturbed about this article since it described him as having had a good time and led a soft life rather than concern himself with pressing national problems, requested that Mitrevics reveal the source thereof. Mitrevics refused to reveal such information because it had been clearly understood before, that the work of the Rikard group, and the organization Perkonkrusts were two separate, divorced matters, whereupon Mitrevics was expelled from the organization by Celmins. This act caused Hahn, Teodors Jansons, and Dzems Raudzins to hand in their resignations from the Perkonkrusts, which were however, not accepted by Celmins.

At this same time a disagreement arose between Rikards and Greble, the reason for it being that the German authorities had requested that approximately 20 members of the Rikard group be assigned to anti-Communist activities in Russia. Greble opposed this idea because he felt that no Latvian should leave homeland, and therefore he, and approximately ten of his friends and supporters, quit the organization. With Greble's departure and with the rift between Rikard and Celmins, Mitrevics became one of the leading personalities in the organization and was able to influence Rikards to the extent that Rikards began to realize the need for a new ^{Security} nationalistic basis to his work and consented to create the aforementioned information center which later coordinated the activities of all covert informers whose reports, up to that time had been utilized in

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removal of a hedge hedge feeling. The chief of the information section therefore became Mitrevics, whose assistant was Teodor Jankovs. Under Mitrevics's jurisdiction and direction came Auzane Sternbergs, Mahn, and later Roberts Krastins.

(17) With the replacement of Liebiak by Schaeffinger, who became chief of Abteilung III of the SD in the beginning of 1944, the relationship between the SD and Rikards group became strained. Shortly after his arrival, Schaeffinger personally visited the headquarters of Rikard's group (which incidentally was the first time that any German official had made an inspection of this headquarters) ostensibly for the purpose of acquainting himself with the workings of the organization. However it was soon found that he paid very particular attention to the information section and requested Mitrevics to furnish him the names of all sources of information, which Mitrevics refused to do. Mitrevics based this refusal upon the fact that when recruited the sources were promised anonymity. Immediately after this visit preparations were made to notify all sources to discontinue their reporting, in case any repercussions from the German side were to appear; preparations were also made to hide all existing covers records if such need arose. It must be noted that a certain feeling of expectancy existed. Mahn and Sternbergs then prepared a lengthy essay entitled "German Latvian Relations" which depicts numerous anti-Latvian acts by the Germans and which contained a warning that if such conditions were to continue, an open and possibly armed conflict between the German occupying authorities and the Latvian population may occur. Though this was far from being a diplomatically worded document, Mahn feels that it was the best that he has ever written because it showed the conditions as they truly were. This document was given to Rikard who—circumventing his next step in the chain of command, —in the SD—transmitted it directly to some highly placed persons in Berlin. The result was that no doubt the local SD was reprimanded and prepared to take corrective steps.

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This document was also shown to Prof. Svabe, famed historian and known anti-German, so that his reaction may be observed. Svabe considered the document well written but doubted whether it would have any effect; his opinion was that such a compilation of facts should either be sent to the Western newspapers or be kept in Latvia until such material could be used as proof of German attempts to subjugate Latvia. Taking this opportunity M also informed Svabe as to the extent of information that the SD possessed about him.

(17) In the beginning of 1943 M also held two speeches arranged covertly and attended by a select group of friends and coworkers in which he described the German colonization plans and their "Ubermensch" (Superman) theory and policy and its effects on his homeland and its population. The first such speech was held in Riga in Valdemars residence and was attended by his university classmates as well as by the dean of the Riga university, Ernests Nagobads /NS/, who warned against taking drastic measures. The second speech was held in the Academy in JELGAVA where he spoke to former (Russian occupation) underground members. This speech basically was of the same nature as the first, however in it Mahn stressed the necessity for resisting the German ideas of colonization and subjugation. His intention with this group was to draw it closer to himself and Nitras so as to reactivate the former, extensive underground.

The only non-underground member who attended M's second lecture was farm machinery lecturer, Janis Abolins, who was asked by M's friends to attend because they considered him as the most promising young Latvian Lecturer. It was ABOLINS who later told M that all that the latter had said in his speech was correct, however that serious thought should be given to recruiting some suitable instructed in sabotage so that resistance may be offered to what in his opinion would be a lengthy Russian occupation following on the heels of the current German one. Mahn admits that he was quite surprised about this view and took no action, though the idea had left a definite impression on him.

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(18) At this same time, it was noted that the German occupying authorities sensed that the population began to resist them though mostly in passive rather than active ways. To rid themselves of such internal, indigenous dislike and opposition, the Germans embarked on a vigorous propaganda campaign to "enlighten" the population. For this purpose they assigned German civilians employed by the Civil Administration to tour Latvia and speak to the inhabitants. To aid these speakers with the language, Rikards group was requested to assign an interpreter to each speaker. H was assigned to this task and standing alongside of the speaker, interpreted his speech as he saw fit. On one occasion the speaker scheduled to speak before a typical farm group, requested Hahn to suggest a good Latvian song which could be sung at the conclusion of his speech. H suggested "God Bless Latvia" (DIEVS GENTI LATVIJA), the former Latvian national anthem which was forbidden by the German authorities. After the lecturer had departed he expressed his appreciation to H for having suggested a song which was sung with such obvious enthusiasm. To his query as to the origin and type of song, H replied that it is an old, patriotic song. In general the speaker was so impressed with H's ability as an interpreter that he told H that after the war the two of them can travel through Russia on a similar assignment.

Later, however, upon returning to Riga, H's real intentions were apparently deduced by the Civil Administration. He was therefore informed by a friend who worked in the political section of the Civil Administration that appropriate, derogatory remarks regarding his conduct were entered in his file. Hahn feels that this episode, though not of itself, was at least ~~also~~ another contributory reason for his subsequent incarceration.

(19) By this time Alfreds VALIMANIS had surpassed his competitor Gustavs Celmins and emerged as the indigenous Latvian leader who, though sponsored and supported by the Germans, did occasionally, quite openly, oppose them; such opposition however, was tolerated by the occupiers because of this there now seems to be a divided opinion among influential and prominent Latvians regarding VALIMANIS; some

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claim that his opposition was genuine and he was not removed because the Germans feared repercussions from the population who in general favored VALDMANIS; others maintain that this opposition was instigated by the Germans themselves who desired that the population rally around a Latvian leader whom they could control because of his pro-German sentiments.

Since, at that time, Valdmanis represented the most acceptable political line, Mitrevics, with Rikards consent, contacted him so as to rid the Rikards group of the undesirable PEREKONKURST domination and to gain a new, nationalistic basis for further activities. This contact resulted in an agreement that Rikards group would exchange all its information - including covert items - while Valdmanis would furnish all latest decisions and transcripts from all meetings of the interdenous governing body. From this meeting Mitrevics retains the impression that Valdmanis was an unusually able individual who excelled in politics and was undoubtedly a thorough nationalist.

It is noteworthy to add that after the war, when Hahn was contacted by British Int. service representative George Kilgour, Hahn was informed that in the latter part of the war British Intelligence representatives in Germany were in contact with Valdmanis.

In order that a Latvian political center be created, Mitrevics, felt that it was necessary to contact Bruno Kalnins/89/ who was an important leader of the social democrats. The initial contact was assigned to Hahn who contemplated undertaking it through Juris Sumisters. This meeting which actually never occurred, had already been arranged, the purpose behind it being to determine if Kalnins wished to participate in such a unification.

(20) In Feb 1943 the aforementioned officers union (national army core) informed the Rikards group that the Latvian Legion was being formed and that these efforts to form such a military body must be disrupted and opposed until the Germans consent to the Latvian sovereignty requests. Security
in contact with such opposition was

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undertaken by a feeling to the nationalistic feeling of those Latvians which were the first to be ordered to report for military service and which were via handbills instructed to disregard such orders. Hahn's assignment was to procure the names of all those persons originally scheduled for military service. He planned to procure these names through the aid of Bruno Suits who was employed in the Department of Labor as the secretary to the chief of this Department P. Reinhardt.

Since Suits claimed he had access to this list, Hahn arranged with Bruno Ruzens /90/, a member of Rikards group (section I (eye), for the receipt of this list, as Ruzens had organized the distribution of the aforementioned handbills. At the arranged time Suits telephoned Hahn and informed him that he (Suits) is unable to produce the rosters since they have been removed. So that the distribution arrangements may be cancelled Hahn telephoned Ruzens and, in the belief that he was talking to the latter, stated his (Hahn's) name when asked to identify himself. Later Hahn found that it was the SD Informant ~~1111/1111/1~~ Popova to whom he had revealed his name. Popova was at that time using Ruzens as an unwitting informant. Incidentally, Hahn was never able to participate in the distribution of the handbills and was not knowledgeable of the success or failure of this undertaking. However, later when incarcerated, he was informed by Serins, who unknown to Hahn also participated in this affair, that the rosters had been obtained and the handbills successfully distributed, though the entire undertaking did in no way deter the formation of the Latvian Legion.

(21) Pertaining to Hahn's personal life, it should be noted that at this particular time on 28 Feb. 43) he asked Tamara Dancs for her hand and, having received a favorable reply, planned in accordance with existing customs to procure her parents blessing on 6 March 1943 on day he intended to become officially engaged. These personal as well as his other plans were interrupted in the early morning hours of 6 March when Hahn was arrested by SD Sgt. COLTZ, his former immediate supervisor.

(22) When arrested Hahn was requested to surrender any weapons. He complied with this request surrendering only his legally authorized service pistol. However, Colt

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and two assistants found a hidden Russian semi-automatic rifle. This deception resulted in a search of Hahn's room where they found another pistol, numerous Russian hand grenades and ammunition for the semi-automatic rifle. All this as well as all correspondence which mainly consisted of anonymous letters between Hahn and his wife - was confiscated. On his way out, Hahn was able to whisper to his father that he immediately inform Rikards and Mitrevics. Later, however, Hahn found that Rikards had already been arrested whereas Hahn's father's warning had saved Mitrevics from being arrested. After two weeks in hiding Mitrevics voluntarily surrendered to the Germans because in principle they had arrested his wife. Mitrevics' surrender then eased Hahn's treatment because the Germans were quite annoyed about Mitrevics' escape.

On this same evening (6 March) approximately 40 members of Rikards' group were arrested, the group headquarters closed, the organization discontinued, and the HQ building (the DNCA) was henceforth occupied by the SD which used it as a pleasure club.

Hahn was interrogated by German SD members, the entire questioning lasting approx 2 months. The questioning itself was conducted by the chief of Section V of the SD, an Austrian Lt. from STEDRY (ethnic) Germans (Volksdeutsch), from LUKIN, and from GRABF; also participating was an Austrian Sgt. SUTTER. Under some-though by no means excessive - duress, Hahn was accused of the following:

- a. Illegal possession of firearms which was taken as an indication of armed revolt.
- b. Attempted interference with military conscription.
- c. Clandestine collection of subversive material.
- d. Possible cooperation with the British.

To all these charges Hahn claimed he was innocent and consequently he was then questioned on the following points:

- a. Listening to foreign broadcasts and the written recording of such information.

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- b. Illegal, anti-German activities while a member of the

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Regarding (a) Mahn freely admitted this monitoring activity while regarding (1) he revealed only what he had previously known was at the disposal of the Germans.

All in all, H states that he revealed a comparatively minute amount of his as well as his friends true activities, aims, and motives. Later Mahn's father who had continually attempted to procure his own release, told H that the Germans had informed him (H's father) that they were forced to keep him in confinement not because they could not do anything against him, but because of his insolence. (H states that when he was asked whether he knew why the Germans had liquidated the Rikards group, he replied with a quote from Shakespeare "The slave has done his duty, the slave may go". Because of this H was beaten, while as a precaution a gas mask was placed on his head. Just before this gas mask was placed on his head he asked the Germans if this was the "New Europe".

Slowly all but the following 7 of the arrested Rikards/ group members were released: Rikards, Urkis, Mitrevics, T. Jansons, A. G. Inbergs, B. Rigens, and Mahn. In the beginning of June 1943 the chief of the SD, Dr. Lange, informed these 7 that they would be transferred to the jail in Valmiera where they would be incarcerated for an indefinite period of time which he termed, "Schulungszeit" (Learning period). He further stated that their release depended upon their behavior in the Valmiera Jail. Furthermore, each was informed as to the reason for the detention, H's transgression being illegal listening to foreign broadcasts which according to Lange called for a minimum of 2 1/2 years in jail; however: "we'll see".

(24) On 12 June 1943 all seven accused were transferred from the Riga jail to the jail at Valmiera where they were all assigned to the same cell. In this jail they found they were among communist inmates some of whom had been caught and jailed on the proof and investigation conducted by Rikards group. The indigenous guard detail in this jail consisted of members of Arajs group, whose conduct toward these 7 was at first quite harsh, but who, later, having found out the truth, treated them comparatively well, even to the point of giving them many privileges.

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The jail was administered by the local SO unit, chief led Lt. J. P. RUDNER /92/ under whose direction the jail was supervised by a Latvian, 1st Lt. J. RINKER, a sadist and drunkard who personally beat not only the communist inmates but also the horses which were an integral part of the prison details.

Through the aid of Janis Dalins /92/ and Janis Zakis the seven inmates secretly received food which the former donated voluntarily from their farms. At the same time—Kahn and his friends found later—Ostave Celmins was quite actively collecting food and money from all ~~PLUCK~~COMMUNIST supporters for the purpose of aiding those fellow members who had been jailed. Since H and his friends had received none of this aid, and since Hugo Ointers later informed them that Celmins had kept all these donations for his own use, the men, particularly Rikards, brought these accusations before Celmins after their release. According to H this particularly incident is even today Celmins' most vulnerable spot and out which he is most criticized.

During their imprisonment, the seven Rikards group members were informed in letters from their families, that the Germans were spreading tales that the Rikards group was not discontinued because of political reasons, but because of misappropriation of German government funds for which the 7 men — who were also found guilty — had to be jailed. This obviously, was incorrect, though there was some question regarding payment of wages and advances which was the responsibility of the chief of the Administrative, support, and Finance section; these charges against Petersons apparently were correct, for later he seems to have repayed a certain sum. Ironically, ~~1943~~ Petersons was one of those 10 released prior to those 7 who eventually were held in Valmiera.

In the fall of 1943 there occurred a reorganization of the Valmiera jail which brought about the following changes:

- a. All communist inmates were transferred to the concentration camp in SALASPILS on 28 Sept 1943 leaving in Valmiera only

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Mahn and his friends and these persons imprisoned for criminal offenses.

b. This jail then became the detention house for those accused of Latvian nationalism, instead of the former communists.

c. The prison chief Kunka was replaced by Lt. Col. Apetis, a more humane and likeable person.

In her letters to her husband the distressed and somewhat hysterical Mrs. Richards informed her spouse that she feared an SD informant among the seven friends because some of the statements the SD was making to her could only come to the SD via such treachery. When they read this the 7 men considered it so much nonsense and laughed about it. However, later, when in Sweden, Hahn was accused of this by pastor Jermans whose wife was a good friend of Mrs. Richards and who was apparently spreading this tale giving treachery as the reason for Hahn's early release.

(25.) Hahn, Aleksander Grimbergs and Bruno Rugens were brought before SD chief Frymmer on 20 Dec. 1943 and were informed that they are going to be released. Handcuffed and under guard these three men were brought to Riga where they were released in the following order: Grimbergs, Hahn, Rugens. When he was released Hahn was told by Stedery that he was being released because of his father's persistence and promise that he (Hahn's father) would vouch for his son; Hahn's father also claimed that Hahn's mother is very will and Hahn is needed at home where his father would see to it that Hahn would not engage in any anti-German activity. Prior to being released the 3 men were requested to furnish any information they had regarding the newspaper "Ariva Latvija" (Free Latvia) which was secretly being published by Gustavs Celmins. Failing to reveal any such information, the men were requested to sign a statement that they would immediately inform the SD of any information they may receive ^{Security Information} pertaining to this newspaper.

