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14 November, 1986

Michael Lawrisky

Dr Michael Lawrisky
Australian-Ukrainian Review
3-11 Russell Street
ESSEXTON VIC 3040

Stamp: PDS/222

Dear Dr Lawrisky,

I have had an opportunity to read the Spring issue of the Australian-Ukrainian Review.

I was most concerned by the article on pages 10 and 11, which claims that the ABC failed to adequately research the series "Nazis in Australia" and as a result broadcast defamatory material.

As I indicated in my earlier letter, the series was meticulously researched. ABC Radio's Head of Specialist Talks, Peter Morton, asked John Loftus to provide a further detailed account of the research undertaken to support the statements made in relation to Jaroslav Stetsko.

John Loftus' reply is attached.

In the light of the serious charges you make against Mr Loftus, I request that you publish his response in its entirety in the next issue of the Australian-Ukrainian Review.

Yours sincerely,

MWJ
MALCOLM LONG
Director, Radio

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October 20, 1986

Peter Morton
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Australian Broadcasting Corporation
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145-153 Elizabeth Street
Sydney 2000 Australia

Dear Mr. Morton,

Thank you for forwarding the article on page 10, Australian-Ukrainian Review, Spring 1986. The article implies that neither I nor Professor Dallin know of any evidence to show that Steako's Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) collaborated with the Nazis or were involved with atrocities. The article implies that I had not even read the Nazi documents cited by Dallin, and that the OUN was a benign organisation that assisted Jews with false passports. Finally, the article insinuates that my criticism of the OUN stems from communist sympathies. Each of these allegations are false and I shall rebutt them specifically.

Firstly, I not only read the Nazi documents cited by Professor Dallin in his book *German Rule in Russia*. I flew to California in 1980 to interview Professor Dallin on behalf of the Justice Department. Professor Dallin graciously loaned me the three cases of Nazi documents that he used in writing the book. Not only did I read them, in many cases I verified their accuracy against original Nazi records in the U.S. National Archives.

Next, the article implies that the West German government rejected Dallin's research in the Oberlander case. Since Oberlander was convicted as a war criminal, as I recall, I doubt these allegations. Professor Dallin's international reputation as a historian needs no defense from me. Even if these charges were true, there may have been a very good reason for Professor Dallin to withhold certain source material. I shall now reveal what Professor Dallin perhaps could not tell the West German Government in 1961, since it

was declassified only recently; the U.S. government had a secret Nazi document entitled The Treatment of the Russian Problem during the Time of the National-Socialist Regime in Germany. For nearly forty years, the contents of this voluminous manuscript have been classified TOP SECRET by the U.S. Army, and was available, until very recently, only to federal employees.

The manuscript is a personal account of the recruitment and secret collaboration of various Russian, White Russian, and Ukrainian groups with Nazi intelligence during World War II. The author is an unimpeachable Nazi source, S.S. Obersturmbannführer Friedrich Buchardt, who helped coordinate the Nazi mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) on the Eastern Front. In return for his encyclopedic knowledge of secret Nazi collaborators, including the GUN, Buchardt was hidden from the Nuremberg Prosecutors by American Intelligence. The remainder of the Einsatzgruppen leaders were convicted as major war criminals and, with few exceptions, were hanged. To my knowledge, Buchardt was the only S.S. Einsatzgruppen leader to escape justice.

I verified Professor Dallin's carbon copy of Buchardt's manuscript by comparing it with the original in the Top Secret-Sensitive Document collection of the Army Chief of Staff for Intelligence. In addition, I cross-checked the Buchardt manuscript against the unpublished and classified Einsatzgruppen reports, as well as against our War Department Project (WDP) microfilm document collection of captured Nazi documents concerning the Ukraine and White Russia.

In addition, I had unrestricted access to the still classified eleven volume collection of the GUN/S which Nikola Lebed turned over to Army CIC, which consists of the internal files of the GUN. Professor Dallin and I are perhaps the only people alive who have had complete access to the original Nazi records of the GUN which have been classified by American intelligence for the last forty years. The Buchardt S.S. manuscript is indisputably authentic. I have a declassified, translated version in my possession. The original German manuscript is in Top Secret Vault No.6, ACBI-SD Index, Confidential Informants Series, Suitland, Maryland.

I find it amusing that some Australian Ukrainians are denying the Nazi roots of the GUN. According to Buchardt, the GUN in Australia was in secret contact with high-level Nazi party leaders prior to 1933 through a man named Konowalek. According to Buchardt, (p.8), "Konowalek was the head of the extreme-nationalistic Ukrainian secret organization GUN which was active all over the world and supposedly was financially

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supported especially by Ukrainian emigrants in Canada, USA and Australia. It developed a very active subversive and conspirative activity and would also not refrain from violence." Confirmation of Buchardt's charges can be found independently in Sayre and Kahn's book Sabotage, which describes OUN terrorist activity on behalf of the Nazis in pre-war America, including torture chambers, bombings, and robberies.

Admiral Canaris, head of German Military Intelligence (Abwehr) noted in his diary that he planned to use the OUN for the "annihilation of the Jews and the Poles." (Nuremberg Doc. J047-78). Buchardt confirms that the plans were carried out (p.158): "The cooperation existing between the German authorities - particularly the German intelligence service - and the OUN became effective for the first time in the German-Polish war when the OUN supplied services of all kinds to the German armed forces entering the Ukrainian settlement areas of Poland."

After the OUN proved its Nazi devotion in the Polish campaign, Buchardt notes (p.159): "The German intelligence service continued the promotion of the OUN because it was the intention to make use of its connections for their own intelligence service as well as for actions behind the Russian front during the expected war...Based on this assumed decisive back-up, the OUN showed an increasing radicalism...This provoked a split in the OUN...whereby the more moderate, predominantly older members, led by Colonel Melnik, left the organization while Bandera continued its policy."

According to Buchardt (p.16), Bandera's faction (OUN/B) continued through 1940 and 1941 with the planning for Operation Barbarossa: "In the south of the eastern front, in Ukraine, the above mentioned Ukrainian nationalist organization OUN had been very much used already during the preparation of the Russian campaign by the German armed forces, particularly by the German intelligence. A close cooperation had been developed between the OUN under Bandera and the German authorities..." Buchardt notes that the OUN's role increased after the invasion to a new and more sinister role (p.24) "Thus, the OUN was used, before the war, largely for intelligence purposes and later, during the advance, to put at the disposal leaders knowing the regions and the languages as well as for purposes of sabotage actions behind the Russian lines."

For the first time, Buchardt confirms that the OUN was secretly behind the selection of local collaborators for the Nazi security machine in the Ukraine, p.26: "Ukrainians,

mostly persons named by the OUN, were then also immediately nominated as temporary mayors, police chiefs, etc." Mykola Lebed was in charge of the internal security section of Bandera's OUN faction (OUN/BS) and helped the Nazis hand-pick OUN members to staff the police forces all across the occupied Ukraine. Lebed later provided his files to U.S. intelligence, including the security checks for some 8,000 OUN members listing their positions in the Nazi police and security agencies.

Buchardt admits that these local police forces created feelings of terror in the conquered areas (p.27): "Even though the first contact with the German occupation power - the organizational confusion, the lack of planning, the first arbitrary measures of violence, the first shooting of Jews...-already created often mistrust and even already aversion and feelings of hatred..." Buchardt's S.S. account confirms Dallin's independent charges (id. at p.113) that: "During the following days of chaos, it became obvious to the Germans that Bandera's followers, including those in the 'Nightingale' regiment, were displaying considerable initiative, conducting purges and pogroms."

Dallin adds in a footnote: "For some information on Banderovite excesses against Russians, Poles, and Jews, as well as members of the rival OUN/M, see W. Diewerge, ed., *Deutsche Soldaten sehen die Sowjetunion* (Berlin: Limpert, 1941), p.45; Einsatzgruppen Reports July 16, August 2, and 20, 1941; Petro Yacovyl, "K desiatol godovschina velikoi provokatsii", *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik* (New York), xxi (1951), 138-49." The citation in Dallin's footnote indicates that these Ukrainian Einsatzgruppen Reports are not available to the general public. These incriminating S.S. records, like Buchardt's manuscript were also classified by U.S. intelligence to protect the OUN.