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It is noteworthy that Celmins was publishing this paper not so much to oppose the Germans in a clandestine manner as to insure himself -- sensing Germany's defeat -- the possibility of claiming opposition to the German regime. This is easily evidenced by the fact that when his coworkers from the rural areas arrived at his office, they were given a stack of newspapers which when leaving they quite openly carried under their arm. It was later found that the Germans who began to suspect Celmins had photographed some individuals leaving his office with a stack of "Brive Latvii" conspicuously under their arm.

Shortly after his release Hahn carried out his previously planned personal affairs by becoming engaged to his present wife who was at that time working as a dentist in Kauna. Though Hahn's wife's mother opposed an early marriage, Hahn, who was ordered to appear for military service on 3 March 1944, was married by the civil authorities on 2 March 1944. On the appropriate day Hahn appeared before the Latvian Legion medical board who declared him unfit for military service because of heart trouble. In accordance with existing procedures, Hahn, having been found unfit for active service, was assigned to Police duty in Riga and was actually employed by the Police Department. At first Hahn was assigned to the 7th precinct whose chief was police Capt. Bekis. Hahn's duties were those of an ordinary patrolman pounding a beat. Inasmuch as the police was at that time very unpopular Hahn applied for the position of interpreter for the police. Having passed a test in German proficiency he was given such a position and assigned as interpreter to the 14th police precinct. As customary, Hahn's civil marriage was followed by a regular church wedding which took place in Riga's St. John's church on 9 April 1944 and was performed by pastor A. Mitulis. The wedding and reception was also attended by all of his former Valmiera jail fellow inmates who had by that time been released.

In June 1944 Hahn began to think about the advice of lecturer Abolins, i.e. that he should form a stay-behind group. ^{Security} This was done because

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of the heavy losses sustained by the Latvian Legion on the Russian front and because a collapse of this front seemed imminent. Hahn discussed this with Waldemar who was assigned to the Hq. of the Latvian Legion. Waldemar, who by virtue of his assignment had access to factual military information, thought Hahn's idea praiseworthy and advised that in his opinion many Latvian Legion soldiers would take to the woods without hesitation because they too saw the inevitable German defeat and retreat from Latvia, which then would again be occupied by the Russians.

(26.) In the very end of July 1944 the Russian forces, which were advancing eastward through Lithuania, sent a surprising bridgehead toward Jelgava, capturing that city and proceeding to Tukums which was also captured. The element of surprise caught the Germans off guard and thus enabled the Russians to cut off any German retreat through the two Kurone ports Liepaja and Ventspils. However, the Germans and many Latvians, fighting completely independently, managed to rally, contain this drive, and eventually push this spearhead out of Tukums, thus clearing an avenue of retreat for the German forces; the Russian forces were at that time firmly entrenched in Jelgava and vicinity where some fierce fighting took place. However, neither the Latvians nor the Germans could push this force out of Jelgava which from then on remained in Russian hands.

This Russian advance, as well as German disinterest to hold Latvia (which was indicated by the hasty and panicky attempts on the part of a number of highly placed officials to flee to Germany), enhanced Hahn's efforts to organize a stay-behind group. Hahn accomplished this in the following manner:

Just prior to the aforementioned spearheads entrance into Latvia, the German authorities permitted the Latvians to renew the "Aizsargi" (home guard) which had been outlawed since 1940 by the Russians, as the Germans. In anticipation of a Russian fifth column, all members of the Aizsargi were assigned

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to the various police precincts. T. Jansson and Rikards, who had in the meantime joined the Aissargi, were assigned to the 14th police precinct where to their surprise they found Mann at work. Mann then related his stay-behind idea to Jansson, who wrote it up in a proposal form and passed it on to Rikards. The latter took this proposal to Lt. Col. Dacitlis /93/ Chief of the Aissargi, who felt that such stay-behind unit -- which Mann named "Anti-Bolshevik Partisan Sq" (FPS) -- would become detrimental to the Aissargi inasmuch as such a group would start its activities by armed resistance to the Germans causing them to outlaw the Aissargi. Nevertheless, upon the insistence of Rikards, Dacitlis consented, with the provision that the FPS would operate clandestinely as an integral part of the Riga Aissargi Regiments, Communications Battalions, special assignment group. This Aissargi Regiment was commanded by Lt. Col. Vitols while the Communications Battalion was under the command of Rudolf's Turin /94/.

Though Mann himself did not have the opportunity to take part in all this preliminary work -- being kept busy by his job of interpreter -- he was, however, kept fully informed of all activities in behalf of the formation of the FPS. Much to the regret of the Mann - Jansson - Rikards triumvirate, the Aissargi were unable to furnish proper support to the FPS causing Rikards to contact some former friends who were at that time with the German Frontaufklarungstrupp (Combat Intelligence Unit) 212, under the command of Lt. Hasselmann whose assistant was Lt. von Pirke. Another officer of this unit was a Lt. Schubert who, after the war, has contacted Janis Celms, Prof. Endzins and others in Germany. The 212th Comb. Int. unit seemed very interested in Rikards plans for stay-behind operations and indicated that they would support the unit even though: "You may curse us (Germans), just as long as you don't fire upon us."

Armed with this promise the FPS began to form small stay-behind groups in the rural areas supplying them with radio sets (for the purpose of keeping the FPS center informed), arms, and explosive; trained radio operators were furnished

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to the small groups from the reservoir of Latvians who readily placed themselves at the disposal of the PPS. The location of such radio operators as well as the assembling of the sets themselves which were received from the 212th Comb. Int. group in parts, was accomplished by Aleksanders Akmentins /95/. Because of the sensitivity of his assignment, the Germans kept Akmentins under very strict control which he thoroughly disliked and as a result, later, went into hiding.

In order to seek further aid in its stay-behind activities, the PPS contacted the Hq. of the Latvian Legion, whose Cdr, Gen. R. Volfs Bangerskis, however, was not favorably inclined, whereas one of Bangerskis aids, Col. Silgailis was sympathetic and officially gave two persons from Hq. leave with covert instructions that they are assigned to the PPS. In summer Komars Svarnbergs and Waldemar began their activity in the formation of the provincial stay-behind units. Also active in the formation of these units were Kevarts Krastins, Krišjanis Kronins, /96/ and Kipars Bruzis /97/.

(27.) In the beginning of Aug. 1944, Hahn's wife joined many Latvians who were fleeing their country fearing a second communist occupation; another reason for her leaving was Hahn's decision to remain in Latvia as a partisan which she felt she was not able to do. Her first location was in Vienna where he passed an examination which enabled her to practice dentistry. In the end of October she -- with the help of Valdmanis -- proceeded to Wiesbaden, where she gave birth to her first child, a son Valdis Antons, on 23 April 1945.

(28.) In the middle of September 1944, though slated for a "Combat Police Regiment", Hahn, through Rikards influence, was transferred from the police to the 212 Comb. Int. group. In the end of Sept. 1944 Hahn reported to the Hq. of this group which was located in Tilsit near Dvinsk. There he was issued a German Army uniform, a side arm, identification (Soldat), and was assigned some N. rank which Hahn does not recall.

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It should be noted here that a similar group known as the Kurelis group after its commanding officer former Latvian General Kurelis, was formed with the sanction of the German authorities. This group, the same as VFB, was under the direction and supervision of the 212th Comb. Int. group through which both groups were also supplied. The ultimate assignment of this group was the same as that of the VFB, though originally the Kurelis group was assigned the task of assisting the German Army to protect Riga from a Russian attack. Jansons attempted to unite the VFB and the Kurelis group by talking to Kurelis chief of staff Capt. Upelnicks, who opposed such unification because, according to Upelnicks, the VFB was too much under German control and hence not as nationalistic a body as the Kurelis group. (Mahn and other VFB members differed with this opinion.) Later, in Kurzeme, in the beginning of November 1944 the Germans discovered several activities of the Kurelis group which to them seemed peculiar:

a. Fearing a complete collapse of the German lines in Latvia, the majority of the 212th Comb. Int. group returned to Germany. The Kurelis group considered this as an indication that their responsibility to defend their country had begun. Consequently, the Kurelis group proclaimed itself as the core of the Latvian National Army and requested all Latvians to appear for service for their country.

b. The result of this proclamation was that a considerable number of Latvians joined Kurelis forces. However, many of these were -- as Kurelis HQ's later admitted -- communist agents and saboteurs from the Latvian Legion.

The chaos which the fear of a collapse of the front has created, subsided when the German Army and the Latvian Legion were able to stabilize the line. This enabled the German authorities to consider Kurelis activities further and

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came to the conclusion that the Kurelis group is a threat to their rear, is causing and instigating disturbances, and is of anti-German sentiments. Consequently this group was liquidated by the SS chief, Maj. Gen. Jekeln /90/. Kurelis himself was arrested and later brought to Germany (now in Uolmsuth, Texas) while most all of his staff officers were

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shot and all the members fled, hunted by the Germans who shot 2000 of them in the STUTTART Concentration Camp.

Main opinion of this episode is that the Germans here by fearing a repetition of the riot of 20 July 1941, removed all stay-behind activities, which they considered political, from the army, and assigned this responsibility to the SO. Kurelis, being under the direction of the 12th Comb. Int. group, was considered -- in addition to everything else -- unreliable. The reason that this same fate did not meet him and the PPS, was that the PPS, prior to the liquidation of Kurelis group, was transferred on their own initiative to and came under the jurisdiction of the "JACHTVERBAND" which was the newly created SS department charged with this new SS assignment--the control and direction of stay-behind matters.

The front having become stabilized, the 12th Comb Int group returned to Latvia and continued its activity of dispatching agents behind the Russian lines, for straight military purposes and aims. As already mentioned this group then had lost all stay-behind responsibilities, though it still did keep up contact with the PPS.

(25) With the German retreat from Estonia, rumors in Riga had it, that the Estonians managed to proclaim their independence and establish a temporary government. This brought about some streetfighting with the German Army remnants. Sprung by this example the Latvians also began to plan such a government which would assume power with the aid of the Latvian Legion. Rikards from PPS was assigned the liaison with this provisional government /99/ which had made all preparations to flee to Sweden if there appeared difficulties from either the German or Russian side. However this project failed completely when Lt. Col. Dzenitis, one of the instigators, revealed this secret when under the influence of alcohol. As suspected no drastic measures were taken by the German authorities, who did send some of the major figures to Germany.

The PPS which was informed of this project and expected to fight was assigned the task of communicating with the provisional government and in case of trouble aid this government in its move from Latvia to Sweden. In order to instruct the units in

Valdemar, H, proceeded to the vicinity of Asin with the appropriate instructions. At present H can only recall two local groups that of the brothers Karlis, Janis, and Peteris RUSOVIS /180/ and that of former Sigvilda Jivil [unclear] and Rikards brother-in-law [unclear] ROZINB.ROD. The Russian advances at that time prohibited H from contacting the RUSOVIS group. However, he could contact Rosenberg on the particular day when he took to the woods in the community of BIRINI. Taking the opportunity, Hahn visited his two sisters in the vicinity of Sigvilda and persuaded them to flee to Riga, though they had originally planned to remain there, fearing the ill effects that the life of a refugee would have upon their small children. Because of the speedy advances of the Russian forces, Hahn returned to Riga two days later, on 28 Sept. 1944 and just in time to say his good-bye's to Rikards who was moving to LIZIRI in northern Kurzeme where, it was said, Mitrevics had been active since July. Rikards assigned Jansons to take his place in Riga.

One of the last PPS Tasks in Riga was to locate nationalistic and patriotic females, who when this city would fall into Russian hands, would associate with Russian officers. Any information received in this manner would be brought to the remaining PPS radio operators who would transmit it to PPS HQ. in Kurzeme.

During this time Valdemars and his friend Egars Ermanis (101), both PPS members, requested the 112 Comb Int. group to give them permission to remain in Riga and join to existing, illegal communist underground forces which were awaiting the arrival of the Russian forces and which had attempted to persuade Ermanis to join this force. This proposal was rejected by the Germans because they had no possibility to check on its authenticity and suspected it may be a provocation attempt. Receiving no support and cover from the Germans, Valdemar and Ermanis had no choice but to abandon their plan and eventually leave Riga with the other PPS members.

In the first day of October 1944 H and Roberts Krastins were ordered to Kurzeme where they were to find suitable quarters for the PPS in BULDIJA where they were also to meet Von Pirke. Arriving there they found Von Pirke who was to furnish support

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to the PPS gorilla group had left for Insterburg, Germany. The officer, who gave them this information advised M and Krastins that they too proceed to Insterburg. However, they told this German officer that they had no desire to leave their homeland. Mahr and Krastins found suitable quarters for the PPS in Kuldiga through the aid of the chief of Kuldiga 1st police precinct, Janis Vanags who had a radio operator under his direction and was leader of all PPS groups in the Kuldiga area. It was anticipated that Vanags radio operator would become the communicator between the groups in Riga and the PPS in Sweden should the latter be forced to flee there.

Having found the necessary quarters, M and Krastins returned to Riga, where they remained comparative inactive until the fall of Riga on 13 October 1944. During this time M travelled between Riga and Majori (on the Riga shore) where the 212th Comb. Int. group had set up forward Hq. On 11 Oct 1944 M was in Riga for the last time and attempted to persuade his parents and older sister to flee from Latvia, (Mahr's younger sister had left for Germany with her two children because the Germans had forced her husband to come to Germany.) Mahr's parents and older sister refused to leave because:

- a. They were too old to become homeless wanderers.
- b. They were assured by the wife of artist ROMANS SUTA, Mrs BELKOVA that M's parents were in no danger. She gave this assurance because her husband, a communist sympathiser had accompanied the retreating Russians in 1941 and was expected to return with them as a powerful individual.
- c. M's older sister was also persuaded by Mrs. E. PERKINS, one of the leading persons in the National Welfare Agency by which M's older sister was employed, that to leave Latvia at such a crucial time, would not only be deserting the sinking ship, but would also enable the Russians to Russiarise Latvia much easier as none of the intelligentsia would remain.

M claims he was very angry because he viewed his parents and sister decision as utterly senseless; he claims he has since ^{Security Information} often regretted parting from his family under such circumstances, however, there was no way he could convince them of the necessity

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to leave.

(10) After the fall of Riga, H proceeded to Talsi where he joined the rest of the PPS members, who in the interim had left Riga with their families. The general feeling within the PPS was for a move to Sweden because ~~the~~ All leading Germans had fled from Latvia and a general situation of complete chaos existed. From Talsi the P.S. moved to Ventpils where in his attempts to organize the move to Sweden it for the first time met Dr. Ginters who was arranging such journeys. H requested aid, giving Dr. Ginters a list of all PPS members. One week later, however, the picture changed, the front was again stabilized and the 212th Comb. Int. group informed the PPS that the Germans would remain in Kurzeme and continue organizing stay behind activities. After several heated debates among PPS members, it was decided that H, Jansons, Krastins would remain in Kurzeme, while the rest, Valdemars, Sternbergs, Krassis, Krastins and radio operator Aboltins would take advantage of Dr. Ginters aid and await boat transportation in the vicinity of Jurkalne. During this writing period, Valdemars who was in possession of a German identification which permitted him easy travel, utilized this for various arrangements that had to be made prior to the departure of the PPS.

Also during this time H again met Dr. Ginters and expressed the desire that Dr. Ginters arrange via his radio contact with Sweden, that those PPS members and others who would remain in Latvia. Ginters replied that he cannot decide such matters as that is not in his jurisdiction but is rather a matter for Gen Tepper's decision-- (This was the first time that H had heard Tepper's name mentioned in connection with any clandestine and resistance activities)-- Receiving no reply, H, Jansons, and Krastins decided to await a reply from Tepper and therefore returned to Kuldiga in the middle of October 1944 where they continued to organize stay-behind groups.

(11) In the middle of October 1944, the German SS Jagdverband --also known as WILDCAT--arrived in Kurzeme under 1st Lt. V. JANKAUS, a Latvian, who had completed an espionage school in Germany, and who was the JAGDVERBAND operations chief in KUCEDICE.

JANKAJS immediate chief was Mr. Von FOLKERSAM who ^{was in contact with} JANKAJS through German liaison officers. (VON FOLKERSAM ^{later} was wounded during a battle on the Oder river and was replaced by a Latvian Lt. Col. Bails Graymanis who became chief of JACOVSKAND—OST.) The assignment of the JACOVSKAND in Latvia was to recruit Latvians for training in Kursk and dispatch behind the Russian lines (for operation in Latvia only). Consequently this activity did not interfere with the PPS who continued to organize stay-behind groups. Yet the work of the PPS was hindered by the fact that beside it there was also Kurelis group which conducted its activities with a great deal of noise.

As already mentioned in the beginning of Oct 1944, the Germans began to arrest many Latvians who they feared were working against them. This was most evident in the cases of members of Kurelis group.

Rikards, fearing arrest, arrived in Kursk and went into hiding and complete inactivity in LIEPINE and awaited the opportunity to flee to Sweden. In the end of Oct, this opportunity presented itself and Rikards began his journey by boat; however, the boat developed motor trouble and Rikards was apprehended by the German authorities to whom he explained that he was attempting to flee to Germany. Shortly thereafter Rikards was released and attempted to rejoin the PPS which, however, turned him down as it was still his intention to flee to Sweden, while the PPS then consisted only of members of were to remain in Latvia; furthermore, there was some animosity now between those who had continued to work while Rikards just sat around awaiting an opportunity to escape.

In the beginning of November, Mitrevics, who also feared that the Germans would arrest him, arrived in Kursk and joined the PPS to whom he promised he would actively aid in the execution of their activity, but who would not pass up the opportunity to flee to Sweden. Mitrevics, who had really never stopped his activities, was accepted, even though he too had attempted to flee to Sweden in the same boat with Rikards.

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The heart and soul of the PPS at that time was Jansons who led the PPS toward a nationalistic goal. The reason that Rikards was not accepted into the fold was partially Jansons fear that the group would fall under German influence, and partially the fact that he had years in active front and clandestine work as well as his incarceration had made Rikards extremely nervous and sought his drink.

(12) Since the arrival of Jankavs arrival in Kurzeme, he repeatedly wrote to Jansons requesting that the latter, who was located in Kuldiga, appear for a visit in the vicinity of Kabilis. Jansons in turn requested that Jankavs do him the honor and visit him in Kuldiga. However, Jansons soon found it impracticable to continue opposing a person recognized and supported by the German authorities. Consequently, Jansons, found a former friend, who was on Jankavs staff and decided to talk to him prior to meeting Jankavs, so as to determine whether a spark of nationalism existed in the JAGVERBAND, or whether it was completely subservient to the Germans. Consequently, H. Jansons, and Krastins proceeded to Kabilis where they met Jansons friend, RAINONDS SILARAJIS /102/, who they found was quite pro-German and who indicated that the PPS would do best to join the JAGVERBAND because the JAGVERBAND would soon take over all stay-behind activities anyway. The pro-German feeling within the JAGVERBAND was further evidenced by the statements of another of its members Lt. Pauls TINOVLJEVS who more or less indicated that the Latvians "must either win with the Germans or perish".

Jansons met Jankavs and disliked the latter's pro-German attitude; therefore the PPS continued to oppose cooperation with the JAGVERBAND until approximately one week after their original meeting, the 212th Comb. Int. group announced that the stay-behind activities were transferred to the JAGVERBAND. The PPS was then given the choice of either joining the JAGVERBAND or lose all support from the German side and continue to operate illegally. This latter possibility the PPS found impractical and therefore decided to join the JAGVERBAND with the covert intent that the PPS could sway the local JAGVERBAND more toward national lines.

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In this reorganization which was brought about by the PPS joining the JAGDVERBAND, H was given the assignment to organize stay-behind groups in Ventpils county. H, in carrying out this assignment, was able to set up stay-behind groups in the following districts(PAGASTI):

- a. BOLD, leader Lt. Mrs AUGIS /105/
- b. ZILAS,
- c. BURAS, the member of the group was Mrs Juris Grinvalds, (104)
- d. VENTA (which included the city of Ventpils), leader policeman ANDREJS MASPALS.
- e. ELKAS, leader Mrs KREKELIS who was shot by red partisans before the end of the war.
- f. VIGALS
- g. PUZIS, leader Mrs GSKOVSKIS /105/.
- h. POPEL leader policeman ZIVKACS /106/.
- i. LUNDAGAS leader police Lt. RUDENIS
- j. VILTINIS, leader officer candidate AMBATS

In this work H was greatly aided by the police chief of Ventpils district, Major JURIS, who according to Waldemars was caught by the Russians in 1946 after a battle in the woods; another assistant was the administrative head of Ventpils district, Valdemars KARLINS /107/. The aid to KARLINS, VILIS EVANITAJIS was also helpful to H.

Aside from this assignment H was also charged with the covert task of keeping in contact with the group arranging travel to Sweden. Aside from Dr. Ginters, H also met OSVALDS BILESKALIS/108/, Mrs PRISENFELDS, /109/, and MADOLSKIS /110/. In addition H also met EDONS VALONAKIS /111/ for whom, in addition to Madolskis, H procured a JAGDVERBAND identification document regarding which he (Hahn) was later questioned by JANIKAVS; H was, however, able to explain his action satisfactorily.

Having been made an integral part of the JAGDVERBAND, the PPS ceased to exist as such; however inasmuch as its center of activity was Kuldiga, where it remained in ~~the same way as before~~ Kabilis— its functions and thereby its outward appearance

remained unchanged so much so that for all intent /of purpose basically nothing seemed to have changed.

In the middle of December 1944 Sternbergs arrived from JURKALNE and joined the PPS where he began to work in the newly created information section. Shortly thereafter Bruno Rugens and his brother-in-law ZIGURDS ZALCMANIS also arrived in Kuldiga and joined the group. A little later the group was also joined by: radio operator Janis Aboline, KRISTAPS KADIKIS, OLGERTS LABIETIS, ATIS KRISKANS /112/, Ima STRADS, Ima BREMSKITS, ERIKS VANGRAVS, BRUNO VEBERS, and KARLIS MITREVICIS.

Shortly after his arrival, Olgerts Labietis was assigned the task of establishing stay-behind groups in the Kuldiga area, while Kadikis was made chief of fortification. The task of creating stay-behind nets in Talsi fell to STRADS, while BREMSKITS undertook this task in LIEPAJA and vicinity and EUGENS in AIZPUTE where he used the alias GAVJA. ZALCMANIS was assigned to work in the Information section which was headed by MITREVICIS. One of the original three PPS members, KRASINS was charged with establishing stay-behind nets in the vicinity of TUKUMS.

(33) The JAEDVERBAND in Kursene consisted of the following persons:

- a. Chief, V. JAKOVYS, Capt.
- b. Adjutant, Ima KANKLINS, Lt.
- c. Lt. JUNKERENS
- d. BALDONIS SILARAJIS Lt. Chief of Political Section
- e. PAULS TIMOFJEVS Lt.
- f. TOCS, Lt.
- g. HARIJS MALDONIS, Lt.
- h. MINTAUTS PLAKIS, Lt.
- i. Ima ONICONS /113/ Lt.
- j. TIMONIKS, Lt.
- k. VOLDEMAR VITOLS, Sgt.
- l. A. JAKOBSONS, Sgt.

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Janson himself was also considered a member of the JANDVUBAKD and was given several positions, the last one-- at the end of war--being chief of the Political Section.

The ranks held by the persons named on previous page are believed to be fictitious and were assigned to these men for cover purposes only.

(34) In the beginning of 1945 H was able to contact the illegally living remnants of Karalis group which had united themselves and assumed the name "VIESTURA STRELNIKI" (the riflemen of the legendary hero VIESTURS). This group was led by former police Captain PETERIS SAMSONS /114/, a very efficient organizer who was assisted by ERNESTS RIKSTIS /115/. The Viestura Strelnieki believed that illegality was the key to success because the Germans had become much too insecure. Though they already had experience in such illegal life and though they -- according to Samsons--they consisted of 2,000 men, they lacked the support the Germans could furnish. Consequently H provided them such support as well as documents which would aid them should they be apprehended by the Germans, because he felt that there was no difference between the aims of the Viestura Strelnieki and the PPS, though the practical achievement of their mutual goal was envisioned by each in a different way.

H and Samsons firmly believed that there would be no aid from the German side once Russia had occupied their country. Consequently they began to draw up a declaration which would unite all illegal and dissident elements in Latvia, which, in case of complete Russian occupation, would place themselves at the disposal of such a power which would guarantee Latvia its freedom and independence; obviously ~~in their minds~~ in back of their minds, they hoped for aid from the western democracies.

In the beginning of March 1945 the news arrived that a boat from Sweden would arrive for the purpose of exfiltrating some persons. So that a person representing the eventual stay-behind elements could be sent to Sweden, but had no authority to speak and act in the name of those remaining; from RUDIS /116/, INGRIDA VIKSNE /117, LIJA KRODERIS /118/. (Later RIKSTIS told H in Sweden that the former upon his arrival, had begged the LOP for aid, but found nobody who would listen to his pleas. He finally was given the opportunity to send one radio message to those he left behind. RIKSTIS

advised to H was "don't give them (the LCP) anything you have, because they'll just extract everything from you and then throw you away like an old, useless, dry hamon."

At this time the PTB and the Viestura Strubinski agreed that at the time of German surrender, the Latvian Legion should also become an integral part of the stay-behind elements. For the purpose of discussing this matter, Janovs and Samsons — with Janovs knowledge— contacted the remaining Latvia ranking officer of the Latvian Legion, Col. Roberts Osis /119/, who they felt was sufficiently qualified and acceptable to become the chief of all partisans when the Germans capitulated. Osis, however, declined the offer, because he felt that his place was with his regiment, ~~at~~ the front. Nevertheless, Janovs, fully convinced of the need to bring the Latvian Legion into the stay-behind fold, continued to explore this possibility with other officers such as, Major ESTIPHEES/120/, Major Kocius/121/and Lt. Lt. NIERVALDIS ADAMOCKS /122/. All his efforts were, however, in vain, because all officers could not see the necessity to organize such a matter prior to the capitulation.

(35) In December 1944 Valdemars who was awaiting transportation to Sweden, was apprehended by the German authorities and threatened with a courts martial for desertion. The 212 Comb Int. group to which he was assigned conducted an investigation and requested H, Valdemars immediate supervisor, to furnish an explanation. H claims he told the investigating officers that Valdemars was sent to the vicinity of JURKALNS to observe the activity there.

(VALDEMAR later informed H that the Germans had showed him a statement signed by H that H confirms the fact that Valdemars had without proper authority absented himself from his post of duty. H claims he explained to Valdemars that this obviously was a clever forgery and, according to Hahn, accepted this explanation, though originally he was convinced that H ~~had~~ had actually written such report.)

Shortly after Valdemar had been charged with being MIA and imprisoned, H, met BILSKALNS and having found that the latter was convinced that Valdemars was a good aid to those attempting to escape Latvia, procured Bileskalns promise to do

all he can to free Valdemars.

In the middle of February Valdemars, in accordance with a general amnesty to all those arrested during WWII, was released. Janson, in his attempt to find a pretext using Latvian Legion officers, met Valdemars in Riga where the latter had just been released from confinement and assigned the duty of EM in charge of a group of EM just released from confinement for similar charges. Janson related to Valdemars his difficulties with the Latvian Legion, and Valdemars, though he wasn't considered a FPS member, promised to do all in his power, not only to convince the leading elements of the Legion, but also to find recruits for stay-behind activities in LIEPAJA.

About one month before the cessation of hostilities Valdemars joined the newly created Latvian National committee which had been sponsored by the German authorities and whose president was the CO of the Latvian Legion BAKHREKIS. (In Kursene, among the Latvians, this committee was commonly called the Potsdam Government because it had originated in Potsdam). Valdemars was at that time being trained for the position of assistant (for special assignments) to Capt. FRUJERS /123/, chief of the Political Police. Because of the short period of time before the Germans capitulated, this "government" was not even able to get properly organized and hence came to nothing.

(36) There was another, independent, attempt in Kursene to organize a Latvian temporary government at this very time. This attempt was supported by H and the FPS which helped to find suitable farmer and labor representative. Despite German threats of reprisals, the majority of representatives met in Baldiga one day before the German forces surrendered, on 7 May 1945. Hahn remembers the following persons who participated in this government's creation: a. Cabinet:

- Col. Roberts OSIS, proposed prime minister
- JAKIS ANDERSONS/12/ proposed minister of Agriculture.
- ARTURS KRODERS, proposed minister of Education.

be transported to Sweden. Dr. Ginters promised to take care of this as well.

It feels that Dr. Ginters was sincere in his promises and no doubt requested aid from Sweden as well as sufficient boats for all persons slated for transportation. However, it believes, that Dr. Ginters requests were not taken into consideration because not a single boat arrived from Sweden after 5 March 1945. Later, in Sweden, Dr. Ginters informed it, that when he (Dr. Ginters) arrived in Sweden, he resigned from the LCP because he was extremely dissatisfied with the action of the LCP during the final period.

(18) In the beginning of April 1945 the IFS suggested to Jankava that a more nationally acceptable Latvian temporary government/

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be created. Hahn, supported by Mitrevics proposed Valdemis as the political head while the aforementioned Col. Osis would become the military chief. For this purpose Hahn and Mitrevics proposed they fly to Germany. Jankavs who reported this to his superiors received a favorable reply and Hahn and Mitrevics made the necessary preparations for their journey to Germany. However, the plane that was to fly them to Germany brought from Germany Aleksandrs Akmentins and Lt. Dougavietis /AJ/ who advised Hahn and Mitrevics that it was useless to attempt anything in Germany because complete confusion reigned there. This made Hahn and Mitrevics decide to cancel their flight.

(39.) Shortly after the German liquidation of Kurelis group, 200 of its members managed to hide in the Kurzeme forests and after awhile joined a communist partisan group, known as the "Red Arrow". In the middle of April 1945 Hahn happened to meet one of these 200 men, Sgt. Senitis /132/, who informed Hahn that the former Kurelis group members were desirous of leaving the company of the "Red Arrow" group because they had nothing other than an illegal existence in common with that group and because the Germans were hunting them because they were erroneously thought to be members of the "Red Arrow". Senitis indicated that the 200 men were willing to fight the Russians if the Germans would permit them to legalize themselves. Hahn related this to Jankavs who contacted the SS Chief in Kurzeme and procured his consent to permit these 200 men to come out of the woods and legalize themselves. The intent behind this was that these 200 men would then be added to Jankavs (Jagdiverbands) stay-behind organization. Because of transportation difficulties Hahn was unable to arrive on time at the appointed meeting place where these men were to be met, with the result that the men feared some sort of deception from the German side and, utilizing the lull in the German attempts to locate them, successfully escaped from their area failing to keep

the arranged appointment with Mahn. The German army officer, Major Arendt, who was in charge of the operation to capture these 20 men and the "Red Arrow" group, complained that Mahn had disrupted what seemed to be a practically successful mission. Mahn was requested to reply by indorsement which he promised to do but which he never actually did. Mahn claims he feared that for this episode he would surely be punished, possibly with a death sentence; however, the entire matter apparently was soon forgotten in the confusion that existed in the last few weeks before the German surrender.