Not to be outdone by OUN/M in antisemitism, the S.S. noted that OUN/M had promised Hitler that they would also free Europe of its Jews. (Unpublished S.S. Einsatzgruppen Report, July 15, 1941). (It was denied that Jaroslav Stetsko, in one of his first acts of "government" issued a public call for the destruction of the Jew-Bolshevik menace in the Ukraine. The murder of Jews was the official policy of both political factions of OUN. The Nazis followed the same policy in every country they invaded: hire a native organization to secretly recruit police volunteers who would help the Nazis with their mass executions. The Ukraine was no exception.

As Buchardt notes, p.72, these local police Battalions were granted some advantages by the Germans, including better

rations in return for their "security tasks." The nature of these "security tasks" is well-documented in the West German court records in 1976 in several cases where Ukrainian police battalions committed systematic mass murder. In addition, the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Canada has identified an OUN leader in Volyn as one of the police commanders who supervised the infamous massacre of Jews at Babi-Yar.

Some Ukrainian revisionists have claimed that the OUN could not have collaborated with the Nazis because its leaders were persecuted and imprisoned within a month after the war. There is only a little truth in that. One faction of the Nazis, the Gestapo, hated the OUN. Other factions, including the Abwehr and the Gauleitung, supported the OUN enthusiastically. Suchardt's faction, SS-SD (Amt VI), at first hated the OUN, but soon changed its mind when confronted with the task of policing the Ukraine with only a handful of German troops.

Stetsko and the other OUN/S political leaders were temporarily arrested after their premature declaration of an "independent" Ukraine offended the Gestapo. Some of the pro-Stetsko police chiefs were removed, but by and large, the OUN-dominated police forces not only remained intact, but the S.S. out of necessity actually expanded them in 1941-1942 from mere auxiliary policemen to full-fledged police battalions.

Sensing a new dependency (or weakness) by the SS, Ränders sought to avenge his previous betrayal by organizing his own military force. As Suchardt notes (p.160): The military group of the OUN being called UPA...started a lively partisan activity and grew consistently in numbers through the Ukrainian youth who wanted to avoid being sent as workers to Germany." For a brief period of time, the OUN had its own renegade force hiding in the forests which would fight anyone who bothered them, including the Germans.

In order to wean potential police recruits away from the political leadership of the OUN, the S.S. dangled a new bait in front of their noses: the elite honor of having their own Ukrainian S.S. Division. As Suchardt notes, p. 160. "The Germans hoped, in particular, to cut the ground away beneath the feet of the OUN or UPA with the formation of this division." The new SS policy was enacted by "the new Governor for Galicia, Dr. Wechter, who was appointed at the turn of the year 1942/43", and according to Suchardt, P.160 "was considered a friend of the Ukrainians and attempted to further strengthen the Ukrainian self-administration. Since he had good relations to Hitler, he succeeded in the establishment of an own Ukrainian division of the Military SS...and that it

were released in September 1944 or temporarily held in loose house arrest in a Berlin villa." (Buchardt, p.238).

Bandera bargained hard throughout 1944 and 1945 with the SS for recognition of the OUN as an official ~~facially~~ ally of the Third Reich. Until official recognition was given, Bandera would collaborate only to the extent of "joint tactical actions; if the Germans would be willing to render counter-services - for example, supply special weapons, medicine, etc. - one would comply with special German wishes concerning the blasting of bridges, supplying of militarily important information, etc. on the part of the UPA." (Buchardt, p.240).

Perhaps sensing that a German defeat was imminent, Bandera preferred to keep the extent of his collaboration a secret, and suggested to the SS "that a neutral personality was to take over the formation of the Ukrainian Committee who had the confidence of the Germans as well as of the OUN and of the remaining Ukrainian-German groups within the German sphere of influence. The Ukrainian General Schandruk was finally proposed for this position. - This was the result of a number of negotiations between the Germans, on the one hand, and Bandera and Orlov, on the other hand." (Buchardt, p.240).

However, Bandera and the UPA kept raising their demands, insisting that the Nazis favor the OUN more than Vlasov's army which undercut Schandruk's negotiations. Bandera wanted the OUN to be the preeminent Nazi force, and according to Buchardt, p.242-243, had the backing of Himmler and SS Group Leader Wachter, who "was considered the one-sided friend of the Galician Ukrainians whose anti-Russian attitude he had always strengthened." By the time that the rest of the Nazis agreed to all of Bandera's demands, the war was almost over.

In sum, Buchardt's manuscript is quite sympathetic to the OUN and critical of German mismanagement and lost opportunities. One is left with the impression of an S.S. leader sadly pining for the on-again, off-again romance with OUN. It is quite farcical for modern Ukrainians to allege that Bandera's ~~(gang)~~ were never Nazi collaborators. From 1933 through 1945, one faction or another of OUN was always in bed with the Nazis. The lower-level salin staffs were dominated by the OUN all through the Nazi occupation. They were the spies of the Ukrainian Holocaust, the members of the police battalions, the soldiers of the S.S.

The myth of Bandera the freedom fighter was invented by American intelligence after the defection of Lohed and Buchardt. In 1951, a false version of OUN history was created

to convince American immigration authorities to drop their ban on OUN members. Bandera himself was protected from arrest by U.S. intelligence, and the horrible Nazi records of OUN atrocities were hidden from public view. The classified files paint a very different, and very damning portrait of the OUN leaders.

For example, in 1981, I gave the U.S. General Accounting Office classified information concerning a prominent Ukrainian collaborator living in America. The GAO investigators confirmed the information I had given them, and described the individual as "Subject D" in an official report to the U.S. Congress. Subject D is identified as a convicted assassin, terrorist, and member of a "nationalist revolutionary organization" which rendered valuable services to the German war effort. Subject D was recently identified by a former member of Congress as Mykola Lebed. Perhaps Mr. Lebed will accuse the entire U.S. Congress of being communist sympathizers.

Quite frankly, I agree with the Gestapo on one point: The OUN was infected from top to bottom with communist double agents who had joined the organization in the 1930's under orders from Moscow. Our NATO intelligence files show that the OUN was dropped from the cold war effort in the late 1950's because "it was riddled with communist agents." This information did not become public until the 1960's when Kim Philby fled to Moscow and wrote a book bragging how he had tried to foist the OUN leaders on the gullible Americans. In the 70's the communist propaganda machine bombarded the west with a barrage of largely truthful disclosures where western intelligence had protected OUN members who were actually Nazi war criminals. In the 1980's the U.S. Justice Department commenced litigation against ~~several~~ OUN members who lied about their war crimes background. The existence of the OUN today only benefits the communist press which seeks to belittle the heroic yearning of honest and decent Ukrainians for the liberation of their homeland from Russian rule.

There is a sad joke in the Ukraine, that a thousand years from now, history will state that Hitler was a petty tyrant in the time of Stalin. A special Commission of the U.S. Congress has been established to investigate the forced starvation of the Ukraine in the 1930's as one of the worst acts of communist genocide in human history. The OUN, which climbed to power over the bodies of its own countrymen, is a disgrace to proud Ukrainians around the world who have long condemned the evils of communism and fascism. As a devout anti-communist and an admirer of Ukrainian culture and courage, I hope that my remarks are directed against a tiny handful of thugs who are

not representative of - or worthy of - the Ukrainian nation. Some day the Ukraine will be freed, but not by the likes of the OUN.

In conclusion, I would note that I have additional corroborating information, but I have been ordered to withhold it by CIA and Department of the Army on grounds of national security. I am appealing the classification decision. In the meantime, I have been instructed to inform the Australian Commission headed by Mr. Menzies that if he wishes to obtain the classified files on this topic, he should apply directly through the U.S. Military Attache. It is time for the fraud of OUN to end. As George Orwell stated, "the most powerful form of lie is the omission, and it is the duty of the historian to see that those lies do not creep into the history books." I am proud to have been of assistance to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation in setting the record straight.

Respectfully,



John J. Loftus
Attorney at Law