(39.) About a week before the surrender Mitrevics finally convinced Jankavs that the Germans would be in no position to furnish support to the stay-behind groups, and consequently Jankavs agreed to give Mitrevics the necessary authority, credentials, signal plans, and other data, so that the latter may proceed to Sweden and attempt to procure western aid for those remaining in Latvia. With Jankavs approval for such mission, Mahn introduced Mitrevics to Dr. Ginters who by that time had received SD approval to continue his activities. Dr. Ginters promised to aid Mitrevics in getting to Sweden. On 6 May Silaskalns, who was directly involved in the organization of expeditions to Sweden which originated from Latvia, had arranged that an entire convoy of boats (about 5 or 6) would leave the Latvian shores. Just prior to the final arrangements Silaskalns was arrested by the Germans, who freed him on the following day. As a result of Mitrevics intervention which was successful because Mitrevics could speak in Jankavs name, having proof of such authority. Consequently, on 8 May 1945, the day the Germans capitulated to the Russians in Kurzeme (incidentally, this was two days after V-E day), this convoy of boats, carrying among others Mitrevics and Anderssons, left the Ventspils harbor.

Prior to leaving Mitrevics had arranged with the RFD that as soon as it humanly possible he would send couriers from Sweden to Lialiro where they were to be received.

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On 7 May 1945 Mohn met Jilskalne for the last time. At this meeting the latter stated that he would remain in Latvia and promised Mohn that should Mohn ever plan to leave for Sweden, Jilskalne would give him an address of a person in Sweden to whom Mohn could turn for aid. Mohn parted with Jilskalne after they made arrangements for subsequent clandestine meetings; also during this meeting Jilskalne mentioned that he had no fear of the impending Russian occupation because he had numerous friends and acquaintances among the communists who were willing to aid him.

Having left Ventspils on the evening of 8 May 1945, the boat convoy had been able to get within sight of Gotland when it was surprised by Russian patrol boats which opened fire upon the last boats. The first boat in which Anderson and Dr. Olters were traveling managed to escape and reached the shores of Gotland. The occupants of all other boats were either ordered to board the Russian patrol boat or the largest boat in the convoy, the tug "Kots". When this was accomplished the other boats were sunk. The Russians then ordered the tug "Kots" to proceed to Ventspils while their boats left. Mohn later learned that the Russian boats proceeded to Klaipeda having on board among others Vitrevics and Dite (though the latter had told Mohn he would not leave Latvia). In Klaipeda, Mohn later found, the male prisoners were separated from the females who were released shortly thereafter and instructed to return to their homes. Then men, among whom were also Vitrevics, Dite, Kertins, and Edvards Pukis, were brought to Ventspils under guard and were placed in the city jail. Subsequently they were transferred to the Miga city jail.

The persons on the tug "Kots", which was ordered to Ventspils, found that all Russian vessels had apparently left. However, since they feared that they were nevertheless being observed, they proceeded to that port weathering a heavy storm prior to their arrival. Upon arriving there they found that they

could just as easily have turned about and continued their journey to Jundis after the Russian patrol boats had left, because they were neither being observed nor had the port of Ventspils been informed to expect this tug. To the advantage of the opportunity all persons on this tug left the tug upon arrival and proceeded to escape. Mohn later found that the following persons had been aboard the "Rete": Vilis Armitajs, five vaivars (1)) and Jans Breimanis (1)).

(10.) In the very beginning of May 1945 Mohn and his friends had heard from German officers that the German lines would not be able to hold off another overall Russian offensive and that the Germans were expecting this to take place in the middle of May. Consequently Mohn began to make preparations to assume an illegal life as a partisan in the woods of Kurzeme, at the same time alerting his stay behind groups. On 8 May 1945 a meeting was held in Ruldige which was attended by all district stay-behind leaders and their messengers for the purpose of receiving final instructions, however such instructions were not forthcoming as Jankavs was in Liepaja conferring with the military authorities, Jankavs had disappeared for several days, and Mitrovice was on his way to Sweden. By night fall Mohn and Sternbergs had learned that the Germans would surrender at midnight. Under the necessity Mohn and Sternbergs gave the necessary orders, to wit that the stay-behind groups assume the previously planned active opposition to the Soviet occupying forces. Two days later Jankavs arrived and was shown a copy of the order to begin the stay-behind activities. Jankavs approved, though Mohn had worded the order in the sense that, now that one of Latvia's enemies had capitulated, there only remains one more to overcome.

Upon parting with Jankavs, he stated that though he may have acted incorrectly in the past, he is still a soldier and will continue to fight, and hopes to meet Mohn and his friends later. Thereupon they arranged a dead letter drop and divided 300,000 rubles of which half was kept by Jankavs.

According to previously prepared plans Mahn and 7 PPO companions proceeded to Lielirbe which was the chosen meeting place for all PPO members in Kuldiga. Because of the Russian parties combing the woods and blocking the roads, it took Mahn 2 weeks to journey these 30 kilometers. On the way Mahn tried to keep an appointment with Jansons, Augis and Akmentins in Ldole. However, because of a misunderstanding this meeting was not kept. Later Mahn heard that Augis and Akmentins were arrested and that Jansons had been shot on the southern bank of lake Usina; rather than falling into Russian hands alive, Jansons shot himself. Also arrested in the first few days was the PPO radio operator Janis Apolins. On 12 May 1945 Mahn met Lt. Staris whom the Germans had released from jail on the day of surrender. After future contact arrangements with Staris had been made, Mahn proceeded to his destination. Shortly after the meeting with Staris, Mahn met Sasa Dreimanis who informed them of the ill fated boat convey. Two days later Atis Kriskans left the group stating that he would attempt to reach the destination by himself. He took along 20,000 rubles and has never been heard of since. On 15 May Mahn and his companions successfully eluded a sizeable Russian patrol; on 17 May the former communist partisans which were aiding the Red Army in combing the woods arrested another member of Mahn's group, Karlis Kitrevics; this constituted a loss of another 20,000 rubles. Finally on 23 May 1945 Mahn and his companions arrived in Lielirbe where they found those PPO members that had been able to arrive plus 2 new recruits. There the entire group remained until 3 June 1945, living in a bunker. During this time the group sent some trusted fellows to reconnoiter the Ventepils area, to procure some necessary material, particularly writing paper for proclamations, and to establish contacts with some acquaintances. Upon returning with the necessary writing paper, the group drafted a proclamation to the effect that now that the German enemy has fallen only the Russian enemy remains. This proclamation was then distributed in the Ventepils area.

During this time Hahn also contacted two foresters with whom he was acquainted and who resided in the vicinity of his bunker. These foresters, one Blumenfelds and Olgerte Kusmanis (who at that time was using the documented alias Olgerte Liepins) were trusted by the communists and supported Hahn quite extensively.

On 7 June Hahn and his original travel companion as well as two additional members left the bunker and proceeded toward Talsi for the purpose of locating the Talsi partisan hq. Locating the previously arranged dead letter drop, they found no news and left a message at a live drop to meet on a future date.

From there Hahn's group proceeded to the vicinity of Piltene arriving there in the middle of June 1945. There they managed to locate the Piltene group as well as Vilis Zvanitajs who remained with the group. The Piltene group, it was found, had added a member to its ranks, 1st Lt. Vairogs, a former Legion officer who had been wounded in the woods and picked up by the Piltene partisans. Speaking several languages, including Russian and English, Vairogs listened to news broadcasts in those languages, and hoped to be able to escape to Belgium where the officers of the Latvian Legion had previously arranged to meet.

Hahn and his group next proceeded to return to Kuldiga where they found the partisan groups had been annihilated and that they could find no news regarding Jansons whereabouts whom they had been seeking.

In the end of June Hahn shot and killed his first and only human being, a Russian NKVD man who came to inquire as to who Hahn and Sternbergs were. On that same day Hahn met Jansons wife who also was trying to locate her husband. Though she had no further news about him, she did relate all she knew about the last best convoy and how the participants had fared.

Hahn and companions then continued their journey to Ziekas where they contacted Lt. Sturis who then arranged that Hahn and his friends remain in the bunkers

under his control. In the beginning of July Sturis and 20 men decided to return to his native area the vicinity of Hirzale where he planned to continue his partisan activities. Prior to leaving he gave Hahn all his contacts which Hahn subsequently used to great advantage. Hahn later heard that Sturis had successfully reached his native area and was receiving sufficient support. Sturis assistant Lt. fvu Gulbis remained in the vicinity of Ziekas and proved to be extremely active in the future.

After a 4 days stay in Ziekas, Hahn proceeded to the vicinity of Dundaga where he kept his previously arranged meeting with the Talsi group. This meeting revealed that this group was by far the largest consisting of approximately 90 men, and that the group had contact with other groups in the area who were led by fvu Felsbergs /135/, Lt. fvu Bouschs (operated in Engure area), and Major fvu Almenkalejs /136/. This group, it was also found, was already at that time publishing and distributing news from the free world which they procured via radio monitoring. Prior to departing, Hahn arranged a future meeting.

On their way to Lielirbe, where they hoped to find news about Jansons and others, they met 2 foresters, fvu Bankalns from Gibade and fvu Mironikova /137/ from Dundaga. The latter was a friend of Kytrevics and quite anxious to flee to Sweden. Hahn promised he would see about this possibility and kept these two foresters in mind as future contacts who had good relations with the Russians. Prior to arriving in Lielirbe, Kadikis shot a Russian who happened upon the group. This created a disturbance and the Russians began combing the woods, causing Hahn and his group to leave the area and head for the Ziekas area.

(41.) Journeying to Ziekas they found Janis Zalcanis and 1st Lt. Eriks Koozgruntdins whom they added to the group. Proceeding further they also located war correspondent Peteris Savejs who also joined the group. Arriving in Ziekas in the end of July 1945 and having two war correspondents, Savejs and Zalcanis with them, Hahn's group began

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to publish a periodical Tevsmel Un arivibai (For Fatherland and Freedom). This paper was distributed through all of Kurzeme and was copied in many locales for further distribution. This paper contained three types of material:

- a. Articles in nationalistic style, not only to retain the nationalistic spirit, but also to entice and encourage the continuation of such spirit among the partisans and the populace.
- b. Threats to those Latvians who chose to side with and work for the communists, calling these individuals by name and relating their deeds.
- c. Enlightenment of the international situation which was based upon radio monitoring.

This paper stated that it was published by the Latvian national partisan organization (LNP) and was published twice monthly.

(12.) In their travels throughout Kurzeme, Sterobergs, Krastins, and Kadikis noted the need for an overall leader who could unite all groups which at that time were completely independent and under the leadership of one individual. The benefits of a union of these groups under one leader are obvious; however the difficulty was that there was no one with a big enough name or high enough rank to assume such a position. Consequently these 3 members of Hahn's group decided to create a fictitious Colonel who they would claim is the accepted leader of all partisans in Kurzeme. The clandestine and conspiratorial living of the partisans afforded the necessary secrecy, so that no one dared to ask the "Colonel's" name or his whereabouts. The original intent was first to unite the partisans by such a ruse and then to find such a Colonel who could really become the overall leader.

Though Hahn personally was, and still is, opposed to deceiving the partisans in such a manner -- he rather felt that one of the available higher ranking officers could assume command -- he nevertheless abided by the rule of the majority, and later, much to his satisfaction, found that this fabrication did produce the

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desired results. The only difficulty encountered was that occasionally some of the other members of Hahn's immediate group who felt they should be in the know, began to complain that the "Colonel" never appeared in person, and should make at least one speech. Until Hahn left Kursk no real "colonel" or someone to pose as such had been found.

(4.) After the decisions of the Potsdam agreement were heard by the Information Section chief, Vairoga, it became evident that the Latvian partisans could expect no aid from the west. Consequently, Vairoga, accompanied by approximately 5 men proceeded toward Poland in an attempt to get to western Germany, and then on to Belgium where he hoped to find the officers of the Latvian Legion.

Having heard the results of the Potsdam conference and knowing that Vitrevice had been unable to reach Sweden, Hahn felt it his duty to try to reach Sweden so that he can convince the west of the plight of the Latvian partisans. Consequently he and the following men proceeded to Jurkalne where they hoped to find a boat: 1st Lt. Kobegruntnieks, Janis Zalomanis, Vilis Zvanitejs, Eduards (last name is forgotten), and radio operator Janis (last name is forgotten).

In the vicinity of Jurkalne Hahn's group met two other groups composed of former Legionnaires who had already been looking for a chance to flee, but had been unsuccessful. The three groups joined forces for the purpose of organizing a flight to Sweden by boat. At this time Hahn had already been able to contact Waldenars through some cut-outs through which he requested Waldenars to procure a boat. For this purpose Hahn sent Waldenars 7,000 rubles, in the belief that Waldenars, who was legal and working as a chauffeur for the wool and leather Central in Rostov, could no doubt get someone to build such a boat. Hahn hoped to use this boat, if none could be procured in the vicinity of Jurkalne. As time progressed, Hahn lost contact with Waldenars and later found that Waldenars' friend who was building this boat for Waldenars was arrested.

See also

At this time Mohn also learned that Dr. Oint^g radio operator ^g Bergmanis, - Jansons, in Ventspils had lost contact with Sweden. Mohn recalls that the parole and countersign when approaching Bergmanis was that Bergmanis would mention a number and the radio operator had to mention another number which, if added to Bergmanis' number would total 10. Bergmanis, who worked as a chauffeur, and lived in Ventspils on Joles Joles (street), together with another underground man who worked as a civil judge. Both men had pseudonyms which were "Kich" and "Flich" but Mohn does not recall which pseudonyms belonged to whom.

Through Jans Jansons Mohn contacted Bergmanis in the hopes that his radio contact with Sweden could be renewed which would then enable Mohn to request a post and come aid for the partisans.

Mohn believed that it was Bergmanis with whom Arins was able to establish radio contact from Sweden in 1945. It is also Mohn's belief that Andersson (an infiltrator from Sweden who arrived in Latvia in the middle of October 1945) prepared his (Mohn's) name from Bergmanis and then tried to contact Mohn.

(b.) During his stay in the vicinity of Jurkalne, Mohn was able to contact his parents by two separate means:

a. Through Valdemars who traveled between Riga and Ventspils and often brought Mohn letters from his family, carrying a reply on his return trip. On two occasions he also brought Mohn his clothing. On one occasion Mohn also sent money to his mother for an operation. All this activity was conducted through Mrs. Jansons and though on two occasions Mohn had arranged a direct meeting, this was not kept because Valdemars could not keep the appointment. According to Mohn a chauffeur in those days could earn an extreme amount by carrying persons who had no traveling facilities and therefore would pay exorbitant prices. Valdemars, who was not as active in such activity as his friend Bergmanis, made approximately 10,000 rubles a month, while the latter earned about 40,000 rubles a month.

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b. Through Janis Abolina, who has been Hahn's group's radio operator, Abolina had been apprehended by Russian patrols, but was released after at least a month in a screening camp. After he had traveled to Riga, he procured a job in his former place of employment, the Jaspotaris radio station. In the end of July 1945 Abolina journeyed to Kuldiga as far as to locate his father and give them as much aid as possible. He was able to reach Hahn through a nurse in Kuldiga to whom he then monthly brought letters from Hahn's parents and who would then give him letters from Hahn to his parents.

These letters informed Hahn that his father is employed as a lecturer in political economy at the Riga University. In answer to Hahn's question, his father informed him that Hahn could spend the winter -- if he could make his way toward Riga -- either in Kalluzi with his eldest sister's mother-in-law, Mrs. Samanis /139/ or in their empty seaside home in Avoti. In addition to that, Hahn's father related many rumors that were being heard and the fact that Hahn's cousin Julijs Ozoline /140/ had returned from Russia and was an NKVD official in Liepaja. (Julius Ozoline disappeared in 1941 when the Russians retreated and was believed to have falsely been taken along by the retreating Russians.) Hahn feels somewhat guilty that Julijs Ozoline became a member of the NKVD, because he believes he set a bad example when he was chairman of the Culture Committee in 1940/41 which Julijs Ozoline followed.

(45.) In August 1945, Alberts Labietis brought the news from Kuldiga that Jankevics was located in the vicinity of Rucava and is desirous of joining Hahn's group. On this occasion Labietis had brought along Jankevics radio operator, the aforementioned Janis. It was later decided that Jankevics would be accepted and would be added to the central group which was actually led by Jeterbergs, but which supposedly was the seat of the fictitious "Colonel". It is noteworthy that Jankevics was accepted only as a nominal member and not as any leader.

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was very interested in M's whereabouts and was informed that Mahn -- who then used the alias ANDIS -- was somewhere near the sea. Laiva and Abolins departed with the promise they would return to the USMA railroad station on 24 September 1945 and would bring along some radio crystals, tents, and some other items.)

At the appointed time Laiva returned to USMA alone and was taken to the partisan bunker where he attempted to continue his double game. On that same day M arrived and Laiva was confronted with the truth. He was informed that he would be shot and was prevailed upon to relate all he knew which he did with delight, as though he were at confession and cleansing himself of his sins. Laiva related that the NKVD had pressed him into service by threatening his family; that it knew that M and Krastins were corresponding with their families; that Jankavs on Laiva's first visit had asked Laiva to check on his girl friends' whereabouts; that the NKVD believed Jankavs and Lt. Jansons to be leaders of the Partisans. According to Laiva, he was instructed to find out the strength of the partisans in Kursama, their other leader, their locations, their radio communications possibilities, details of their safe houses, support points, and paroles. Laiva further informed that Abolins had been kept as a hostage in case he (Laiva) should be detected; furthermore, the NKVD did not trust Abolins sufficiently.

Laiva was then asked why he had not informed the partisans that he was in the service of the NKVD; they told him that had he done so, they could have gained a great deal of information by doubling him out to the NKVD. The partisans felt that as an old friend and fellow-fighter, it had been his duty to inform them. To this, Laiva explained that, working for the NKVD and being under its influence he had realized how useless their fight was at that time; however, he stated, that at the first sign of war he would have informed them of the truth. Holding Abolins up as an example, the partisans told Laiva that he would be shot, to which he reacted with surprising calm, and having signed a confession, requested he be permitted to sleep. After a sound two hour sleep, he was shot by his 1st commanding officer, Jankavs.

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Taking Latvian documents and belongings, Sternberg travelled to Riga where he planned to organize an underground.

(47) Right after the German surrender, former Latvian Legionist Lt. Gen. Alotainis /141/, managed to legalize himself and subsequently pass through all Russian screenings. Claiming to be knowledgeable in the field of agriculture, he managed to procure the position of director with the Seed Control which purchased all seed in the Ventpils district. In this position Alotainis emerged as the chief supporter of the partisans sending them food, particularly dairy products and shoes and clothing through a well established net. His main assistant in this covert activity was a female agronomist overtly employed by the firm, Mrs. Dzelze. Mrs. Dzelze was often requested by the NKVD to furnish information regarding the partisans. These requests she related to the partisans, including their group, which then decided what information she is to reveal. It was her opinion that she could not hold out such a game for long.

In addition to his covert activities, Alotainis was also active in aiding many partisans to legalize themselves by procuring for them jobs which required a minimum of documents and in which they later could be fairly documented. He also managed to procure actual documents by making, among others, a connection with a printing firm in Riga which printed VOJENHII BILKTI.

On 9 Sept. 1945 Alotainis proposed a meeting of all partisan and underground leaders in Kurzeme, which was held in ELKAS. In this conference it was decided to organize all the opposition elements into two main sectors:

a. The partisans' main aim would be to hinder all Russian acts of terror and inhumanity. This was mainly accomplished by threatening letters to Russians or Latvians engaged in such activities. According to Mann such threats were fairly successful for a while. Under no circumstances should the partisans enter into armed conflicts with the Soviet forces. The question of living through the winter was discussed at length and many valuable suggestions offered.

b. The underground members whose assignments consisted of supporting the partisans, accept and aid those partisans who were physically or otherwise unable to

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continue the strenuous partisan life, and involve the ^{greater political working} while at the same time locating and recruiting former political figures and workers. The idea was also discussed that in case of war the underground would create a temporary government. Should the Baltic situation become a prolonged affair, it was anticipated that slowly all partisan activities would be legalized if possible and —in any case, legal or illegal— form the basis of the underground.

Furthermore, in this meeting, definite land areas of activity were assigned to each partisan group, in order to coordinate all efforts.

During this meeting there also arose the question of the fictitious "colonel" who was known as the "Kurzeme Commandant". KRASTINS then informed all, that the "colonel" was unable to appear and had authorized KRASTINS to speak for him. The "colonel", Krastins stated, does not wish to participate in all these support activities but is rather interested in forming a fighting nucleus which could remain inactive until the beginning of a war. He is of the opinion that Krastins narrative was very unconvincing and caused many people to disbelieve the entire story of the "KURZEME COMMANDANT".

In this meeting it was also determined that all partisans which were known to those present, live in the KURZEME woods. It was further estimated that approximately 1000 more were hiding in the Kurzeme area, making an estimated total of 1500 partisans in Kurzeme.

For coordinating purposes it was decided to appoint a partisan and an underground leader for each of the districts, Ventpils, Talsi, Kuldiga, and Aizpute. Since, however, only the Ventpils district was truly represented the 2 leaders for this district only were appointed, the Ventpils district partisan leader being H, and the underground leader being ZILDAINS. H, however, claims that he declined because he desired to flee to Sweden. In his place 2nd Lt. Janis Gulbis was appointed, who a few weeks later disappeared under puzzling circumstances. (H feels that Gulbis no doubt was caught by a Russian patrol.)

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Leaders for the remaining districts, it was decided would be those, at the next

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meeting which would take place on 21 Sept 1945 at the northern end of Lake UOMA. Until this following meeting it was hoped STERNBERG's group would be able to locate and propose a suitable military figure as leader for all Kurzeme partisans. Sternberg's group had, at that time, tentatively decided to propose Maj. Akmenskis who was with the Talsi partisans in the vicinity of Valdemarjila.

(48) The 2nd partisan section which was scheduled for 21 Sept 1945 did not take place because of the aforementioned incident with LAVIA. The cancellation was not known to H who proceeded from the vicinity of JURKALNE to lake UOMA taking along Col. Rudolfis Opmanis /147/ who, H believed, could also be considered for the position of leader of the Kurzeme partisans and underground. Arriving at lake UOMA, H was informed about the Latva incident, the cancellation of the meeting, and participated in the final interrogation of LAVIA. Between H and Sternberg's group it was then decided that Col. Opmanis was not quite the ~~ideal~~ individual for the position of leader; though Opmanis himself, was quite willing to undertake the assignment, it was felt that he did not possess the needed qualifications.

H then saw Sternberg off to Riga and returned to the vicinity of JURKALNE bringing Opmanis with him. At this time, in preparation for H's trip to Sweden the radio man Janis (last name unknown) prepared a signal plan for H's use.

(49) In the end of September 1945 H was visited by ZIEDAINIS who wanted to discuss partisan support activities. He also reported that an employee of his Seed Central had been arrested, which H viewed as a warning, but which Ziedainis dismissed as insignificant. At that time H began to feel that Ziedainis was lacking the necessary personal security in that he wrote down all names of contacts, etc. Though Ziedainis was warned about this, he felt that there was nothing to fear, because the Russians would never catch him. On 1 Oct 1945 Ziedainis and Opmanis were arrested in the office of the Seed Central. This was reported to Security Personnel. US then instructed her to return to Ventspils and warn all persons who ~~are~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~vicinity~~ ~~of~~ ~~Ventspils~~ and ~~Warn~~ ~~any~~ ~~persons~~ ~~who~~ ~~are~~ ~~in~~ ~~the~~ ~~vicinity~~ ~~of~~ ~~Ventspils~~ compromise, particularly Dr. Irene SAPRASA /143/ who before the capitulation instructed

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stay-behind personnel in first aid, and who after the war clandestinely provided the partisans with medicine which she procured from her place of employment, the Ventspils hospital. Valdemars was also to be arrested, though he had very little connection with Ziedainis and was known to the latter only as an alias.

On Mrs. Valdemars' return she saw another female contact was arrested just as they were preparing to enter the woods. At that same time, in Ventspils, the Russians also arrested Mrs. Velta Skobe when she attempted to contact Ziedainis.

These arrests resulted in Russian patrols through the woods where K and his group was located, though apparently the Russians did not know their exact location. Because of this it was decided to unite the groups which were located in this forest, the other two groups being led by Skobe and 1st Lt. Karlis Strame. This united group then moved toward Alsunga where Skobe's group was located in an area unknown to Ziedainis. Two days prior to K's and Strame's arrival at Skobe's camp, the latter's wife arrived and related how -- under very dramatic circumstances -- she had been able to escape from the Russians by using the same route that ANILICA GUNTINS had used and which was known to her. She claimed that she had informed the Russians that she was a contact for the partisan leader Janis SLUCITEJS (who only existed in her imagination). The Russians believed her and in their desire to catch such a "great leader" followed her into the woods where she managed to escape. The Russians then combed those woods the entire night in their attempt to find her, however to no avail. The fact that they were actually looking for someone, was confirmed by K who observed this activity while on his way to Skobe's camp. Mrs. Skobe further informed that during her interrogation she was confronted by Ziedainis, who was asked whether he knew the partisan leader Janis Slucitejs. To Ziedainis' reply that he did not know any one by that name, Mrs. Skobe remarked to the Russian that Ziedainis was not big enough to know all about K Kursons. Regarding Ziedainis Mrs. Skobe said that the former had been beaten so much that he offered no resistance whatsoever and revealed everything after only adding a great deal of lying.

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(50) This situation caused Kahr and Skobe to begin investigating the boat

situation more intensely. Though they did send two female cut-outs to Valdemars to check on the progress of the boat he was having built, the cut-outs never returned. Hahn claims that the reason they were somewhat reluctant about leaving till then were the persistent rumors that even the western allies would arrive in Riga. These rumors were apparently originated by the NKVD so as to raise the general moral and to cause the partisans to leave the woods which some groups actually did because they believed that, since an order was given to all janitors to clean their premises, the western force could not be long in coming.

SKOBE was of the opinion that he and Hahn must leave Kurzeme as quickly as possible because the Russians would, no doubt, find them sooner or later, and must also be knowledgeable of their plans to flee to Sweden. The only difference of opinion between Hahn and Skobe consisted in the way the trip is to be undertaken the former felt that a boat and crew must be procured by force, at any point since one or two members of a crew would no doubt desire to flee, but all four necessary crew men would surely not have this desire. The latter, however, believed that they must all claim to be NKVD men who would order some fishermen to take them out to sea so as to catch a boatful of spies that is reportedly on its way to Latvia. In this plan one man was to be in Russian uniform.

The latter plan was used and Skobe was unanimously appointed leader of the entire undertaking. It was felt that should their deception be discovered, Hahn's idea of force could still be employed. Procuring a uniform of a Latvian who had been discharged from the Russian Army because of tuberculosis, Hahn began to seek gasoline for the group and to convince a segment of their group which opposed their plan to flee and desired to remain in Kurzeme, to cover the embarkation of the fleeing group. Hahn successfully completed his assignments, while Skobe used his group to reconnoiter the sea shore, find the best boat available, choose the approaches from the forest, and assign specific tasks to all participants.

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Hahn claims that after Ziedāns' arrest when the Russians began to comb the woods and his group joined Jkobens, the total number of persons in both groups was 25 plus 4 or 5 farmers who later fled to the woods, but left as soon as the Russians ceased their intensified raids of houses, of this group 17 were in favor of fleeing, while the 6 opposing this, remained and covered the embarkation of those leaving.

(51) In September of 1951 Hahn heard from a teacher, Jānis KALVĀ, that the NKVD had quite openly informed the fishermen in the vicinity of JURKALNE that they (NKVD) were awaiting a boat from Sweden in which "Arnitis" was to arrive. Regarding Arnitis, Hahn only knew that he had been faced throughout KURZEME as one of the most active workers in aiding persons to flee to Sweden. However, the infiltrators were not caught when landing as they landed at another site, debarking in the vicinity of JURKALNE, but did leave behind a rubber raft which they were forced to use since the boat either sank or was sunk on purpose. About a week later the Latvian militia arrested Arnitis and Petersons (or Smits) (Hahn is not certain which one) who had gone to Ventspils together as the group worked in pairs. A week prior to Hahn's departure he was informed by his reporters in PLANI (Majas) that Andersons would like to meet him. Unable to do so because of his decision to go to Sweden H instructed the leader of the remaining group, Maksis Kirpe, to meet Andersons. Later, in Sweden, Hahn was informed by Baldemar that Andersons was also arrested, interrogated, and tortured; for awhile Andersons was held in the Ventspils jail occupying the same cell with pastor Orivans. According to Waldemars in 1948 Andersons was in a special camp in Russia and could not be contacted.

About 2 weeks before leaving, Mrs. Ailse Lejins, a coworker of H's group, was arrested at a house in PLANI. On the way to Ventspils, she escaped from the NKVD during the night and returned to Hahn's group in the woods. She then related that she had seen Arnitis and another man (Petersons or Smits) who were being led toward Ventspils under guard.

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(54) All preparations were made for the boat to leave on 31 October 1945. The departure was successfully completed at 07:00 and was covered by the remaining group which consisted of: MARIJA KINATE, group leader who did not desire to leave because his wife was working in Riga as a teacher, having participated with her husband on the ill-fated attempt to flee to Sweden on the NOTA. She as a woman was released, while her husband later escaped from confinement.

- VALDIS UNVALS, alias STANISLAVS.
- LEZITE (true name unknown)
- JANIS (last name unknown) radio operator
- EDUARDS (last name unknown) former policeman
- ALBERTS (last name unknown) former policeman

D. Mohn's Post-war activities

(1) On 31 October 1945 Mohn along with other Latvians arrived in Sweden from Kursene in a fisher boat, having left Latvia from a Finnish wharf near the village of JURKALNE, four kilometers from the village proper. They arrived in Gotland at the fishing village of Lugele (south of Slite) after a 20 hour trip without any difficulty. The other persons in the boat were:

- Mrs. ALISS LAMINS /144/
- Mrs. VILTA SROBE /145/
- 1st Lt. KIMARS SROBE /146/
- 1st Lt. KALIS ROSZONKINIKIS /147/
- 1st Lt. KARLIS STRAUMI /148/
- 2nd Lt. NIKLAJS ZIRNIS /149/
- Police Lt. ROBERTS SMITMANIS /150/
- Sgt. ALFRIDS GIPARSONS /151/
- Cpl. PETERIS VIRSIS /152/
- JANIS V. ZALOVANIS /153/ War correspondent
- VILIS IV. NITAJIS /154/
- Cpl. JANIS KRUMS /155/
- VALDIS LANDMANIS
- FRU NIKES
- Sgt. MARIS SAKOBIS /156/
- JOHANN BUREDA /157/

Mohn and Srobe came out of Kursene with the assignment which was in part self imposed, to seek contact with a friendly Western nation so as to organize a return, if possible during that same year, or at least no later than the following year. They had arrangements for contact with the three radio sets remaining in Kursene

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one of which was in the forest near the Lake Vasa, the second being with the group that covered Mahā's departure, and the third being in Venetia operated by the aforementioned JAKOBSON. Mahā was also to find shoes and clothing which he was to send back with the infiltration group. Although Mahā a signal plan for the radio set held by the group which covered his departure, it was feared that this set may be too weak to send, and therefore arrangements were made that in such case this group would transmit ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ to Mahā through one of the other sets. On two previously arranged days of each month a reception committee would await the boats until the following year; this was a precaution in case radio contact could not be established. Later Waldemar reported that the group which covered Mahā's retreat was arrested at night in January 1946, and completely liquidated. The leader of this group, Maris Kieris, fell into Russian hands after being wounded.

(2) Shortly after his arrival in Sweden, the first Latvian who visited him was Haris Ginters, Secretary of Latvian the YMCA in Stockholm, and Latvian pastor Janis Svika. Both of these individuals had flown to Gotland from Stockholm and therefore had arrived one day before Maris Ziverts of Tenfers group. Svika and Ginters viewed the arrival of these seventeen persons as the follow up of an infiltration operation which they (Svika and Ginters) had organized two weeks before. This infiltration consisted of: Arvils, engineer, Anderson, sailor, and Petersons and Suits, and was financed by Swedish church funds, the church being interested in removing from Latvia as many clergy men as possible. As mentioned previously this operation was known to the NKVD already in September of that year and Mahā had heard about it through his underground channels.

(3) Informing Ginters of the arrangements of reception as well as possible radio contact, Mahā and Sasbe prevailed upon him to aid them in their assignments. It should be noted that neither Mahā nor Ginters were certain who the other was and therefore after some preliminary skepticism did find finally a common friend Heinricha Urkis, regarding whom Ginters expressed that "We are from the same camp" **SE** was the **USP**

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(5) Prior to releasing these 17 persons they were thoroughly interrogated under the direction of a Swedish coastal defence officer who used a German speaking lady as an interpreter. This lady, whose name Hahn has forgotten, was indeed a very helpful, sympathetic and understanding person. She advised the refugees that their position was precarious because ten days after their arrival in Sweden the Russian authorities had requested their return, because they were "war criminals" who had caused disorder and had stolen some property (the only true part of this according to Hahn is that they did steal the boat with which they came to Sweden). According to the lady interpreter this case was being studied by the Swedish Government and, in case of the group was forced to return, she advised that the refugees attempt to proceed through international waters to Lubeck, Germany. It is noteworthy that this lady informed the group as they were in Gotland they could receive aid and also taught them certain phrases in Swedish which would enable them to get by temporarily.

Later the group found that the Swedish Government had asked Bruno Kalmins for recommendations which he had supplied stating that though he didn't know these individuals personally he could only vouch for them because any Latvians escaping from Latvia at such a late date must be patriots. Janis Kalmanis later personally thanked Kalmins for this act.

After approximately one week the group as such was permitted to proceed to the mainland of Sweden, the two fishermen, who ferried the group across to Sweden under duress, were permitted to return to their homeland by the Swedish authorities having been given a certificate which stated that they were voluntarily returning. Arriving on the Swedish mainland all 17 persons were placed in the refugee camp in Huselans, where all eventually were informed of some employment possibility or other.

Staying in this camp from 8 November 1945 until 10 January 1946; H kept up his contact with Hugo Ginters who during his time informed him that his radio operator in the vicinity of SKILSTUKA ~~was~~ was constructing a radio set with which they could contact his homeland. In the end of November Ginters informed H that the construction of the radio was completed and H gave him his first message to Latvia;

which stated that attempts were being made to send a boat to Latvia in the next two months, and that the current international situation was extremely unfavorable. It was expected to find, in that the battle with Germany was continuing, and that the participants in the war should be prepared for a lengthy stay.

During that time, in order to reach persons who were not directly contacted by K. Ullis, MIVAKS and Dr. Ginters, a letter was sent out from the group, written by M. Skobe, with the cooperation of a Latvian group member. This letter, which was intended to have the possibility of transmission to the participants, M. Skobe did not give them this information because he felt loyal to Hugo Zinters but gave them an impression that the group had written letters so that they could be sent to the participants, and that in the future it was possible, yet receive a message which, if brought to Mahn, could be considered as such. It should be noted here that this activity of the group was not in the opinion of Mahn — not knowledgeable to the Swedish intelligence service, though during the war such activity conducted by the LCF for Swedish intelligence.

(6) Neither Hugo Zinters nor the LCF attempts to contact Latvia by radio using Mahn's signal plan proved successful because the group received no answers to his transmissions and the letter, also not receiving replies (because, as previously stated, Valdemars informed that the group had been apprehended.), attempted and was unsuccessful in establishing contact with the radio set in Ventpils with which its operator, Jakabs Arins, /159/ had a pre-arranged signal plan of 1945 vintage. Obviously Mahn never knew the contents of the messages received and sent in this connection but was informed of the fact that contact was made by Dr. Zinters.

By December 1945 it developed that support from the Swedish church was either not at all to be expected or at least a long way off. Consequently, Mahn and Skobe, who by that time were associated with H. Ginters and Astor Sytkis /160/ to the extent that were being viewed as the group, persisted and insisted that the letter try to procure this support at all cost since by that time H. Ginters and Sytkis realized that support from the Swedish Church would not be forthcoming and since they were continually plagued by Mahn and Skobe to procure such support, they finally informed the letter

two of the following giving this as the reason for abandoning all hope for Swedish church support:

In an attempt to remove all enemy propaganda from the Soviet occupied Baltic States, the Swedish church appointed pastor Harald Biezais as the head of this removal operation, covering the Latvian sector. Biezais then procured SVIKIS aid in this undertaking. After contacting Hahn and Grobe, Biezais gave them his word, under oath, that he would reveal nothing they told him to anyone, even his closest friends. Biezais, (whom H terms very ambitious), for this as well as personal reasons, never revealed any information regarding Hahn and Grobe to Biezais, as he (Biezais) felt certain that he would procure all the needed help from the Swedish church without the help of Biezais, thereby circumventing the latter completely.

However through Janis Krums, who Biezais reported in LITVA confirmed, Biezais found that Hahn had a signal plan, was planning a return trip to Latvia, and was collaborating with SVIKIS behind Biezais' back. Biezais then attempted to procure the signal plan from SVIKIS by any and all means. Failing to do so because SVIKIS had given his word to Hahn, Biezais then began a smear campaign, calling SVIKIS a communist and making statements that there were communist agents among the 17 refugees. Hahn and Mrs. Lejins therefore visited Biezais and demanded proof of his statements which he failed to produce. However, he stated that although he does not believe Hahn and Mrs. Lejins to be communist, but that there surely must be some among their group. They parted in a very unfriendly manner, Hahn and Mrs. Lejins insisting that had there been communists among them, they would never have reached Sweden.

Shortly thereafter the Swedish Socialist press began a campaign against pastor SVANTAR OJA who was the actual supporter of the program to exfiltrate clergymen from the Baltic states. According to Hahn SVANTAR OJA was a great idealist and friend of the Baltic states, aiding them their people as much as possible. The socialist press, at that time, accused SVANTAR OJA had also appropriated Swedish Gov't funds (the SVENSKA DIAKONISSTYRELSEN, the Swedish church, was government supported.) and was

engaged in illegal activities with me, as a member of the government had no right to do. I think I was there and I visited some large of nice... of funds, as he never admitted to my... of concentration operations. He was... then discharged from his position and... an insignificant... in one... village in the north of Sweden... the... church. I... as... in the heart and soul of this activity. The majority of Bruno Kalnina... blame him for this entire affair.

In December of 1945 H. Ginters informed Mann that he had been able to contact a representative of American intelligence at the Embassy in Stockholm. According to Ginters(H) the Americans were very interested and promised their final answer within a month; however month after month passed with no word, and led Mann to believe that H. Ginters may have possibly related an imaginary tale just so he could keep Mann's contact possibilities from other groups. Mann suspects H. Ginters tale to be untrue because H. Ginters had told him that the Americans would use the Labas y's radio for transmissions to Latvia, which seems quite peculiar to him. H. Ginters gave him no further info regarding his contacts with the US Embassy except that he had been in touch with one American working there. Mann, however, believes that H. Ginters contact was with one of two Latvians, Mrs PALMS and ARTUR. DRIMANIS, who both were employed by the Embassy's information section. Drimanis had known Skobe from their high school days in Latvia and hence, upon Skobe's arrival in Sweden, he often visited him. As far as Mann knows, Skobe never asked Drimanis about H. Ginters because at that time Skobe and he had no reason to doubt H. Ginters claim that he was in direct contact with the Americans.

In the beginning of December 1945 a documented Swedish intelligence officer, BJ Johanson, contacted Mrs. Lajins asking if she knew anyone of her group of refugees who would be interested in undertaking a mission to Latvia (checking with Hugo Ginters). Mann found that according to him such a person as John... Mrs Lajins replied that such persons were available whereupon Johanson stated that he would return

within two weeks in detail. Ginter was confirmed, and Hahn to believe that his information was correct, and the Soviet intelligence matter or not there was any truth to the idea that these refugees in the camps were partisans and are therefore to be taken into custody with aid, or, (b) the Jews were merely attempting to pass the authenticity of Russia that these refugees were NKVD agents.

(7) Failing to get Jewish church aid as well as American aid, Hahn and Jacobs procured a name (which Hahn does not recall) in the British Embassy from Ginters and attempted to interest the British in their behalf. (Jacobs spoke some English.) This particular individual was not available and hence Skobe spoke with someone else who replied that although they (The British) were sorry for the Latvian nation they could undertake nothing at that time.

(8) On one of his visits with Hahn, Ziverts requested Hahn to give him a situation report which Hahn had written in cooperation with Jalmenis and which depicted the situation in Latvia subsequent to the cessation of hostilities. Ziverts promised Hahn that by the most direct means he would send this report to the Latvian Ambassador in London, Karlis Zarins, whom H. Ginters also separately notified of the arrival of this refugee group and of the fact that Ziverts would be sending Zarins this aforementioned report. Later Zarins informed Hahn that he had never received this report whereupon Hahn sent him another copy.

On 10 January Hahn had the opportunity to be gainfully employed as a laboratory assistant for the Rockerfell Laboratory in Lund, and therefore left the camp but kept up his contact with Hugo Ginter and Jacobs, who remained in the camp.

Prior to leaving for Lund, H. Ginters warned Hahn that there were two Latvians in Lund who were suspected of working for the Soviets. Arriving in Lund Hahn found from his friend Pannous and from others, that such suspicions were actually held against (Jms OPMANBERG and ALFRIDS CILDEMANIS /161/. In Pannous opinion these suspicions were baseless and that these two persons were no doubt victims of a spy mania inherent in the emigre society which readily makes various accusations against persons who do not

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participate in the social functions and in general keep to themselves rather than enter into all sorts of intrigues.

In Feb 1946 Hahn held a speech at the YMCA in Lund where he talked about his experiences in Kursema and went to the surrender. (Hahn gave this speech on a total of 5 occasions, in Lund, Helsingborg, Borås, Jönköping, and Halmstadborg.) After this speech in Lund, Hahn was approached by CILDERMANIS who expressed the desire to have a chat with Hahn as he (CILDERMANIS) is very interested about the activities in the Kursema forests. CILDERMANIS' approach to Hahn was noticed by Janis Celasins /162/ and Dr. Augusts SKRISTIS /163/ who then warned Hahn not to reveal anything to CILDERMANIS and OJASKARSSON because of the aforementioned reasons. After a talk with Lunnarova, nevertheless met CILDERMANIS at the appointed time and place. Since both Lunnarova and Hahn were very careful about this meeting they agreed upon a certain length of time for the duration of the meeting which CILDERMANIS would observe. Lunnarova then accompanied Hahn to the meeting place and awaited his return no later than the time they had decided upon.

During the conversation it developed that CILDERMANIS had been active before the end of the war, in 1945, in the activities against the communist partisans. In this activity he worked with the SD in LIEPĀJA under NUOC PUKINS /164/ and Herberts TILDĀMANIS /165/. Hahn then remembered that he had met him in Kuldīga in connection with exchange of information between Pukins and the info section of the SD regarding communist activities in Latvia. Cildermanis then also recalled this casual meeting. After some talk about the "good old days", CILDERMANIS wondered if Hahn had any intentions of returning to Latvia. To this Hahn replied in the affirmative and indicated that it is difficult at the present time from a material and strictly nationalistic standpoint. CILDERMANIS then also expressed his readiness to return to Latvia and settle some old scores with some former communist partisans. CILDERMANIS also stated that he was aware of the rumors about his pro-communist attitude, but he based this on some previous comments made by him, when, working in Swedish swamps as a venial laborer, he fearing possible deportation from Sweden because of his previous activity with the SD, had made some leftist statements so as to erase an ~~ENTIRE~~ ~~ENTIRE~~ belief that he

had been a KGB.

When Hahn's apartment time had elapsed, he departed, and related all the foregoing to Childermanis, who was then very convinced that even if there was no basis for all the suspicions regarding Childermanis. In the summer of 1946 Hahn again met Childermanis and requested that he furnish him some Latvian maps which he claimed he needed for his boy scout activities in Lund (Hahn then was a scout leader of the Latvian boy scouts at that time that organized in Lund). In reality Hahn needed such maps for Lukins operation for which he prepared all maps. Childermanis did furnish Hahn a few maps.

In the fall of 1946 Celmainis stopped Hahn on the street in Lund and informed Hahn that his (Celmainis') suspicions of CHILDERMANIS were no figment of imagination as he had proof to support his suspicions. Celmainis then related that he had an old friend, a former Latvian officer, who is working for the Russians in Stockholm, and who at the same time is reporting to the Latvians. This friend, according to Celmainis, had written to the latter and requested that he warn Hahn that the Soviets are knowledgeable of his plans, as he (this friend of Celmainis) had read CHILDERMANIS report of the meeting with Hahn. Celmainis further mentioned the time, date, place, and duration of Hahn's meeting with CHILDERMANIS, which convinced Hahn of the authenticity of Celmainis' information. According to Celmainis, his friend had informed that Childermanis in his report had stated that Hahn and his friends are planning a return mission to Latvia and had suggested that Hahn be either recruited and "drawn to" the Soviets or be denounced and accused as working for them because he (Childermanis) considered Hahn dangerous. CHILDERMANIS' final suggestion in this report to the Soviets, was, that since he felt it impossible to recruit Hahn, the second alternative, that of spreading the rumor that Hahn is already working for the communists, be used.

Hahn then reproached Celmainis for not having told him this sooner as he had had the letter from his friend for a month, to which Celmainis said that he did not want to destroy Hahn's happy family reunion. (During this time Hahn had been able to

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and in the course of the operation of the boat, Skobe furnished a white flag, papers, the necessary maps, and other necessary supplies, and furnished all the necessary information, including the names of the participants in the operation. The names of the participants, including Skobe, Ieglis Oliva and Mrs. Baumanis, furnished to the Swedish operation, were also given to the operation. As far as Skobe knows Lukins had received for this operation 15,000 Swedish crowns, 17,000 crowns being sent for the purchase of the boat.

The operation took place on Christmas 1946, on the eve of the severe storm and the icebergs of the area the boat did not reach the national coast and returned to Sweden. Having created some alarm when leaving Sweden, as well as when returning in Gotland, the boat was picked up by the Swedish authorities when it returned. The Swedish customs officials found the weapons and other supplies in the boat which when the Swedish communist press became knowledgeable, creating a tremendous uproar and excitement. Most at fault in this fiasco was Skobe who acted somewhat incorrectly and diplomatically when the boat returned, by failing to talk to Frau Bonde /Lt/ as previously arranged. Bonde could easily have taken the entire situation in hand and covered the presence of weapons and other supplies to the satisfaction of the Swedish officials. However, Skobe chose to deal with the Swedes directly, disregarding Bonde's presence. If he had acted properly, another possibility existed so that the Swedes could have been delayed from boarding the boat and all damaging evidence could have been thrown overboard. As a result all participants in his operation, 1st Lt. Skobe, 1st Lt. Robesgruntnieks, air force Sgt. Thompsons, (or Tomsons), Frickis Knorras, Fonsavs, and the actual infiltrator, Albert (?) Juravics), were incarcerated for 9 months and as a result three of them, Skobe, Robesgruntnieks, and Thompsons were declared persons not grata in Sweden. The first two individuals went to Gotland, the last one remaining in Sweden since he had no place to go and could not merely be sent away by the Swedes. Just prior to departing from Sweden Skobe informed Kehn that during the interrogations nothing regarding his (Kehn's) participation had been revealed.

MUONINEN, LIINA, and others from the Latvian resistance, and later
devised they would have been in an operation, and would rather work and study
in Sweden. MANN also stated that he never saw the boat, and that he did not
know whether MANNING and others could give any information. He debriefed
them, shortly after the arrival, KARLIS ZIVANS, victim, was a refugee, and
despite their oath, he attempted to talk to MANNING, and furnished MANNING
a number of the fortifications of the port of Līvāni. MANNING also advised them to
abandon all hope of returning because the boat Latvians had already been brought out
of there and there is no interest in those who have remained.

The boat with which these four fled was built by them on the Līvāni lake,
and was exceptionally well constructed. Because of this Skobe tried to steal this
boat, but in the process he ran it into a cliff and the boat sunk.

One of these 4, Fricis Konrads is the same who participated in the abortive
LUKINS operation as the machinist. Due to his deportation order, he still lives in
Sweden and according to Mahn, is still desirous of participating in an expedition to
Latvia.

(11) In approximately August 1947 Mahn first met LUKINS personally who
together with MUON GINTINS then related the entire abortive SMER Christmas 1946
operation to him, expressing also the opinion that Skobe was at fault in this fiasco.

Luking then further related that in a radio (RICHARDUS ZANDE) operator to
Latvia. ZANDE established radio contact with LUKINS operator in Sweden JERARIS ARINS.
This contact then formed the basis for the second, abortive LUKINS operation, which
is described previously. LUKINS claimed that the cost for this operation was the
comparatively small sum of 5,000 Swedish crowns. The helmsman for this operation
was the same as for the following Christmas 1946 operation, from POMZAVS. Mahn claims
LUKINS never mentioned where he got the 5,000 crowns but Mahn believes that such a
sum could at that time easily have been procured from local Latvians.

According to LUKINS, ZANDE was landed at the fishing wharf of the fishing
village SKULTE. This Mahn explains not on the Kurzeme, but on the Vidzeme shore, SMER
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which required the boat to pass through the Straights of 1947. ZANDS was and a native in Latvia for approximately one year, during which time he traveled a great deal and sent very unsatisfactory messages, about which LUKINS was quite sure. On one occasion ZANDS requested that LUKINS furnish the NKVD information that he (ZANDS) had sent from Latvia. This obviously could not be considered with the ZANDS messages were not of the type and caliber to bring before an international body.

In approximately summer 1947 Zands was caught by the Russians. Hahn claims that LUKINS had good possibilities for communication with Latvia through Czechoslovakia. Through this mail channel LUKINS heard that Zands escaped from the Russians, but was later arrested and has not been heard of since.

Valdemars later informed Hahn that ^{his} organization was aware of Zands's arrival in Latvia, but because of his unsatisfactory and insecure conduct decided not to contact him. On their first and only meeting Valdemars told LUKINS that Zands along with 20 others was arrested when they were awaiting the arrival of the Christmas boat. According to Valdemars, they were arrested because a woman whom Zands had promised to take to Sweden was deleted from the list and another woman substituted. This caused the original woman to report Zands to the NKVD. LUKINS did not believe Valdemars account to be correct as he (LUKINS) was still in radio contact with Zands after the Christmas expedition fell through. Hahn was asked whether LUKINS did not realize that Zands could have been under control. To this Hahn answered that LUKINS felt that such could not have been the case because there had been ^{no} significant break in the radio contact to indicate this. Hahn does not know whether or not LUKINS had arranged control and compromise indicators with Zands. Furthermore Hahn claims that LUKINS radio operator Arins who was familiar with Zands's sign did not note anything unusual or out of place in Zands's transmissions.

In his talks with Valdemars, Hahn learned that in Valdemars opinion there were actually two men infiltrated in the operation "Rainis" and "Dainis". LUKINS never mentioned either of these names to Hahn and continually spoke of only one. Hahn

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Mahn is not certain whether there were one or two agents landed at that time, though he also questioned CANUDO 2 who knows Arins well, and whose opinion there were actually two involved in this operation. Mahn believes it quite possible that two cover names could have been used by Zande so as to confuse the Soviets.

(12) The following two indications lead Mahn to believe that the abortive Lukins operation of Christmas 1946 would possibly have been supported by French intelligence; Mahn has no further substantiating evidence.

a. In 1948 in a conversation the general trend of which Mahn does not recall, Lukins informed him that he is knowledgeable of a French penetration operation. Though Mahn could not recall the date of this operation, he believes it to have been said to have occurred in 1946. The operation was a submarine infiltration which intended to land one or more Latvian agents on the Lithuanian coast from whence they were to proceed to Latvia. The Latvian agents were recruited in Sweden, their recruiter or their training area not being known to Mahn.

The operation was unsuccessful because the submarine was forced to return since it was believed that the Soviet coastal defense guards had noticed it.

b. Estris Alberings, daughter of former Latvian Minister of Agriculture, was and is still today very interested and very active in partisan support and assistance work in Germany, she recently visited Silde a former underground member in Latvia. In general she is known to travel a great deal. Her previous background consisted of attending the French Lyceum in Riga which was an institution of grammar and high school levels in which the French language was used exclusively and in which the French influence was great. Estris Alberings was the mistress of Eriks Kobesgrundrieks, Strobes operational assistant.

It may be of some significance that in the summer of 1947 Lukins participated in a boy scout jamboree in France, as he had been the Patriar boy scout leader in Sweden.

(13) During the aforementioned meeting between Mahn, H. Ointers, and Lukins,

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H. Ointers informed them that he would have to disist from active participation in operational work because the last operation had brought him into serious financial difficulties. It was therefore decided that in order to renew this operation, Hahn would seek financial support from Swedish nationals in the Gotteborg area while Lukins would do the same in Stockholm. They did not succeed in this attempt. Lukins, finding himself in a precarious financial situation because he too had gotten into debt as a result of his abortive operation, became quite desperate and among many other possibilities mentioned the fact that possibly assistance would be procured from the Spanish Consulate in Stockholm with which he had in contact. Hahn thought that the contact could be procured through a casual acquaintance of his, Baroness Rene von CAPPIENHAUSEN, whose previous husband (the GERANO was a Mexican diplomat in Germany before the war. Arrogously believing that having been the wife of a Mexican diplomat she could have Spanish contacts, Hahn by mail contacted her non-in-law, his former friend George PUNNANOVIS whom he merely asked if his mother-in-law had Spanish contacts. His reply was in the negative and Hahn having informed him of nothing regarding the operation, discontinued the correspondence.

It is noteworthy that during this time, when Lukins and Hahn were seeking financial aid, the former told Hahn that if this planned operation were to succeed and he (Lukins) could prove that radio contact was established with Latvia, there would become available unlimited resources for further activities from the backers of his previous, abortive operation.

In October 1947 Hahn, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ^{EM PILLON} [] and Lukins discussed the possibility of creating a new, clean operations organization. This was agreed upon with no definite arrangements and concrete plans as no funds were available. During the discussions EM PILLON brought out the fact that the Lukins-purchased boat was unusable for further operations because pictures of it had appeared in the Swedish press, and suggested that some fishing boats belonging to Latvians in Sweden could easily be procured with the entire crew. At this time Hahn also met Kline for the first time and gave him all

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Min material regarding the partisans that could be utilized for propaganda purposes only, since Kalm had at that time begun to work on his book "Total Terror" which was to be originally published in Sweden. Hahn claims to have obtained information whatsoever was given to Kalm. Since Kalm was at that time preparing to immigrate to the US, Hahn gave him the assignment to attempt to procure aid for the partisans in Latvia, explaining to Kalm the situation in general. In January 1948 Kalm departed for the US with the promise to do all possible to procure aid.

(14) In the beginning of 1948 Lukins informed Hahn of a new project which consisted of infiltrating ~~of~~ one Latvian who was a trained radio operator and who desired to return because of his little daughter who had remained there. His (Lukins) plan was to use a small aluminum boat with an outboard motor. For this operation the minimum financial need was 5,000 crowns which it was felt could be procured without too much difficulty. Hahn's assignment was to ~~to~~ procure the finances which he felt he could procure through Lindress, the owner of a plumbing (engineering) concern in Goteberg whom Hahn contacted and who besides promising to furnish 3,000 crowns personally because of humanitarian reasons also recommended Hahn to several other Swedish business men who Hahn believed would furnish some aid. During this period of time Lukins had purchased this boat, while Hahn by correspondence discussed with the former the need for clear operational responsibilities which must be assigned to the members of their newly created group, to which ~~to~~ Lukins agreed.

It was then agreed upon that Lukins would be the technical chief responsible for all preparatory activities. ~~of~~ EXPILLO was charged with the training of all personnel. Hahn claims that neither he nor ~~to~~ were given specific responsibilities or tasks. The question of a leader was then discussed and though Lukins was opposed to Dr. Ginters, he finally agreed to abide with the decision of the majority that Dr. Ginters, who was sufficiently esteemed in Sweden, become the leader of the group. In order to inform Dr. Ginters of this decision and request him to accept the position of chief of the group, Hahn contacted him in March 1948, but found that Dr.

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Ginters, who is sympathetic, related that conditions had changed for the better, in that contact had been made with the Tibers who again seemed to be interested in the Latvian area. This seemed to solve the financial support problem and therefore Hahn acquainted Dr. Ginters with Lukins' new project. (Dr. Ginters knew Lukins well from previous days as well as all the details of the latter's abortive operations). In the interim Lukins had procured sufficient funds to purchase the needed boat and also contacted the Swedish state police (State Polis) among whom he had many old friends who promised him technical aid. However, since in the same month of that year an agreement between the Tibers and Tilbury was signed stipulating that Tilbury is to be the sole Latvian in charge of Tibers operations in the Latvian field; only on this condition did Tilbury consent to work for the Tibers who accepted this condition. This Tibers/Tilbury agreement was told to Lukins by his contact in the state police who further told him that he is forced to withdraw all promises because of an order from the top and that henceforth the Swedish authorities would cooperate only with Tilbury in any and all Latvian operations.

(15) Although Dr. Ginters had originally stated that he could procure support for Lukins' planned operation, it later developed that Tilbury did not agree to this, forcing Dr. Ginters, who Hahn later found was subordinate to him, to accept Tilbury's decision, which caused Lukins to believe that Dr. Ginters had evil intentions and therefore Lukins (who is very temperamental) broke with Dr. Ginters—therefore also with Tilbury because he not only felt deceived by Dr. Ginters but also did not agree with Tilbury's political views as these were the views of the LDF. Lukins having left, Hahn, BNPILLO, and BNPOTAL decided to await further results of this new Tilbury/Tibers arrangement.

In July 1948 Dr. Ginters contacted Hahn in the hopes that he (Dr. Ginters) could persuade them to work with the Tilbury group. In Hahn's opinion // the main reason for Dr. Ginters' desire to have Hahn and his friends join Tilbury's group was

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their ability to procure recruits for operational missions. According to Hahn, the LCP (i.e. TILBURY) never had been, is not now, and will never be able to procure recruits for penetration operations. During this meeting, Dr. Ginters informed Hahn in detail about the Tibars/Tilbury agreement. His entire narrative was known to Hahn who had been informed of it by Lukins, though Hahn was somewhat skeptical about its truth until Dr. Ginters confirmed it. One additional point which Ginters possibly brought out to quiet Hahn's fears was emphasized, this being the fact that in this arrangement the situation was such that Tilbury will not be influenced in his position by internal Latvian politics, i.e. the LCP political lines but will leave all politics aside in his operations.

Dr. Ginters next asked Hahn, if he and his co-workers, whom Ginters considered to be politically clean, would desire to join Tilbury group whereby he mentioned that at the same time— is he ~~was~~ accepted— Hahn was to compile a list of friends and acquaintances whom he was to classify in the following manner depending upon each individual's desire:

- a. Those ready to undertake a penetration mission at any time
- b. Those interested in undertaking a mission to Latvia only in time of war.
- c. Those interested in remaining in Sweden so as to be able to fight as partisans in case of a Russian invasion of Sweden.

The applicants for the above assignments were, in accordance with Dr. Ginters wishes, to write a personal history of themselves, paying particular attention to education, language qualification, and their opinions re communism as well as any activities in opposition to communism (anti or pro-Germanism was not of interest). Those applicants with families could be assured that their families would be cared for and would be placed in a safe place outside of Sweden in case of war. Hahn indicated doubt that the Swedes would be able to accomplish all this and that their own house was clean, i.e. Hahn believed that the Tibars were penetrated by communist agents.

Lengthy debates ensued which lasted far into the night and ~~on~~ ⁱⁿ the early morning Dr. Ginters finally revealed to that the Broadway was behind all this. Dr. Ginters further amplified this by saying that the Broadway was behind Tilbury group unknown to the Tibars and that his fact must not only be withheld at all cost from the Tibars but also from all other Latvians. From the Broadway contact with Tilbury the following Broadway interests and opinions could be evidenced:

a. Broadway believed that in case of a Russian invasion of Sweden, the Swedish people would be poor opponents to the Russians while the Latvians, who were experienced and would surely oppose the invaders would make much more suitable partisan leaders whom Broadway could then support.

b. Broadway would be able to support Latvian partisans much more satisfactorily than the Tibars.

c. Guarantees for families of Latvian participants have been given by Broadway (and not by the Tibars as stated before).

d. Broadway would judge by the biographies which individuals would be acceptable to them.

Though at first Hahn felt that it was unwise to furnish biographies to the Tibars he agreed to furnish them to Broadway because he felt that this was sufficiently secure. To this Dr. Ginters added that the biographies were to be furnished as soon as possible because it was intended to ~~begin~~ begin training very shortly. Hahn feels that this urgency had some connection with the current international situation at that time (the Berlin airlift ~~is~~ had just begun). Furthermore Dr. Ginters felt that Hahn should personally meet Tilbury with whom he could then discuss this matter.

Discussing this matter with [] an NEPILLOW in detail the former still felt uncertain and refused to believe that Tilbury and the LCP had given up all political ambitions. NEPILLOW being interested, particularly in the training phase, completed a very general biography along with Hahn; [] refused to do this.

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On 19 August 1948 Hahn met Tilbury in the presence of Dr. Ginters. Tilbury also assured Hahn - who specifically requested such assurance - that he Tilbury had no political interests in this operational work and that he Tilbury could vouch for no LCP connection and interference in this matter. Regarding training in Sweden, Tilbury felt it would present a problem in that it would be difficult to conceal this until that time no solution had been found.

THE Tilbury also mentioned during this conversation that this work had been begun by him, Dr. Ginters and former Latvian Ambassador to Sweden Valdemars Salnajs; Tilbury further stated that since Salnajs had just died, the two remaining, he and Dr. Ginters, would have to continue alone.

During the following months Hahn furnished three further ex biographies about Dr. GEORGE MURNEVOVS, JANIS ZULSITIS, and Lt. Army Capt. JANIS JANRAVS. All these applied for the aforementioned C group (See para 15, on Hahn's advice. These and the biographies of Hahn and RUPILLOW were the only ones furnished Tilbury by Hahn, as the latter-influenced by [] [] suspicions - also was somewhat uncertain as to whether or not Tilbury political ambitions would again come to the fore. Later, writing to Dr. Ginters, Hahn used the excuse that he did not possess the means to travel extensively and hence the small amount of biographies; the truth of the matter was that Hahn decided to await any substantiation to his belief that Tilbury would again begin his political meddling.

(16) The following indications lead Hahn to believe that **VALDEMARIS SALNAJS**, former Lat. Ambassador to Sweden who died in the summer 1948 in Sweden was Tilbury contact with the Broadway.

a. Tilbury in his talk with Hahn mentioned SALNAJS as one of the three leaders in this group, the others being Tilbury himself and Dr. Ginters.

b. SALHJÖ, according to TILUOKI was very active during the war in continuing contact with Latvia.

c. Just prior to the German surrender Hahn was informed by OSVALDS RILESKALNS, that in case Hahn did indeed proceed to Sweden, RILESKALNS would furnish him the name of one of the foremost Latvians in Sweden who is in a position to put Hahn in contact with a western democracy which would be able to aid the partisans. This RILESKALNS never had the opportunity to do.

On the other hand, VOLDEMAR related to Hahn in 1948 that RILESKALNS has informed him, that TILUOKI has been in contact with BROADWAY since 1936. (Later, in March 1950, the BROADWAY case officer who contacted Hahn in Sweden replied to Hahn's question as to whether it was true that TILUOKI has been in contact with BROADWAY since 1936 by brushing it off and saying, that it is true, but that this was not a very serious, but rather just a "routine" contact which BROADWAY has been in the habit of undertaking and keeping with many important and well-known Latvian high-ranking officers.

(17) In October 1948 Hahn received a phone call from HUDO GINTERS who informed Hahn that an acquaintance from Latvia had arrived and that HUDO GINTERS would do all possible that this acquaintance get to see Hahn. After one week Hahn received a letter from VOLDEMAR in which he told Hahn that the battle in his homeland is continuing and that one of the leaders there (it later developed that this was OSVALDS RILESKALNS) still holds Hahn in high regard because of his excellent activities in Kursk.

In the beginning of November 1948 VOLDEMAR arrived in Mid, Sweden, Hahn's having received money for the trip from BONNE and instructions how to reach Hahn from GINTERS. According to VOLDEMARS, the Swedish authorities did not attempt to detain him in any manner and, after a thorough debriefing conducted by an TICMARS staff member in German as well as by TILUOKI himself, Voldemar was permitted to visit Hahn. The reason this permission was so readily granted, Hahn believes, is the fact that TILUOKI, no doubt, then considered Hahn to be a member of his group and hence believed that Hahn

would only bring Valdemar closer to TILBURY.

Just prior to leaving Stockholm Valdemar was informed by HUGO OINTERS that he (H. OINTERS) had seen to it that VALDEMAR's dossier was completely removed from the general files of the Aliens Commission and placed in a very special file to which only one Swedish official had access. Later, in '40, Hahn helped VALDEMAR procure a ration card which, along with his identity documents, was in his true name, although whenever possible VALDEMAR used the alias VALDEMAR JANTZEN.

Remaining with Hahn until the end of January 1949, VALDEMAR related that he (VALDEMAR) has agreed to cooperate with TILBURY giving TILBURY his word of honor that he would work with no one else. Hence VALDEMAR had been forced to reject HUGO OINTERS to put him in touch with ABE. HUGO OINTERS claimed that he had such contact with an American who is quite anxious to meet him. HUGO OINTERS then described the meeting place which to Hahn sounded like the US Embassy in Stockholm. HUGO OINTERS did not reveal any further details about his US contact, except to say later, after VALDEMAR had declined, that HUGO OINTERS' American friend could not understand why VALDEMAR would not seek contact with the US.

During his stay with Hahn VALDEMAR expressed regret that he had been unable to fulfill two wishes requested by the partisans in Latvia:

- a. To work only directly with foreign intelligence agencies.
- b. To seek particularly US contact.

Hahn told VALDEMAR that he felt that VALDEMAR had been affected by the high rank of TILBURY to whom he could not show insubordination as a former enlisted man. Be that as it may and whatever the reasons may be behind it, VALDEMAR felt he could not break the promise he had given TILBURY. Valdemar also expressed regret that the letter that Hahn wrote in reply to VALDEMAR's letter did not reach him before he made his promise to TILBURY. In this reply Hahn warned VALDEMAR not to reveal anything prior to studying the entire situation. Hahn had further explained to VALDEMAR that

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In Sweden there are numerous groups all motivated by ambition and that VALMERS should be careful lest he be misled.

Seeing the lack of political harmony in exile which disappointed him greatly, and seeing no possibility to find suitable infiltration candidates, VALMERS, who had originally decided to remain in Sweden and Halm (considered as a reserve candidate) volunteered to H. GINTERS in December 1949 to return to Latvia.

So as not to lose the possibility of procuring US aid in the future, Halm and VALMERS worked out a signal plan and an operational plan which would be completely divorced from and never revealed to the Swedes and/or TILVNY. At first their plan was to procure US aid through H. GINTERS, however, this was later changed because LUKINS claimed that it was he and not H. GINTERS who had contact with the US. In fact H. GINTERS was claiming that he had contact with US officials when, according to LUKINS, it was LUKINS who had the actual contact on which H. GINTERS based his claim. LUKINS then revealed that it was the US Naval Attache in Stockholm with whom he was in contact and who had supported the abortive Christmas 1946 expedition.

18. In the end of January 1949 VALMERS, Halm and JAVIS KRUMS began training in radio Russian Army CB, tradecraft, and firing in preparation for a Spring infiltration. The training was conducted by the following TIEMAS case officers in German language: encoding and decoding instructor- JANTOR, Radio Chief Instructor - SIMANSON, Tradecraft (2 hrs.) ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ CB and firing instructor who also was in charge of all training, - Capt. ANDERSON, (a third, another radio instructor, Halm cannot recall.

This training was conducted in the safe house for Estonians who were simultaneously being trained for this mission. The Lithuanian candidates also participated in this training at the living quarters of the Estonians. All three safehouses were located on the Island of LIDTOS, the Latvians being located in the summer home belonging to Swedish archeology lecturer OKIJJALL.

On one occasion an American archeologist was visiting
GEIJVALL. This gave Valdemars some idea that possibly this man
could be approached to furnish U. S. aid, but nothing came of it.

Since in the beginning, when Hahn was recruited, there was
some reservation in Dr. Gluter's mind that Hahn should be used
for this mission, and since as training progressed it developed that JANIS
KNIBS was unsatisfactory for such an undertaking, TILBURY requested
that Hahn come to Stockholm where TILBURY then stated that his
superiors desired some clarity as to how many Latvians would
participate in this operation. Hence TILBURY desired a final
answer from Hahn. Hahn claims that he then declined to participate
in the infiltration because of the following reasons:

a. In a discussion with Valdemars, Hahn and he both felt
that, had the landing site been somewhere on the Latvian coast,
Hahn would have been of great help. But since it has been decided
to use the Lithuanian coast, Hahn could not be as useful.

b. Valdemars claimed that his organization was having enough
difficulty legalizing those Latvians coming out of the woods or re-
turning from Russia proper, that Hahn would only be an additional
burden; furthermore Hahn never having had experience in illegal
living would, no doubt, have to be "led by the hand" and would
"jump every time he saw a Russian".

c. TILBURY's lack of security, as well as the fact that one
of the Lithuanian traitors had, when inebriated revealed that an
operation was to be undertaken, caused Hahn to reconsider. Further-
more, a meeting with LUKINS not only strengthened his fears of
lack of security, but also revealed that this operation had political
overtones because LUKINS stated that all LCP members were saying

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that "now they really had the right men going on". Relating this evidence of political overtones to Dr. Gidters (Hahn did not reveal the source), Dr. Gidters said that such could not be the case and that this was only "the talk of the LCP opposition".

d. Valdemars also desired that Hahn remain in the western world, because he (Valdemars) then felt that there was a capable person who could remain this side of the iron curtain who could not only be depended upon, but also could attempt to activate the underground organization which was to a great extent divorced from Valdemars group.

19. The course lasted two months, was very general in nature, and lacked proper control and security, although the instructors were quite satisfactory.

So that the Latvian partisans would not lose the possibility of U. S. aid, as already mentioned. Valdemars arranged a signal plan and contact chain with Hahn which was completely divorced from that arranged by TILBURY with Valdemar. In addition KALNE, in the U. S. was notified that representative from the homeland partisans had arrived and that he should do all possible to arouse U.S. interest in this divorced and separate operational plan of Hahn's. KALNE answered only 6 months later, which caused Hahn and Valdemar to decide to contact in order that radio contact with Sweden (Hahn) be arranged in the presence of Valdemar LUKINS, who had a radio set at his disposal. It was arranged that LUKINS, whose radio operator JARIS LAIGA (now in U.S. since 1949) would not be knowledgeable of the code, but rather would become the "technician" in charge while Hahn would encode and decode all messages; no conditions

Security :

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that LUKINS would see the traffic were made.

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20. JANIS KRUMS, the 3rd trainee, formerly of SKOBE group, wrote to BROFF in England and among other items, mentioned the fact that a person had returned from Latvia. SKOBE thereupon wrote to Hahn, requesting the latter to confirm this information and also informing Hahn that he is working for BHOATWAY. Hahn replied that KRUMS was imagining things which, incidentally, he often did and for which he was well known. The fact that SKOBE was working for BHOATWAY was revealed by Hahn to TILBURY, who showed dislike that such was the case, though Hahn thought that some coordination was now needed.

21. Shortly, before the operation Valdemar showed Hahn a written document which TILBURY had given to VALDEMAR. This document which was destined for VALDEMAR'S organization in Latvia and which TILBURY requested VALDEMAR not show to Hahn, contained the general as well as internal Latvian emigre situation, the latter clearly indicating that LCP had supremacy in Latvian politics and stating quite falsely - that the LCP is the only organization which is now and has ever done anything for the liberation. This declaration was signed by MINTAUTS CAKSTE, one of the LCP leaders and son of the first Latvian President JANIS CAKSTE; signing this document he used the pseudonym "ZIEMELIS". In this declaration VALDEMAR was called "VALTERIS". According to Hahn, VALDEMAR was documented as VALTERIS RIMSTINS in 1944/45 in Kurzeme.

22. The VALDEMAR infiltration, having been delayed from 7 April 1949 - 30 April 1949; took place on 30 April 1949, with the following persons participating as far as Hahn knows:

- a. Latvians - VALDEMAR
- b. Estonians - MAX - sub later - on his way from Lithuania

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to Estonia - died of pneumonia. The second is not known.

c. Lithuanians - BHIFLIS - half Lithuanian, half Latvian, who in this operation used the alias OSIS.

ICEKOR - who was Lithuanian chief for Swedish operations. After the operation he was replaced as chief of Lithuanian operations for TIEBALS by a Lithuanian professor who arrived in Stockholm from London.

Third name not remembered, but Hahn does know that he was comparatively recent partisan arrival from Lithuania.

The group was successfully landed somewhere on the Lithuanian coast. However, as it later could be deduced from VALDEMARS letters to Hahn and from some of TILBURY utterings, VALDEMAR had lost either all or at least a majority of his supplies and equipment including either his radio or his crystals. (These letters to Hahn contained no secret writing though VALDEMAR did have a special type of secret writing pencil which he received from TILBURY who said it came from BROADWAY and which he used for communications with TILBURY to whom VALDEMARS wrote addressing his letters with his true name and real address). (Later, when Hahn talked to BROADWAY representative, George Kilgour, the latter requested that Hahn furnish him all letters he had received from VALDEMARS so that the BROADWAY could ascertain whether or not these letters did not contain S/W. Hahn claims that TILBURY too had asked for these letters, but was told that they had been burned)

- | Page | Question |
|-------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 38 | From whom in the resistance and on what authority did Skobe and Hahn undertake this assignment?
Size, composition, organization of the three resistance groups. |
| 39 | "Tepfers group" means LCP? <i>YES</i> |
| 40 | Hahn's exact role in under found. Skobe's role was <i>partisan</i>
Who is Grivans <i>Grivans</i> ? <i>Group leader</i>
Who is Heinrich Urkis? In what sense is he member same group?
Members Latvian Assistance Committee. <i>Explained...</i> |
| 40-41 | Why should group with different aim and field of operations <i>explained</i> have been considered of danger to Hahn and Ginters? |
| 41 | What is known of future activities of Mrs. Lejins? <i>(See appendix)</i> |
| 42 | How did Hahn know about the info being passed to the British?
Further info on Kikulis. <i>(See appendix)</i> |
| 46 | Identity of person in British Embassy? <i>NOT Remembered</i> |
| 47 | Hahn's activity from 10 Jan 46 to May 46? <i>Explained</i> |
| 48 | Details of Skobe's undiplomatic actions. <i>Explained</i>
Are Robesgrundnieks any relation to Robesnieks? <i>NO</i> |

- 49 Hahn's activity from Summer 1946 to August 1947 (1 year)-?
 Did H. Winters introduce Hahn to Lukins? *NO. Hahn arranged to meet LUKINS by mail - Ginters was not present when they met.*
- 50 This is first appearance of Anderson and Peterson in narrative. *Therefore: details of how they got together, details of partnership, each one's sphere, contacts of each (may use SC chart as basis).*
- 51 Name of radio operator or description. *NOT known*
 Who is Lindros? Why he willing to back illegal op to such extent when he Swedish citizen? *Explained*
 Details of SC: persons, status of each, degree of knowledge, etc
- 52 Why did V. Ginters look up Hahn? *Explained.*
- 53 Names of agents in trench op? From where did sub leave? *not known*
 Coordinated with SIS in any way? *NO*
 Does "former underground operator" refer to Silde or Alberings?
 Details in either case: *Explained*
- 54 Subsequent activities of Eriks Rob a, runnieks? *appendix*
 Date of info in Para 10? (Presume June 48).
- 55 *What is "C" group? explained*
 Did Dr. Ginters ever mention Amb. Salnajs in this connection? *NO*
- 57 Why did V. go to Hid? Did SIS send him on just agree or what?
 Details on H. Winters contact with AIS. *Explained*
- 58 SIS training. Arrangements of pay, insurance, assurances of return, etc. Training cover, cover for agents, methods of training, op planning, briefing. Hahn once mentioned some of training material came from SIS-?
 Janis Krums-details.
- 59 Wasn't arrangement of signal was already breach of V. promise?
 On what did its future use depend?
- 60 What developer for SE? How does Hahn know no SE?
- 62 Any indication whatsoever that SIS did contact V. Hahn told Robert XX "Hillmaing", Lot Ellscur. *no name mentioned in Robert (Hahn)*

65 Continue through summer 51: More Kilgour contacts by Peterson or Anderson? other BIS? Skobe? Kalme?

Lamberg

Saulitis

RMB

Sarvovs-Kreicis

V. Ginters-Rancans connections and associates.

Vilkankis

Attempted landing of Peter and Janis Robesnieks, Vilkankis, and Janis Orunis (Fall 1950). *Seems to be SIS or divorced from Tappan / LCP complex.*

Kikulis

Ziverts relationship to Hahn, ex SIS, during later contacts.

Internal resistance orgs: Bileskalns, Valdemar, Deglavs, etc.

Questions based on Lamberg's answers.

Knowledge of other Sw. or Brit. ops in Sweden during his residency, or independent ones, successful or not. Kalnina?

*LC Paper
VILKANKIS*

brothers

Seems to be SIS or divorced from Tappan / LCP complex.